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Political TV Call-in Shows in Taiwan: Animating Crisis Discourses through Reported Speech

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Political TV Call-in Shows in Taiwan:
Animating Crisis Discourses through Reported Speech

by

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Dedication

To my father and life-long mentor,

James Chi-ying Chu.

To my mother and role model on how to do it all,

Ruth Lin Chu.

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Preface

While attending high school at the Taipei American School from 1984 to 1986, I would occasionally meet my friends at the McDonald's on Chung Hsiao East Road (忠孝東路) in downtown Taipei a few minutes before an air raid drill, which the Nationalist Party-led government periodically orchestrated when the country was still under martial law in preparation for a possible military attack from China. As we waited out the hour-long mock exercise, which meant staying off the streets and remaining indoors, we would consume Chicken McNuggets and French Fries as we surreptitiously kept watch for signs of anyone defying the government's ban on public mobility. In our rudimentary ethnographic observations, no one ever did.

In contrast, my experiences with McDonald's during my ethnographic research in Taipei from 1998 to 2000 were decidedly not restricted to nor associated with air raid drills. Instead, I used the city's ubiquitous McDonald's establishments as a *rendezvous* point where I would meet and interview various "local" informants who ranged from former Taipei City council members to college students to taxi drivers. Even the menu reflected the sign of the times as I found choices catering to Taiwanese taste buds in the form of "red tea" (*hongcha* 紅茶) (a.k.a "black tea"), corn chowder soup (*yumi tang* 玉米湯), and teriyaki chicken burgers.

However, the event that best epitomized the Taiwanization of this U.S.-based Golden Arches franchise in my eyes was its wildly successful Hello Kitty promotion in 1999. In an advertising coup that reflected how intimately Ronald McDonald's handlers had their finger(s) on Taiwan's pop cultural pulse, the fast

food chain offered the dynamic duo of Hello Kitty and her male friend (Daniel) at the bargain price of NT$150 (approx. US$5) with each Happy Meal purchase (limited to one per customer, please). In the first promotion (there were two promotions that offered five pairs of Hello Kitty and Daniel each time),[1] avid collectors-cum-consumers lined up the night before to ensure their share of this marketing prize. Those who succeeded in purchasing this coveted product would later showcase their trophy acquisitions in storefront display cases and the back windows of their Honda Accords and BMWs. Thus, the McDonald's I had known in the mid-1980s as an escapist bunker during mock air raid drills had been transformed in the late 1990s into a site for interviews on political call-in shows and where Taipei's postmodern citizenry would queue up to buy Hello Kittys.

Another contrast between the Taiwan I knew in the twilight of its martial law years and the democratizing nation-state I witnessed at the cusp of the 21st millennium can be captured in the transformation of another space: Taipei's public buses. I recall the oppressive silence of these public bus rides, save for when my International friends and I were on board, at which point we were the only ones speaking in this marked and potentially monitored public sphere. Today, silent bus rides are a part of Taiwan's forgotten and discarded past as radios play to the driver's station of choice, students talk loudly to each other across the length of the bus, and elderly patrons criticize bus drivers for their poor driving skills while the drivers retort by exhorting the same elderly patrons to disembark faster.

As a final example, I provide a more subtle yet nonetheless significant contrast of the Taipei of my teenage years and the cosmopolitan society I returned

[1] In the first promotion, Hello Kitty and Daniel were outfitted in different, ethnic attire. For instance, they would be dressed in traditional Japanese, Chinese, and Korean clothing. In the second promotion, the stuffed pair were dressed in Western wear and according to gendered roles such as a bride and groom or in 1950's U.S. attire, with Hello Kitty in bobby socks and a poodle skirt and Daniel in a leather jacket and rolled up jeans.

to a decade later as a graduate student. While my mobility as a high school student was limited by parental curfews, the eminent threat came from my parents' scoldings and the omnipresent gaze of the KMT-regime. Besides, there were no 24-hour KTV (karoke) bars or MTV (movie rental) establishments to patron in the mid-1980s as there are today, and have been since the early 1990s. Yet when I returned in the summer of 1996 to pursue Mandarin language study, my mobility was again monitored by my parents, but no longer by the central government (which was still under KMT rule). Their exhortations that I take precautions in my public activities was no less parental than before; however, the difference was the source of the potential threat, which came not from government censors, but rather from kidnappings, ransoms, and worse as witnessed by the high profile murder of singer Bai Bing-bing's teenage daughter in the summer of 1997. Similarly, I recall my father's aversion to taking taxicabs as his status as a KMT spokesperson not only made him vulnerable to such extortions, but moreover, to public criticism from those who were displeased with the central government's policies. Such verbal censure would have been unheard of ten years earlier. However, uninhibited expressions of dissent now had multiple venues, which Taiwan's democratically maturing and politically-savvy citizenry increasingly exercised under a revised Republic of China constitution that protected this newfound personal right.

I describe these personal experiences as not merely impressionable, adolescent memories and striking, ethnographic moments, but also as token examples of Taiwan's political and sociocultural transformation from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s. In particular, the vignettes from my teenage years capture the manner crisis discourses of eminent military invasion by China's Red Army and the silencing of public discourse permeated everyday life in Taiwan prior to the lifting of martial law. In contrast, my graduate student awareness of the advantages of a modernizing Taiwan society in the form of unfettered commercial

consumption and relatively open political discussion, and inversely, its accompanying disadvantages in the form of increased crime and unsolicited criticism attempts to reconcile and give equal weight to these conflicting aspects in an increasingly democratic and civil society.

Moreover, these juxtapositions represent the personal starting point for my study's exploration of how Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses have shifted from being vehicles of governmental propaganda to being featured as prime-time, popularized infotainment, five nights a week in the guise of Taiwan's politically-oriented TV call-in shows. It is this incongruity between my memories and experiences of Taiwan, and namely, metropolitan Taipei, that inspired me to ethnographically explore and capture the dramatic changes that are unfolding in this sociopolitically democratizing, mass media liberalizing, and economically commercializing country.

Political TV Call-in Shows in Taiwan: Animating Crisis Discourses through Reported Speech

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This dissertation investigates how political TV call-in show participants use reported speech to animate and negotiate "crisis" readings of program topics as well as to recreate and perpetuate dominant "crisis" discourses in Taiwan's sociopolitical arena. As an interdisciplinary study, I build upon previous research on reported speech in the areas of ethnography of speaking, conversation analysis, communication studies, and Taiwan studies. Through detailed analysis of call-in show verbal interactions, I argue that speech reporting offers speakers a flexible and powerful linguistic device to animate and negotiate controversial sociopolitical issues and events including cross-straits tensions between Taiwan and China, ethno-political conflicts between *benshengren* (Taiwanese) and *waishengren* (Mainlanders), as well as gendered political roles. In examining two call-in show speech events—"reconciliation talk" and "saliva wars" or verbal

sparring—I demonstrate that participants use reported speech to playfully perform and index these crisis topics.

My analysis of call-in participants' speech reporting practices also demonstrates that direct reported speech should be more accurately described as "constructed dialogue" or "hypothetical reported speech." Furthermore, participants' use of hypothetical reported speech provides them with an effective and efficient linguistic resource to ascribe utterances to other speakers in ways that index locally recognizable identities and sociopolitical crisis discourses in Taiwan. I illustrate that this linguistic device allows speakers to distance themselves from sensitive issues by framing their responses through the words of another, while also providing them the means to hypothesize various interpretations or outcomes. In addition, my investigation reveals that entitlement claims to reported speech cannot be automatically assumed and asserted by reporters, but rather constitutes a mutually engineered process between speakers. Overall, the dissertation explores call-in show "ways of reporting," and specifically, how this linguistic device maintains the call-in show's crisis frame as well as perpetuates Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses.

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Chapter One: Introducing Call-in Show "Open Talk"

Figure 1: *2100: All People Open Talk* moderator Lee Tao.

DISCOVERING "KNOCK AND RESPOND" (CALL-IN) SHOWS

My "a-ha" moment for this dissertation occurred two years before I was consciously seeking a topic. In the summer of 1996, while surfing the channels of Taiwan's[1] newfound and rapidly growing cable television selection, I happened upon a program featuring a man dressed in a striped, long-sleeved collared shirt accessorized with a pair of suspenders. He was seated behind a broadcaster's desk leaning on his right forearm, his left arm propped to the side and at a right angle with his hand flat against the tabletop. I paused in mid-click, struck by his sartorial and embodied familiarity. As the camera shifted to another angle, I noticed four or five individuals seated behind a long, curved table. It gradually

[1] I have opted to use "Taiwan" rather than "Republic of China" (ROC) when referring to this geopolitical entity in this dissertation. However, I do use "ROC," when emphasizing cross-straits differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) (a.k.a. China), as well as when differentiating between the country's China-based national identity (ROC) versus a Taiwan-based worldview. For further reading on these issues, see Wachman (1994:3-29).

dawned upon me that I was watching a talk show, referred to in the local parlance as a "knock and respond" (*kouying* 叩應)[2] or "call-in" show.[3]

A series of other observations followed. I recognized the moderator as an Asian Larry King look-a-like, and then realized I wasn't watching a foreign program but a local, Taiwan-based broadcast. This was no CNN-produced Larry King Live. This was Taiwan's "Larry King" live from a downtown Taipei[4] TV studio. This was call-in show "open talk"[5] (*kaijiang* 開講) as characterized by dramatic introductions, verbal sparring, and scaremongering, courtesy of Taiwan's liberalizing mass media and my parents' cable TV subscription. Apparently, 50-odd years of official, censored (mis)information was being replaced and reformulated right before my jaded, Western "I've-seen-this-before-no-wait-what's-this?!" eyes.

WHY STUDY TAIWAN'S POLITICAL TV CALL-IN SHOWS?

I begin this dissertation on Taiwan's political TV call-in shows with a personal account to illustrate that while talk shows populate television programming in many Western societies,[6] mass-mediated verbal interactions constitute a potentially significant political and social phenomenon for emerging

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[2] Mandarin Chinese terms will be represented in Hanyu pinyin and accompanied by their Chinese ideographic script. However, the Wades-Giles Romanization system, which is primarily used in Taiwan, will be used for conventionalized names such as "Kuomintang" and established figures in Taiwan's sociopolitical environment (e.g., former President Lee Teng-hui).

[3] I elaborate upon the word play on the Mandarin Chinese term "*kouying*" in Chapter Two. Briefly, *kouying* represents the Mandarin Chinese transliteration of "call-in." However, the two characters which comprise the term also literally mean "knock" (*kou* 叩) and "respond" (*ying* 應).

[4] Taipei is the capital of the Republic of China (a.k.a. Taiwan).

[5] The translation of the program's title as "All People Open Talk" and my lower case use here recalls Goffman's (1974) notion of "fresh talk," which he describes as "the extemporaneous, ongoing formulation of a text under the exigency of immediate response to our current situation" (146).

[6] As a small cross section of the international appeal of "audience participation programmes" (Livingstone and Lunt 1994), talk show studies have also been conducted in Israel (Liebes 1999), Germany (Liebscher 1999), and the United Kingdom (cf. Tolson 2001a). I provide a review of U.S. talk show studies later in the chapter.

democracies like Taiwan. Consequently, I regard the rarified "open" air of Taiwan's TV call-in shows as an invaluable discursive space for study, especially when considering that its latest generation of leaders and general populace still carry memories of incarceration or worse for voicing their opinions on sociopolitical matters less than 20 years ago during Taiwan's martial law era (1949-1987). My interest in exploring political TV call-in show verbal interactions thus stems from personal awareness that participation in sociopolitical discussions represents a hard-earned privilege and is a nascent practice in Taiwan.

In a society where *Survivor* and *Big Brother* have yet to wield their programming influence on the viewing public, Taiwan's political TV call-in shows represent the local equivalent of "reality TV." Instead of voting a fellow participant off an island, call-in show viewers voice their approval or disapproval toward sociopolitical leaders (many of whom also appear as call-in show panelists) by phoning in or registering their views through dial-in opinion polling. Rather than competing for monetary capital, call-in show panelists compete for the social capital to shape the worldviews of program viewers. And instead of protecting oneself from being sold out by, or inversely, selling out fellow competitors to survive, call-in show participants verbally spar over which politician or political party is selling out Taiwan to China.

Despite the fact that Taiwan's political TV call-in shows are largely inspired by their U.S. counterparts, such as *Larry King Live* and Sunday morning current affairs talk shows, it must be emphasized that this programming phenomenon is primarily an indigenized[7] or "made in Taiwan" product.[8] Taiwan

[7] Miller (1992) describes the process of "indigenization" as involving digestion, incorporation, and assimilation.

[8] The phrase "Made in Taiwan," which is often abbreviated as "MIT," is a familiar saying/joke among Taiwan residents, especially for those who have lived or studied abroad in the U.S. The phrase, and especially the abbreviation, indexes and plays on the symbolic capital associated with the original "MIT" or Massachusettes Institute of Technology. Given that Taiwan is known to be a

media scholars Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) capture this sentiment when they acknowledge that scholars "must be mindful that…audiences indigenize foreign programs in the way they interpret them and give them a meaning that is relevant to their own experience" (121).[9] As a result, I consider Taiwan's call-in shows and participants' language practices as products of the country's mass media liberalization and sociopolitical democratization processes. For instance, while criticizing the government, and especially a government official, could lead to incarceration during martial law, in post-martial law Taiwan call-in participants frequently reappropriate and strategically revoice a leading sociopolitical figure's words to obliquely contest the utterance, and thus the person's political stance, in order to negotiate a new interpretation of an issue or event. In examining how call-in shows encourage the animated discussion of controversial issues and individuals, this study contributes to research that investigates the role language use plays in mass-mediated spaces in democratizing societies.

Yet, it is equally important to recognize and understand that 'local' cultures are continually refashioned out of elements, such as mass media programming, initially produced elsewhere (cf. Miller 1992). Taiwan's sociopolitical environment proves to be no exception. Given that the country imports and absorbs so many U.S. economic, cultural, political, and mass media products and practices, one often finds traces of "non-native" characteristics in Taiwan—from McDonalds to skateboarding and from *Ally McBeal* to political campaign ads. In the case of Taiwan's political TV call-in shows, it is equally valuable to understand the talk show genre in the U.S. as a means to comprehend how Taiwan's mass media and sociopolitical practices have adopted certain

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major exporter of inexpensive (e.g. shoes, bicycles) and expensive (e.g., computers, semiconductors) products to many Western countries (including the U.S.), the "Made in Taiwan" descriptor here also refers to the country's international reputation and the scale of its socioeconomic production.

[9] See Liebes and Katz's (1990) study of the "indigenization" of *Dallas* (a U.S.-derived television drama series) by Israeli viewers for a thoughtful analysis of foreign mass media products.

features, while modifying others. To do so, I provide a brief background of the rise of U.S. talk shows in a later section in this chapter.

Given the complexity of this research setting and topic, my study takes an interdisciplinary approach to examining political TV call-in show verbal interactions. In particular, I use a discourse-centered approach (cf. Bauman and Sherzer 1989; Sherzer 1987) to investigate call-in participant linguistic practices based on ethnographic observations. I supplement this approach with theoretical concepts and methods from conversation analysis, ethnopragmatics, and communication studies as well. It is through these approaches that I situate my study within the developing field of Taiwan studies and the growing body of research on its society and people. Subsequently, my analysis of how call-in shows frame and its participants reproduce Taiwan's crisis discourses through the calculated use of edited video clips and selective speech reporting respectively, illustrates the importance of grasping the close relationship between the mass media, sociopolitical processes, and linguistic practice.

Popularizing Taiwan politics

Most significantly, this study regards call-in show ways of speaking as part of an emerging form of political deliberation in Taiwan that I regard as the popularization of politics or "pop politics." By providing a mass-mediated forum for the deliberation of sensitive sociopolitical issues and events, political TV call-in shows reflect Taiwan's emerging democracy-in-practice through linguistic practice. In focusing on call-in participants' language use as a significant site of study for understanding Taiwan's sociopolitical democratization and mass media liberalization, this research project seeks to redress the field of anthropology's "failure to attribute much significance to language in the study of politics" (Myers and Brenneis 1984:5).

Given that "politics is so inherently linked with value," this study seeks to investigate and situate popularized forms of political discourses by considering

call-in participants' "relationships to sources of social value and to the processes that generate it" (ibid:4). The two primary sources of social value that I examine in this study thus are: Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses and call-in participants' use of reported speech. Meanwhile, the processes that I investigate as reproducing these two social values are Taiwan's democratizing sociopolitical environment and liberalizing mass media.

Consequently, I explore the emergence of a sociolinguistically based "pop political" arena in Taiwan through an ethnographic investigation of one specific venue: political TV call-in shows. By studying the manner in which call-in show participants use reported speech in innovative and spontaneous ways, this study examines and, in the process, reconfirms the claim that "[i]deas and opinions don't have to be 'well formed' before they can be expressed" (Livingstone and Lunt 1994:24). This understanding proves particularly salient for mass-mediated venues that embrace audience participation, and moreover, are oriented to the popular discussion of the political. By championing this perspective, this study not only emphasizes the playful and strategic linguistic practices participants demonstrate through call-in show talk, but also seeks to understand how Taiwan's sociopolitical events and issues are increasingly popularized through everyday language use in new discursive spaces such as call-in shows.

At the intersection of Taiwan politics, language, and mass media

This study's investigation thus builds upon previous research on Taiwan's political, sociocultural, linguistic, and mass media development. Studies on Taiwan's political development, processes, and practices have received the most attention. Taiwan scholars have investigated the complex relationship between party politics and ethnic identity (Chu 2000; Kerr 1965; Lin 1990; Wachman 1994; Wang 1994; Wu 1992); elections, pluralism, and political participation (Chen 1981; Hsieh 2000; Li 1988; Peng 1966; Rigger 1999; Tsai 1984);

nationalism and national sovereignty (Mendel 1970; Wachman 1994, 2000); as well as sociopolitical behavior and democratization (Kim 2000; Kuo 2000).

Scholars who examine Taiwan's evolution from a state under martial law to a postmodern nation-state have provided insights into the society's unique blending of traditional and (post)modern practices (cf. Aspalter 2001; Bosco 1994; Chun 1996a, 1996b; Guy 1999; Huang 1994; Jordon et al. in press; Maguire 1998; Marsh 1996; Rubinstein 1994, 1999). In particular, anthropologists have contributed rich ethnographies that document these political and sociopolitical changes in Taiwan, including studies on the evolution of *guanxi* (關係) networks and local politics (Bosco 1992), bridal portrait industry and evolving wedding practices (Adrian 1999), popularized rituals and religious beliefs (Boretz 1995, 1999; Moskowitz 2001, in press), the globalization of Taiwan identity through the culture of baseball (Morris in press), family relations and household networks (Wolf 1968), and Taiwan's evolving class consciousness (Gates 1981, 1987, 1992).

Similarly, Taiwan's rich, multilingual environment has attracted many linguistic anthropological and sociolinguistic studies. This corpus of research covers a wide range of topics including language change and language contact (Ann 1998; Cheng 1979, 1985, 1987; Kubler 1985a, 1985b; Lu 1988; Peng 1991; Young 1988), language attitudes and choice (Thatcher 1995; Young et al. 1992), identity and language ideology (Hsiau 1997; Liao 2000; Lin 1983; Shih 1983; Su 2000; Tse 2000; van den Berg 1986, 1992), language socialization (Farris 1991), language policies and standardization (Li 1985; Tse 1986), and online communities (Su in press).

With the recent liberalization of the country's mass media environment, a number of scholars have also begun to monitor this evolving industry and its influences on Taiwan society. For instance, Berman (1992) analyzes the role of Taiwan's press in the country's democratization process while Rampal (1994)

documents Taiwan's "media boom" in the areas of print, radio broadcasting, cable television, and satellite transmission following the lifting of martial law in 1987. In a study regarding viewers' political socialization as a result of their exposure to mass media, Wei and Leung (1998) find that in post-martial law Taiwan residents generally have positive impressions of the media, including the political knowledge it imparts. On a similar note, Chen (1998) states that the mass media play an integral role in Taiwan's emerging democracy, while Chiu and Chan-Olmstead (1999) acknowledge the impact of cable television programming (e.g., call-in shows) has on political campaign practices.

While previous studies of Taiwan's political TV call-in shows have taken either a historical (Chen 1994) or quantitative approach to understanding participatory public communication (Hsu 1994; Huang 1995; Lee 1998; Peng 1999, 2001; Shen 1999), this study offers an ethnographic perspective that contextualizes participants' linguistic practices within both the call-in show studio setting and the country's sociopolitical environment. That is, the current project counterbalances questionnaire-based studies of participants' and viewers' impressions of TV call-in shows with a contextualized understanding of how participants' verbal interactions reflect and reconstruct sociopolitical processes.

Although the present study on Taiwan's political TV call-in shows examines several talk show episodes that addressed the country's 2000 presidential elections, I do not focus on political party electoral strategies, such as the use of call-in teams (*kouying budui* 叩應部隊) (which I elaborate upon in Chapter Two), nor on party representatives' campaign practices, such as the wearing of campaign paraphernalia when appearing on a call-in show. What this study does investigate is the call-in show's promotion and perpetuation of dominant sociopolitical discourses in Taiwan. The following section elaborates upon the study's thesis in greater detail.

FOCUS OF STUDY: CALL-IN SHOW "CRISIS" DISCOURSES AND SPEECH REPORTING

Through the tri-focal lens of Taiwan's sociopolitical, mass media and linguistic processes, this study examines how call-in shows frame and program participants to perform a narrative logic that revolves around crisis-oriented topics and interpretations. Specifically, this study explores how call-in shows foreground and participants' linguistic practices recreate dominant sociopolitical "crisis" discourses.[10] Drawing from Bourdieu's (1977, 1985) notion of "cultural capital," this study investigates how Taiwan's political TV call-in programs institutionalize and the manner in which participants strategically cultivate through their linguistic practices during program deliberations. By regarding Taiwan's crisis discourses as a form cultural capital, I consider them as sociopolitical and cultural knowledge as well as sociolinguistic skills that are "embodied, incorporated within the body or mind (*habitus*) of those who know how to do certain valued things" (Smart 1993:393). The "value" that this cultural capital has for various "agents" (ibid: 392) includes the struggle for power and status among Taiwan's main political parties (e.g., the Nationalist Party, Democratic Progressive Party, New Party, and People's First Party),[11] as well as establishing a particular worldview regarding Taiwan's national identity (i.e., are its citizens "Chinese," "Taiwanese," both, or neither?) and sovereignty as a nation-state.

Furthermore, this study suggests that Taiwan's populace have been have been inculcated by certain sociopolitical crisis discourses (e.g., cross-straits tensions with the PRC) through various institutions—including the state, education, and mass media—particularly during martial law (1945-1987) under the KMT regime,[12] but also within Taiwan's democratizing environment through other means. For instance, with the liberalization of Taiwan's mass media, crisis

[10] Henceforth, I will refer to crisis discourses without quotation marks.
[11] I discuss Taiwan's political parties and their ideologies in Chapter Three.
[12] I elaborate upon the KMT governing practices in Chapter Three.

discourses are institutionalized under the guise of "infotainment" through political TV call-in shows, and subsequently, reproduced and embodied by call-in participants. Given that most participants include leading public figures from Taiwan's political, academic, and mass media spheres, these "agents" (e.g., moderators, producers, guest panelists, and call-in teams) are quite knowledgeable and capable of capitalizing upon the privileges (e.g., status and power) and generating products (e.g., public anxiety, electoral results, program ratings) that this form of cultural capital accords them (cf. Smart 1993; Thompson 1991). Thus while the institutionalized conduits and forms of cultural capital changes over time or can even be removed (Smart 1993:393), the knowledge that these institutions disseminate and the practices its agents engage in cannot easily be erased.

Furthermore, this study considers Taiwan's crisis discourses as a representative, and revealing, response to Harrell and Huang's (1994) query: "What does it mean to be of this island [of Taiwan]?" (21). Regardless if one is an entrepreneur, caretaker, student, or politician in Taiwan, social interactions are continuously defined and influenced by prevailing sociopolitical issues and events that subtly or blatantly threaten the daily lives of its residents and the national security of this nation-state in "real" and imagined ways. I introduce several of these factors in Chapter Three, including Taiwan-China cross-straits relations, ethno-political tensions between "local Taiwanese" (*benshengren* 本省人) and "Mainlanders" (*waishengren* 外省人), Taiwan's competing national identities, and traditional cultural values towards gendered relations of power and status.

From a sociolinguistic perspective, I examine how popularized understandings of the Mandarin Chinese term for 'crisis,' *weiji* (危機), are performed by call-in participants in their deliberations. While a dictionary definition of "*weiji*" describes the term as "a pivotal moment of life or death,

success or failure,"[13] a contemporary interpretation highlights the inherent tension between the two ideograms that comprise the word, namely, *wei* (危)—meaning 'danger'—and *ji* (機)—meaning 'opportunity.' Consequently, this study explores the manner in which call-in show participants infuse rhetorical urgency in their remarks to animate and juxtapose the program topics' dangers and opportunities. As previously mentioned, call-in shows frequently feature topics that foreground Taiwan's precarious geopolitical status vis-à-vis the PRC and the international community, as well as domestic issues such as its nascent yet maturing democratic environment.

Specifically, I examine the manner in which Taiwan's political TV call-in shows feature topics that encourage participants to use language in strategic ways to enact and perpetuate crisis discourses drawn from prevailing issues and events in the sociopolitical arena. This study's premise that TV call-in show verbal interactions contribute to the dramatization of Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses draws from Tolson's (2001b) observation that the significance of talk shows "has crucially to do with the fact that [they] revolve around the *performance of talk*" (3; original emphasis). In later chapters, I explore how participants perform and articulate Taiwan's competing crisis discourses through the creative use of reported speech. As a prevalent linguistic device in everyday language use, this study finds that speech reporting proves even more versatile in the dramatic and discursive space of call-in shows.

With their edited video clips, verbal sparring, and 20-second caller commentaries, Taiwan's political TV call-in shows constitute a forum rich with opportunities for participants to "transmit, recall, weigh and pass judgment on other people's words, opinions, assertions, [and] information" (Bakhtin 1981:338). In this mass-mediated forum, speech reporting carries serious consequences—given the "weight of 'everyone says' and 'it is said' in public

[13] The Chinese definition reads as: 生死成敗的緊要關頭（簡明活用辭典 , 1990: 185.)

opinion, public rumor, gossip, slander and so forth" (ibid), an observation this study substantiates through its exploration. It is not surprising that another speaker's utterances experience greater scrutiny within the fervent and contentious environment of call-in show discussions, especially when linguistic competency is not only highly valued, but moreover, characterizes this linguistic setting. I thus regard participants' speech reporting practices as a key component in maintaining and perpetuating the call-in show's crisis frame, such that its prevalent application represents a form of verbal art unique to this programming genre.

Speech reporting epitomizes Vološinov's (1973 (1929)) notion of dialogism or "double voiced discourse," a theoretical construct that also foregrounds the metadiscursiveness of language as a whole. Described as "speech within speech, utterance within utterance and at the same time speech about speech, utterance about utterance" (ibid:115), Vološinov's construct recalls the Chinese saying "within speech there is speech" (*hua zhong you hua* 話中有話). This cross-cultural acknowledgement of the self-reflexivity of speech reveals that this aspect of language use is appreciated and recognized across languages, a finding that is substantiated in the diverse body of research on reported speech I present in Chapter Four.

Similarly, the prevalence of reported speech in call-in show verbal interactions suggests that presenting and framing crisis scenarios does not require a specialized vocabulary or language that only the media and sociopolitical elite are privy to or command. This study forwards that speech reporting represents an argumentative style that popularizes or "communizes" the political discussion of sociopolitical issues, thus making discursive participation readily available to speakers of varying linguistic competencies. In other words, reported speech provides one means that lay participants (i.e., callers) can have the same fluency in accessing and contesting mainstream discourses as do their invited panelist

counterparts. Any participant can introduce the speech of another as a reputable source and as credible evidence to bolster an argument or detract from an opponent's remarks. As my study later demonstrates, the reappropriation and acceptance of reported speech represents a highly negotiable process, which makes this linguistic feature all the more versatile for its users, not to mention intriguing for scholarly analysis.

That said, my study does not discount the influence of other factors that contribute to call-in participants' language use, including gender, class,[14] ethnicity, education, and culture. However, I focus on speech reporting for the primary reason that it crosses such sociocultural boundaries insofar as it highlights the linguistic competency of its users regardless of their political affiliation, gendered politics, and language ideologies.[15] Moreover, the manner in which participants use reported speech to present, contest, and negotiate their crisis interpretations of program topics emphasizes the degree to which they reproduce embodied practices and institutionalized understandings of Taiwan's crisis discourses.

SITUATING THE TALK SHOW

Media-ting (oppositional) public sphere(s)

The mass-mediated speech event commonly known as the "talk show" has frequently been compared to Habermas' (1984) notion of the "public sphere," where private individuals discuss public affairs and "something approaching public opinion can be formed" (198). Nevertheless talk show scholars are quick to suggest that this postmodern programming genre bears little resemblance to

[14] Some Taiwan scholars argue that Taiwan ha only recently shown signs of developing a class structure in its society. For further reading see Gates (1981), Hsiao (1993), Marsh (1996), and Tsay (1993).

[15] I cite these three sociopolitical factors as they feature prominently in call-in show "crisis" topics and the verbal interactions I analyze in this study.

Habermas' idealized space (cf. Liebes 1999; Livingstone and Lunt 1994; Tolson 2001b). Nor, these scholars argue, do talk shows constitute Habermas' revised notion of a "pseudo-public sphere" (Habermas 1989), which he claims mass-mediated societies foster given their evolution from a "culture-debating" public to one that is "culture-consuming" (cf. Livingstone and Lunt 1994).[16]

While Taiwan's political TV call-in shows do provide its populace a newfound public space in which to deliberate sociopolitical issues, their primary participants cannot be categorized as "private" individuals. Rather, call-in participants are predominantly comprised of an elite circle of sociopolitical figures who are recruited and paid to appear on, and in some cases even to lobby, TV call-in programs.[17] While socioeconomic development since the 1980s has gradually created and cultivated a consumer-oriented populace in Taiwan (Bosco 1994; Wu 1997), an equally valuable sociopolitical phenomenon has arisen in the form of political TV call-in shows, namely, the emergence of a viable "cultural debate" forum that reflects Taiwan's democratization process. I thus consider Taiwan's political TV call-in shows as a representative example of what Negt and Kluge (1993) regard as "oppositional public spheres," that is, spaces where conflicting discourses are welcomed, nurtured, and disseminated. Consequently, rather than heralding call-in programs as abetting Taiwan's populace to achieve consensus around controversial issues (Bu Dazhong 2000; Xi Shenglin 2000), I champion the call-in show's contesting (and contested) discursive space, and in

[16] The notion of a public sphere is interpreted as a "forum in which the authority of the state could be criticized and called upon to justify itself before an informed and reasoning public" (Thompson 1990:109). However, Habermas' construct has been criticized by revisionist historiography as an idealized rather than historical reality (Curran 1991). With the arrival and influence of mass media, Habermas (1989) subsequently suggests that a "pseudo-public sphere" has been "hollowed out by the mass media" leading to a "no longer literary public…[that is] patched together to create a sort of superfamilial zone of familiarity" (162).

[17] It should be noted that political parties have been known to send a recommended list of speakers to call-in program producers, particularly during national elections, as a means to control which party representatives are invited as guest panelists (James C. Hsiung 2000). A detailed discussion of the selection process for call-in show guest panelists is provided in Chapter Two.

particular, its "debate without conclusion" format (Livingstone and Lunt 1994:301).

Performative practice and "infotainment" product

Acknowledging that call-in shows showcase "crisis" topics without offering definitive answers does not diminish their significance or worth, however. While call-in show detractors find the call-in program's non-conclusive conclusions disconcerting—most vividly illustrated by overlapping panelist voices at the end of each *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* (*Badian Da Xiao Sheng* 八點大小聲) episode while the credits roll[18]—my study forwards that the program's unfinished, "messy" finale lends itself to the enormity and complexity of the issues its participants deliberate.

Given their transnational reach, Taiwan's political TV call-in shows also have a pronounced impact on how overseas viewers interpret the "crisis"-framed information featured on the programs as "news." In examining the presentation of affect in Israeli newspapers, Lefkowtiz (2001) finds that "the packaging of information as 'news' takes on ever greater significance as the world becomes increasingly global and interconnected" (179).[19] In short, the program's infotainment premise of infusing newsworthy topics with entertainment features unashamedly accepts and openly promotes its product as constructive sociopolitical deliberation but with a performative twist, what Kalb (1998) describes as "the new news."

Performance thus represents a crucial component of talk shows. Goffman (1959) describes performance as any activity that can influence other participants

[18] On *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*, panelists are cued when the program is about to conclude when they hear the show's theme music on the in-studio speakers. In-studio participants also have visual access to several TV monitors arranged around the soundstage that allow participants to view the broadcast including superimposed text and images.

[19] For more reading on the relationship between global processes and news coverage, see Appadurai (1990) and Friedman (1999).

to take seriously the contrived context such that "the impression of reality which he [sic] stages *is* the real reality" (17; original italics). In the case of Taiwan's call-in shows, the "reality" that participants endeavor to create and maintain is one defined and informed by crisis discourses. Moreover, the performativity of call-in show discourses lies in speakers' and viewers' participation in the construction and deconstruction of these discourses. The reward for participants lies in neither their ability to offer argumentative cogency or resolution to the featured crisis discourses, but rather in their direct or vicarious engagement in the performance. In short, closure is anathema to the call-in show's modus operandi to dramatize sociopolitical events and issues.

The call-in show's infotainment premise also adheres to Goffman's (1981) dramaturgical model that regards modern, and I would add modernizing,[20] societies as a "theater" in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. Although situating the call-in show as theater (in both the physical and rhetorical senses) allows for a greater appreciation of talk as a primary form of sociopolitical participation, it also leaves the genre vulnerable to criticism. Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) ambivalently recognize that while call-in programs offer the people of Taiwan "greater opportunities to participate in the political process," they also question whether these programs are providing "'political participation'" given that viewers of Taiwan's leading call-in show, *2100: All People Open Talk* (*Quanmin Kaijiang* 全民開講), are restricted to voicing their opinions in the "last five minutes of the program" (67-68). Although callers' participation is limited by time restrictions, which I expand upon in my ethnographic description of *2100* in Chapter Two, this study's examination of caller excerpts suggests that their ability to economically communicate their perspectives effectively ensures their presence in call-in programs.

Goffman's theater construct can also be applied to societies that are not generally considered to be "modern" or even "modernizing" insofar that language represents the primary conduit through which politics unfolds. In Duranti's (1994) study of the *fono*, a political speech event in the Falefā community in Western Samoa, he considers oratory as "intrinsically tied to social dramas [and] political confrontations" (2) given that Samoan politics takes the "form of a linguistic problem" (3). Similarly, Carpignano et al. (1990) capture the dramatic tendencies and conflict orientation of talk shows when they describe them as "the most eloquent example of the crisis of theatricality" (49).

The notion of a "crisis of theatricality" succinctly epitomizes the political TV call-in show's crisis frame and participants' representations of crisis discourses. In my investigation into how call-in programs present topics through a crisis-based interpretation, I draw upon Goffman's (1974) notion of "frame" or "frameworks," which involves the process of identifying and labeling an activity from something that is meaningless into something that is "meaningful" (21). Similarly, I examine how call-in participants animate crisis scenarios and sociopolitical tensions by strategically using reported speech to portray locally recognizable personas through calculated shifts of "footing" (Goffman 1981) that distinguish their own voice from those that they perform.

Aside from the aforementioned public sphere/dramaturgical model positionings of the talk show, this programming genre and speech event embraces a wide spectrum of televised talk, incorporating daytime, celebrity, and current affairs talk shows into one big pool (Haarman 2001). Describing a talk show by its most basic elements—format (talk) and participants (speakers)—simplifies an

[20] I consider the notion of "modern" problematic as it presumes a categorization or assignation by a privileged group or society simultaneously excludes others as it further establishes its own superiority. Despite these problems, the Goffman's theater construct proves useful to my analysis.

eclectic mass media phenomenon.[21] In the U.S., the phrase "talk show" usually elicits references to personified daytime TV varieties (e.g., *The Oprah Winfrey Show, The Ricki Lake Show*) or sensationalism-driven (trash) talk shows (e.g., *The Jerry Springer Show* and *The Maury Povich Show*).[22] Weekday morning talk news shows (e.g., *Good Morning America*, *The Today Show*) as well as current affairs versions in the form of "Sunday talk" (e.g., *Meet the Press*, *Face the Nation, This Week*) and cable TV prime time talk (e.g., *Hardball*, *Crossfire*, *The O'Reilly Factor*) can also be included in this genre.[23] A growing array of technologically advanced programs with call-in (e.g., *Larry King Live*, *Imus in the Morning*) and chatroom features (e.g., *The Spin Room*) further broaden the talk show's participatory options.

From this brief survey, one can observe that the talk show[24] genre tends to evolve and expand its participatory features with each technological improvement, leading to an even greater diffusion of public communication.[25] Within Taiwan's nascent mass media environment, cable TV call-in programs

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[21] Although my study focuses on TV current affairs talk shows, it should be noted that nationally syndicated talk radio programs in the U.S., including those hosted by Rush Limbaugh and Howard Stern, and local programs, such as Radio Mambi and Radio Marti in Miami with its talk about Cuban politics, offer public forums for political discussion and increasingly wield influence in shaping public opinion. A similar relationship between radio and TV call-in shows can be found in Taiwan (see Chapter Two).

[22] Kevin Glynn (2000) lists other labels talk shows and tabloid TV programs have been called, including "reality-based" or "actuality" programming, "confrontainment," and "trash TV." (2)

[23] With a second wave of political talk shows (*The McLaughlin Group*, *Crossfire*, and *This Week with David Brinkley)* appearing in the early 1980s (Hirsch 1991:9), coupled with the spread of all-news cable stations such as CNN, MSNBC, and the Fox News Channel, political talk shows no longer only occupy Sunday morning time slots, but also secure the post-evening news and pre-primetime niche on weeknights.

[24] Late (late) night programs such as *The Daily Show*, *The Late Show with David Letterman* and *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno* are not considered "talk shows," but rather are categorized by some researchers as "discussion programs." Discussion programs highlight the host, who usually interview invited guests with the aim to entertain a live studio and television audiences. This format places less emphasis on audience/viewer participation, and subsequently, more focus on the host and guests (Abt and Mustazza 1997).

[25] It can be argued, however, that the dissolution and diffusion of public communication precludes the coherence of any "spheres" per se, thus breaking down and relegating the notion of "oppositional public spheres" obsolete. I thank Dr. Boretz for bringing this to my attention.

have quickly adapted to and capitalized upon the country's democratizing and technologically savvy society. Moreover, their popularity suggests a sustained interest on the part of viewers to watch, and more importantly, to participate in mass-mediated deliberations.

TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF MASS MEDIA

Given the rise of participatory programs in Taiwan and its common presence in mass-mediated societies in general, anthropology appears well suited to exploring the impact this programming genre has on sociolinguistic behavior as well as its influence in shaping sociopolitical discourses. Recalling Geertz's (1973, 1984) declaration for creating ethnographies with "thick descriptions" of a community's values, relationships, and practices, Eiselein and Tapper's (1976b) rhetorical query of whether anthropologists can "afford to ignore media's possible influence if we wish to do a complete and accurate ethnography" (114) seeks to uphold this methodological and theoretical premise of anthropological research. Moreover, drawing attention to the omission of media in ethnographic-based studies is discerning for understanding media's subtle yet significant presence in any society.

Prior to the advent of Direct TV, Tivo, and the Internet, early prononents of "media anthropology"[26] (Eiselein and Topper 1976a) had already recognized that "[s]ome form of media is found in almost every human society today, and yet many current ethnographies ignore the importance and even the existence of media" (Eiselein and Topper 1976b:114).[27] Two decades later, Spitulnik (1993) also reasserts the claim that "[t]here is as yet no 'anthropology of mass media'" to develop "numerous angles for approaching mass media anthropologically" (293). Yet another ten years have passed since these scholars' "state of (mass) media

[26] I place "media" in quotations to highlight the slightly different, yet significant terminology Spitulnik versus Eiselein and Topper use to refer to this medium.

anthropology" declarations. Are anthropologists finally heeding their concerns, and more importantly, responding to their "call for research"?

At the turn of the 21st century, it is encouraging to witness the growing appreciation and valuing of mass media-oriented anthropological research as an increasing number of scholars orient their studies towards discovering the sociocultural, economic, and political resonances of mass media in daily interactions. This includes understanding the role the mass media play in social relations of identity, power, space, and time in diverse and diversifying, as well as, modern and modernizing societies.[28] A growing body of research examines the role of the mass media in a variety of contexts (Dickey 1997; Spitulnik 1993) as well as its interaction with individuals and communities through film (Yang 1994b), indigenous media (Ginsberg 1994, 1997; Klain and Peterson 2000), literacy programs (Besnier 1995; Schieffelin 2000; Schieffelin and Doucet 1994; Street 1993, 2001), online communities (cf. Crystal 2001, Hawisher and Self 2000; Herring 1996; Herring et. al. 1995; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996; Porter 1997; Ronkin and Karn 1999; Su in press; Wilson and Peterson 2002), print media and journalism (Lefkowitz 1995, 2001; Peterson 2001), radio broadcasting (Spitulnik 1993, 1994, 1997, 1999; Van de Bulck and Van Poeke 1996), telecommunications (Hall 1995; Keating 2000; Keating and Mirus in press), and, of particular interest to this study, television talk shows and dramas (Liebes 1999; Mankekar 1993a, 1993b, 1999; Miller 1992; Painter 1994).

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[27] Anthropologists who did recognize the value in conducting mass media research in the 1970s and earlier include Divale (1972), Eiselein (1974), and Powdermaker (1950).

[28] Four decades earlier, anthropologists also noted that the study of media should not be restricted to industrial societies or to minority groups within those societies. For instance, many indigenous forms of media exist in "developing and peasant societies" (Eiselein and Topper 1976b:114), including "signal drums, petroglyphs, smoke signals, as well as the ever present transistor radio and the battery-operated phonograph" (Eiselein and Toper 1976c:124) (cf. Mathur 1965; Rodgers 1969; Schramm 1964). The ideologies of the time can be found in the terms the scholars used to refer to these communities.

Nonetheless, what explanation can one give for the lack of anthropological literature on "popular" mass media programming such as TV talk shows?[29] A simple answer might be found in the discipline's fear of "popularizing" anthropology by studying and hence giving merit to such cultural forms (Eiselein and Topper 1976c:130). Another explanation derives from an anthropological aversion to activities having an "aura of non-intellectual pleasure," causing many an anthropologist to "shy[30] away from scholarly consideration of pleasure, leisure, and escape" (Dickey 1997:414). Hannerz (1971) also notes that "anthropologists usually regard mass media research within their discipline as gimmickry," while immediately adding that this is "a rather unfortunate attitude" (186).

Eiselein and Topper (1976c) are less reserved in their criticism of anthropologists' "high culture" positioning when they state, "the omission of any consideration of the artifacts of media and their usage shatters the holistic nature of anthropology" (114). Similarly, Dickey (1997) observes that even if her anthropological colleagues could avoid popular cultural experiences in their personal lives, "we have no excuse for so thoroughly ignoring the media in our own work" (414). Morley and Robins (1995) summarize this need with the following insightful and succinct observation:

> Anthropologists, as much as anyone else, need to take the contemporary media very seriously indeed, not least for the simple reason that the media now make us all anthropologists in our own living rooms, surveying the world of al those others who are represented to us on the screen (238).

These researchers thus concur that the field of anthropology and anthropologically-minded scholars have much to offer in understanding how

[29] I provide a summary of talk show research in other fields—including mass media studies, cultural studies, communication studies, and sociology—in the section entitled "Situating the 'talk show'."

[30] Interestingly, Eiselein and Topper (1976c) also described anthropology's avoidance of media research as an exhibition of "shyness" (131).

people from various cultures use and create different forms of media, including the ways they are embedded in social, political, and economic systems.

Developing a linguistic anthropology of mass media

To leave the study of popular television programming to other disciplines (e.g., mass media studies, sociology, and communication studies) assumes that anthropology, and linguistic anthropology in particular, has little to contribute to this topic. To the contrary, this is far from the case. Rather, linguistic anthropologists are particularly well-equipped in terms of methodology and theory to address questions pertaining to the production and reception of linguistic practices, cultural values, and social relations in the realm of mass media (cf. Carbaugh 1991; Dickey 1997). As Eiselein and Tapper (1976b) argue, given that "culture is communication, . .we can base our study of media upon the models of linguistic anthropology and conceptualize the workings of the various media as a kind of grammar" (115).

Given the link between communication and mass media, why the paucity of studies on popularized forms of mass-mediated language use? One reason for this oversight can be explained by what this form of linguistic interaction does *not* represent, namely, face-to-face communication (Spitulnik 1999). In other words, a preference for focusing on "the individual communication event and the sender-receiver dyad" in linguistic anthropology has contributed to a lack of understanding of "how media forms are situated within broader social processes and in relation to specific understandings of the communication genres that they instantiate" (Spitulnik 1993:298). In short, this linguistic anthropological bias has led to the marginalization of (quasi-)mediated[31] interactions.

However, recent linguistic anthropological research into "non-face-to-face communication" in indigenous radio broadcasting among the Navajo (Klain and

Peterson 2000) and on Zambia national radio stations (Spitulnik 1994, 1997), video telecommunication technology for the deaf (Keating 2000; Keating and Mirus in press), and Taiwan-based online communities (Su in press) demonstrates growing awareness of the need explore these emerging and diversifying modes of communication, as well as recognition of their influential and integral roles in everyday linguistic practices. This study also contributes to the research lacuna in linguistic anthropology on quasi-mediated interactions by investigating how new communication technologies such as video clips and call-ins influence participants' linguistic practices. I am particularly interested in analyzing how participants draw from technological resources within the call-in show setting, while applying linguistic strategies already present in their cultural repertoires to discuss and negotiate sociopolitical relations of status, power, and identity. In the process, I seek to understand the communicative consequences participants' linguistic choices have in shaping present and absent relationships (Basso 1979) and how call-in show verbal interactions establish and contribute to new cultural practices (Keating 2000:114).

For instance, to what extent do call-in participants' speech reporting practices merely represent the recycling of existing linguistic resources? Inversely, in what ways are their verbal interactions introducing new and innovative linguistic practices as a result of interacting with technologically based props in a mass-mediated forum? To begin exploring these questions, it is first necessary to acknowledge that "nothing begins from zero," even for mass-mediated communities that "are large, shifting, and somewhat intangible" (Spitulnik 1997:161). Yet, mediated communities are also based on "some *experience* of belonging and mutuality" (ibid:163) that is created and maintained through language use. Drawing from these perspectives, I argue that Taiwan's

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[31] I elaborate on what forms of communication are considered to be "quasi-mediated" interactions later in the chapter.

sociopolitical crisis discourses on the one hand, and the call-in show's "crisis" frame and participant discussions on the other, constitute an experience and practice of belonging for the people of Taiwan. Consequently, political TV call-in shows represent a prime verbal forum for one to explore and understand Taiwan's sociopolitical processes across space and time.

Talk show ethnographies: an emerging fieldsite

Inspired in part by Carbaugh's (1988) ethnographic study of *Donahue*, a leading U.S. daytime talk show during the 1980s, scholarly interest in talk shows has increased in the last fifteen years, leading to a broader understanding of this mass media genre.[32] Scholars in sociology, sociolinguistics, and communication studies have produced the most research on the subject in their explorations of talk shows as a social phenomenon, linguistic practice, and pop cultural product.[33] However, linguistic anthropological investigations into the genre remain markedly absent as their "popular" characterization and mass-mediated production often relegates them to the domain of folklore or cultural studies (Traube 1996). When it comes to talk shows, a "benign neglect" (Goodwin 1990:1) persists in the linguistic anthropological literature in investigating talk as an agent and resource in reconstructing and negotiating relations of power, status, and identity in this milieu. A gap thus exists between theoretical analysis and ethnographic observations of talk shows, as well as between sociolinguistic analyses of linguistic behavior and sociopolitical contextualization of discursive processes.

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[32] For instance, a number of researchers have examined the impact talk shows have had on political processes (Anderson 1999; Hirsch 1991; Verwey 1990), democratic practices and values (Goyton 2001; Jones 2001), sexual identity and power relations (Gamson 1998; Masciarotte 1991; Shattuc 1997), cultural production (Montgomery 1999), as well as mass media in general (Delli Carpini and Williams 2001; Munson 1993; Patterson 2000; cf. Scannell 1991).

[33] This includes studies on participant verbal interactions to better grasp the nuances of advice-giving (Hutchby 1995), conflict talk (Hutchby 1996, 2001; Wood 2001), presentations of the self

A few exceptions exist, however. These include Grocer's (1998) examination of a *Donahue* episode that focused on the 1990 Brown University rape list controversy and Liebscher's (1999) inquiry into national identity formation in a reunified Germany on German talk shows. Although both studies provide detailed linguistic anthropological analyses from videotaped data of talk shows, they do not offer an ethnographic perspective of the talk show setting itself. Consequently, my study fills this gap by offering a "thick description" of Taiwan's political TV call-in show verbal interactions by combining participant observation of the call-in show production setting and process, including its behind-the-scenes dynamics, varied participant pool (e.g., moderators, guest panelists, callers, political parties), and studio environment, with detailed analysis of participants' language use.[34]

WAYS OF EXPLORING CALL-IN SHOW TALK: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERPECTIVE

In exploring Taiwan's crisis discourses as enacted through talk on political TV call-in shows, I draw from the theoretical and methodological approaches of the ethnography of speaking, conversation analysis, language as social action, speech play and verbal art, as well as media studies. My analysis culls from various fields in order to paint a broad portrait of how this mass-mediated phenomenon is situated in Taiwan's sociolinguistic and sociopolitical landscape. In my aim to contribute to these various fields with this study, I also take an interdisciplinary approach and attempt to write in a style that is accessible to readers in as many disciplinary fields as possible.

(Avery and Ellis 1979; Myers 2001), therapy talk (Brunvatne and Tolson 2001; Lowney 1999), personal narratives (Thornborrow 1997), and performance (Haarman 2001; Thornborrow 2001).

[34] Having said this, I am aware that my study does not address viewer and non-viewer perspectives toward call-in shows.

Ethnographic ways of studying call-in shows

In my examination of Taiwan's TV call-in shows, I use a discourse-centered approach (Sherzer 1987), which is based on the ethnography of speaking (Bauman and Sherzer 1989; Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Hymes 1995 (1962)) or "ways of speaking" model (Hymes' 1989 (1972)).[35] In particular, a discourse-centered approach foregrounds how "reality, knowledge, and sociocultural experience are constructed, perceived, transmitted, and actually performed through the filter of everyday discourse" (Sherzer 1983:17). My study thus explores how language intersects with cultural patterns and social functions in ways that contribute to the "collaborative construction of meaning" (Keating 1998:3).

Through this approach, I am able to explore the "socioexpressive dimensions" of speaking (Bauman and Sherzer 1989:12), and moreover, how such linguistic features "ramify throughout the sociocultural life of whole communities" (ibid:11), in this case, Taiwan. I also take an ethnopragmatics approach to my topic, in that it "relies on ethnography to illuminate the ways in which speech is both constituted by and constitutive of social interaction" and regards "discourse as always embedded within socioculturally organized activities" (Duranti 1994:11). Subsequently, I investigate how sociocultural values and political ideologies in Taiwan inform and influence participants' linguistic practices on political TV call-in programs.

Although Carbaugh's (1988) ethnographic examination of language use on *Donahue* also adopts a "ways of speaking" approach to explore the "*talking* that is American, more than an *American* that is talking" (2; original emphasis), my study differs from his by avoiding all-encompassing, *sui generis* claims that call-

[35] The phrase and methodological approach, "ways of speaking," draws upon Whorf's "fashions of speaking" construct (Hymes 1989 (1972):446). Other ethnography of speaking research, such as Sherzer's (1983) exploration into "Kuna ways of speaking" and Ide's (1998) study on "small talk" and "American ways of speaking," have also expanded upon this concept.

in show verbal interactions represent the "talking that is Taiwanese" or even of a "Taiwanese that is talking."[36] Rather, I regard call-in participants' language use, including speech reporting, as being uniquely applied within this mass-mediated speech event.

In exploring call-in show ways of speaking, I also investigate the performance of two other "mini-speech events" within the political call-in show itself, namely, "reconciliation (*hejie* 和解) talk" and "saliva wars" (*koushui zhan* 口水戰).[37] I identify and label them as speech events following Hymes' (1995 (1962)) ethnographic observation that "[i]nsofar as participants in a society conceive their verbal interaction in terms of [speech events], the critical attributes and the distribution of these are worth discovering" (258). As such, the descriptors "reconciliation talk" and "saliva wars" represent translations of terms that call-in programs and participants have used to refer to certain linguistic practices and events.

For instance, I derive "reconciliation talk" from a *2100* episode entitled "Big Reconciliation Coffee" (*da hejie kafei* 大和解咖啡). The program producers culled the headline from an event of the same name that was organized by several legislators at the Legislative Yuan (*lifayuan* 立法院), Taiwan's highest parliamentary body. The term "saliva war" has even greater associations with

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[36] As I explain in Chapter Two, the descriptor "Taiwanese" as an adjective and noun is problematic for ethnographic and sociopolitical reasons in Taiwan's multiethnic and multilingual society. However, I use the descriptor here to describe those residents who live in Taiwan.

[37] I translate the term "*koushui zhan*" as "saliva war" as opposed to "spitting war" or the more commonly known English equivalent of "mudslinging" in order to capture the term's literal meaning in Mandarin Chinese. Other suggestions I have received toward translating this sociolinguistically expressive term and complex practice include "verbal dueling," "snarling match," "dog fight" (I thank Avron Boretz for these interpretations). While each of these descriptors capture various aspects of "*koushui zhan*," my choice of the somewhat awkward sounding term "saliva war" serves to emphasize its culturally-unique origins, including the manner in which I examine its practice, namely, call-in participants' contestation and negotiation of "crises" in Taiwan's sociopolitical arena. Lastly, I opted not to use "duel" or "dueling" as it suggests the involvement of only two individuals or parties, whereas it is possible to have more than two participants involved in *koushui zhan*.

Taiwan politics, as this colloquial moniker captures the verbal blustering and heated confrontations between politicians on the legislative floor. The notion carries the same derogatory meaning as the English term "mudslinging" and its characterization of negative rhetorical practices politicians use to denigrate others, especially during electoral campaigns. I provide a more detailed explanation of these sociocultural values and negotiations in Chapters Six and Seven.

My ethnographic investigation of the call-in show production process is also supplemented by my observations as an end-user or consumer. My fieldwork observations capture activities such as topic and panelist selection, videotape editing, caller management, and the studio telebroadcast. My ethnographic research also includes on-site visits to six of the nine weeknight call-in shows that aired in early 2000.[38] Out of the six programs, I select two—TVBS's *2100: All People Open Talk* and SETN's *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*—as my primary fieldsites for investigating call-in show crisis framing and participant verbal interactions.[39] In addition, my study incorporates insights from interviews with call-in show producers and participants (i.e., moderators and guest panelists).

My reasons for studying *2100* and *8 o'clock* include their popularity among viewers, as demonstrated through their high rankings in Taiwan's A.C. Neilsen polls, and the moderators' different facilitation styles. Although the two programs have unique features and moderation styles, they nonetheless encourage similar discursive practices, including topic selection and a discussion orientation that encourages speakers to foment anxiety-ridden rhetoric. I present a more detailed analysis of these similarities and differences in Chapter Two.

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[38] Other call-in programs that I observed included CTN's *Face-to-face Debate* (*Xiang dui lun* 相對論), ETTV's *Always Speak Your Mind* (*You hua lao shi jiang* 有話老實講), FTV's *Everybody Let's Deliberate* (*Dajia lai shenpan* 大家來審判), and STV's *Final Decision 2000* (*Juezhan 2000* 決戰 2000).

[39] Four of the nine political TV call-in programs discontinued airing immediately or soon after the presidential election on March 18, 2000. This was another determining factor for choosing *2100* and *8 o'clock* as my primary fieldsites.

Call-in show talk as talk-in-interaction

The methodological tools of conversation analysis (CA) (Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973) proved particularly helpful to my examination of how call-in participants use and manipulate reported speech to recall and inscribe crisis readings of program topics. In praising conversation analysis as an analytical tool, Goodwin and Goodwin (1992) note that "[p]articular interpretations of events in the world may be far less important than the structures used to accomplish such congruent interpretations of a social activity in the first place" (182). Given the focus that CA places on examining the regularities of everyday talk, many scholars have applied its methodology to understanding linguistic behavior in social institutions (Agar 1995) such as courtrooms (Atkinson and Drew 1979), at political rallies (Atkinson 1984), and during formal interactions between professionals and clients (Antaki and Rapley 1996; Boden and Zimmerman 1991; cf. Drew and Heritage 1992).

Of particular interest to this study is the breadth of CA research that examines verbal interactions in broadcast talk (Greatbatch 1988, 1992; Heritage 1985; Scannell 1991), and specifically, on talk radio (Hutchby 1992, 1995, 1997) and talk shows (cf. Haarman 1999; Tolson 2001a). In his research on news interviews, Heritage (1985) describes interviewers as refraining from producing backchannel cues or continuers (Schegloff 1981)—such as "uh huh" or "right"—when interviewees are speaking in order to avoid acting as the primary recipient of the interviewee's answers, thus allowing the overhearing audience to assume that role. As for panel-based TV interviews, Greatbatch (1992) finds that host allocations of turn-taking plays a key role in determining the confrontation level between panelists. In contrast, Hutchby's (2001) examination of a U.S. daytime talk show, *The Ricki Lake Show*, demonstrates that guest panelists routinely address one another directly and even appeal to the host for support. Here, talk

show hosts serve as advocates and facilitators of verbal confrontations between disputants.

Although my study does not conduct a micro-analysis of call-in participants' turn-taking, I do note marked instances of linguistic behavior such as interruptions of or contributions to another speaker's turn of talk. For instance, the moderator of *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* exhibits a facilitation style characterized by frequent interjections and rephrasings of other speakers' utterances. While these interruptions may be interpreted as backchannel cues in the spirit of attentive listening, such an assessment must nevertheless be contextualized within the interaction itself. In one excerpt I later examine, the male moderator and a male guest panelist incredulously repeat a phrase another female panelist had previously uttered. Rather than serving as a supportive backchanneling cue the repetition acts as a disparaging and subversive appraisal of both utterance and speaker, which succeeds in undermining the female panelist's main argument.

Conversation analysis's emphasis on situating each subsequent action as dependent upon the prior action (Goodwin 1994) and its examination of the manner in which every utterance is "*context shaped and context renewing*" (Holt 1999:506; original emphasis) also proves invaluable to my study. My investigation of call-in participants' speech reporting as a prominent linguistic device in program deliberations focuses on its role in expanding upon call-in show sound bites and speaker comments. Intrigued by the myriad ~~of~~ ways participants insert "direct" reported speech (a.k.a. "quoted speech") in their commentary to forward their own or dissuade another's interpretation of an utterance or incident, I suggest that what is presented as "direct quotation" often

bears little or no resemblance to previously spoken or technologically replayed utterances.[40]

My analysis of call-in show verbal interactions also benefits from technological tools such as videotaped data, which supplemented my ethnographic observations. As I was not allowed to videotape call-in programs within the studio setting itself, my study relies upon call-in show telebroadcasts for detailed linguistic analysis.[41] By reviewing videotaped recordings, I was able to verify, or in several cases disprove, the source utterance and original speaker from which the reported speech derived. Videotaped segments and sound bites featured on the call-in show provide additional access to utterances spoken outside the program context. Researchers who study reported speech have voiced frustration at rarely being present when the original utterance was made. Consequently, the effort to "determine systematically how quoting speakers transform others' words is impeded by the difficulty of directly comparing original utterances with subsequent quotations of them" (Koven 2001:519).

Fortunately, in the present study, the technological resources of call-in shows partially overcome this analytical conundrum. Although original utterances appear in a decontextualized and edited form on call-in shows, participants (and researchers) are nonetheless allowed to see and hear the original speaker's remarks. Again, such opportunities rarely occur in most studies on reported speech. By reviewing videotaped call-in programs, I am able to compare whether the "quoted speech" call-in participants present is indeed direct reported speech or a creative (re)construction of another speaker's words (cf. Haberland 1986; Tannen 1989).

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[40] The phrase "technologically replayed utterances" refers to sound bites and video clips of utterances that call-in shows play at the beginning and during the program.

[41] My inability to gather videotaped data within the studio setting prevented me from analyzing off-camera verbal behaviors, which could have further contextualized participants' "on-camera" remarks.

Aside from its usefulness for research on reported speech, Charles Goodwin (1994) explains other advantages to using videotaped data:

> I use videotapes as my primary source of data, recognizing that, like transcription, any camera position constitutes a theory about what is relevant within a scene—one that will have enormous consequences for what can be seen in it later—and what forms of subsequent analysis are possible. A tremendous advantage of recorded data is that they permit repeated, detailed examination of actual sequences of talk and embodies work practices in the settings where practitioners actually perform these activities (607).

I glean similar benefits from repeated viewings of program recordings, including tracing how certain utterances evolve during the course of a single episode and even across several episodes. In attending to this speech reporting process, I adhere to the emphasis CA places on the patterned progression of verbal interactions.[42] By repeatedly viewing call-in show verbal interactions, I was also able to link speech reporting practices to participants' performances of reconciliation talk and saliva wars.

How to do things on call-in shows

My methodological approach is also influenced by the language as social action school of thought (Austin 1962; Labov and Fanshel 1977; Searle 1969). In the seminal work *How to do things with words*, Austin (1962) explains that a speaker performs and accomplishes specific acts through his utterances. Austin regards language as a force that influences the social world and specifically names three including: (1) *locutionary* force, the act of producing the utterance itself; (2) *illocutionary* force, the conventional effect of the utterance in social interaction; and (3) *perlocutionary* force, the extended effects of utterances, including side effects or consequences, the speaker's intentions notwithstanding. Additionally,

[42] Although this is not a focus of my study, selective camera angles and supplementary program devices (such as graphics) contribute toward the packaged product that is the political TV call-in show.

studies as diverse as honorific language use in Pohnpei, Micronesia (Keating 1998) to the performance of small talk in service encounters in the United States (Ide 1998) demonstrate that language as social action has the force to negotiate and confer status relations as well as to facilitate interactions between relative strangers.

Receivers or hearers of reported speech—such as other guest panelists, the moderator, and television viewers—are able to comprehend and situate quoted utterances within ongoing talk by relying upon general principles of cooperative conversation (Grice 1957, 1968), shared information, and the ability to draw inferences (cf. Schiffrin 1994). For speech reporting to be successful, reporters of quoted speech expect listeners to possess the required knowledge about events, people, and places that the reported utterance recalls and indexes.

Likewise, call-in shows assume that viewers have a basic understanding of past and present sociopolitical issues in Taiwan. Nonetheless, call-in shows mediate the exchange of information between program and viewer by providing supplemental material. In creating a crisis ambiance, call-in shows rely upon the joint use of technological props such as video clips, digital cartoons, graphics, and text.[43] While these program features are important, my study primarily focuses on the linguistic tools participants wield when contributing to the call-in show crisis frame.

Hybrid social interactions and the exchange of symbolic forms

An examination of TV call-in shows also requires a media studies perspective to orient the multiple interactions within and through this mass-mediated product. In applying Thompson's (1995) social interaction category of

[43] Although it is not a primary focus of this study, I include on-site productions among the call-in show's repertoire of crisis-rendering tools. These broadcasts typically occur in the area where a "real" crisis has occurred such as *2100's* broadcast from Chi-chi (集集), the area in south central Taiwan that sustained the most damage from the 921 earthquake in 1999 and claimed over 2000 victims.

"mediated quasi-interaction"—which generally applies to reader or recipient interactions with books, newspapers, radio, and television—my study situates call-in show verbal interactions within this classification. Thompson distinguishes mediated quasi-interactions from face-to-face interactions and mediated interactions by their reduced "degree of reciprocity and interpersonal specificity," given that they are produced for "an infinite range of potential recipients" (ibid:84). Thompson also concedes that many social interactions exhibit a "hybrid character" that combines these three forms of interaction. Taiwan's TV call-in shows, for instance, include not only mediated quasi-interactions between studio participants and television viewers but also face-to-face interactions between the moderator and guest panelists within the studio setting.[44]

Drawing from Bourdieu's (1991) notion of symbolic capital, Thompson describes participants in mediated quasi-interactions as predominantly partaking in a process of communication and symbolic exchange. A distinct characteristic of this form of interaction includes participants producing "symbolic forms for others who are not physically present, while others are involved primarily in receiving symbolic forms produced by others to whom they cannot respond" (Thompson 1995:84-85). My study in this respect regards call-in participants' linguistic practices as readily exchangeable cultural and symbolic currency in both the immediate call-in show context and Taiwan society at large.

Mediated quasi-interactions also require senders and receivers to interact across space and time, which in some senses limits participants to a narrower range of symbolic cues in comparison to face-to-face interactions. I also approach call-in show interactions as the asymmetrical production of symbolic forms between studio participants and television viewers, with the former constituting

[44] Of the six call-in programs that I visited, only one program (*Final Decision 2000*) included a live studio audience in its format, which was allowed to pose questions to the guest panelists. As I do not include excerpts from this program, I will not be examining this form of studio verbal interaction.

the primary producers and the latter representing the main receivers. As a result, call-in participants often draw upon tested and reliable rhetorical devices, such as reported speech, to increase the successful reception of their indexically rich commentary.

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Transcribing verbal data into textual form represents a "practical problem" for linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists alike as they confront the politics of representation (Goodwin 1994; cf. Ochs 1979; Schieffelin and Doucet 1994). Although a form of representation itself, a conversation analysis approach attempts to overcome this obstacle by using detailed transcription conventions that capture participants' varied verbal features and bodily orientations during an unfolding social interaction (Sacks et al. 1974). Linguistic anthropologists equally emphasize that in transforming speech practices into physical and visible lines on a page, the transcription should make apparent to readers how a speaker organizes his or her talk into relevant units (cf. Sherzer and Woodbury 1987). In my study, I use a format that combines the transcription features of conversation analysis while attempting to maintain the organizational structure of call-in show talk from a linguistic anthropological perspective. These transcription conventions can be found in Appendix A.

As for the data excerpts in this study, I first transcribed call-in show verbal interactions into the original languages, in this case Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese, which I then translated into English. In my transcriptions, I present both versions by placing Chinese ideograms and English text side-by-side. Given grammatical differences between Chinese and English, the two textual versions may not correspond line-for-line in the transcribed data excerpts. Excerpts I do not analyze in detail are presented in English, with the Chinese text available for reference in Appendix B.

Following the appendices is a Glossary that lists key Chinese terms and phrases I cite in the dissertation (e.g., *waishengren*, *koushui zhan*). The Glossary is organized in alphabetical order according to the Romanization system I use most frequently in the dissertation. Chinese terms that I generally represent in Hanyu Pinyin in the text will be rendered thusly in the Glossary, as will those terms that I present according to the Romanization system used in Taiwan.[45] In addition to an English gloss, I provide alternate English transliterations, a brief description of each term or phrase, and when applicable, its relevance to the present study.

Following the Glossary is a List of Individuals that includes the call-in show participants and sociopolitical figures from Taiwan and the PRC that appear throughout the dissertation. In this list, I provide each individual's Chinese name, its transliteration, and, if known, an English name. I also briefly describe the individual's title and sociopolitical affiliation.

I have chosen to transliterate most Chinese terms and names in Hanyu Pinyin, which is the Romanization system used in the PRC, as this is the transliteration system taught in most Chinese language courses in the U.S. However, I adhere to other orthographic forms for names and terms that the English language media in Taiwan have conventionalized. For instance, I use the English transliteration of "Kuomintang" instead of "Guomindang" for the Nationalist Party (國民黨). In addition, I refer to several individuals by their English names, rather than their Chinese transliterated name, if one is available. Examples include political figures such as People's First Party Chairman James Soong (a.k.a. Song Chuyü 宋楚瑜) and ROC Vice President Annette Lu (a.k.a. Lu Hsiu-lian or Lu Xiulian 呂秀蓮), as well as some of my interviewees (e.g., James C. Hsiung 熊杰) and call-in participants (e.g., Tim T. Y. Yu 丁庭宇).

[45] I deliberately do not specify which Romanization system here as multiple systems are currently

In addition, I periodically incorporate Chinese ideograms and their corresponding transliteration in the body of the text. I resort to this dual reference when introducing certain terms or concepts in their corresponding Chinese form (e.g., 'crisis' as *weiji* (危機), 'harmony' as *he* (和)). When examining call-in show data excerpts, I generally include both the English translation and the original Chinese text in the discussion, particularly when they prove central to my analysis. I do not include these terms and phrases in the Glossary, however.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In the following chapter, Chapter Two, I explore the rise of call-in shows in Taiwan, including their influence on language, society, and politics. This chapter also includes an introduction to the study's main ethnographic sites, namely, the political TV call-in shows *2100: All People Open Talk* and *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*. In describing the program participants, production processes, and broadcasting formats, I compare and contrast *2100* and *8 o'clock* in terms of how these features influence the discursive ambience for and verbal interactions of its participants.

In Chapter Three, I present this study's conceptualization of crisis discourse through the dual lens of mass media studies and linguistic anthropology. In particular, I appropriate Edelman's (1977, 1988) observation that crisis events are linguistic constructions created for political purposes. The chapter introduces Goffman's (1974) notion of frame and primary frameworks in relation to this study's argument that political TV call-in shows recreate and contribute to Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses by promoting and maintaining a crisis frame through their selected topics and program deliberations. As previously mentioned, the chapter considers popularized understandings of the Mandarin Chinese term for "crisis"—*weiji* (危機)—as reflecting the dialectical meanings of

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in use.

its two ideograms, namely, "danger" (*wei* 危) and "opportunity" (*ji* 幾). This contemporary interpretation informs my study's examination of how call-in participants index and negotiate these two aspects of crisis-oriented topics during program deliberations.

In the second half of Chapter Three, I introduce several sociopolitical events and issues that were featured as call-in show topics during the eight-month period in which I conducted fieldwork for this study (January to August 2000). Figuring prominently on call-in shows are discussions on cross-straits relations between Taiwan and the PRC. This issue also represented a significant factor in Taiwan's presidential elections, which I refer to in my analyses. Another dominant topic that call-in shows frequently feature is *benshengren/waishengren* (本省人/外省人) relations between so-called local Taiwanese and Mainlanders, also known as "ethno-political sentiments" (*shengji qingjie* 省籍情結). I summarize this intergroup dynamic as deriving from competing sociopolitical worldviews between *benshengren*, who advocate for a Taiwan worldview, and *waishengren*, who maintain a China-based perspective. Lastly, I consider the increasing role of gendered politics in Taiwan's democratizing environment through the political trajectory of Taiwan's first female Vice President, Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), and particularly, the crisis discourses Lu's unconventional linguistic behavior raises, including the alleged threat it poses to Taiwan's national security.

In Chapter Four, I introduce the linguistic device of reported speech, which serves as the focus of this study's analysis of call-in show participants' verbal interactions. The chapter begins by distinguishing the forms and functions of direct and indirect reported speech. I then problematize the "reportedness" of direct reported speech by considering the notions of hypothetical reported speech (Haberland 1986) and constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989). The remainder of the chapter introduces a broad interdisciplinary body of research on reported speech and explores how it informs the present study.

Chapters Five, Six, and Seven constitute the core of my study's exploration of the call-in show crisis frame, and specifically, how crisis discourses are performed through participants' use of reported speech. The three chapters inform and elaborate upon each other as they investigate speakers' use of various speech reporting practices, including direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech.

Chapter Five provides an overview of the ways participants use reported speech to explore the complex crisis readings underlying each call-in program topic. This includes using reported speech to "editorialize" (Buttny 1998; Buttny and Williams 2000) and "mark" (Clark and Gerrig 1990; Mitchell-Kernan 1972) the original utterance and speaker. The chapter also considers the use of speech reporting in collaboration with other linguistic devices such as polyphonic strategies (Günthner 1999) or "parodic stylization" (Bakhtin 1981) and code-switching or code displacement (Álvarez-Cáccamo 1996). Together, these linguistic features highlight the ways reported speech subverts and supplants socially recognizable identities and local power relations. Overall, reported speech practices foreground the heteroglossic (Bakhtin 1981, 1986) nature of language use, such as allowing the reporter to simultaneously present the original speaker's and his own ethno-political identities and ideologies, while juxtaposing the worldview of the linguistically constructed "storyworld" with that of the real world (Günthner 1999).

The next two chapters, Chapters Six and Seven, examine two speech events—reconciliation talk and saliva wars—that epitomize call-in show ways of speaking. Chapter Six introduces the notions of harmony (*he* 和), "moral face" (*lian* 臉), and "social face" or "image" (*mianzi* 面子) in Chinese societies as it applies to Taiwan. Despite the subversive and confrontational atmosphere of political TV call-in shows, the chapter examines how participants maintain these social values between present and absent interlocutors and sociopolitical entities

through the performance of reconciliation talk. The chapter illustrates that reported speech plays a key role in negotiating competing ideologies and understandings of crisis issues, for instance, through allowing a participant to voice and reconcile various characters and perspectives in the same stretch of talk.

Conversely, Chapter Seven investigates the display of social dis-harmony on call-in shows through verbal disputes or saliva wars. The chapter provides a local understanding of saliva wars in Taiwan's sociopolitical sphere by introducing the speech event within the context of legislative debates in Taiwan. Speech reporting plays a prominent and strategic role in saliva wars as program disputants manipulate and create quoted utterances to further their arguments. In particular, reported speech serves as a form of evidentiality (Besnier 1993) and represents reputable sources or bases (Pomerantz 1984) that reaffirms a speaker's entitlement claims to privileged insider knowledge of an event or issue. In cases when an event or topic is surrounded by innuendo and hearsay, participants frequently use hypothetical reported speech to create the illusion of authenticity and to enhance their credibility. However, other speakers can deny the validity and even ridicule the use of reported speech as evidence. In this chapter, I demonstrate instances in which participants undermine another speaker's use of reported speech as support for argumentative claims by recontextualizing or reclaiming the original utterance as their own.

In the concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, I provide an overview of the study's claims and findings, addressing the questions I pose in Chapter Four regarding the roles reported speech play in call-in participant discussions of Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses. For instance, the study finds that reported speech allows participants to distance themselves from a controversial utterance while reappropriating it to another speaker. In addition, the speech reporting can provide participants the means to concurrently present and negotiate opposing perspectives to an issue or event by engaging in "thought experiments"

through hypothetical reported speech (Myers 1999b). The chapter also extends the study's contributions towards other disciplinary fields, including media studies, popular culture studies, and political science. I consider some of the study's limitations and propose areas for future research that this project has inspired such as the influence of speech play and argumentative styles in call-in show discussions.

In this final chapter, I also address the ways Taiwan's political TV call-in shows have "indigenized" or "Taiwanized" talk shows. I reflect upon how call-in show deliberations have introduced a form of "pop politics" in Taiwan that is characterized by everyday linguistic practices such as speech reporting. In extending the "danger/opportunity" dichotomy, I consider the dangers and opportunities call-in shows pose to the sociopolitical topics they feature as well as the risks involved and rewards gained in researching this programming phenomenon. Lastly, I explore the dialogical relationships underlying this study's investigation as call-in show "ways of reporting," especially the dependence upon and recreation of sociopolitical crisis discourses.

The following chapter provides a brief background on Taiwan's mass media environment as well as introduces the study's primary fieldsites, the call-in shows *2100: All People Open Talk* and *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*.

Chapter Two: Welcome to *2100: All People Open Talk* and *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*

This chapter provides an overview of how Taiwan's political TV call-in shows rose to prominence and popularity in the wake of sweeping changes in Taiwan's sociopolitical and mass media environments. In addition, I ethnographically situate the two call-in show settings where I conducted fieldwork for this study, namely, TVBS's *2100: All People Open Talk* and SETN's *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*.

THE RISE OF TAIWAN'S CALL-IN SHOW "MANIA"

In investigating mass media development in Taiwan, scholars such as Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) qualified their understandings by situating their assessments within local cultural and political processes. For instance, mass media liberalization followed Taiwan's sociopolitical development, with the passage of the first reformative legislation occurring seven years after the lifting of martial law in 1987. Political TV call-in shows thus appeared on television screens in Taiwan at the same time TV station ownership passed from governmental control to capitalistic competition.

Upon closer inspection, however, Taiwan's TV "call-in (show) mania" (*kouying rechao* 叩應熱潮) (Shen 1999:175) was quieting brewing long before mass media liberalization. As underground radio stealthily increased its broadcasting presence in the 1970s and 1980s, radio call-in shows attracted a sociopolitically oppressed populace who used the anonymous forum with its reduced risk of state retribution as a public space to voice their social discontent (cf. Chen 1998; Shen 1999). The Taiwan-based opposition movement, locally

referred to as the *dangwai* (黨外),[1] used these illegal broadcasting conduits to promote a "Taiwanese consciousness"[2] (*bentu yishi* 本土意識) and mobilize a local populace comprised mostly of "local Taiwanese" (*benshengren* 本省人).[3] The opposition movement's *bentu* (本土) or "local" (meaning Taiwan) agenda sought to counter the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT 國民黨) regime's China-based ideologies, which the KMT promulgated through the country's mass media and other institutional conduits. Underground radio subverted the KMT's China and Chinese-oriented inculcating policies by broadcasting in Taiwanese (*Taiyu* 台語) or Hohlo (河洛話),[4] a language spoken by most *benshengren* and which originated from the southern region of Fujian province in China, rather than in the "national language" (*guoyu* 國語) or Mandarin Chinese, a dialect from northern China.[5]

Meanwhile, Taiwan's illegal cable television industry[6] began transmission in the late 1960s, providing Taiwan's populace alternatives to the three KMT-

[1] *Dangwai* (黨外) literally means "outside the party," referring to outside the KMT party. This term arose given the restrictions the KMT regime placed on the formation of political parties, out of fear of organized opposition to their rule, during the period Taiwan was under martial law.

[2] The Mandarin term *bentuhua* literally means "to nativize" and is commonly translated in Taiwan's English-language newspapers as "Taiwanese consciousness." Here, I use "Taiwanese consciousness" for *butuyishi*. More discussion on the notions of *bentuhua* and Taiwanese consciousness is provided in Chapter Two.

[3] I explain the distinctions between Taiwan's ethno-political groups in greater detail in Chapter Two.

[4] The term Hohlo represents the Taiwanese term for "Taiwanese." This term has only recently entered public use in Taiwan. In Mandarin, Hohlo is also referred to as *Minnanhua* (閩南話), which translates as the Min Southern language.

[5] Taiwan is a multilingual society with its residents speaking a variety of Chinese languages, including Mandarin and Taiwanese or Hohlo, as well as Hakka and eleven Aborigine languages. For the most part, Mandarin and Taiwanese share a written language based on Han Chinese characters.

[6] Cable television in Taiwan was originally transmitted through Common Antennas Television (CATV) systems set up by "pirate" cable television companies and the political opposition (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2001).

owned and operated TV stations (Chen 1998).[7] By the mid-1980s, cable TV had gained a strong enough foothold in Taiwan such that it was colloquially called "the fourth channel" (*disitai* 第四台)[8] in a facetious nod to the aforementioned three terrestrial stations. Most significantly, cable television contributed to cultural change and political action (cf. Topper and Wilson 1976) in Taiwan. In March 1990, the underground media made a breakthrough when Taiwan's first local political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; *Minjindang* 民進黨)—which evolved from the former *dangwai* movement—established an island-wide network of radio and television stations called "The Voice of Democracy" (ibid:26).[9] Soon after, the 1993 Cable TV Law legalized private ownership of Taiwan's mass media enterprises, thus opening this nascent market to foreign and local investment (Rampal 1994:73).

Launched by a Hong Kong-based news enterprise (TVB),[10] the country's first all-news TV channel (TVBS) began broadcasting on September 28, 1993 (Shen 1999:145). Since the mid-1990s, five 24-hour news TV stations compete for viewers in a nation with only 23 million residents. This news broadcasting-to-population ratio is even more impressive when compared with the U.S., which has

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[7] The three "terrestrial" channels include Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) (*Taishi* 台視), China Television Company (CTV) (*Zhongshi* 中視), and the Chinese Television System (CTS) (*Huashi* 華視) (*ROC Yearbook* 2000:276).

[8] The moniker "the fourth channel" refers to a break from the standard, three terrestrial broadcasting networks that were owned and operated by the previous ruling party, the KMT. Prior to the 1993 Cable TV laws, viewers acquired cable TV channels (such as CNN, MTV, NHK, and various local stations) through illegally installed satellite attennas or "little ears" (*xiao erduo* 小耳朵) on apartment rooftops and windows.

[9] When television first arrived in Taiwan in 1962, Taiwanese language programs were the most popular. In 1972, the KMT government ordained that all TV stations could only broadcast Taiwanese language programs one hour per day, which was divided into two half hour segments once at noon and again at night. By 1976, all television shows were to be broadcast in Mandarin while the Taiwanese language shows would be gradually phased by the end of the year (Wachman 1994:107).

[10] At the time, TVBS only broadcast one channel. By the late 1990s, the cable enterprise had expanded its cable selection to include those devoted solely to news, sports, and general entertainment.

a population ten times larger (250 million) than that of Taiwan but has only five national all-news stations.[11]

The evolution from cable TV news coverage to infotainment news programming did not take long in Taiwan's rapidly liberalizing mass media environment (cf. Shen 1999). On August 1, 1994, Taiwan's first cable TV call-in show[12]—*2100 All People Open Talk*—made its debut on TVBS (ibid:145). The program's popularity among viewers, and its influential clout within political circles, led other cable TV stations to produce their own political call-in programs. By the time I conducted fieldwork for this study in early 2000, nine weeknight political call-in programs could be found on Taiwan's airwaves vying for the country's coveted viewership.

Other TV stations' imitation of *2100*'s format not only confers the highest form of flattery upon this flagship political TV call-in show, but also highlights Taiwan's increasingly competitive mass media environment. The call-in show's political influence can also be felt at the voting booth as studies indicate that candidates who appear on *2100: All People Open Talk*, Taiwan's leading political TV call-in program, have a greater chance of being elected (Chiu and Chan-Olmstead 1999). Similarly, the call-in show's prestigious station in Taiwan society can be logged in the number of calls producers receive from legislative assistants who lobby on behalf of their bosses (e.g., politicians) for a coveted spot on the program's high profile guest panel. As for profitability, with their low overhead, the programs quickly earn financial rewards from commercial sales. This is particularly true during the election season, which occurs yearly in

[11] As of August 2000, the time research for this study concluded, Taiwan's five all-news stations were TVBS, ETTV (*Dongsen* 東森), FTV (*Minshi* 民視), Global TV (*Huanqiu* 環球), and CTN (*Dadi* 大地). In the U.S., the five all-news TV stations include CNN Headline News, CNN Live, MSNBC, CNBC, and Fox News.

[12] Although Taiwan's TV stations also offer relationship, financial/investment, and social issue (including women, children, and education) call-in programs, those discussing political topics are by far the most widely viewed.

Taiwan, when political candidates and their parties fill the 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. time slot with campaign commercials during live call-in show broadcasts, not to mention the additional advertising revenue TV stations earn during reruns.[13]

To a certain extent, the latest wave of "call-in mania" epitomizes a trend towards a more popularized form of political participation in Taiwan. The 2000 edition of the *Republic of China Yearbook*,[14] a guide to Taiwan that the Governmental Information Office (GIO) publishes, proudly describes that call-in show listeners are "eager to express their views on the air about national developments and to put questions to government officials who visit the studios to answer inquiries about government policy" (274).

The program's participatory premise can likewise be found in the locally-coined moniker "call-in show" (*kouying jiemu* 叩應節目). Playing on the English pronunciation of "call-in," its Mandarin transliteration—*kouying* (叩應)—literally means to "knock and respond" (Shen 2000:146). This linguistic interpretation reflects the Taiwanization of this programming genre, particularly in its interactive format and purported emphasis on callers rather than guest panelists.

In the following sections, I explore the various ways Taiwan's political TV call-in shows have become indigenized or "Taiwanized." In my ethnographic account of the neighborhoods where this study's two primary fieldsites—*2100: All People Open Talk* and *8 o'clock Loud and Soft* Voices—are situated, I describe how these distinct areas of Taipei reflect the city's, and country's, rapidly changing environment.

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[13] Political TV call-in programs repeat their programs later in the night and sometimes the next day. For instance, *2100* rebroadcasts its program from midnight to 1 a.m. and again from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. the following afternoon.

[14] The Republic of China (ROC) represents Taiwan's official name, which is used on most government issued documents. Recently, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) under President Chen Shui-bian's administration approved and began issuing passports that read "Republic of Taiwan." The MOFA explained this decision as a way to protect Taiwan's citizens abroad who were being confused with travelers from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

INTRODUCING TAIPEI: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Located at the northern end of Taiwan, the capital of the Republic of China (ROC), Taipei (*Taibei* 台北),[15] is nestled in a basin and surrounded by mountains. Part of this mountain range has been allocated as Yangmingshan (陽明山) National Park,[16] a popular destination for local residents and tourists alike. Taipei proper covers an area of 271.11 square kilometers and is divided into 12 districts. The capital represents the country's most populous city with 2.63 million residents (as of January 2003),[17] while the Taipei-Keelung[18] (台北−基隆) Greater Metropolitan Area has approximately 6.4 million residents (*ROC Yearbook* 2000: 24).

Before the arrival of Han Chinese immigrants to Taiwan during the Ming (明) Dynasty (1368-1644), Taipei was originally the home of the Kaidagelan, one of Taiwan's eleven Aboriginal groups. Until the Ching (清) Dynasty (1644-1911), the area that now comprises greater Taipei was considered by Han Chinese immigrants to be wild, undeveloped, and thus, uninhabitable. Chen Lai-chang, a native of Chuanchou (川州), Fujian Province (China), sought permission from the Ching rulers to develop the area currently known as Wanhua (萬華) District, Taipei's oldest section. With its convenient access to water, most notably the Tamsui (*Danshui* 淡水) River,[19] and its geographical attributes as a naturally

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[15] The name "Taipei" means "north (or northern) Taiwan."

[16] The name "Yangmingshan" can be translated as "Sun(light) Bright Mountain" or "Brilliant Sunlight Mountain."

[17] This figure was reported by the Taipei City Government webpage: http://www.taipei.gov.tw/English/. Unless otherwise noted, the information on Taipei has been gathered from this website.

[18] Keelung is located at the northern tip of Taiwan and is one of the country's busiest seaports. The Spanish were the first to settle in the area (May 12, 1626), naming it Santissimo Trinidad.

[19] Originally, the river was named by Spanish colonizers as Tarfarlan River (Hung 2000:23). Its current Chinese name, "Tamsui," means "calm waters."

protected harbor, the region soon became a major trading center for the Ching Dynasty in the Taipei basin area.

During the periods when Taiwan was a Dutch colony, and later when it was under Ching Dynasty rule, the island's capital was located in Tainan (台南),[20] a port city in southeastern Taiwan. After the Ching Dynasty's defeat to the Japanese in the Japanese-Sino war in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan and became a Japanese colony for the next 50 years (1895-1945). Subsequently, the Japanese colonial government relocated the capital to Taipei. In so doing, Taipei was torn down and redesigned three times before assuming the proportions of a city suitable to be the capital for the Japanese colonial government (Hung 2000).

With the KMT regime's relocation from China to Taiwan in 1949, Taipei preserved its capital city status, but now represented the "temporary" seat of government for the Republic of China. Since then, the city has emerged as the country's political, economic, educational, cultural, and transportation hub. As the official Taipei City Government website declares: "Taipei is a vibrant blend of traditional culture and cosmopolitan life. . .[and] now proudly stands as one of East Asia's most important cities."

In the following sections, I describe two Taipei neighborhoods, Kuanghua Market and the area surrounding the World Trade Center construction project, which had yet to be completed at the time this study was completed in August 2000. In these two areas, one finds the two TV stations and their call-in programs, TVBS's *2100: All People Open Talk* and SETN's *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*, where I conducted fieldwork from January to August 2000. Incidentally, these two neighborhoods epitomize the "vibrant blend" of traditional and cosmopolitan Taipei as described by the official city government website.

[20] The name "Tainan" means "south (or southern) Taiwan."

Kuanghua Market

A pedestrian exploring the space-deprived sidewalks of Kuanghua Market (*Kuanghua Shangchang* 光華商場) in central Taipei finds herself encountering the metropolis' "old" and "new" economies side-by-side.[21] Two to four-story business-households compete with each other for retail and living space in this commercial/residential neighborhood, which became renowned for its inexpensive computer software, hardware, accessory equipment, and repair services in the early 1980s.[22] With the liberalization of Taiwan's telecommunications market in the late 1990s, Kuanghua's computer-dominated enterprises now include a growing array of telecommunication businesses. The popularity of "hand machines" (*shou ji* 手機), or mobile phones, manifests itself in the number of stores selling the handsets and their accessories, valued as fashion statements and hence status markers.[23]

Equally integral to the neighborhood's ambiance are mobile food stalls. Tucked away between computer and cell phone storefronts, these Taiwanese "fast food" (*kuaican* 快餐) vendors offer customers (e.g., students, businessmen, and shoppers) sweets such as shaved ice with red bean and condensed milk (*baobing* 刨冰), pearl milk tea (*zhenzhu naicha* 珍珠奶茶), hot grass jelly (*shaoxiancao* 燒仙草), and egg pudding with white peanuts. "Salty" (*xian* 鹹)[24] food can also be purchased in the form of knife-pared noodles (*daoxiaomian* 刀削麵), scallion

[21] I deliberately refer to Taipei, rather than Taiwan, as the environment described here is unique to the nation's capital, which also represents Taiwan's most industrialized and cosmopolitan city.
[22] Taipei now has at least two main computer shopping districts. The relatively older location is located in the Kuanghua Market District described here. A newer computer shopping mall is concentrated in the Acer-sponsored building located across from the main Taipei train station.
[23] These accessories include cell phone covers, removable antennas in neon and with flash lights, dangling beads, handset cradles shaped as plastic chairs or teddy bears, and face-plates featuring *Coca-Cola* logos and Japanese *manga* characters reminiscent of commercialized versions of interchangeable Gucci watch frames.
[24] In Chinese culture, food is generally differentiated into two categories, "sweet" (*tian* 甜) and "salty" (*xian* 鹹).

pancakes (*congyoubin*g 蔥油餅), potstickers (*guotie* 鍋貼), Cantonese-style BBQ, and the local specialty, Taiwanese stinky tofu (*chou doufu* 臭豆腐).

Occupying larger corner spaces are music/DVD stores featuring an array of international artists; for instance, Mariah Carey's *Rainbow* CD is displayed alongside Taiwan pop-diva A-mei's *Regardless*. While Taiwanese, Mandarin, and Cantonese pop music occupy a significant portion of the floor space, a substantial amount of room is dedicated to U.S. artists. This musical categorization is also evident in the prominent display of separate "Top Ten" charts for Taiwan and the U.S.

Located on the floors above the street-level music, computer, and telecommunication businesses one finds 24-hour *manga* reading establishments, which rent books for on-premises reading at NT$1 per minute (approx. US$.03).[25] As an imported Japanese product, *manga*, which are books with cartoon-like drawings that have on average 50 volumes per storyline,[26] have a strong set of devotees among Taiwan's high school and college-aged students of both genders. *Manga* genres include storylines featuring hybrid martial art/sci-fi sagas, superhero chronicles, basketball dreams, adolescent anxiety, cartoon character-populated worlds, and "soft"-porn (these books are locked in glass-paneled cabinets where the potential reader can "look but not touch"). For the *manga* reader's comfort, the establishments provide small alcoves with or without tables that are outfitted with sofas, armchairs, and reading lamps that emit a soft glow, which combine to create a relaxed and inviting reading atmosphere. To sustain the

[25] I use "rental stores" here to refer to the procedure of charging readers a fee for reading the material, just as video rentals charge borrowers a fee to rent a movie. However, *manga* establishments usually do not allow customers to take the literature out of the store.

[26] The length of each *manga* series depends in part to its popularity among readers. In some cases, discontinued storylines are "revived" following widespread demand for its continuation by fans. The more popular *manga* series have been translated for television in the form of dramas (with people acting out the *manga* characters) and animé or Japanese-style animation.

reader's stamina, these stores sell hot and cold beverages with unlimited refills, "small eats" (*xiao chi* 小吃) or appetizers, and even three-course meals.

At the heart of Kuanghua one also finds the downtown headquarters of cable TV conglomerate TVBS. This 16-floor monolith juts out as an anomaly amidst the squat "skyline" of its surroundings. While its neighboring, modest businesses settle for slivers of commercial property, TVBS occupies a privileged tract of land that includes in its landscaping a coveted Taipei commodity: open space. Extending from the sidewalk, where a lone guardhouse demarcates the separation between TVBS's private property and Kuanghua's public streets, a gleaming, white-tiled driveway stretches toward the tint-glass windowed and rectangular-shaped high rise. Inside the building's foyer, two or three guards, whose primary job is to pose standard security questions to non-TVBS badge-wearing persons, sit behind a chest-high, chrome counter. The gate-keeping process merely contributes to both the building's and TVBS's imposing and professional allure.

Yet, TVBS's physical and commercial presence imparts a quiet respectability to a district infamous for bootleg software and imitation products. Aside from being a major employer in an area dominated by family-owned businesses, TVBS contributes to the neighborhood's economy through its employees' daily consumer practices. The TV station's white-collar, college-educated employees mingle with middle-aged shop owners as well as university and high school students who prowl the stores for CDs, cell phone accessories, and second-hand computer equipment.

Thus Kuanghua's neighborhood ambiance comfortably juxtaposes old and new technologies, mom-and-pop businesses and chain-store conglomerates, as well as face-to-face transactions and private-reading hideaways. While Kuanghua is able to accommodate these unique contrasts, such is not the case for the area

where SETN is located, a twenty-minute taxicab ride away, where modernizing construction projects are already building the Taipei of the future.

World Trade Center District

At the eastern end of Jen-ai Road (*Renai Lu* 仁愛路), where it meets Keelung Road (*Jilong Lu* 基隆路), one finds a different configuration of commercial space. Here, the Taipei City Government's aspiration to transform the capital into a modern, international Asian city—comparable to Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore—is evident throughout the area.[27] This goal is mirrored on the city government's official website which describes this section of the city as "the modern face of Taipei with its glass and steel skyscrapers, wide boulevards, and the World Trade Center."[28]

However, prior to attaining its current reputation as a shopping and entertainment district, the area where SETN is presently located originally housed thousands of mainland Chinese refugees.[29] Many of the refugees were Nationalist party or Kuomintang (KMT; 國民黨) foot soldiers who fled to Taiwan along with the KMT regime in the mid to late 1940s. To those who recall Taiwan's colonial and martial law periods, this section of Taipei reflects the civilian experience of the country's tumultuous political past. In a site that was once overrun with "temporary" housing units constructed from cheap wood, corrugated-steel, and

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[27] The government's goal evidently also extends to the virtual world. On the first page of the city government's website (http://www.taipei.gov.tw/English/), it displays a picture of Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) with the word "Taipei" in orange, shadow-boxed letters above his head. To the picture's right is a quotation by Mayor Ma that has the headline: "BUILDING A CYBERCITY." The quotation itself reads: "When I campaigned for Taipei mayor three years ago, I promised Taipei citizens that I would build Taipei into a world-class capital if I were elected. To deliver that promise, I am building Taipei into a CyberCity first, because it is the best way to enhance Taipei's competitiveness in the 21st century."

[28] The quotation was posted at: http://ezgo.taipeielife.net/homepage/english/eng_introduction.htm)

[29] Interestingly, the Taipei City Government website states that until the 1970s, this area was comprised of what it euphemistically describes as "largely underused fields," after which the city began to develop it as a "financial and commercial district" (see above footnote for website).

rubber-tires for dislocated *waishengren* (外省人),[30] or Mainlander, families one now finds towering construction cranes, steel girders, and Southeast Asian immigrant workers hired to erect Taipei's own "World Trade Center."[31]

Just across the street from this construction project stands a 25-story Hyatt Hotel. The tract of land on which the hotel is currently located once hosted a cemetery during Japan's 50-year (1895-1945) colonial occupation of Taiwan. Today, oral history, in the form of local "urban legends" that even foreign visitors are familiar with serves as the primary means of preserving this section of Taipei's, and Taiwan's, past. Such accounts weave tales that the ghosts of executed Taiwan residents continue to wander the carpeted halls and faux-marble lobby of this international hotel chain for spiritual release and perhaps retribution. Neither museums nor plaques preserve these post-colonial, post-martial law tracts of history. While other recognized "historical" landmarks around the city are commemorated by a large marble slab or stone on which hand-chiseled words carved in the style of Chinese calligraphy memorialize the location and events that took place there, this former burial ground is absent of any such markings.

Rather, since the mid-1980s, the pre-industrialized past of this ten block radius has been gradually erased and replaced by high-rise shopping malls. One of the first shopping complexes in this area was the hastily erected[32] Warner Village (*Huana weixiu* 華納威秀) with its trendy boutiques,[33] food court,[34] and 16-screen

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[30] The Mandarin term, "*waishengren*" literally translates as "outside the province person" and generally refers to Han Chinese from Mainland China. The term's sociopolitical ramifications will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

[31] At the time I conducted my fieldwork in 2000, this project was advertised on the construction site's temporary wooden barriers as Taipei's "World Trade Center." However, the name may have been changed since the events of September 11, 2001.

[32] I describe the construction of Warner Village as "hastily erected" given rumors that building materials were compromised in the rush to quickly erect the shopping mall and cinemaplex. However, this information has not prevented shoppers and entertainment-seekers from patronizing its stores and services.

[33] Stores located in Warner Village include Nine West, BCBG, and various other European and U.S.-based clothing and shoe companies.

cinemaplex; the high-scale Japanese Mitsugushi (*Xinguang sanyue* 新光三越) Department Store; and the most recent addition, a "New York, New York" shopping arcade complete with a miniature Statue of Liberty. These multi-storey consumer monuments reflect the non-Taiwan orientation of the city's new identity, which is prominently defined by pop culture.

For instance, Warner Village has the influence to draw devoted fans of Hollywood movie stars such as Tom Cruise and Hong Kong-based "crossover"[35] star Chu Yun-fat (*Zhou Runfa* 周潤發). Here, as elsewhere around the world, fans wait hours to catch a glimpse of these transnational celebrities. Meanwhile, located a ten-minute walk and 30-minute drive away respectively, Taiwan's two main national memorials, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Halls, contrast markedly with Taipei's increasingly consumer-environment as epitomized by the aforementioned shopping malls. Originally constructed to commemorate the founder and former presidents of the Republic of China, these institutional monuments now host so-called "high cultural" productions including opera, Western classical music, and traditional Chinese music in their concert halls.

Located between the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall and Warner Village are the modest edifices of the Taipei City Government and City Council Hall. At first glance, these institutional buildings seem oddly placed, situated at the intersection of several major thoroughfares. Yet, to Taiwan's *fengshui* (風水) or geomancy-conscious architects, the government buildings are designed to bring positive energy or *qi* (氣) to the city and its administration. For instance, two Chinese lions

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[34] Fast-food establishments in the food court include Burger King, Hägen Daas, a mini-cafe, a Chinese food stand, and a Japanese food stand. At the time this study was conducted, there was also a Planet Hollywood on the 2nd floor.

[35] The notion, "crossover," in its broadest definition "refers to a performer or media text that gains a new audience;" yet, in U.S. popular use it primarily describes "non-white performers and media texts that become popular with white audiences" (Beltrán 2002:42).

guard the main building's front entrance and face its counterpart at the other end of Jen-ai Road, namely, the Presidential Palace and the seat of the ROC Presidency.

Thus, standing at the eastern end of one of Taipei's largest and most decorated boulevards is the post-modern, minimalist-looking Taipei City Government. In contrast, at the western end of Jen-ai Road resides the Presidential Palace, a model of Japanese colonial architecture, itself modeled on European buildings of the late 19th century. The city government's spread of cubic-like structures surrounded by modern, towering high rises lie in symbolic and geographic juxtaposition to the national government's historically-laden and emblematic seat of power.[36]

At the fringes of the World Trade Center district corporate offices styled with landscaped patios and pane glass walls. The office buildings appear oddly placed, as though "Little Taipei" in Monterrey Park, California,[37] had been supplanted and transferred to Taipei as "Little LA." The attempt to emulate U.S. corporate culture is most evident in the marble and glass office buildings. These distinctly contemporary structures characterize this section of Taipei as they increasingly dominate the landscape with their imposing height and wide entrances, which contrast with the crowded neighborhood outdoor markets and squat four-storey buildings. However, unlike Kuanghua Market where old and new economies and architectural styles cohabitate, the World Trade Center district is rapidly and distinctly replacing outdated structures with modern 20-storey apartment complexes.

In sum, my description of Taipei's geographical transformation from a besieged city under martial law, where bodily and verbal movements were once

[36] Currently, the DPP occupies the Presidential palace while the KMT occupies the Taipei city government. Another coincidental juxtaposition.

restricted and silenced, to its late 20th century reconfiguration as an internationalizing metropolis, where capitalistic enterprises and pop cultural products reflect the city's *zeitgeist* and increasingly command the populace's attention, captures in broad paint strokes a similar evolution within Taiwan's mass media environment and sociopolitical landscape. My description of these two sections of Taipei also serves to illustrate the laminations of old and new, the contrast of erased history and history-in-the-making, as well as its residents' struggles with negotiating lingering traces of the past with present-day, modernizing agendas. In many ways, Taipei's visible evolution, as witnessed in its increasing skyline and merchandize-laden city sidewalks, underlies this dissertation's inquiry into Taiwan's political TV call-in shows and participants' deliberations of sociopolitical crisis discourses. In fact, I regard the programs as an emerging, mass-mediated site where the country's democratization processes are showcased, performed, and reproduced.

In the following sections, I explore how these processes manifest themselves in the production and broadcast of political TV call-in shows. Specifically, I demonstrate how its participants—including moderators, production staff, guest panelists, and callers—contribute to presenting current events within a crisis frame and as infotainment products through orchestrated panelist representation, dramatic topic headlines, selectively edited video clips, and technologically-enhanced tools such as graphics, textual representation, and screen presentation.

THE CALL-IN SHOW WORKSPACE

As I approach the *2100* production unit located on the 3rd floor of TVBS's downtown office building, I notice that the desktops are covered with phone

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[37] Monterrey Park, Temple City, Alahambra, and its surrounding suburban cities are located in the suburbs of Los Angeles, CA, and have been dubbed by locals as "Little Taipei" due to its large Taiwan immigrant population.

directories, newspaper clippings, buried telephones, news magazines, fax coversheets, potential guest lists, and half-finished milk-tea cartons. Suspended from the ceiling and cradled in black frames hang two television sets. One is turned to TVBS's 24-hour news channel (TVBS-N) while the second airs one of Taiwan's four other 24-hour news channels. The televisions presence serves as a constant reminder of the business the call-in staff is in, namely, the creation of newsworthy products. On a nearby mobile desk, a computer, printer, and fax machine occupy its entire surface. The staff members must share the one computer and printer, or borrow one from an adjoining unit. Yang,[38] the unit manager, however, has his own laptop reserved for his use.

It is interesting to note that *2100*'s production unit is located not with the TV station's news division, but among the entertainment-oriented programs and the TVBS newsmagazine staff.[39] In addition, the *2100* production unit's 3rd floor location is conspicuously separated from *2100* moderator Lee Tao's office, which is located on the 10th floor among the executive suites. Moreover, while other call-in show production units work 8 to 9 hours per day, *2100*'s staff members regularly put in an arduous 14-hour workday.

If *2100* represents the prototype that other call-in programs model themselves after, then SETN's *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* offers a slightly different variation on the original. As the second-ranked political TV call-in program at the time this study was conducted (January to August 2000), *8 o'clock* represents the only serious challenge to *2100* and the TV programming genre that it introduced to Taiwan. Located in Taipei's new commercial center near the Taipei City Hall, *8 o'clock's* call-in show style is undoubtedly influenced by its

[38]In deference to the production staff's privacy, I have decided to use pseudonyms. However, guest panelists' and moderators' names will remain unchanged as the call-in programs are publicly accessible.

[39] Although Shen (1999) notes that *2100* is "integrated as part of the whole news teamwork in TVBS" (187), I found this was true insofar that *2100* has access to the news division's videotapes

parent company, SETN, and its local Taiwanese programming bent. As a less prominent political TV call-in show, *8 o'clock* enjoys more programming latitude and less ratings pressure than *2100*, a situation that is readily apparent in its more flexible organizational structure.

Like *2100*, the *8 o'clock* production unit is placed with the other commercial/entertainment program units and not with the news division.[40] At SETN, this includes programs that review Japanese fashion, monitor pop star lifestyles, and report on the local music scene. As the *8 o'clock* staff cold calls prospective guests, the Japanese pop songs playing in the background provide an amusing contrast to the call-in show staff's discussions of sociopolitical machinations and cross-straits tensions. Grouped with these pop culture-oriented shows, yet also framed as a news program, the *8 o'clock*'s production staff literally and figuratively finds itself situated at the crossroads of "news" and "show." *8 o'clock*'s hybrid positioning and eclectic character is also epitomized by the show's moderator, Yü Fu (漁夫), whom I introduce in the following section.

THE MODERATORS

2100 moderator: Lee Tao

2100's moderator, Lee Tao (李濤), generally initiates, delegates, and approves each stage of the call-in show's production process including selecting the call-in topic(s), planning the guest list, editing the computer graphics, requesting video footage, and phrasing viewer polling questions. The "hotline"[41] in the *2100* production unit, a phone line reserved exclusively for calls between

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and editing rooms. However, the news division took precedence when it came to using and accessing these resources.

[40] The news units occupy two floors, half of the 8th floor (on the opposite side of the reception area) and the floor above, the 9th floor.

Lee Tao and the production unit, reflects this top-down organizational structure.[42] In turn, the production unit realizes Lee Tao's vision for each episode. This is not to say, however, that the production staff does not contribute suggestions or alternative directions that are later included in the actual broadcast.

The 10th floor, where TVBS's executive offices are housed (including Lee Tao's), differs dramatically from the 3rd floor, where *2100*'s production staff is located. In contrast to the hustle and bustle of the programming units, the executive suites have a hush-hush atmosphere reminiscent of a museum or library.[43] One reason for Lee Tao's exclusive office address derives from his multiple positions as TVBS Vice President as well as senior director and moderator of *2100: All People Open Talk*. Consequently, Lee Tao represents one of the most visible "faces" of TVBS in Taiwan and abroad.[44] Lee Tao's experience with international mass media environments serves as one of his greatest assets.[45] It was while Lee Tao was working as a reporter in the U.S. that he found inspiration from CNN's talk show *Larry King Live*, which eventually led him to produce Taiwan's first cable TV call-in show in the form of *2100: All People Open Talk*. Prior to *2100*'s incarnation, however, Lee Tao already had experience hosting a radio call-in program. With *2100* being Lee Tao's trademark

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[41] The direct line between the *2100* production unit and Lee Tao is concretely represented by a red phone that sits on the production unit manager's (Yang) desk.

[42] My observations differ from Shen's (1999) impressions that *2100* makes a "conscious effort to avoid imposing too much of the host's [Lee Tao] personality on the [program] discussion" (189). As I analyze in subsequent data chapters, Lee Tao's unique prosodic stylization infuses his topic introductions and discussion commentary as well as influences guest panelist deliberations.

[43] During my seven months of fieldwork at *2100*, Lee Tao's personal office was not accessible to me, although we did have a one-on-one interview in a waiting room near his office. I once asked *2100*'s production manager if I may accompany him in his pre-broadcast meetings with Lee Tao, which is held in Lee Tao's office. However, he informed me that this wouldn't be appropriate as the discussions were private.

[44] His high recognition factor and executive position keeps him traveling overseas, such as to the PRC, to seek collaborative projects, attract investors, increase distribution, enlarge TVBS's market, as well as research and monitor new programming trends.

contribution to the local cable media landscape, he is widely regarded as the "founder" of the political TV call-in show genre in Taiwan.

As previously mentioned, Taiwan's political TV call-in programs differ most from their U.S. counterparts in striving to present a non-ideological, non-partisan image. *2100*'s success is based on its so-called "objectivity" and "neutrality." Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) claim that in Taiwan, "the media that gains the trust of audiences, and thus captures the largest share of the market, are those that perform as 'objective' and 'professional' journalists rather than tools of any one political party" (60). Lee Tao credits *2100*'s rapid and sustained success to its ability to earn acceptability and credibility in the eyes of the public (Lee Tao 2000). To him, the moderator plays a key role in this effort, including projecting a "neutral" (*zhongli* 中立) image that avoids openly demonstrating political leanings towards a candidate, political party, or Taiwan's sovereignty issue.[46] As Jin Xiuli (靳秀麗), moderator of *Always Speak Your Mind* (*You Hua Laoshi Jiang* 有話老實講), explains: "if [a call-in program] already [has] a preconceived standpoint, the people that you attract are the small masses (*xiaozhongi* 小眾) ... So I feel that Lee Tao, the reason why he is successful, is understandable; that is, he definitely does not attract a [niche] market" (Jin Xiuli 2000).

8 o'clock moderator: Yü Fu

In contrast to *2100*'s spatial arrangement, *8 o'clock* moderator Yü Fu's office is situated within six paces from the call-in show production unit. He caters to a tacit "open door policy" with staff members entering his office at their

[45] In the early 1980s, Lee Tao was stationed in the United States as a reporter in its Washington D.C. bureau while working for China TV (CTV), a government (KMT)-owned and operated television station.

convenience to use the computer, desk, phone, or balcony. Given that Yü Fu does not arrive at SETN until after 6 p.m., open access to his office has practical implications and carries over to the staff's casual attitude toward and close relationship with the moderator. Although the staff addresses Yü Fu by his official title of "director general" (*zhongjian* 總監), a title that most closely resembles "senior vice president" within an American business context, they use the address term in a way that emphasizes camaraderie rather than status or hierarchy.

In contrast to my non-accessibility to Lee Tao's office, I was shown to Yü Fu's personal office from my first interview with him and had continued access while conducting fieldwork. Yü Fu's office was spacious and simply decorated. Several framed works of Chinese calligraphy hung on the walls, with each artwork dedicated to Yü Fu in the artist's own hand.[47] A small television set sat recessed in a cubby hole opposite from the desk and to the right of the doorway. To the right of the television set, a sliding glass door led to an enclosed balcony which overlooked a modern shopping district that included Warner Village and a Mitsugushi department store. Two office chairs faced the desk, which were usually occupied by the staff during pre-broadcast meetings. The desk itself was L-shaped, with a scanner and computer occupying the shorter leg, while the evening's papers, crisply folded and untouched, sat in the center of the longer portion of desk.

A man of many hats, Yü Fu moderates *8 o'clock* as his "nightshift" in a varied workday and eclectic career. For instance, Yü Fu's "day jobs" as a radio talk show host, political cartoonist, restaurateur, and computer animation

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[46] Several viewers and guests, however, have expressed to me that Lee Tao appears biased in his moderating, but towards which political parties/candidates or guests varies depending on whom one asks (personal interviews).

[47] In the Chinese culture, having a piece of artwork addressed to you in Chinese calligraphy by the artist is a sign of respect. People display these items (usually a scroll or a painting) in a prominent place in their home or office.

entrepreneur[48] prevent him from investing more time at SETN or into *8 o'clock* than his 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. commitment. Although he holds the title of board member at SETN, the designation is mainly honorary as Yü Fu is minimally involved in *8 o'clock* and the TV station, including business strategizing or programming processes. Given his outside responsibilities, Yü Fu's involvement with *8 o'clock* is thus limited to his role as program moderator.

Upon arriving at SETN, Yü Fu begins his "day" at *8 o'clock* with a lunchbox meal (or some other form of Taiwan-style fast food) that has been placed on his desk prior to his arrival. SETN's news channel plays on the TV set in his office as Yü Fu eats his meal. The evening's papers are neatly stacked on his desk corner for his review, should he choose to do so.[49] Soon after, Mia[50] and several *8 o'clock* staff members enter Yü Fu's office to update him on the program's topic. Seated in one of the two chairs facing Yü Fu's desk, the staff member who booked the evening's guests provides Yü Fu a summary of each panelist's perspective toward that evening's topic. Next, the group spends a few minutes brainstorming titles for that night's broadcast.[51] The task inspires joking (including off-colored ones) and satirical political commentary, generally led by Yü Fu himself. Throughout these tasks, Yü Fu is usually sketching a political cartoon for the next day's papers. As soon as Yü Fu finishes a drawing, he calls his assistant over who takes the sketch and dries the ink with a hairdryer.

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[48] At the time of my first interview/meeting with Yü Fu (April 2000), the computer animation company was a month away from being launched. I later visited this site where I also observed Yu Fu's weekday radio program.

[49] Unlike at *2100* where the staff clips and organizes articles for Lee Tao for his reading and preparation for that night's broadcast, Yü Fu does not request this service nor go to such lengths to prepare for the evening's program topic.

[50] Pseudonym.

[51] Inevitably, the program's headliner is coined by Mia after 10 to 15 minutes of half-hearted contributions by Yü Fu and the staff.

Figure 2: *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* moderator Yü Fu in his trademark pastel-colored shirt and tie.

After the meeting, and shortly before 7:30 p.m., Yü Fu changes into a brightly colored shirt and an ornate tie that the SETN wardrobe department has provided and delivered by 4 p.m. While Lee Tao's trademark sartorial style is his patterned suspenders, Yü Fu's wardrobe includes artistic ties and rainbow-colored shirts. On another call-in show, the moderator (male) is consistently outfitted in colorful vests. Interestingly, female call-in show moderators do not have a "clothing trademark," and therefore, have more latitude in their apparel. By 7:30, Yü Fu walks up two flights of stairs to the makeup room/greenroom where he makes his final preparations for the broadcast. It is here that Yü Fu's contributions to the call-in show truly begin. Hence, in contrast to *2100* where moderator Lee Tao runs and embodies the call-in show, at *8 o'clock*, it is the production unit that plans and produces the program's format and thematic direction.

THE PRODUCTION UNITS

A day in the life of *2100*

At the time I began my fieldwork at *2100*, the five staff members included four men and one woman, while their ages ranged from early twenties to early thirties. All of the staff had at least a college degree, while one member attended college in the U.S.[52] A few, but not all, of the staff had some experience related to the production and thematic content of *2100* such as communication studies, broadcasting, or political science.[53]

With 14-hour workdays five days a week, the six *2100* staff members arrive at their desks between 8 and 9 a.m. and leave the TV station half an hour after the program's conclusion at 10 p.m. The first to arrive each morning is Yang, the production unit manager. The morning begins with a phone call from *2100* moderator, Lee Tao, which Yang answers. This first call of the day establishes the general direction for that evening's program. However, within the space of 30 minutes, Lee Tao might call another two to three times to elaborate upon his initial ideas.

The conclusion of Yang's phone conversation with Lee Tao cues the other staff members to cease their individual activities and jot down on whatever is accessible (e.g., scratch paper or discarded fax coversheets) Yang's summation of Lee Tao's instructions. Included in these instructions is the program topic or topics, which are usually inspired from the previous night's news or, if it is a slow news day, an issue that Lee Tao incites emotional reactions from program viewers such as ROC-PRC cross-straits tensions or the ambivalence and controversy surrounding Taiwan's national identities.[54]

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[52] The sole female staff member did her undergraduate studies in the U.S. At least one staff member expressed interest in persuring a graduate degree.

[53] For instance, one staff member had earned an undergraduate degree in English.

[54] More discussion on these two issues is provided in Chapter Three.

Once the preliminary guest panelists have been invited, Yang writes a brief summary of the evening's topic, which the staff faxes over to the potential panelists' offices. Meanwhile, the other staff members read through a stack of daily newspapers from which they clip promising articles, with "promising" meaning those that discuss sociopolitical issues that may be useful for future programs.[55] Articles related to that evening's topic are later collated in a folder and delivered to Lee Tao by 5 p.m. for his review before the 8 p.m. broadcast.

By mid-afternoon, the production unit has further solidified the topic and program direction. At this time, the staff recontacts the initially invited guest panelists as well as any other panelists they may have added in the interim. These follow-up conversations are part of the final screening process that reconfirms each panelist's ideological stance towards the evening's topic(s). At this point, those individuals who are not compatible with the program's political representation are eliminated. A more detailed description of the panelist selection process is provided in a later section.

A day in the life of *8 o'clock*

In comparison to *2100*'s predominantly male production staff, *8 o'clock* had an equal distribution of two women and two men in its production unit at the time I began my observations in late April 2000. By the end of my fieldwork in early August, however, this gender ratio (female:male) had changed to four to one. Although *8 o'clock*'s production unit's membership continuously changed during the course of my fieldwork, Mia represented the one constant in the group. The age range of *8 o'clock*'s staff, from the early to late twenties, proved to be slightly younger than *2100*'s. As with *2100*, the production staff included college graduates who did not necessarily have political experience or even interest in

[55] The selected articles are placed in a large rectangular butter cookie tin, which serves as a "half-way house" before being filed away in the *2100* archives (a set of file cabinets and some folders).

politics,[56] but who had experience with or majored in media broadcasting. In fact, recent hires admitted that SETN did not immediately inform them which unit they would be assigned to work on. Several even confided that they had never watched *8 o'clock* prior to working for the unit, and in some cases, had barely even heard of it.

Three hours after the *2100* staff have started their work day, the staff of *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* arrive at SETN in the flexible starting time between late morning and early afternoon. Mia is usually the first to arrive, the production unit manager and 3-year veteran of *8 o'clock* at the time fieldwork was conducted. The remaining staff members arrive shortly thereafter, with all being present by 1 p.m.

8 o'clock production staff roles are clearly defined to minimize task overlap. Staff members are assigned one of the following responsibilities: calling and booking guest panelists; writing the introductory segment as well as selecting and cutting video segments; writing the "supplement" sections, which are segments of quoted statements related to that night's topic and featured before commercial breaks; and clipping articles from that day's papers. Mia generally decides the evening's topic, with some input from the other staff members. Consequently, *8 o'clock'*s moderator, Yü Fu, does not provide, nor is he solicited for, input on the show's topic. On rare occasions, however, SETN's executive management may intervene and insist that the call-in show address a given issue.[57]

In contrast to *2100*'s 14-hour workday, *8 o'clock*'s relatively short nine-hour work schedule (approximately from noon to 9 p.m.) requires it pursue tasks that many of the other TV call-in shows' production units have already

[56] For instance, Mia earned her undergraduate education in French, which included studying abroad for a year in Poitiers, France (a personal coincidence as I had done the same, including a six-week *stage* in Poitiers, my junior yeaer abroad).
[57] I recall this occurring only once during my observations.

accomplished by noon. For instance, by the time *8 o'clock*'s staff arrives at work, *2100* has already contacted a preliminary list of invitees and earmarked them as possible guests. Meanwhile, *8 o'clock* spends a majority of the afternoon soliciting and booking guests for that evening's program, namely, those who *2100* or any of the other six call-in shows did not invite.[58] Also, while *2100* enlists two to three of its production members in this task, *8 o'clock* assigns one individual in this endeavor, a job that is rotated among the staff members on a weekly basis.

THE GUEST PANELISTS

In brainstorming for potential guest speakers, the *2100* staff typically creates a preliminary list of invitees who are divided by political affiliation (e.g., KMT, DPP, New Party, and "other").[59] These guests include politicians, media personalities such as editors or journalists, as well as a few political pundits and scholars. Interestingly, these same guests usually decline invitations from other TV call-in shows as they do not wish to be "blacklisted" from *2100*, as *2100* is known to be quite territorial with their guest list.

However, some guests flout this tacit contract with *2100* and accept appearances on other shows. In doing so, these guests have known to be "penalized" by *2100* in the sense of not being invited back to the show for a certain period after their transgression. Certain names frequently reappear on this list regardless of the program's potential topic. I regard these panelist regulars as "friends of Lee Tao." Yang (1997) offers a different description by referring to these "old faces" as "a group of safety air bags." From a quantitative approach,

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[58] Some guests are booked from several days to a week in advanced regardless of what the topic may be. This again demonstrates *8 o'clock*'s tendency to invite guests who do not necessarily exhibit expertise on a particular topic or issue per se but rather have a general knowledge of politics.

[59] These four categories applied during the primary period in which my fieldwork was conducted (again, from January to August 2000). Since July 2000, however, two new parties have been formed including the People's First Party (PFP) in mid-July 2000, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in August 2001.

Shen (1999) provides a more detailed analysis of the lack of panelist diversity on *2100* (220-225). Although these individuals may not be well versed in every topic that *2100* features, they are nevertheless considered as having a solid grasp of sociopolitical issues in general. More importantly, these regulars demonstrate linguistic dexterity and exhibit a "TV presence" that resonates with viewers, fellow guests, and most importantly, Lee Tao himself.

In contrast, "non-regular" panelists are invited for both their expertise and ideological stance towards a given topic. It is telling that these two criteria are often blurred, particularly when the call-in show's dual goals are to entertain and inform. While one way to achieve these objectives is to select a controversial topic, the other is to convene as contentious a guest panel as possible. This includes pre-selecting individuals who are willing to articulate and represent dissenting perspectives and unpopular opinions.

Preliminary phone interviews with potential panelists allow the production unit to assess if they meet their guest panel profile as well as to gauge their stance towards the evening's topic.[60] Between inviting a well-informed versus TV savvy guest, production units typically select the latter as they are regarded as being more televisually compelling than the former. As Shih Hsin University (世新大學) communications professor James C. Hsiung (Hsiung Jie 熊杰) explained, "[If] you're not dynamic enough, [or] you don't have *enough*" an individual won't be considered, much less invited as a guest panelist (Hsiung Jie 2000; original emphasis).[61] Consequently, speakers who articulate their ideas clearly, concisely, and in an entertaining fashion are coveted and regarded as "A-list" guest panelists. This practice is also common in interviews as news programs

[60] Contacting potential guests (typically through a politician's assistant or secretary) occupies the entire morning period—roughly from 8:30 a.m. to 1 p.m.—given the difficulty in locating the individual and then waiting for their return call.

[61] It is interesting that Prof. Hsiung evokes "enough" to encapsulate all the intangible qualities that an individual needs to be invited at a call-in show panelist.

are "obliged" to seek subjects who can make events seem interesting (Berman 1992). The challenge, then, is to find guests who are knowledgeable about a topic as well as physically and linguistically attractive to audiences.

As the leading political TV call-in show, *2100* is in the enviable position to be selective in their invitations, insofar as to even disinvite guests. If an individual known for her conservative views reveals herself to be more moderate than expected, the person may later be replaced in favor of someone else who meets the "role" (e.g., ideological position) the program seeks. Another reason might derive from changes in the program's direction or featured topic(s). This often arises from sudden shifts in the daily news cycle, loss of interest in the initial topic, or difficulties in finding guests who can, or are willing, to take different sides to the selected issue. The last reason is particularly important for a call-in show, for if several guests advocate the same viewpoint, it undermines the "crisis" discourses upon which the call-in show thrives and produces.[62] Should the topic still be deemed worthy for broadcast, the production unit will then continue to find qualified panelists. This usually requires broadening the list of invitees from the political realm to mass media and academic spheres, and upon occasion, to non-profit organizations and independent scholars/writers.

The decision-making process for the final group of panelists can be as informed as it is arbitrary; that is, the most knowledgeable individuals may not prevail, while more "recognizable" or "well-known" personalities do. That is not to say that the popular personalities are not well-versed in the topic for discussion. The comparison only serves to emphasize that an individual's knowledge of the topic alone is not enough for one to be selected for a call-in show appearance. Other times, the opposite occurs where a less familiar figure is invited in an attempt to introduce a fresh face and voice into a repeatedly featured yet still popular and controversial issue. Lastly, potential guests may themselves suddenly

[62] I elaborate upon what I mean by "crisis discourses" in Chapter Three.

decide to bow out from a program due to unforeseen events or an invitation from another program, though this scenario is less likely to happen to *2100* than to other call-in programs.

Given that *2100* is the top-ranked TV call-in program in Taiwan, most invited speakers prefer to appear on *2100* over other programs given its higher ratings, and hence, greater audience exposure. *2100* also has an unstated policy that they do like to have guests appear on more than one program per evening, whereas other political TV call-in programs do not. Finally, once the guest panel has been confirmed, the production staff provides Lee Tao with a summary of each panelist's perspective to help him prepare for the program.

In contrast, guest panelists for *8 o'clock* are generally decided by Mia and one other staff member. Given that *8 o'clock*'s staff does not report to work until early afternoon, they often find that their guest selection is limited to whomever the other call-in shows do not invite. Moreover, as a result of moderator Yü Fu's blunt moderating style, *8 o'clock* has a reputation for inciting animated discussions, which dissuades potential panelists who dislike this approach.[63] Yet, despite these qualities, *8 o'clock* remains Taiwan's second-ranked political TV call-in program, a status that lends it considerable political weight as well as commercial success.

THE STUDIO SETTING

The *2100* studio

A row of blue, textured office chairs spaced a body width and a half apart are lined up behind a curvilinear table. Pads of paper and pens have been placed neatly before each seat, while a flat-screen monitor occupies the far right end of the table. A recessed TV monitor behind the moderator's seat intermittently flashes different images, graphics, and words. A grey and bright blue backdrop

with a network of Swiss-cheese holes serve as the set's backdrop. Such are the details of *2100*'s call-in show studio that viewers see on their television screens.

Beyond the viewers' gaze, however, one can find three large cameras on mobile tripods, more computers and closed-circuit television sets, floodlights, extra chairs, pitchers filled with hot water, butcher paper, and overhead speakers. In addition, a largely silent yet cognizant production staff stands in the wings as they closely monitor the entire broadcast. Their roles range from refilling the guests' and host's glasses with hot water,[64] resetting the 20-second timer for each caller, signaling when a commercial break is due, or notifying the host when a video segment is ready. Although *2100* has its own studio, its operation spills beyond the formal studio's steel vault door and spills into a cramped space which I call the "half studio."[65] It is here that *2100*'s eleven call-in operators, seated in two rows of five to six people each, receive callers and log their personal information (e.g., name, gender, and calling location).

The *2100* production staff usually arrives in the studio half an hour to 45 minutes before its 9 p.m. broadcast, the time when the majority of its competitors are airing their programs during the time slot of 8 to 9 p.m. One staff member records the other call-in shows' topics and guest panelists as a means to keep track of the competition. This information is later stored in a binder for future reference. Another staff member accompanies the broadcast manager—who is in continuous communication with the moderator through a headset and microphone and cues him throughout the broadcast—in the control room where the program is composed through added text, graphics, split-screens, and other technological

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[63] Excerpts of Yü Fu's moderating style is provided later in the dissertation.

[64] It is common for people in Taiwan, as well as other Chinese societies, to prefer to drink hot rather than cold water.

[65] The call-in show operators' quarters are so tightly confined that the outward swinging studio doors to its left and right only open to one-third of their full axis. Given that the width of the door opening is barely one medium-sized body wide, entering and exiting the *2100* studio requires one to shuffle sideways into the room (for even petite, Taiwanese women).

wizardry. The remaining four staff members spread themselves throughout the studio. Once Lee Tao takes his place behind the call-in show desk, however, all eyes remain on him.

Guest panelists begin arriving approximately 30 minutes prior to airtime. They are first directed to the make-up studio, which is located on the 16th floor. After their make-up has been applied (for all guests regardless of gender), the guests make their way to the *2100* studio one floor below. As they enter, Lee Tao interrupts his activities in mid-gesture or mid-sentence to heartily greet guests by enthusiastically shaking their hand and patting them on the shoulder. The consummate host, Lee facilitates guests introductions, asks questions, engages in small talk in order to put the panelists at ease.

Once a majority of the guests have arrived and are seated, Lee Tao positions himself in the center of the room and on top of the *2100* logo that lies on the floor in front of the guest panelists. He then launches into a five minute "pre-broadcast" talk that outlines the show's topic(s), its ramifications, and the questions/possibilities it raises. Lee Tao's enthusiasm is evident through his animated gestures, and most distinctly, in his voice inflection. During Lee Tao's talk, guest panelists might venture a joke or two, foreshadowing the animated and quick-witted discussion to come.

The *8 o'clock* studio

Located just outside of the *8 o'clock* studio, the makeup/greenroom is sparsely outfitted with a set of two barber shop-styled chairs facing a wall of brightly lit mirrors. An armchair and small couch are arranged in an alcove near the door, while a small storage room filled with costumes occupies a back corner of the room. The small space creates an intimate setting that lets the guest panelists and moderator to mingle and make small talk prior to the broadcast. Panelists arrive anywhere between 30 minutes to a few minutes prior to the 8 p.m.

air time.[66] Once guest panelists begin to file in, Yü Fu assumes his role as host, filling in the awkward down time between make-up and the program broadcast. Yü Fu's hosting style include plying his captive audience with anecdotes of his travels, accounts of his two daughters, personal observations of recent sociopolitical events, and the occasional politically incorrect joke. [67]

Figure 3: The *8 o'clock* studio set with moderator, Yü Fu (far right), and five guest panelists deliberating the featured topic: "Former ROC president Lee (Teng-hui), ROC president (Chen Shui-) Bian, ROC vice president Lu (Hsiu-lian): Who is most for Taiwan independence?"

Once the previous program (a Japanese pop culture show) exits the shared studio, Yü Fu and the panelists make their way onto the *8 o'clock* set. The studio space itself is divided into three different sets. The call-in show set is located directly across from that of the Japanese pop culture program. The difference between the two sets presents a study of contrasts. The *8 o'clock* sound stage, coordinated in steel grey, blue, and yellow, includes a semi-circular row of chairs that surround a prominent *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* logo, the size and shape

[66] An *8 o'clock* staff member greets the guests in the 1st floor lobby and personally escorts them to the elevators, as the elevators are only accessible to building pass holders after 7:30 p.m. Some panelists even arrive after the broadcast has begun.

of a large dial. In contrast, the Japanese program features a jarring kaleidoscope of colors from neon pink and fluorescent green to sherbet orange and lemon zinger.

The seating arrangement for the guest panelists is similar to that of *2100*, with the moderator positioned at the right end of a long table while the guest panelists sit to left. A row of three TV sets, suspended from the ceiling behind the panelists, flash an undulating SETN logo throughout the broadcast. Directly opposite the call-in set stands a life-sized Hello Kitty with a clock for a stomach that stars impassively at the participants. Various other IKEA-inspired[68] items fill out the pop cultural program's set, including a backdrop of bookcases lined with pop cultural kitsch such as stuffed animals, CD cases, and magazines. During the broadcast, I perch my laptop on a pink cube-shaped coffee table and I sit on the edge of an overstuffed lime-green armchair as I type my notes.

A three-person crew operates the cameras while a set manager cues the moderator for commercial breaks and callers. One *8 o'clock* production staff member stands opposite to the moderator near a dry erase board to write each caller's name, gender, and location for Yü Fu's reference. Although Mia is present on the set during the broadcast, her role is more of a bystander. For instance, she shuttles between the set, control room, and call-in operator room more to monitor than direct the proceedings. Occasionally, however, she will consult with Yü Fu during commercial breaks to remind him to stay on topic or follow up a previous line of questioning.

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[67] Yü Fu is also an avid world traveler and photographer. He once gave me copies of a calendar that was filled with photographs that he had personally taken.

[68] IKEA had opened at least three stores in Taipei by 1999-2000. Its distinct furniture and interior decorating style quickly influenced Taiwan's culture, including its television programs. I recall seeing a program featuring a couple in their mid-to late 20's that took place entirely in their bedroom, which was decorated entirely by IKEA products.

THE BROADCAST

2100 program format

The *2100* broadcast begins with a 30-second video montage of previous *2100* episodes, accompanied by digitized music punctuated with fast-paced drum beats. Following this segment, the camera swings over to Lee Tao as he poses in his signature hunched, elbow-leaning posture. Lee Tao begins the program with an opening monologue, similar to the one in the chapter's epigraph, which welcomes viewers and introduces the evening's topic. Lee Tao then introduces each panelist by their occupational title(s)—such as "Legislator," "professor," "editor-in-chief," "director," or "former VP candidate"—and affiliation (e.g. political party, organization, company). As a group, Lee Tao refers to the panelists as "honored guests" (*guibin* 貴賓), a generic term of respect that can be used in a variety of social contexts. To the viewer, guest panelists are identified in the lower right hand corner of the screen by their social position (first line); if applicable, by political affiliation (second line, in parentheses); and by name (third line, separated by a red bar). As for the television audience, Lee refers to them with an equal mixture of politeness and intimacy, addressing them as "(our) viewer friends" (*guanzhong pengyoumen* 觀眾朋友們).

Following these formalities, each panelist is invited to briefly present their perspective towards the featured topic, speaking between two to four minutes each. The order in which panelists are invited to speak is arbitrary, usually decided upon by Lee Tao minutes before the broadcast.[69] These opening summaries assist the viewer in situating each panelist's ideological stance regarding the featured topic.

Figure 4: The studio setting at *2100: All People Open Talk*. Present are seven legislators deliberating the featured topic, "Big reconciliation: what is our (national) identity?"

2100 follows a five segment, four commercial break broadcast format. The first commercial break typically arrives 12 to 15 minutes into the program, during which time each panelist has addressed the topic at least once. Although the production staff outlines to the second the length of each segment and commercial break, Lee Tao regularly diverges from this master plan. Lee Tao often makes impromptu, executive decisions on when to cut to a commercial break, how long a segment will run, and how many callers to receive per episode. From my observations, these decisions are based on his "feel" for the program's rhythm. For instance, if a heated deliberation is underway, Lee Tao may either allow it to continue to maintain the program momentum, or inversely, interrupt the discussion for a commercial break to create suspense and pique viewer interest.

Unlike *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*, where speaker interruptions and overlapping is common if not expected (I expand upon this later), Lee Tao

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[69] Should Lee Tao invite the panelist immediately to his right to speak first, the remaining panelists speak in adjacent seat order sequence. The same applies if the guest furthest from Lee Tao is invited to introduce her perspective first.

maintains a tight hold on the program's progression including speaker turns, the introduction of video clips, and commercial breaks. Another reason why overlaps seldom occur derives from Lee Tao's tendency to paraphrase or reinterpret a speaker's remarks, thus preventing a guest panelist from securing the next speaker turn. Generally, clearly defined panelist turn taking is the rule, while interruptions and floor-wrestling are the exception on *2100*. Should callers personally denigrate another speaker—be it a panelist, moderator, or caller—Lee Tao politely reminds them to critique the issue and not the person. In turn, Lee Tao performs the language and behavior he exhorts his guests and callers to adopt, namely, one of tolerance and open-mindedness on the one hand, and the sharing of personal experiences and perspectives on the other.

Depending on the remaining time, each guest is given 15 to 30 seconds to summarize their arguments at the end of each episode. Lee Tao's closing monologue reminds viewers of the topic's relevance to current sociopolitical events, while thanking viewers for their participation and reminding them to return the following night for another episode of *2100*. Due to the program's free-flowing script, *2100* often exceeds its allotted one hour broadcast time by running five to ten minutes longer. In other words, Lee Tao's moderating style both influences *2100*'s variable broadcast length as well as characterizes the program's inspired format.

Callers on *2100* are addressed in an even more perfunctory manner given the program's unmatched inclusion of 20-30 callers per episode. By including so many callers, however, requires placing a 20-second cap to each caller's speaking time. A sequentially ascending digital clock shown on the lower right hand side of the TV screen reminds both callers and the moderator of this time limit. Should a caller surpass the 20-second mark, Lee Tao may allow a grace period of five seconds for the caller to wrap up, though he usually interrupts the caller by thanking her and introducing the next caller. This speaking limit was initiated

even before the arrival of call-in teams (*kouying budui* 叩應部隊), which appeared in full force during the last three months of Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. Call-in teams are comprised of volunteers who are usually supporters of a particular political party or candidate. The teams emerge on the call-in show scene during an election period, and more so for national than local elections. More discussion of callers and call-in teams is provided later in this chapter.

However, guest panelists and callers do find ways to subvert and outmaneuver such speaking constraints. Panelists might capitalize on the brief silence between a previous guest's comments and Lee's summarizing soliloquies or simply interrupt another speaker. Callers have less latitude to break the timed speaking harness imposed upon them by both the digital clock and Lee's preemptory "thank you's," which pragmatically signal that the caller's 20-seconds of abbreviated Warholian[70] fame has been breeched. Yet, rambling callers frequently escape with a few seconds of unallotted speaking time.

While some scholars note that new mass media programming such as call-in shows have provided the people of Taiwan with greater opportunities to participate in the political process, they simultaneously criticize these shows for restricting public opinion to "the last five minutes of the program," deriding such moments as hardly representative of "political participation" (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2001:67). Although this study focuses on the linguistic tactics call-in show participants use to frame program topics as crises, and less on their participatory nature (cf. Shen 1999), the ethnographic observations I proffer in this study suggest that viewers creatively maximize their allotted 20 seconds in ways that strategically articulate their political perspectives and personal experiences.

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[70] In using "Warholian," I refer to U.S. artist Andy Warhol's infamous line that every person on earth will enjoy at least 15 minutes of fame. In this case, I suggest that Taiwan's call-in shows provide callers at least 20 seconds of broadcast fame. Given Warhol's close association with

8 o'clock program format

In comparison to *2100*'s more flexible broadcast format, *8 o'clock*'s telecast is predictably divided into five segments and four commercial breaks with little variation episode to episode.[71] The first segment includes a topic and guest panel introduction by the moderator, which is followed by a one-minute video montage and voice-over that situates the featured topic within current events, opening comments by each panelists, and a brief panel discussion. *8 o'clock* also adds a 30-second "Supplement" segment prior to each commercial break that presents quotes or a chronology of events related to the topic, which I elaborate upon later in the chapter.

During the second and third segments, which run between eight to ten minutes, the moderator receives three caller comments in each segment, which he intersperses between panelist deliberations. In the fourth segment, which lasts between seven to eight minutes, the moderator gradually wraps up the panel discussion. The fifth segment constitutes a three to five minute free-for-all conclusion that includes little moderator direction as the panelists speak over each other in a bid for having the last word. When *8 o'clock*'s theme music begins to play over the studio speakers, the moderator is cued to quickly summarize the episode's deliberation, thank the viewers, and remind them to return for the next broadcast.

THE CALLERS

2100 call-in phone bank

By far, *2100* has the most sophisticated caller selection process among all the call-in programs, which incidentally, reflects the program's high caller traffic. As previously mentioned, *2100*'s call-in phone bank or operator room resides in

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popular culture, I reappropriate his utterance within the infotainment programming genre of Taiwan's call-in shows.

the "half studio" space outside the program's main studio. Thirty red telephones are neatly arranged on two staggered rows, behind which five to six operators are seated per row. Each operator is assigned to three phones. A blue cardboard tag with a number that increases in succession from right to left, front row to back row, is attached to the back of each phone. Thus, the operator in the front row far right, answers phones 11, 12, and 13, while the operator to her right monitors phones 21, 22, and 23, and so on. Similarly, the operator in the second row, far right answers phones 61, 62, and 63, while the person her right uses phones 71, 72, and 73, etc.

Figure 5: The *2100* call-in phone bank, as shown on the screen to the right of the moderator, Lee Tao. The call-in "hot line" number for *2100* is shown at the bottom of the screen and below the topic headline: "(ROC President) A-bian wants Tang Fei: is this a 'mission impossible'?"

The head operator sits in the center of the first row and manages the switchboard that links each phone and caller with both the call-in show studio's speaker system and the control room during the program. Directly in front of the switchboard hangs a long Plexiglas holder that can carry up to six large drawing pads. When fielding a caller, the operator asks for the caller's surname, gender,

[71] For an outline of the program, see the *8 o'clock* "rundown" sheet in Appendix C.

and calling location, which she records with a felt-tip marker on a large drawing board. For instance, the operator would identify a caller's gender by writing either an "L" (for "lady") for a female or an "S" (for "sir") for a male in a lower right hand box.[72] In the upper right hand box, the operator records the caller's calling location such as Taipei county (*Taibeixian* 台北縣). Lastly, the caller's surname (e.g., "Chen" (陳)) is written in the center and represents the most prominent notation on the drawing pad. Meanwhile, the operator asks the caller to wait on the line until Lee Tao cues the operator to connect the caller's phone line with the studio and control room.

Suspended from the ceiling directly opposite the call-in operators is a TV camera that captures the entire phone bank set. This camera allows TV viewers to literally watch the operators on their television screens, which appears in a small window below the main image. This live broadcast of *2100*'s phone bank achieves several purposes some functional, others symbolic. Practically speaking, the drawing boards inform the moderator of the caller's name, location, and gender, which he reads aloud to the studio participants and viewing audience.

The operator room broadcast also allows callers, who are often simultaneously watching the program, to monitor the order their call will be aired. Featuring the operators at work through live footage also provides viewers a "behind-the-scenes" peak that portrays the program in an unmediated or "raw" form. The image of young, fresh-faced operators—who are predominantly female and range in age from the early to late twenties—contrasts in age and gender with the older, and predominantly male, guests and moderator. Given that other call-in programs do not broadcast their call-in operation, *2100*'s inclusion of this footage

[72] Although "L" and "S" may seem odd choices to the native English speaker, rather than "F" for female and "M" for male, they nonetheless roughly correspond to similar gendered address terms in Chinese, namely, *xiaojie* (小姐), which means "Miss," and *xiansheng* (先生), which means "Mister" or "Sir," respectively.

symbolically presents the show as being upfront and open about its caller selection process, which enhances the program's viewer credibility.

8 o'clock call-in operation

While *2100* boasts eleven operators on its call-in staff, *8 o'clock* relies upon a one-person, three-phone, six-line call-in operation. Moreover, *8 o'clock* airs only six callers per episode, a format that rarely changes. *8 o'clock*'s modest call-in operation is situated in a narrow room, about twenty times smaller than that of *2100*'s. Its operator is not broadcast live, and moreover, caller phone numbers are not filtered and selected by an external telecommunications company. A production staff member doubles as the call-in operator during the broadcast and takes calls in sequential caller order. The operator records the callers' name, location, and gender on a pad of paper, which is then handed to another production staff member who writes the information on a white erase board located in the studio. As he watches the program broadcast via a small television set in the cramped "switchboard room," the operator waits for the moderator to introduce a caller's name before linking the phone line with the studio control room. As the call is broadcast over the air, it is simultaneously transmitted over the sound system within the studio for the guest panelists and moderator to hear.

Unlike *2100* where each call is restricted to 20 seconds, callers on *8 o'clock* do not face a set speaking time limit. Rather, the moderator decides when to conclude a call. Upon occasion, the moderator places a caller on hold, asks a panelist to respond to the caller's remarks, and then returns to the caller for further comments. Featuring fewer callers consequently allows *8 o'clock* to incorporate panelist-caller and moderator-caller interactions, an option that *2100*'s call-in assembly line format precludes.

Figure 6: *8 o'clock* guest panelist, New Party Legislator Hsieh Chi-ta (left), and moderator, Yü Fu (right), listening to a caller's remarks. The call-in phone number is listed on the bottom of the screen.

Although *8 o'clock* is also targeted by call-in teams, a caller phenomenon I clarify in the next section, it does not use screening procedures to thwart or diminish their presence on the program. One reason may be its low caller acceptance ratio. Another explanation may derive from its parent TV company's political orientation. Given SETN's self-promotion as a "native Taiwan" (*bentu* 本土) TV station and its "Taiwanization" approach to programming, its viewers tend to be more open to pro-Taiwan sentiments and pro-DPP supporters. Consequently, call-in teams may find it difficult to penetrate *8 o'clock*'s core audience, and therefore, consider it more profitable to focus their efforts on other TV call-in programs during the 8 p.m. to 9 p.m. time slot instead.[73]

Call-in team phenomenon

The conflation of Taiwan's increasingly competitive electoral environment and call-in show mania (*kouying rechao* 叩應熱潮) has contributed

to the recent campaign tactic of using call-in teams to flood call-in show switchboards with the aim of manipulating the political representation of its received callers. Call-in teams can be differentiated between those that are "organized" versus "non-organized."[74] While both types involve callers who speak on a political candidate's behalf, organized call-in teams are more likely to be managerially and spatially (e.g., in one location) centralized.

For instance, organized call-in teams operate from a facility equipped with computerized phones that can repeatedly dial a call-in show with different phone numbers. The campaign staff provides organized call-in teams with several prepared scripts or "talking points," including slogans that promote their candidate, or inversely, disparage their opponents. Callers on organized teams are also monetarily compensated for participating and are even given a financial bonus if their call is aired. In contrast, non-organized or voluntary call-in teams are not centralized in one location. These callers generally dial from non-automated phones and from a personal residence or cell phone. Like its counterpart, non-organized call-in teams have access to talking points prepared by their candidate's political party. However, non-organized call-in team members generally speak without prearranged scripts, in other words "naturally," which is one way of distinguishing between the two types of call-in teams during a program.[75]

Regardless of its organized or non-organized structure, call-in teams reflect the degree to which callers play an increasingly strategic role not only on

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[73] This assessment assumes that call-in teams are primarily KMT-friendly, or even more specifically, KMT supported. From my conversations with informants, it appeared that the origanized and paid call-in teams were KMT-based.

[74] It was very difficult to determine which political parties had "organized" versus "non-organized" call-in teams as well as to procure the actual prepared call-in scripts. However, it is widely circulated that the former ruling party, the KMT, had organized call-in teams while opposition parties—such as the DPP, NP and Independent candidate James Soong's campaign—relied upon non-organized call-in teams.

Taiwan's political call-in shows but in the campaign environment as well. For veteran call-in show participants and viewers, spotting call-in team and non-call-in team callers has become a game of sorts. According to some informants, a familiar voice heard on an earlier episode, or those who use hackneyed slogans or familiar "good (political) party/bad party" stories, often reveals that a caller hails from a call-in team.

In contrast, the average caller calling from home on a single phone line is at a disadvantage when competing against call-in teams with automated phones, scripted slogans, and monetary incentives. However, as the call-in show excerpts I later examine will demonstrate, the most personal and entertaining callers are those who speak from their own perspectives and share personal anecdotes. To the best of my knowledge, the calls that I analyze do not include those from call-in teams. Consequently, this study does not address call-in team language use, an area I fully encourage other scholars to explore.

Caller selection process: strategic randomness

In response to the emergence of call-in teams, *2100* implemented procedures to screen their presence and hopefully diminish their impact. It was the first call-in program to contract its caller selection operation to an outside private telecommunications firm, which designed and implemented a procedure that weeds out assumed call-in team phone numbers. For instance, the telecommunications firm would automatically reject sequential phone numbers (i.e., 2477-4000, 2477-4001, etc.), which usually suggests numbers belonging to an organized call-in team. Another feature involves amassing caller phone numbers until a certain point in the program, then submitting the numbers to the telecommunications company for random selection. These phone numbers are sent when a button, which sits on the front edge of the panelists' table and is

[75] Of course, organized call-in teams could have caught on to this distinction and thus altered their

visible to studio and television viewers alike, within the call-in show studio is pressed, an honored task that Lee Tao asks one of the panelists to perform.

From the amassed phone numbers, the telecommunication's company selects a group of 20 numbers and transmits them to a computer in the call-in operator studio. These 20 phone numbers are then projected on a closed-circuit TV monitor for the operators' reference. From this list, each operator is assigned two phone numbers from which she selects and calls a non-Taipei City/County phone number. The reasoning behind this method is to give priority to non-Taipei, (e.g., non-02 area code) phone numbers in order to provide a more "balanced" caller representation around the country. For instance, if one number has a Kaohsiung area code and the other a Taipei one, the Kaohsiung number will take precedence. If both numbers have non-Taipei area codes, the operator randomly chooses one of the two.[76] In cases where the phone number turns out to be an "empty" line with no answer, the operator dials the second phone number.[77] There are several reasons why a phone number may have no response. One possible reason is that the number belongs to an "organized" call-in team which uses automated phones and serial phone numbers. Non-answered phone numbers provide operators another means for weeding out calls from call-in teams.

2100's counter call-in team tactics seem to reduce their presence and influence on the program. Nevertheless, call-in teams were still able to infiltrate *2100*'s call-in operation, as well as those of other call-in shows, and subsequently provide the call-in team's political candidate with 20-seconds worth of free air time.

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strategy to include calls that sounded unscripted and thus "genuine."

[76] This also applies if both phone numbers have Taipei area codes.

[77] This is the second reason why each operator is assigned two phone numbers despite the fact that only 10 callers are selected per call-in group.

THE PROPS: FRAMING THE TOPIC

Aside from its human participants, a call-in show episode is also filled with various inanimate props including topic headlines, video clips or longer video montages, satellite-fed interviews of guests who are unable to appear in the studio, and computer graphics such as political cartoons and program titles. Different topics and program styles lend themselves to certain props better than others; thus the variety of props varies from episode to episode as well as from program to program. The following represents the standard props that *2100* and *8 o'clock* regularly use in their broadcasts.

Headlines and teasers

In a significant departure from other call-in shows that concentrate on only one topic per one-hour episode, *2100* may feature two to four topics within the same time span. Sometimes the topics are related and merely refinements of an initially broad issue; other times they represent a hodge-podge collection of current events that reflect the eclectic news day.

As with the production process, Lee Tao also decides each episode's headlines and teasers (or subheadline). He typically drafts headlines in the studio as he reviews that evening's program. As soon as the headlines are completed, they are delivered by voice over an in-studio microphone to the broadcasting booth so that they can be typed into a Mac computer program for later broadcast.

Aside from the moderator's introduction of the topic, headlines or teasers represent the primary frame from which participants understand the featured issue. Most headliners are phrased as a question—such as "Should the Vice President be recalled?"—which establishes a pro/con, yes/no deliberative format. In the aforementioned example, the use of "recalled" rather than "retained" also frames the question in a manner that already entertains the possibility of removing rather than keeping Annette Lu as Vice President (cf. Shen 1999:232-236). Shen claims that to frame a topic in a question form "implies, above all, that the issue is

open to discussion" (ibid:233). Occasionally, programs construct headlines in a proclamatory manner, such as "China Bans A-mei!" (*Zhonggong fengsha A-mei!* 中共封殺阿妹!). These types of headliners have an aura of outrage that increases the crisis mentality of an event or issue. For instance, Shen observes that the call-in program's "open-to-discussion" spirit is conveyed in the headline's statement, or in this case exclamatory, format (ibid:233).

Oftentimes, *2100* inserts variations of its program name "All People Open Talk" within the headline as a tag line. For instance, in the aforementioned teaser "China Bans A-mei!" the full headline for this episode reads: "China Bans A-mei! All People Open Talk!" Although Shen (1999) documents *2100*'s use of "open talk" in its statement-oriented headlines—such as "The legislator opened mouth to bite? Voters open mouths to talk" (立委開咬? 選民開講!) and "One month after the presidential inauguration: All people come for open talk" (總統就職滿月，全民來開講!)—she fails to link this rhetorical format as a calculated gesture of call-in show self-promotion (234).[78] Spitulnik (1997) finds a similar practice in her study of Zambian radio broadcasts and states that program titles "are designed for reproducibility and recognizability" by listeners or, in the case of call-in shows, viewers (172). By embedding the program name within the headline, *2100* strategically achieves several marketing strategies: to promote the program, to link the program's objective with the deliberated topic, and lastly, to increase viewer recognition of the program as a *2100* product.

From my observations, no other call-in show included its program name within a headline or teaser. Whether this finding indicates other programs' non-creative headline-making endeavors or modest restraint is uncertain. However, the fact that *2100*'s program name occasionally doubles up as a headliner reveals a practice that is not hindered by any of the aforementioned reasons.

In comparison, *8 o'clock*'s headlines are crafted through a group brainstorming process that includes both the production staff and moderator. Although Mia generally crafts the final headline, other production staff members are always invited to contribute. Headline-making at *8 o'clock* often inspires humorous word play among the staff, usually leading to titles that are inappropriate for a politically-oriented program. While many of the other tasks in the call-in production process requires "serious" work such as research, collating, and condensing information, in contrast headline-making opens the door for greater creativity, including language play.

Despite its marginal role within the entire production process, crafting call-in show headlines are critical as it establishes an episode's theme and directs the subsequent discussion's initial line of inquiry. Headlines can thus both inform and direct viewers in their assessments toward an controversial sociopolitical issue or event. For instance, the following two part headline—"Recalling 'A-Lian': is it that serious?" (*Bamian A-lian You name yanzhong*? 罷免阿蓮:有那麼嚴重?)—exposes the call-in show's own interpretation of recent events, namely, whether a legislative motion to recall Vice President Annette Lu is warranted. First, by using a fictional, hybrid name "A-Lian"[79] in the main headline, the call-in show subtly implicates both President Chen and Vice President Lu within the recall motion rather than linking it with VP Lu alone. This linguistic maneuver tactically broadens the issue to incorporate President Chen as well as shifts the focus from the recall motion to Chen and Lu's rocky working relationship. Through a nine-character headline, the call-in show predisposes

[78] The second title refers to former President Lee Teng-hui's 1996 inauguration and Taiwan's first direct presidential election. The English translations are the original author's.

[79] Again, the abbreviation "A-Lian" (啊蓮) is comprised of the first character in President Chen's nickname "A-bian" (阿扁) and the second character in VP Lu's given name Hsiu-lian (秀蓮).

viewers' interpretation of events, including whether VP Lu's recent behavior warrants a recall vote.[80]

Introductory montage

Although *8 o'clock*'s moderator introduces the topic of discussion in the call-in show's opening sequence, Yü Fu does not situate the issue as Lee Tao does in his opening monologue. Rather, a one-minute video montage with accompanying voice-over performs this function. An *8 o'clock* staff member prepares the montage by culling from various news clips within the SETN video archives, while the accompanying text is researched and written by a second staff member. Preparing the introductory text may take most of the afternoon as the staff member must be alert to any changing developments throughout the day related to the chosen topic. Selecting and slicing the news clips for the video montage can be completed within an hour or less, depending upon how many clips are included, and is typically accomplished one to two hours before the broadcast. After the video segment's completion, a voice-over is added, which is usually read by a female production unit member.[81]

The following represents an example of an introductory segment for an episode on "Recalling 'A-Lian': is it that serious?" (*Bamian A-lian you name yanzhong*? 罷免阿蓮 有那麼嚴重?)**.** The verbal text, in both the original Chinese version and an English translation, follows:

> 國民黨立委今天發起罷免副總統呂秀蓮，而且親民黨，新黨立委也都 加入連署，因此整個罷免呂秀連案已經逼近通過門檻，罷免案發起人國民黨立委穆閩珠批評呂秀蓮無視於副總統備位而不干政的憲政職份，一再發表

[80] I examine excerpts from this episode later in the dissertation.

[81] The person who reads the text is usually not the same person who writes it. The reason why a female voice is used for the voice-over may be related to the public perception that I often heard in my interviews with call-in participants, and namely from male informants, that female announcers and broadcasters have a more "attractive" sounding voice.

不當言論，加深兩岸緊張的關係，罷免案將提供陳水扁總統一個重新選擇副總統的機會。而對罷免呂秀蓮的聲浪轉高，日前才發新聞稿否認黑臉說的總統府，終於出面表遺憾，也澄清陳水扁，呂秀蓮互動良好，外界傳聞並非事實。從民進黨主席林義雄出面制約，到國代建議，立委發起罷免，呂秀蓮就任不到一個月，就經歷如此重大的政治風暴，呂秀蓮到底不能能閃得過？雖然民進黨禁止黨籍立委連署，但是立委周伯倫引用陳水扁的--"國家利益鉤高於 政黨利益" 談話，認為不該強制約束，使得副總 統自己的同志也可能加入。副總統罷免案，使立法院熱鬧滾滾，但是立法院想罷免呂秀蓮，真的是為了台海安全著想？還是想拿 呂秀蓮，嚇唬 嚇唬陳水扁？

Today, KMT Legislators proposed a motion to recall Vice President Lu Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu). People's First Party and New Party legislators, moreover, also followed suit. Consequently, the entire Vice Presidential Recall Bill is close to surpassing the required threshold. The author of the [VP] Recall Bill and KMT legislator Mu Minzhu criticized Lu for ignoring the fact that, according to the constitution, the Vice Presidency is not designed to interfere with policy making. But Lu has continuously issued inappropriate statements, which has [contributed to] intensifying and worsening relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Recall Bill will give President Chen Shui-bian another opportunity to select a vice president. As clamor for the recall of Lu Hsiu-lian increases, the Presidential office recently issued a news release that denied [Lu's] "black face" remarks. It also finally expressed their regrets [for the comments] and clarified President Chen and Vice President Lu's relations as being on good terms. Circulating rumors about their relations as being otherwise are inaccurate. From DPP Chairman Lin Yixiong's [call for] restraint, to the National Assembly's proposal, to Legislators' motion to recall [the Vice President], it has been barely a month since Lu took office. Given these recent and large political eruptions, can Lu evade these attacks? Although the DPP forbids its legislators from supporting the motion, Legislator Zhou Bolun has [nevertheless] quoted President Chen's slogan that "national interests take precedence over party interests" to state that the party should not forcefully restrict them [and their actions]. This has caused [even] the Vice President's own colleagues to participate in the motion. [As such], the Vice President Recall Bill has caused the Legislative Yuan to boil over with excitement. Yet, is the Legislative Yuan's interest in recalling the Vice President truly in the name of preserving peace in the Taiwan Straits? Or is it [merely] using [VP] Lu to frighten [Pres.] Chen?

The introductory summary's wording and its accompaniment of selected video clips frames the featured topic, the recalling of Vice President Lu from elected office, in a manner that predisposes the viewer's assessments in a crisis-oriented direction. The introductory montage's framing process begins subtly, first by presenting several "facts," and then by gradually introducing more

circumspect evaluations. For instance, the introduction blandly states that a recall bill was initiated by a group of KMT (Nationalist) party legislators who sought to remove Vice President Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lian 呂秀蓮) from office. The text then builds upon this information by noting that the People's First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP), both of which are KMT splinter parties, also introduced similar legislative bills soon after. Thus, within two lines, the introduction has rhetorically escalated the tensions surrounding the unprecedented recall bill as well as established the grounds for a political confrontation between the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its opposition parties, including the aforementioned KMT, NP, and PFP.

At the end of the introductory passage, it explicitly states why VP Lu should be recalled. However, it does so by framing it within the remarks of opposition party legislator, KMT Legislator Mu Minzhu (穆閩珠), who claims that VP Lu has overstepped the bounds of her elected office and constitutionally designated powers. Without analyzing the entire introductory segment, one can see that with each line, the oppositional party dissent against Vice President Lu builds both "factually," through the listing of legislative behavior, as well as rhetorically, through the inclusion of "reported" statements by certain politicians.[82]

However, what I wish to emphasize here is the introductory passage's use of reported speech, namely, indirect reported speech. This rhetorical strategy allows the reporter, in this case the call-in program, to provide "evidence" and "sources" of why this headlining topic warrants attention and discussion. I expand upon call-in participants' strategic speech reporting practices and their

[82] I place "reported" in quotation marks in order to highlight that what is described as reported reported is not always a faithful reproduction of a prior utterance. I introduce various theoretical understandings of this linguistic device in Chapter Four.

effectiveness in contributing to the call-in show's crisis frame in my analysis of call-in show excerpts later in the dissertation.

Lastly, the introductory segment situates or frames the topic's discussion even before the guest panelists have had an opportunity to present their own perspectives. Based on a scripted narrative that is supplemented with background video clips of images somewhat related to the verbal text, the introduction audio/visual montage carries more weight than its one-minute air time suggests.

The staff member who writes the verbal text is usually not the same person who compiles and edits the video clip montage. In addition, a third person may record the verbal text that viewers hear during the call-in show broadcast. Video clips for the introduction montage are taken from an archive of video footage taken by SETN cameramen. Occasionally, the introduction's verbal text will be paired with video footage that is not chronologically accurate. For instance, if the text describes President Chen as performing a duty, such as visiting a hospital, that occurred earlier that day, the video clip may feature him doing a similar activity but on a different day.

Although the introductory montage can stand alone disconnected from the rest of the program, its presence and inclusion is significant by assuming that viewers (and perhaps even guest panelists) need the background information or perspective it offers before launching into an open discussion of the featured topic. In other words, *8 o'clock* does not assume that its viewers are knowledgeable about the latest developments in Taiwan's constantly shifting sociopolitical landscape.

"News mixed supplements"

Unlike the introductory segment with its video footage, *8 o'clock*'s four individual Supplement segments are presented as written and oral texts. Drawn from newspapers, magazines, the 24-hour news stations, and the Internet, these brief snippets are prepared by an *8 o'clock* staff member the day of the broadcast.

However, "mews mixed supplements" (*xinwen dabu tie* 新聞大補帖) do not necessarily correlate with the direction the panel discussion follows as they are prepared prior to the program broadcast. Instead, these segments focus the viewer's attention on political party behaviors, individual comments, or a series of events that are related to the featured crisis topic.

An examination of the following Supplement examples reveals how this textual device uses reported speech to draw attention to dominant crisis discourses in Taiwan's sociopolitical sphere. In the first example, the Supplement focuses on the actions of one person, President Chen Shui-bian. Entitled "Long Live the Republic of China: Is A-bian sincere?" (*Zhonghuaminguo wansui A-bian zhen xin ma*? 中華民國萬歲阿扁真心嗎?), the Supplement lists and compares several comments President Chen made within the space of two months regarding Taiwan's future.

大補帖一
阿扁語錄— 兩岸篇

0501 提出"善意和解，積極合作與永久和平"的兩岸和解方針

0520 在既有基礎上，共同處理"未來一個中國"問題

0620 兩岸對"一中"沒有共識的共識，南北韓能，為何兩岸不能

0628 新政府願意接受 "一個中國，各自表述，"但大陸方面卻不承認.

Supplement One
A-bian's quotations[83] (verbal record)—on cross-straits [relations]

0501 Proposed an approach for cross-straits peace through "goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation and permanent peace."

0520 On the basis of the existing situation, [both sides of the Straits] jointly work to resolve the "future one China" issue.

0620 The cross-straits attitude to "one China" is to "agree to disagree" [have a "consensus without a consensus"], [yet] if North [and]

[83] By calling the Supplement "A-bian's quotations," the call-in staff may be playing on the notion of Mao Zedong's (毛澤東) quotations published in the PRC in the infamous "little red book."

South Korea can, why can't the two sides of the [Taiwan] Straits?

0628 The new government is ready to accept "one China [but] with respective interpretations," but Mainland China does not recognize it.

The above Supplement groups President Chen's comments by date, which serves to highlight their chronological proximity and evolution. The first quote occurred less than a month before his inauguration (May 1st) while the second quote took place the day he assumed office (May 20th). Chen's third comment was drawn from his first presidential press conference on the one-month anniversary of his presidency (June 20th), while the fourth quote took place a week later (June 28th). This type of comparative format emphasizes subtle shifts in language use, and consequently, foregrounds any inconsistencies. Here, President Chen's cross-straits approach is portrayed as shifting from one of collaboration (first two quotes) to one that respects differences "agreeing to disagree" (third quote), and finally, to acknowledging a stalemate (fourth quote). By presenting quoted remarks in a decontextualized manner, *8 o'clock* cloaks its reframing of "real quotations" under the rubric of a "factual" (and chronological) presentation. This misleading format leads viewers to interpret comments in a manner that complements the call-in show's agenda: to root out or even manipulate controversial events or, in this case, utterances.

In similar manner, Supplement sections also use reported speech to compare differing perspectives among Taiwan's four main political parties: the Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), New Party (NP), and People's First Party (PFP).[84] This format serves as a foil for the political representatives on the program who typically echo and enact, albeit

[84] Background on Taiwan's sociopolitical environment is provided in Chapter Three.

unknowingly,[85] party-affiliated remarks featured in the Supplement segment. The following excerpt is drawn from the same episode as the previous example:

> 大補帖三
> 誰在製造麻煩?
>
> 民進黨： 總統表達最大善意，若中共再無善意回應，就是麻煩製造者
>
> 國民黨: 肯定陳水扁回到 “ 一中, ” 希望中共儘速回復談判
>
> 親民黨： 既已接受 “一中各表”，也應回歸國統會，儘速召開國統會
>
> 新黨： 表示歡迎 ，但過於簡化，客易引起大陸誤解，指為 “兩國論”
>
> Supplement Three
> Who's stirring up trouble?
>
> DPP: The President expressed the greatest goodwill (towards Mainland China); if Communist China again doesn't return this goodwill, then they are the troublemakers.
>
> KMT: Undoubtedly Chen Shui-bian has returned to [a] "one China" [stance]; [we] hope that Communist China quickly resumes negotiations
>
> PFP: Since [we] have already agreed to "one China, [but] with respective interpretations," [we] should also return to the National Reunification Council [and] quickly reconvene the National Reunification Council.
>
> NP: We welcome [Chen's] approach to [cross-straits] peace. But it is over simplified. It will easily lead to misunderstandings on the part of Mainland China and be misinterpreted as [former President Lee Teng-hui's] "two-state principle."[86]

This Supplement format deliberately highlights the differences between each political party's perspectives toward the featured topic. Although each quotation is associated with a particular party, no single name or voice is assigned

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[85] The guest panelists are not aware of the content of the Supplement sections until the actual broadcast, if at all. Given that the Supplements come before a commercial break, the guests are often talking to each other "off the air" at this point and not paying attention to the closed-circuit TV screens in the studio.

[86] The "two states principle" or "two China theory" (*liangguolun* 兩國論) was proposed by former President Lee Teng-hui in August 2000, which stirred the PRC's ire. This stance deviates

to the remarks. As such, *8 o'clock* encourages viewers to find their thematic link and to engage in "sense-making" (Tannen 1989). Nonetheless, the program producers have framed the quotations for easier associative reading, in this case through their order of appearance. For instance, the DPP quotation is introduced first, which orients the viewer's subsequent assessment from this perspective. The remaining order lists the viewpoints of the opposition parties, namely, KMT, People's First Party (PFP), and New Party. To informed viewer, the quotations associated with these three KMT-based parties (the New Party and PFP were founded by former KMT party members) reveal nuanced differences regarding their approach to ROC-PRC relations, namely, their China-reunification orientation. The larger picture that these four quotations paint are the sociopolitical tensions and ideological differences between the ruling DPP party and the "pan blue camp,"[87] meaning the KMT, New Party, and People's First Party.

Presenting each political party's comments in this manner foregrounds their differences while downplaying their similarities. A closer examination of the last excerpt reveals another juxtaposition, namely, a tacit alliance between Taiwan's political parties and against China. Yet, whether President Chen is sincere in his loyalty to the Republic of China—as opposed to his reputation for advocating an independent "Republic of Taiwan"—the Taiwan-China cross-straits situation is temporarily subsumed under the current episode's emphasis on domestic tensions between the ruling DPP and its opposition, including the aforementioned three political parties.

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from the "one China" and even "one China but with different interpretations" theories as it approaches declaration of an independent "Republic of Taiwan."

[87] The opposition to the "pan blue camp" is the "pan green camp," which is comprised of the DPP and the recently formed Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).

Figure 7: Example of a *8 o'clock* "news mixed supplement." This supplement features quotations from various public figures addressing the featured topic: "Should the (ROC) vice president be recalled?"

Although Supplement segments are featured in transition between program discussions and commercial breaks, they function as more than mere fillers. Rather, these textual scripts reinforce the episode's crisis-interpretation of the topic by feeding viewers bite-sized quotes or summarized histories that support this reading. By packaging such information for easy viewer consumption, the Supplement's abridged and decontextualized presentation dangerously simplifies the sociopolitical issues and events it highlights as well as diminishes alternative interpretations of the featured topic.

Sound bites/video clips

Edited video clips of a key public figure (e.g., President Chen Shui-bian, Vice President Annette Lu, pop singer A-mei, or a political candidate) related to the featured topic offer another form of reported speech-influenced reading of a sociopolitical issue or event. Moreover, coupled with the episode's headline, video clips and sound-bites also reinforce the call-in show's overall crisis frame, regardless of the topic.

Political cartoons

One of *2100*'s unique props involves the political cartoon, which is computer generated rather than hand-drawn. The inclusion of cartoons provides an alternative, and typically humorous, angle from which to view a topic or issue. As Goodwin (1994) observes:

> A theory of discourse that ignored graphic representations would be missing…a key element of the discourse . . . Instead of mirroring spoken language, these external representations complement it, using the distinctive characteristics of the material world to organize phenomena in ways that spoken language cannot… (609).

Consequently, the cartoons' humorous, witty, and descriptive devices enable the program to express viewpoints or agendas that are too risqué to voice aloud. For instance, during the 2000 presidential elections, *2100* featured a cartoon that satirized the three leading ROC Presidential candidates—KMT candidate Lien Chan (連戰), DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), and independent candidate James Soong (宋楚瑜). The cartoon portrayed each of the candidates as imitating ROC President Lee Teng-hui by showing a caricature of each candidate looking into a mirror and seeing President Lee's reflection. While the panelists might allude to the candidates' attempts to walk in Lee Teng-hui's very long shadow in their remarks, the *2100* cartoon subtly takes the critical observation to a higher level.

In another example, a *2100* cartoon depicts ROC Prime Minister Tang Fei (唐飛) as an action hero similar to Tom Cruise's character in the movie "Mission Impossible" (see Figure 8). Here, the prime minister's "mission impossible" (*bu keneng de renwu* 不可能的任務) is to prevent the inter-party contentiousness of Taiwan's opposition parties (e.g., the KMT, New Party, and the recently formed People's First Party) from paralyzing the ROC's new ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party. The cartoon depicts Tang Fei swooping down from the ceiling (like Cruise's character does in the movie) to reclaim the prime minister's podium

(a symbol of the prime minister's authority) in the Legislative Yuan, (*lifayuan* 立法院) Taiwan's highest parliamentary body, from the reaching hands of several legislators.

Figure 8: ROC Prime Minister Tang Fei depicted in a "mission impossible" political cartoon featured on *2100: All People Open Talk*.

As a former KMT member and a former ROC Secretary of Defense, Tang Fei was selected to hold the third-highest cabinet position in President Chen Shui-bian's administration as a gesture to accommodate the interests, and thus mollify the fears, of the recently defeated KMT party and its splinter parties (i.e., the New Party and PFP). Moreover, Tang Fei's unassuming personality and esteemed background as a decorated military leader brought needed experience to President Chen's inchoate administration. Despite these qualities, Tang Fei's former affiliation with the KMT as party member made his new role as a DPP official all the more difficult given oppositional party resistance to President Chen's presidency. The cartoon's humorous portrayal of Tang Fei's "mission impossible" insightfully captures the intricacies of his role as well as the symbolism of his lonely and controversial position as a former KMT official within a DPP

administration.[88] In fact, Tang Fei's career as ROC Prime Minister only lasted several months as he voluntarily resigned in early October for health reasons.[89]

Political cartoons thus express latent impressions of controversial issues that panelists and moderators, and perhaps even callers, are hesitant to voice. Such props can also both foreground and mitigate sensitive issues by cloaking them under the rubric of satire.

Satellite-fed interviews

Satellite-feed interviews represent another *2100* feature that its competitors do not offer. Located off-site, or outside the call-in show studio, the "special" guest panel member is both visible and audible via satellite transmission. Long-distance interviews are used when a guest cannot appear in-person in the studio. This commonly occurs when *2100* invites a mainland China or Hong Kong-based scholar to participate as an "honorary guest panelist." These guests are typically invited to participate on programs that feature cross-straits ROC-PRC relations as its topic. To set up this link, the production staff are required to communicate with China-based—or Hong Kong-based TVB—colleagues. These honorary guests are usually solicited by Lee Tao himself, with the technical details handled by the staff. Lee Tao travels quite extensively within China, often meeting with government officials, scholars, and entrepreneurs in his capacity as TVBS's vice president and *2100's* executive producer and moderator. Thus, Lee Tao is able to use this clout to solicit and invite politicians, scholars, and media-related personalities to appear on *2100*.

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[88] In fact, Tang Fei voluntarily resigned his KMT membership after several KMT officials proposed doing so through an executive decision by the KMT central standing committee.

[89] Prior to assuming his position, he had undergone surgery for a benign brain tumor and thus was hospitalized for several weeks at the beginning of his Prime Ministership. In this sense, Tang Fei faced multiple challenges as Prime Minister, political opposition notwithstanding. Thus his reasons for resigning due to health concerns were quite serious and not entirely a convenient excuse.

This procedure may also used for speakers located within Taiwan. During an episode on crime, *2100* featured a woman who had been assaulted and interviewed her from a hospital bed in Kaohsiung, a city in southern Taiwan. In this case, an image of a injured crime victim heightened the topic's emotional and visual quotient. Moreover, off-site guests not only enrich the guest panel and discussion, but also focus the discussion around the "honorary" guest's expertise or experience. In turn, satellite-feed interviews extend a call-in show's participant pool to encompass those outside of the greater Taipei metropolitan area, and even beyond the island (or country) of Taiwan, where most, if not all, guests are located.[90]

Phone-in and public opinion polling

Aside from the program's standard call-in feature, both *2100* and *8 o'clock* occasionally offer viewers the chance to participate in phone-in polls that invites them to respond to a question related to that evening's topic(s). Such polls generally ask questions in a "yes/no" or "pro/con" manner, such as "Should Chen Shui-bian declare Taiwan independence?" A multiple choice format is occasionally used for questions that ask voters to select among a variety of answers. For instance, in an episode that deliberated ethno-political identities, *2100*'s viewers were asked if they identified themselves as being "Chinese but not Taiwanese" (*wo renwei wo shi zhongguoren bu shi taiwanren* 我認為我是中國人), "Taiwanese but not Chinese" (*wo renwei wo shi taiwanren bu shi zhongguoren* 我認為我是台灣人), both ("*liangge dou rentong* 兩個都認同), or neither (*liangge dou bu rentong* 兩個都不認同).

Aside from on-the-air call-in show polling, *2100* conducts its own public opinion polls through its in-house polling division. A prime feature during

[90] The transnationalism of call-in show participants is evidenced in a caller excerpt I examine in Chapter Five that features a woman who identifies herself as "Singaporean."

national elections, *2100*'s public opinion polls are featured as "exclusive" findings. In recent years, Taiwan's public opinion polling craze has reached near saturation levels to the extent that most political organizations, research institutes, and political parties hire or sponsor "independent firms" to conduct polls for them. Each polling source, as well as the entity that hires it, promotes its figures as more "objective" and "accurate" than its competitors. To combat public suspicion of polls commissioned by special interest parties, *2100* and its parent TV station (TVBS) promote the reliability and validity of their polls by emphasizing their "neutral" stance and non-political affiliations. Frequently, national newspapers and magazines often reprint TVBS's polling results. This "free" publicity lends their figures with even greater authority and credibility.

By interweaving public opinion with topical deliberation, *2100* seeks to both assess popular sentiments as well as generate discussion among its panelists and viewers. Moreover, *2100* presents polling results as "fact" and downplays—i.e., ignores—the polls' inherent statistical errors.[91] This misguided use of polling figures further subsumes any questioning or problematize of *2100*'s polling methods, error ratios, or validity. By not explaining their polling process, *2100* encourages its viewers to take the figures at face value. Furthermore, the moderator often uses polling results to seek reactions and direct participants' comments in a certain direction. By designing a topic around public opinion polls, and supplementing it with call-in polling, reifies polling results as well as reduces the topic itself to mere numbers and percentages.

Unfortunately, the role of phone-in and public opinion polling on call-in shows is often overlooked given the call-in show's repertoire of eye-catching props, such has satellite-feed interviews, and contentious participant deliberations. However, their passive presence lends them greater influence in situating issues within a "factual" or "objective" light. Be it through a formal TVBS polling

[91] *2100* does not provide the margin of error for any of their polls.

division or live call-in polling, *2100* presents public opinion polling as a serious and "added value" service to its viewers. The stamp of a TVBS or "*2100*" public opinion or call-in poll represents another feature that distinguishes the program from its competitors.

8 o'clock began including phone-in polling soon after *2100* introduced it on its program. *8 o'clock* charges callers NT$1 (approx. US$0.03) per call or vote. The polling question is always related to the main topic. For instance, on the episode entitled, "Recalling 'A-Lian': is it that serious?" (*Bamian A-lian you name yanzhong*? 罷免阿蓮 有那麼嚴重?)**,** *8 o'clock*'s polling question asked viewers whether Vice President Lu should be recalled, with the option to vote "yes," "no," or "undecided." Processing phone-in polls is not conducted at the SETN studio, but rather contracted to an outside company. Throughout the program, a running ticker tape appears on the bottom of the television screen and continuously updates the poll's results. The moderator also announces polling figures throughout the program, typically after a commercial break, while the "final results" are announced at program's end.

Such polls are inaccurate, however, as there are no restrictions for repeat voters. Moreover, polls are even more susceptible to call-in teams as there is no screening process that weeds out suspected call-in team numbers. Phone-in voting is thus one of the most effective areas where call-in teams can skew political party representativeness on call-in shows. For this reason, polling numbers fluctuate wildly across a call-in program's one-hour duration.

Yet, because phone-in polling attracts viewers by galvanizing call-in teams and/or viewers to participate in this low-risk, passive-aggressive activity, *8 o'clock*, as well as other call-in shows, frequently incorporates them as an added feature to its standard roundtable discussion format. Unlike *2100*, however, *8 o'clock* does not conduct its own in-house polls, nor quote other polling sources, for inclusion on their call-in show. Hence, featuring "objective" polling results is

not a priority for *8 o'clock*, which is consistent with its general indifference towards presenting a "neutral" stance in its program format.

In the following chapter, I introduce various approaches to conceptualizing the notion of "crisis" and particularly its relation to language use in politically-oriented settings. The next chapter also summarizes the sociopolitical issues and events that are featured or referenced in the call-in show excerpts I later examine.

Chapter Three: Framing Call-in Show "Crisis" Discourses

This chapter explores the concept of 'crisis' as a form of strategic power (Edelman 1977, 1988; Tulis 1987) and a unifying force (Liebes 1999), which forms the basis of the study's notion of "crisis" discourses. Next, the chapter discusses how Taiwan's call-in shows present their featured topics within a "crisis" frame through Goffman's (1974) notion of primary frameworks. I then introduce how 'crisis' is conceptualized and represented in Chinese by the two ideograms *wei* (危) and *ji* (機) as well as consider how the term is popularly understood by speakers in Taiwan as a juxtaposition of these two characters' individual definitions as "danger" (*wei*) and "opportunity" (*ji*). This inherent duality of *weiji* informs this study's investigation of Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses, which I introduce in the latter half of the chapter.

WHAT ARE CRISIS DISCOURSES?

Crisis as concept and frame

Despite its urgent and ominous connotations, 'crisis' as a conceptual construct cannot be easily categorized as either good or bad, positive or negative. When used to depict an emergency or threat, the term can inspire the need for unity and common sacrifice (Edelman 1977:45). Yet, when applied to shape public opinion, the descriptor can rationalize political policies that are detrimental to disadvantaged groups (Edelman 1988:32).

Of particular interest to this study is Edelman's (1988) linkage of crisis to media practices, which he communicates in the following observation:1

> [A] crisis, like all news developments, is a creation of the language used to depict it; the appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a fact or of a rare situation (31).

Similarly, in his research on Israeli newspaper coverage of sociopolitical events, Lefkowitz describes over-dramatized press coverage as "media crises" (183). Edelman (1977) also recognizes that the language used to discuss each crisis is selective in what it chooses to emphasize and obscure (44). Drawing upon these perspectives, this study explores the manner in which call-in participants use language to recreate and contest Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses in ways that both encourage reconciliation and sow dissention. In addition, I examine how their linguistic practices contribute to maintaining the status quo as it simultaneously exposes the reproduction of such discourses.

This study regards Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses as constituting and constituted by the political TV call-in show's "primary framework," which renders "what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of a scene into something that is meaningful" (Goffman 1974:21). Primary frameworks can vary in their organization, allowing users to "locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (ibid). In the case of Taiwan's political TV call-in shows, their primary framework revolves around a crisis orientation, which participants contribute toward primarily through their linguistic behavior both verbally and nonverbally. Shen (1999) makes a similar assertion in her call-in show study when she claims that program headlines

[1] Murray Edelman (1992) elucidates his concept of crisis in the article in "The construction of uses and social problems" by vividly conceptualizing a *social crisis* is a "radiation of signifiers" that evokes "an exploding set of scenes and signs that move in unpredictable directions and that radiate endlessly" (278-279).

engender a calculated and confrontational "simple dichotomy," which call-in show hosts emphasize through their language use and moderating tactics (234).[2]

My study is particularly interested in the organizing principles call-in participants use when orienting their speech towards Taiwan's crisis discourses. Goffman's notion of "frame" thus forms a central component of my analysis of the call-in show's constructed crisis ambiance:

> I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them; *frame* is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify (ibid:10-11, emphasis added).

Given this study's ethnographically-oriented and discourse-centered approach, my investigation into the crisis frame of Taiwan's political call-in shows also considers the sociopolitical contexts (e.g., issues and events) participants' linguistic practices index within and outside the call-in studio setting (cf. Duranti and Goodwin 1992). In this regard, I consider context as a process of inference (Gumperz 1982), in which linguistic actions are both context shaped and context renewing (Heritage 1984).[3]

By extension, this study examines call-in participants' linguistic construction of crisis discourses through a "frame space" (Goffman 1981:230). Frame spaces allow speakers to select certain options and forfeit others such that they are using only part of the entire space at any given time. This linguistic strategy proves particularly salient when presenting self and other voices through quoted speech as a means to establishing and reconfiguring the footing of ongoing talk. For instance, a speaker can utter words "formulated by someone in the name

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[2] In her observations of *2100*'s host, Lee Tao, Shen describes him as "calculatedly orchestrat[ing] a preferred juxtaposition of conflicting opinions" toward the featured topic "with a tempo he schedules" (239).

[3] Duranti and Goodwin (1992) recognize the difficulty in defining the depth and range of "context" when they admit, "it does not seem possible…to give a single, precise, technical definition of **context**, and eventually we might have to accept that such a definition may not be possible" (2; original emphasis).

of someone, directing these remarks to some set of others in some of their capacities" (ibid:230), a tactic call-in participants frequently use and which this study later examines in greater detail.

For call-in show crisis frames to be correctly performed and understood, participants assume that listeners share the same pool of beliefs and knowledge that they do as derived from their sociopolitical environment. Goffman (1974) describes this shared knowledge as a social framework or "guided doings," which includes "background understanding [of] events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being" (22). Political TV call-in shows rely heavily upon the guided doings participants and viewers bring to the program, including their grasp of the sociopolitical events and issues that inform the program's featured topics.

Social frameworks aside, Edelman (1977) suggests that crisis discourses tend to be less emergent and more chronic as they reflect endemic economic and political power imbalances (44). In his investigation into the "continuing crisis" of U.S. education, Rollins (1996) identifies an inherent oxymoron when noting that the notion of a "persistent crisis" obscures an underlying and obfuscating discourse in "the larger drama of American citizenship itself" (4). He declares that crisis rhetoric substitutes for a clear mission and fails to fulfill a vision of an ideal society (ibid:262). Similarly, my study regards the call-in show's crisis-orientation as capitalizing upon prevailing sociopolitical inequalities in Taiwan's international and domestic arenas, including Taiwan-China cross-straits relations, ethno-political tensions between *benshengren* (本省人) and *waishengren* (外省人), and gendered roles. Most significantly, call-in shows' repeated featuring of crisis topics, as well as participants' willingness to deliberate and viewers' interest in watching the programs, suggests the need for public discussion of these issues within the country's increasingly open and democratic environment.

In exploring the common practice of U.S. Presidents evoking crises to bolster their popular leadership, Tulis (1987) warns that routinized use of "crisis politics" may inversely undermine the public's ability to distinguish genuine from spurious crises. However, Edelman (1977) argues that the divergence between the symbolic representation of crises and their concrete manifestation is intrinsic to their popular acceptance. Both these perspectives inform my exploration into the ways political TV call-in shows not only encourage, but also popularize a form of political deliberation that reproduces crisis discourses through its program format and participants' linguistic behavior.

Yet, two of the most problematic political influences in shaping social beliefs are public opinion on the one hand, and labeling events and issues as crisis-ridden on the other (Edelman 1977:43-46). This study's investigation on call-in show crisis discourses focuses on the latter, and particularly, the act and negotiation of labeling sociopolitical events and issues as being in crisis. In their study of high school students' labeling (or naming) practices, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1995) claim that labels represent a "socially significant and contested practice" and are only "endowed with meaning" when used in "relation to real people in real situations" (478). Rymes' (1996) study of naming practices confirms this finding and adds that naming constitutes a social practice that can have "multiple generations of meaning" with the potential for appropriation and redefinition within different communities (258).

Although these scholars focused upon the practice of labeling or naming persons rather than events, their understandings are applicable to my study's interest in how sociopolitical issues and incidents are labeled (or not) as crises by call-in participants. The following opening monologue by *2100* moderator Lee Tao illustrates the manner in which program topics are infused with crisis descriptors and sentiment:

> Hello everyone. Welcome to *2100: All People Open Talk!* Right now we are going to discuss a problem. It is possible that this problem has always existed in our society, but seldom do people talk about it because this issue is quite…sensitive.[4]

Just as labeling individuals requires "not simply a matter of fitting a word to a pre-existing [social] category" (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1995:478), the practice of labeling sociopolitical events or issues as "urgent," "sensitive," and "forbidden" also involves identifying and negotiating the various (e.g., dominant and marginal) discourses such terms engender.[5] In my data analysis, I illustrate that Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses are not *sui generis,* but rather created and contested through call-in participants' verbal interactions, and in particular, through reported speech.

From a Foucaudian (1970) perspective, the act of naming is significant insofar as it points out that naming one thing is *not* naming another. For instance, it is significant to note how the same sociopolitical issue (e.g., ethno-political relations) are described by some as leading to "feelings of anxiety" and a "sense of loss," while at other times they are regarded as "reconcilable" and "simple."[6] Later, I examine a saliva war between two legislators where one accuses the other of labeling him or "putting a hat on" (*kou maozi* 扣帽子) him, while doing so in return. Contestations of acts of labeling or "acts of identity" (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985) are telling moments of social interaction and sociopolitical processes as they reveal which groups or speakers are overtly marked, and inversely, which are not.

Talk shows can also assume the role of an institutionalized facilitator by mediating between extraordinary, stressful "real world" events and a displaced

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[4] See Appendix B, Excerpt 1 for Chinese text.

[5] *2100* moderator Lee Tao used these terms to describe Taiwan's ethno-political tensions, which was the featured topic for that evening.

[6] There terms are used by President Chen Shui-bian and PFP Legislator Diane Lee respectively. I present excerpts of these statements in Chapters Six and Seven.

populace. For instance, when *2100: All People Open Talk* broadcast on-site episodes in locales such as Chi-chi (集集) in central Taiwan following the devastating 1999 September 21 earthquake in which over 2000 people were killed, the call-in show filled a sociopolitical need by providing victims a public forum and outlet to express their frustrations and fears toward the local and central governments. Similar examples can also be found in the U.S., including 24-hour coverage by network and cable news stations in the days and weeks following September 11, and more recently, during the U.S. war with Iraq. However, mass media need not inspire participants to deliberate exceptional events for viewers and non-viewers alike to feel its presence and impact on public opinion and political decision-making (Meyorwitz 1985).

In personal interviews with two of the producers of CTN's *Face-to-face Debate* (*Xiang dui lun* 相對論), they stated that their call-in show abets viewers and panelists to build consensus around controversial issues and events, which also contributes to strengthening Taiwan's maturing democratic society (Ho Sun-sea 2000; Xi Shenglin 2000). While this study concurs that call-in shows provide an invaluable space for the public deliberation of previously banned topics, such as Taiwan's national identity and which continues to be a sensitive issue, this study considers these programs as being less a model of "consensus-building" per se than an example of "agreeing to disagree."

When the study turns to examining several instances of guest panelists engaging in "saliva wars" or verbal sparring, I investigate how this oppositional yet collaborative linguistic practice represents the primary manner through which dissenting views are articulated, contested, and negotiated. Moreover, given the study's premise that call-in shows present their featured topics within a crisis frame and participants' reproduce sociopolitical crisis discourses through their language use, it would be antithetical to regard call-in shows as regarding consensus-building as their modus operandi as that would preclude the

regeneration of the aforementioned mass-mediated and discursive products five nights a week.

Similarly, consciousness-raising does not necessarily lead to critical thinking or the reassessment of sociopolitical crises. Bourdieu (1977) expresses this sentiment when he states that while a crisis represents a "necessary condition for a questioning of doxa," it is "not a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse" (169). In the present study, I forward that Taiwan's political TV call-in shows minimally include and entertain the heterodox voices of callers who supposedly represent the "true" voice of the people, even as the programs abet the orthodox agendas of Taiwan's political parties by inviting guest panelists that represent their worldviews.

This study thus regards call-in show crisis discourses as a form of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1985, 1991) that the programs institutionalize and participants strategically wield, context, and exchange during program deliberations. Specifically, cultural capital consists of "knowledge, skills, and other cultural acquisitions as exemplified by educational or technical qualifications" (Thompson 1991:14), which an individual can use to generate "privilege, products, income, or wealth" (Smart 1993:392). Moreover, cultural capital can be both "*embodied* within the self through a process of education and cultivation, and *institutionalized*, such as when…accorded recognition by authorities" (ibid, original italics).

Within Bourdieu's (1991) "political field," which he describes as a site where "political products, issues, programs, analyses, commentaries, concepts and events are created" (172), cultural capital constitutes an invaluable instrument that is necessary to participate actively in politics. Consequently, this study regards Taiwan's political TV call-in shows as a mass-mediated political field where agents (e.g., moderators, guest panelists, and callers) participate in the exchange and production of crisis discourses in the form of program topics on controversial

sociopolitical issues and events. These discourses thus serve as and represent call-in participants' primary cultural capital within the political field of the call-in show.

By repeatedly featuring crisis-oriented topics episode after episode, call-in shows abet the institutionalization of Taiwan's crisis discourses through participants deliberations as they animate, contest, and negotiate their existence, real or imagined. Drawing further upon Bourdieu's description of the political field, this study also regards Taiwan's political TV call-in programs as:

> …limiting the universe of political discourse…[to] what is politically thinkable, to the finite space of discourses capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of the political *problematic*, understood as a space of stances effectively adopted within the field—i.e. stances that are socio-logically possible given the laws that determine entry into the field (ibid:172; original italics).

In terms of Taiwan's mass media and sociopolitical arenas, what is "politically thinkable" are the country's real or imagined sociopolitical crises, four of which I introduce later in this chapter. As my analyses of call-in show excerpts later illustrate, participants who are willing to adopt a crisis stance and perform crisis voices are those who are most successful in having their interpretation deliberated, but not necessarily accepted. Inversely, those participants who attempt to discredit crisis-oriented readings of an event or issue, or even dare to expose the fallacy of the discursive production and reproduction of crises, are marginalized in this elite playing field or "game" (Bourdieu 1977, 1991). This is particularly apparent when guest panelists engage in saliva wars or verbal sparring whereby verbal duelists compete to present a more persuasive crisis interpretation than one's opponent, a speech event I elaborate upon in Chapter Seven.

***Weiji* (crisis) as danger and opportunity**

Whether "crisis" is rendered in English or in Mandarin Chinese as "*weiji*" (危機), both languages share similar interpretations for this concept. For instance, a U.S. English dictionary defines "crisis" as an "unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending" or "a situation that has reached a critical phase" (*Merriam Webster's Dictionary* 1995: 275). A Chinese dictionary from Taiwan offers a comparable explanation for *weiji* (危機) as: (1) a potential for latent disaster or misfortune; (2) a critical moment between life or death, success or failure; or (3) a phrase of warning as in "economic crisis."[7]

Recently, however, a popularized conceptualization of *weiji* has emerged that reflects and highlights the dialectical tension between the two Chinese ideograms that comprise the term, namely, *wei* (危) and *ji* (機). Given the above dictionary definitions for "*weiji*," "*wei*" translates as "danger," while "*ji*" (機) is contextually understood as "a pivotal turning point"—as in 樞機 (*shuji*) meaning a "vital point" or "pivot."[8] Nonetheless a "folk etymology"[9] has emerged that also regards *ji* (機) as meaning "opportunity," thus contrasting this ideogram with *wei*'s (危) meaning as "danger." [10]

Examples of this popular evolution of *weiji* as constituting a juxtaposition between "danger" and "opportunity" can be found in the following example. The late UC Berkeley chancellor Tien Chang-lin (田長霖) reportedly displayed the

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[7] The original definition reads as: (1) 潛伏的禍機；(2) 生死成敗的緊要關頭；(3) 即"經濟危機"的省語(簡明活用辭典，五南圖書出版公司，1997). English translation made by the author.

[8] The Chinese explanation is represented as: 事物的關鍵 (簡明活用辭典, 1990:686).

[9] I thank Dr. Avron Boretz for contributing this descriptor as a means for explaining the contemporary interpretation of *ji* as "opportunity."

[10] The Greek language has a similar understanding of "crisis" as a combination of danger and opportunity. (I thank Kristen Hoerl for bringing this to my attention.) I should also add that *ji* can also mean "time"; thus, *weiji* as "danger" and "time" more closely approximates the English interpretation of "crisis" as a "time of danger" or critical moment.

Chinese characters "危機" on his office wall and stated that he preferred to see most crises as opportunities.[11] Common sayings that use *wei* such as "turning danger into stability or peace" (*zhuan wei wei an* 轉危為安) and terms that include *ji* such as "a favorable turn" (*zhuanji* 轉機) likewise capture the notion of turning an unfavorable event into something favorable.

This study regards this popularized understanding of *weiji* as a delicate balance between "danger" and "opportunity" as a useful (bifocal) lens through which to analyze the crisis frame of political TV call-in shows, and moreover, the crisis discourses participants deliberate. In the following chapters, I seek to demonstrate how call-in shows and their participants address and render Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses as cultural capital by seizing upon the latent and manifest dangers and opportunities in the topics they feature and deliberate respectively. I regard language, and specifically speech reporting, as the primary tool through which participants commodify and exchange this cultural capital during program deliberations.

CRISIS DISCOURSES AS SPEECH PLAY

If one considers the political call-in show format as "infotainment," that is, a mixture of news and entertainment, then successful adherence to both aspects requires participants to engage in linguistic hybridity or "blendings" (Bauman 1992) of several speech genres. I forward that the crisis discourses participants perform on Taiwan's call-in shows blends and extends the verbal artistry that speakers use in the daily conduct of their social lives into the realm of mass media and politics. Briggs (1988) suggests that speakers are frequently inspired by resources within their immediate social, physical, and linguistic context when engaging in speech play and verbal art. Interdisciplinary research on the creativity of language use also recognizes that speech play can occur anywhere, and

[11] Taken from: http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2002/10/tien.html.

moreover, can be found embedded within other linguistic forms (Sherzer and Woodbury 1987:8-9).

In call-in participants' endeavors to orient their linguistic behavior towards the call-in show's overarching crisis frame, my study explores how their performance of two types of speech play, or speech genres with a playful orientation, contributes to this end including "reconciliation (*hejie* 和解) talk" and "saliva wars" (*koushui zhan* 口水戰). My study considers reconciliation talk and saliva wars as opposing yet complimentary speech genres that collectively capture the opportunities and dangers of the sociopolitical crisis issues and events call-in shows feature. This includes the reconciliation or appeasement of crisis interpretations on the one hand, and the enactment of crisis scenarios through verbal sparring on the other.

Participants' manipulation of the part-real, part-imaginary nuances of crisis discourses in call-in show talk corroborates Goffman's (1959) interpretation of performance as any activity that succeeds in persuading other participants that the "impression of reality which he [sic] stages *is* the real reality" (17; original emphasis). Basso's (1979) study of Western Apache joking practices of the Whiteman represents a primary example of how speech play and discursive ideologies intersect. In his observations, he discovered that joking often indexes and renegotiates complex sociocultural relations of power and status that the performer has experienced or observed. Similarly, this study later explores how call-in participants use various strategic linguistic devices (e.g., reported speech, code-switching, and prosodic stylization) to index locally-recognizable personas and editorialize their unequal sociopolitical relations.

However, before doing so, the following sections introduce several ideological issues and sociopolitical events that captured the attention of Taiwan's political TV call-in shows during the period I conducted fieldwork for this study.

TAIWAN'S "REAL" SOCIOPOLITICAL CRISES

Taiwan's historically-based yet evolving sociopolitical conflicts serve as the backdrop to and material for the call-in show's crisis-oriented topics, and subsequently, participants' deliberations. In the call-in show excerpts I later analyze, participants frequently reference and deliberate the following four issues and events: 1) cross-straits relations between Taiwan and China,[12] and in particular, the concept of "China" (*zhongguo* 中國) and the "one China principle" (*yige zhongguo de yuanze* 一個中國的原則); 2) the 2000 ROC presidential election held on March 18th; 3) ethno-political relations (*shengji qingjie* 省籍情解) between Taiwan's two main ethno-political groups, "Mainlanders" or *waishengren* (外省人) and "Taiwanese" or *benshengren* (本省人);[13] and, 4) gendered identities and roles in Taiwan politics as embodied by the Republic of China's (ROC) first female vice president, Annette Lu.

The cross-straits crisis: Taiwan-China relations

The cross-straits "crisis" between Taiwan and China can be summarized as a 53-year old civil war over two opposing worldviews: one which argues for a unified "one China" (*yige zhongguo* 一個中國) versus another that pursues official declaration of Taiwan independence (*Taidu* 台獨 or *Taiwan duli* 台灣獨立). These divergent sociopolitical agendas stem from the "temporary" establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) (*Zhonghua Minguo* 中華民國)[14] government to the islands of Taiwan (台灣), Penghu (澎湖), Matsu (馬祖), and Kinmen (金門) following the Nationalist Party's (a.k.a. Kuomintang, KMT

[12] Throughout the dissertation I use "China" interchangeably with its official title, the People's Republic of China (PRC). Distinctions between Taiwan and ROC on the one hand, and China and the PRC on the other, are provided later in the chapter.
[13] I explain these terms in more detail later in this section.
[14] The Republic of China was officially established by Sun Yat-sen (*Sun Zhongshan* 孫中山) on mainland China, the current PRC, on October 10, 1911.

國民黨) defeat under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (*Zhongguo Gongchandang* 中國共產黨). Subsequently, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong (毛澤東), the CCP founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) (*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo* 中華人民共和國) on the mainland (*dalu* 大陸) or what is generally recognized today as "China."[15] Since this geopolitical division, the leadership on both sides of the Taiwan Straits has been mired in an impasse over what constitutes "China," and by extension, the question of Taiwan's sovereignty as an independent nation-state.[16]

For the PRC, Taiwan represents the last jewel in the Chinese Communist Party's crown that has yet to be reunited with the "Chinese motherland," especially following the repatriation of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom in 1997 and Macau from Portugal in 1999. In Taiwan, however, the notion of "China" is alternately embraced and vilified by vying ideological groups who range from China reunification traditionalists to Taiwan independence advocates. In short, the Taiwan-PRC cross-straits crisis represents the unresolved status of disparate political ideologies regarding the reestablishment of a unified "China" or the formal declaration of an independent "Republic of Taiwan." However, given the geopolitical consequences of either outcome, cross-straits relations continuously oscillate between the status quo and potential military confrontation depending upon the domestic and international events that might be considered (un)favorable to either side of the Taiwan Straits.

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[15] Chairman Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949.

[16] Although I attempt to provide an objective presentation of cross-straits relations, I am aware that my ideological biases emerge in my writing. However, to completely ignore or erase them is neither possible nor appropriate for my study's ethnographic approach. Thus while my account exposes my political leanings to the careful reader, attempts have been made to moderate them as much as possible.

Taiwan's national identity crisis

Cross-straits tensions also play a crucial role in Taiwan's national identity in terms of whether the island constitutes a sovereign nation-state or represents a province of China or (cf. Copper 1996). This issue becomes particularly salient during Taiwan's national elections—including those for the Legislative Yuan, Taipei mayor, ROC president—as voters weigh potential candidates and the parties they represent by their pro-(China) unification or pro-(Taiwan) independence stance. Generally, voting decisions are also linked to concerns over Taiwan's national security, and particularly, in its relations with China.[17] During the 1990s, these concerns entered the economic domain as Taiwan's economy became increasingly linked, and some would argue dangerously dependent upon, with China's.

Taiwan's political parties and candidates thus attempt to differentiate themselves from their opponents, and for their voters, by their national identity platforms and cross-straits policies or "white papers" (*baipishu* 白皮書). Parties labeled as "mainland China-friendly" (*qin dalu* 親大陸)—such as the New Party (NP) (*Xindang* 新黨) and to a lesser degree the KMT—campaign on platforms that advocate eventual reunification with China.[18] Since the late 1980s, the KMT has attempted to shed its mainland China-identity by pursuing a "Taiwanization" or bentu (本土) approach that incorporates more local Taiwanese in its ranks, such as former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). The KMT has also attempted to shift to the political center by representing the status quo, which includes neither

[17] Many candidates create slogans or mottos that directly include terms such as "peace" (*heping* 和平) and "stability" (*pingan* 平安) a long with "prosperity" (*fu* 福) and "happiness" (*yule* 愉樂) notions that promote national and personal well-being, which is important to Taiwan's economy and international/national status.

[18] Recently, the New Party has altered its ideological perspective to reflect Taiwan's present sovereign status. However, the party continues to base its argument on the 1945 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shinoseki that repatriated Taiwan and its territories to "China" after 50 years of Japanese colonial rule.

renouncing unification nor taking steps towards Taiwan independence. Despite the party's persistent claims that the Republic of China (ROC) represents "China," the KMT's predominantly *benshengren* or Taiwanese support base has forced the party to take a more pragmatic stance towards Taiwan's national identity issue.

In contrast, political parties that lean towards Taiwan independence to varying degrees—such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (*Minjingdang* 民進黨), the current ruling party, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) (*Taiwan Tuanjie Lianmeng* 台灣團結聯盟)[19]—offer a Taiwan-based worldview. This ideological stance contends that Taiwan has never been a part of present-day "China" as represented by either the ROC or PRC governments given that it was the Qing (清) Dynasty that seceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 following their defeat in the Sino-Japanese war (Gardella 1999: 187).[20] Since becoming Taiwan's ruling party in May 2000, however, the DPP has moderated its Taiwan independence stance under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Under the guidance of former ROC president and former KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), the TSU now represents the country's most vocal proponent of Taiwan independence.

Another new party, the People's First Party (PFP) (*Qinmindang* 親民黨) has attempted to present itself as apolitical in regards to Taiwan's national identity discourses. Founded in 2000, James Soong (宋楚瑜), the PFP's chairman and a former KMT high-ranking official, has engineered a party platform that focuses

[19] The Taiwan Solidarity Union was formed by Lee Teng-hui supporters in late 2001. While its members include former KMT and DPP supporters, the party continues Lee's vision of building a "Taiwanized" (*bentuhua* 本土化) ROC.

[20] Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist Party or KMT overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911.

on combating "black gold"[21] (*heijin* 黑金) or political corruption, while obfuscating its cross-straits agenda as a means to not only differentiate itself from the KMT and New Party, given that most of its followers were former KMT and to a lesser degree NP supporters, but also to attract moderate voters.[22]

ROC national elections and PRC saber-rattling

Taiwan's national identity discourses have faced new complications for reasons arising from rapid sociopolitical changes within the country over the last 15 years. This includes the lifting of martial law in 1987 as well as the gradual democratization of its political system and national elections throughout the 1990s, which recently produced the ROC's first democratic transfer of power from the mainland China-derived KMT to the Taiwan-based DPP party in 2000.

Nonetheless, Taiwan's national sovereignty issue remains linked to and influenced by its tenuous relations with the PRC. For instance, prior to Taiwan's first democratic presidential elections in 1996,[23] the PRC launched "military exercises" in the Taiwan Straits as its leadership regarded the elections as a step towards Taiwan independence.[24] Despite the PRC's saber rattling and attempts to intimidate Taiwan's voters, presidential incumbent and KMT candidate Lee Teng-

[21] To the U.S. reader, and especially Texans, "black gold" in this case does not refer to the other kind of "gold," namely, oil or petroleum.

[22] As of February 2003, reports have circulated that PFP chairman James Soong may team with KMT chairman Lien Chan in the 2004 presidential race. If this presidential ticket transpires, the PFP's political stance will have swung decidely back into the KMT camp.

[23] In an instance where art imitates life, a recent episode (February 28, 2002) of *The West Wing* (NBC)—a political drama that details events within a Democratic White House—depicted a cross-straits scenario loosely based on events in March 1996 when China engaged in military exercises in the Taiwan Straits. While the TV series portrayed China's actions as a warning to Taiwan for testing "American-made Patriot missiles" and for "thinking about holding democratic elections," the actual incident occurred in anticipation of Taiwan's first democratic presidential elections.

[24] The first direct presidential elections in 1996 escalated cross straits tensions to its highest point in 40 years between not only the two main protagonists, but also China and the United States. President Clinton responded to the PRC's military exercises by deploying two US aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits.

hui enjoyed a landslide victory, one which further cemented Taiwan's place within the club of democratic nations.[25]

In response, the PRC suspended future cross-straits talks and refused to acknowledge the "one China, each with his own interpretation" (*yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu* 一個中國各自表述) understanding unofficial representatives from Taiwan and China had reached in 1992.[26] Events in the summer of 1999 added to cross-straits tensions when President Lee unceremoniously introduced his "special state-to-state relations" (*teshu guo yu guo guanxi* 特殊國與國關係) cross-straits policy,[27] which stated that both Taiwan and China are sovereign states yet enjoy a special relationship due to their shared cultural origins. Following this impromptu pronunciation, the PRC claimed that President Lee's revised reading of the "one China" agreement was tantamount to declaring Taiwan independence.

In the months before Taiwan's 2000 presidential election, the PRC again threatened Taiwan's voters, this time opting to exercise verbal rather than military missiles. For instance, in a call-in show excerpt I later examine, a video clip features PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) warning "Taiwan compatriots" (*Taiwan tongbao* 台灣同胞) to not do "anything emotional and rash," otherwise they "won't have any opportunities to regret it."[28] The prime minister's unambiguous language sought to dissuade Taiwan's voters from electing Taiwan independence advocate and DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian. However, the PRC government's thinly veiled threats merely emboldened Taiwan's

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[25] Lee won with 53% of the popular vote.

[26] Aside from having official departments that address cross-straits relations, meetings between Taiwan and China have been held between the chairpersons of organizations that unofficially represent the respective governments. For instance, Taiwan is represented by Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫), the chair of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)), while China is represented by Wan Daohan (汪道涵) of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) .

[27] In July 1999, President Lee introduced this policy during an interview with a German radio station.

[28] For the entire excerpt, see Appendix B, Excerpt 6.

electorate to exercise their democratic and sovereign rights by electing Chen into office over independent candidate James Soong and KMT candidate Lien Chan (連戰) in a closely contested race.[29]

Taiwan's 2000 election represented an unprecedented presidential campaign for another reason as well. Political TV call-in shows played a significant role as candidate spokespersons and supporters capitalized upon the programs' "free" airtime to articulate their support for or against a specific candidate. This study suggests that a primary battlefield for Taiwan's 2000 presidential election occurred on the small screen and not in elaborately orchestrated campaign rallies, such as during the 1996 presidential election and in the 1998 Taipei mayoral race.[30] Moreover, in a departure from previous national elections in which TV commercials constituted the frontlines for disseminating candidates' campaign platforms—as during KMT candidate Lee Teng-hui's 1996 election—political TV call-in shows were also pivotal in promoting candidates and combating misinformation.

Although my study does not directly address the 2000 presidential election, several call-in excerpts refer to the cross-straits and domestic tensions it inspired. In one excerpt, I examine how *2100: All People Open* Talk moderator, Lee Tao, recalls and responds to PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's forewarning that Taiwan's electorate "must stay alert" (*yaojingyi* 要警惕). The verbal warfare between the two geopolitical entities subsequently enters the call-in show studio when Lee Tao creatively expresses the defiance of Taiwan's voters through hypothetical reported speech. As I later demonstrate, call-in participants find ways

[29] The margin of victory between Chen Shui-bian and James Soong was separated by less than three percentage points. Chen 39.3% won of the popular vote to Soong's 36.84% (*Taipei Journal*, April 20, 2001:1).

[30] The 1998 mayoral elections also featured DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian, this time as the incumbent mayoral candidate, who was defeated by KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. Ironcially, some political analysts declared Chen's loss as a sign of his political irrelevance and eventual

to reconfigure sociopolitical power imbalances through innovative uses of language.

Ethno-political relations (*shengji qingjie*): benshengren/waishengren tensions

Aside from cross-straits relations, another issue that Taiwan's politicians alternately manipulate and avoid during elections are references to "ethno-political relations" (*shengji qinjie* 省籍情結). The phrase *shenji qingjie* can be literally translated as "province identity sentiments." The notion of *shengji* (省籍) or "province identity" refers to a person's patrilineal ancestral origins,[31] while *qingjie* (情結), interpreted here as "sentiments," denotes an individual's emotional affiliation for her geographic origins or roots.

However, Chang (1994) describes *shengji wenti* (省籍問題) or the "*shengji* problem" as not one simply based on provincial origin, but rather on the "'making' of an ethnic problem and the re-discovery (or for some, discovery) of a new ethnic identity" (94). *Shengji* differences can also be regarded as only one of several sociopolitical organizing processes in Taiwan society that is arranged according to different "social power dimensions" (ibid). Drawing from this understanding, my study prefers to translate *shengji qingjie* as "ethno-political relations" as the phrase more accurately captures the ethnic, sociocultural, and political factors that contribute to tensions between *benshengren* (本省人) or Taiwanese and *waishengren* (外省人) or Mainlanders,[32] and which also impacts

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demise. In another inaccurate prognostication, the KMT mayoral victory was regarded as a forecast of the 2000 presidential election outcome.

[31] For instance, even though I was born and raised in the U.S., I would be categorized as a *waishengren* or "Mainlander" in Taiwan given that my father was born in Fuzhou, China. Moreover, if an individual's father was born in China, but has a mother who was born in Taiwan, she would still be considered a "*waishengren*."

[32] I prefer not to use "ethnic groups" to distinguish between Taiwan's Mainlander (*waishengren*), Taiwanese (*benshengren*), and Hakka populations as they are all considered as Han Chinese.

Taiwan's two other ethno-political categories including the Hakka (*kejiaren* 客家人) and eleven Aboriginal groups.

According to the Government Information Office's (GIO) annual publication, the *Republic of China Yearbook*, Taiwan's population is comprised of four broad groups. These four groups include Taiwanese who are largely of Minnan (閩南)[33] descent, Mainlanders who immigrated to Taiwan from mainland China between 1945 to 1949, Hakka (*kejiaren* 客家人), and members of Taiwan's eleven Aboriginal groups (*yuanzhumin* 原住民).[34] As of early 2002, Taiwan's ethnic composition is roughly 85% Taiwanese, 10% Mainlander, 3.5% Hakka, and 1.5% Aborigine (including all eleven groups).[35]

The English descriptor "Taiwanese" proves both problematic and insufficient to describe Taiwan's complex ethno-political differentiations as it is also used to represent another identifier, namely, the Mandarin Chinese term for *Taiwanren* (台灣人). In a personal interview, speech communication professor Jack Yu (Yu Tzu-hsiang 游梓翔) of Shih Hsin University (世新大學) explained that the term "*Taiwanren*" was originally used to describe a cultural group (*wenhua zuqun* 文化族群) (Jack Tzu-hsiang Yu 2000). Recently, another sociopolitical identifier, "new Taiwanese" (*Xin Taiwanren* 新台灣人), has entered Taiwan's sociopolitical lexicon. This term gained popularity during the 1998 Taipei mayoral election when former ROC President Lee Teng-hui used the descriptor to emphasize KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) identification

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[33] Minnan refers to speakers of the Southern Min dialect. These speakers largely immigrated from present-day southern Fujian province in China.

[34] Mainlanders, Taiwanese, and Hakka are all considered to be Han Chinese. Distinctions between the three groups are generally based on language and date each group immigrated to Taiwan from China (cf. Wachman 1994; Chen, Chuang, and Huang 1994).

[35] The *Republic of China Yearbook* (2000) lists nine Aborigine groups. However, an article in the *Taipei Times* in December 2002 reported that ROC government recently recognized an eleventh tribe.

with Taiwan despite having been born in mainland-China. President Lee's linguistic move strategically avoided labeling Ma Ying-jeou as a Mainlander or *waishengren* as means to increase Ma's appeal to non-*waishengren* voters, such as *benshengren*. Given these disparate political readings, I prefer to use the term *benshengren* rather than Taiwanese when identifying this cultural group in my discussions of ethno-political tensions between *benshengren* and *waishengren*.

Similarly, I use the term Mainlander for *waishengren* rather than "Chinese" (*Zhongguoren* 中國人) when referring to Han Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan from China after 1945. This is due to the ideological and mythological connotations *Zhongguoren* evokes, including "obligations and loyalties of political affiliation and the myth of the Central Country" (Tu 1991:25). According to Tu Weiming (1991), the English translations of "Central Country" or "Middle Kingdom" both poetically and ideologically capture the Chinese term and notion of "*Zhongguo*" (中國), more commonly referred to as "China." Although debates regarding whether the people of Taiwan are *Zhongguoren* enters into ethno-political discourses, my emphasis on using *waishengren* grounds sociopolitical relations between *waishengren* and *benshengren* as a Taiwan-based issue as opposed to one that involves "Chinese" elsewhere, including those in China, Singapore, or Hong Kong.

These descriptors represent the crux of a call-in excerpt I examine in which a female guest panelist presents her interpretations of the identifiers *Zhongguoren* and *Taiwanren* while negotiating their sensitive sociopolitical ideologies. In stretching the two term's indexical meanings, the panelist simultaneously demonstrates their highly fluid state and arbitrary groundings. She succeeds in broadening the terms' politicized understandings by reconfiguring their reified interpretations in a "thought experiment" (Myers 1999a) through the use of hypothetical reported speech, a linguistic device I elaborate upon in the next chapter.

Returning to the notion of *shengji qingjie* or ethno-political sentiments, the phrase also refers to tensions arising from historical, sociopolitical power imbalances between *benshengren* and *waishengren*, which still resonate in Taiwan even today. Tensions between these two sociopolitical groups derive from Taiwan's oppressive past, including the incarceration and massacre of thousands of *benshengren*[36] under the mainland China-derived KMT regime when the country was under martial law from the late 1940s to 1987 (cf. Phillips 1999).

Consequently, ethno-political sentiments derive from a half century of *waishengren* hegemony over Taiwan's local population, which is predominantly comprised of *benshengren*. The martial law policy the KMT had implemented on the Chinese mainland in 1948 in an effort to suppress communist rebellion was continued on Taiwan as a means to eliminate local cultural and linguistic practices, which KMT leaders considered a potential threat to their mainland-based regime (Wang 1999:323). Several events in recent Taiwan history immortalize the injustices the local population endured at the hands of the KMT including the February 28 Incident in 1947, more commonly referred to as 2-28 (*er-er-ba* 二二八); the White Terror Era (*baise kongbu* 白色恐怖) that covered the 1950s to late 1970s; and the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 (cf. Kerr 1965; Mendel 1970; Peng 1966).

The combined factors of a *waishengren* ruling party and its suppression of the local, predominantly *benshengren* population has thus contributed to lingering ethno-political sentiments and ideological differences between these two groups (Wachman 1994:30-33). Since the implementation of free national elections in the late 1980s, evolving power relations between *benshengren* and *waishengren* manifest themselves in political party ideologies as electoral candidates frequently

[36] Individuals from other ethno-political groups were also mistreated by the KMT during this period, including the Hakka and Abroginal groups. Mainlanders were occasionally the victims of sociopolitical abuse as well. However, the overwhelming majority of the victims were *benshengren*.

use the identifiers to categorize, divide, and attract voters (Rigger 1999:141). As presented earlier in the chapter, each political party's worldview regarding Taiwan's sovereignty and national identity is distinguished in the sociopolitical imaginary according to pro-Taiwan independence and *benshengren*-favorable versus pro-unification and *waishengren*-favorable agendas.[37]

Yet, these demarcations ignore Taiwan's increasingly multicultural and multilingual society where such political distinctions carry less relevance in everyday interactions. Taiwan's political landscape has gradually acknowledged these trends in its campaign strategies with the coining of the identifier *Xin Taiwanren* (新台灣人) or "New Taiwanese" an apt example of politicians' early attempts to replace old ethno-political categories with contemporary, yet just as limiting identifiers.[38]

Given that inter-group marriage is increasingly common in Taiwan, Professor Yu cautions that to manipulate "*shengji*" for political ends is dangerous and sensitive (Jack Yu 2000). The persistent generation of ethno-political crisis discourses by Taiwan's political parties reflects sociopolitical struggles over power and popular support as well as a deliberate denial of Taiwan's diversified demographics. Call-in shows thus emerge as another site where ethno-political relations take center stage as program producers recognize the range of politicians-cum-guest panelists available to discuss this issue as well as the wide of appeal it holds for Taiwan's viewers.[39]

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[37] Despite this reified and dichotomous reading of Taiwan's sociopolitical environment, concerns associated with the Hakka and Aborigine groups do periodically arise to public consciousness. For instance, in the 2000 presidential election, independent presidential candidate Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良) campaigned as a Hakka candidate in seeking to appeal to that segment of the population.

[38] In Taiwan parlance, this labeling practice is colloquially described as "putting a hat on someone" (*kou maozi* 扣帽子). I examine a saliva war in Chapter Seven that addresses this practice.

[39] I recognize that a chicken-and-egg scenario may be occurring here as viewers and guest panelists react to the call-in show's emphasis on ethno-political relations and vice versa.

The constitutional crisis: gendered politics and VP Annette Lu

The final crisis issue this study examines focuses on call-in show deliberations of ROC Vice President Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lian 呂秀蓮), and in particular, the "constitutional crisis" that her controversial linguistic behavior initiated. In a string of verbal remarks uttered shortly after her inauguration as the ROC's first female vice president in May 2000, Lu referred to her position in President Chen Shui-bian's administration as a "scorned woman in the palace" (*shengong yuanfu* 深宮怨婦), declared that "Jiang Zemin only dares to insult women" (*Jiang Zemin zhi gan ma nüren* 江澤民只敢罵女人) in response to the PRC president's personal attacks toward her, and finally, compared herself as playing the "black face" (*heilian* 黑臉) or "bad cop" to President Chen's "white face" (*bailian* 白臉) or "good cop."[40]

In the *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* episode my study examines, I demonstrate how guest panelists revoice Annette Lu's verbal utterances and reframe them as endangering Taiwan's national security. Call-in panelists succeed in reappropriating her original remarks by linking their evaluations of the utterances with their own reportings of them through quoted speech. I contrast these guest panelists' negative portrayals of Annette Lu with another female panelist's defense of the Vice President's linguistic behavior. I later demonstrate that the female panelist's arguments are weakened by her reliance on indirect rather than direct reported speech in her efforts to contextualize Lu's remarks within the vice president's speech honoring Taiwan's women's rights movement. Finally, I consider call-in participants' deliberations regarding Annette Lu's controversial linguistic behavior as reflecting the inequalities in Taiwan politics including gendered relations of power, status, and identity.

[40] A more detailed analysis of Lu's statements is provided in Chapters Five and Seven.

Frequently, women in Taiwan enter politics via male family connections, abetted by the status, prestige, and *guanxi* (關係), roughly translated as "network,"[41] or influence of a father, brother, or husband. More often than not, when a male relation is jailed, retires, or dies, a wife, daughter, sister, or niece assumes the vacant position (cf. Chou et al. 1990). Annette Lu, however, entered into Taiwan politics driven by her own convictions and considerable resolve. Lu emerged onto Taiwan's political scene in dramatic fashion during the White Terror Era (1950-70s) when martial law was at its height under KMT rule.

Among the opposition leaders who were incarcerated for anti-government activity in the early 1970s, Annette Lu was only one of two females[42] detained in a political penitentiary on Green Island (*lü dao* 綠島).[43] Following the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979, Annette Lu was again arrested for participating in opposition party activities. As one of the deputy editors of the subversive journal, *Formosa* (*Meilidao* 美麗島),[44] Lu also played a key role in promoting pro-Taiwanese independence consciousness. Following her incarceration, Lu and several of her former prison-mates continued to vociferously advocate for a transparent and democratic sociopolitical environment that included an eventual plebiscite on Taiwan's sovereignty as an independent country.

Incidentally, the "constitutional crisis" Lu's verbal behavior initiated was not the first time Annette Lu had been criticized for undermining Taiwan's national stability. For instance, her detractors decried Lu for leading Taiwan's

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[41] The Chinese concept of "guanxi" (關係) is complex and involves not only personal networks and close affiliation but also reciprocal obligation and investment. For further reading on the topic, see Kipnis (1997), Smart (1993), Yan (1996), and Yang (1994a).

[42] Other opposition leaders who were incarcerated included current ROC President Chen Shui-bian and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) founder and former chairperson, Shi Ming-teh (施明德).

[43] Green Island is located off the southeastern coast of Taiwan. The penitentiary is no longer used, while a monument was recently constructed on the island commemorating universal human rights.

[44] The name of the magazine was inspired by the Portuguese descriptor for Taiwan, *ihla Formosa*, which means "beautiful island."

women's rights movement and described her campaign as an attempt "to destabilize the society, [and] especially to arose (sic) dispute between the husbands and wives of our high ranking officials so that their marriages may be broken" (Lu 1988:12, ff.2, in Farris 1994:311). At a time when gender equality remained an unchampioned issue in the early 1980s, Annette Lu co-founded Taiwan's first women's organization, the Awakening Foundation (*Funu Xinzhi Jijinhui* 婦女新知基金會), that dedicated itself to women's rights. During the mid-1970s when Taiwan began experiencing rising prosperity and the emergence of middle-class norms,[45] Annette Lu incited a wave of female/women consciousness with her book, *New Feminism*, which was first published in 1974 and reissued in 1986 (Farris 1994:310, cf. Lu 1986 (1974)).

In her groundbreaking book, Annette Lu claims in the chapter entitled "Still a patriarchal society" that invisible inequalities stemming from patriarchal values continue to control women's fates in Taiwan. Gender ideology, Lu states, acts as both a symbolic system and social constraint that abets the construction and maintenance of a social structure that prevents changes in women's status in Taiwan. She specifically cites four Chinese patriarchal values that hinder gender equality including the following traditional worldviews: 1) "continuing the family line" (*zhuanzhong jiedai* 傳宗接代) which leads to "valuing men over women" (*zhong nan qing nu* 重男輕女); 2) the "three obediences and four virtues" (*san cong si de* 三從四德)[46] that women must adhere, which contributes to the notion that "men are respected [and] women are debased" (*nan zun nu bei* 男尊女卑); 3) "one-sided chastity" (*pianmian zhencao* 片面貞操) where a "double moral

[45] Applying the category "middle-class" to Taiwan society is a bit misleading, as class boundaries are just emerging and tend to be fluid and unstable, as many people occupy more than one class position at the same time (Gold 1994).

[46] The "three obediences" refer to women obeying their father before marriage, their husband after marriage, and their son after the husband's demise. The "four virtues" include morality, proper speech, having a modest manner, and diligent work.

standard" (*shuangzhong daode biaozhun* 雙重道德標準) exists which requires women to be chaste and allows men to be promiscuous; and 4) a gendered division of labor where "men are the breadwinners [work outdoors] while women are housewives [work indoors]" (*nan wai nu nei* 男外女內) which maintains "sex-role differences" (*xingbie jiaose chabie* 性別角色差別) (Lu 1986 (1974):87-88). Ironically, Lu finds herself constrained and harangued for flaunting these same gendered prescriptions, and particularly the second and fourth values, in her unorthodox behavior as ROC vice president.

Upon assuming the vice presidency, Annette Lu had the opportunity to challenge the aforementioned gendered discourses. However, Lu's outspokenness and the constraints of her elected office unwittingly made her a high profile victim instead. With her straightforward speaking style, Lu was labeled by the local media as Taiwan's "I.B.M.," that is, "International Big Mouth." Similarly, prominent local scholars lambasted Vice President Lu's contradictory and uninvited policy statements for undermining President Chen's own cross-straits agenda and endangering Taiwan's national security.

Opposition party legislators from the KMT, NP, and PFP consequently threatened to introduce a bill in the Legislative Yuan that would recall Lu and replace her with a newly elected vice president. What began as criticism of Lu's untimely and so-called inappropriate linguistic behavior escalated into a constitutional crisis regarding the legality of removing a democratically-elected official and the nation's vice president no less. Furthermore, the Annette Lu controversy exposed the vulnerability of Taiwan's nascent and untested democratic principles, as well as its struggles with reconciling traditional Confucian cultural values towards gendered roles and practices.

The trajectory of Lu's sociopolitical ascension from political opposition leader to ROC Vice President not only provides a sociohistorical mapping of Taiwan's democratic and feminist movements, but also reveals the tensions latent

between her roles as feminist activist, scholar, and lawyer on the one hand, and the expectations of her elected office on the other. Call-in show deliberations regarding Annette Lu's controversial vice presidency thus serve as a prime angle from which to explore the conflation of Taiwan's crisis discourses regarding the country's precarious geopolitical status as well as investigate the mass media's intense scrutiny of a public figure's linguistic behavior. Moreover, by examining how call-in participants articulate and negotiate Annette Lu's individual and public roles with her language practices, my study is able to analyze the extent to which sociopolitical crisis discourses influence the country's evolving democratic and gendered order.

In the following chapter, I introduce the role reported speech plays in call-in show verbal interactions as how this linguistic device allows call-in participants to strategically animate and creatively reconfigure Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses.

Chapter Four: Speech Reporting as Call-in Show Ways of Speaking

> The importance of reported speech in natural languages cannot be over-emphasized. . .[for] while we would like to have our public-intended messages reach everyone directly, circumstances are such that we are almost always exposed to a limited audience only. It is through reported speech that our utterances/messages reach hearers with whom we are not directly in touch.
>
> Massamba (1986:99)

This chapter links the expression and negotiation of crisis discourses to the use of reported speech in call-in show talk. I begin by introducing traditional conceptions of direct and indirect reported speech, including their comparative roles in specific contexts and cultures. Next, I explore the ways reported speech highlights the heteroglossic features of speech (Bakhtin 1981, 1986) such as the ability for speakers to embed voices in an ongoing stretch of talk (Goffman 1974, 1981). In introducing the notion of hypothetical reported speech, I consider the problematic interpretation of direct reported speech as faithfully "quoting another speaker" (Clark and Gerrig 1990). Subsequently, many scholars regard speech reporting as a creative linguistic act that depicts a constructed, selective, and even fictitious portrayal of a speaker's words or thoughts (Buttny and Williams 2000; Fógany 1986; Kuipers 1990; Tannen 1989). The bulk of the chapter considers the role reported speech plays in call-in show deliberations, and particularly, how participants use this linguistic device to augment, negotiate, and counter crisis readings of sociopolitical events and ideologies in Taiwan.

WHAT CONSTITUTES REPORTED SPEECH?

Demarcating the "types" of reported speech proves more complicated than merely distinguishing between direct and indirect reported speech.[1] In the following section, I explore the validity of describing direct reported speech as the faithful reproduction of another's utterance by introducing the notion of hypothetical reported speech. In the current section, however, I limit the discussion to differentiations between the surface form and functions of direct and indirect reported speech.

What scholars of speech reporting generally recognize as direct reported speech has alternately been described as "quoted speech" (Coulmas 1986), "direct quotation" (Besnier 1993), "direct discourse" (Wierzbicka 1974), or "verbatim quotation" (Massamba 1986). Some researchers claim that direct reported speech provides a "more authentic" version of an utterance (Li 1986:41) in that it produces a "*faithful verbatim report* of a person's actual words" (Toolon 1988:120; original italics), a reading that has been dubbed as the "verbatim principle" (Clark and Gerrig 1990).

In comparison, indirect reported speech is variously referred to in the literature as "indirect speech" (Coulmas 1986), "indirect quotation" (Besnier 1993), "indirect discourse" (Wierzbicka 1974), and "summary quotes" (Buttny and Williams 2000). In contrast to direct reported speech, speakers engaged in indirect speech reporting are "free to blend information about an utterance with information about the world not conveyed by that utterance" (Coulmas 1986:1). For consistency, my study will use "direct reported speech" and "indirect reported speech" when referring to these two forms of speech reporting.

[1] "Free indirect speech" is not addressed in this study. For further reading on this linguistic form, please refer to Banfield (1973), Wierzbicka (1974), and Coulmas (1986). The study will alternately use "reported speech" and "speech reporting" to refer to call-in show speakers' use of direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech.

Distinctions between direct and indirect reported speech generally focus upon the reporter's deictic orientation when recapturing the original utterance, the tense of the reported utterance, and the inclusion of a complimentizer "that" in indirect but not direct reported speech (Li 1986:29). Basic examples of direct versus indirect reported speech in English and Chinese include the following two sentences respectively: (1) Yu Fu said, "I'm tired." (direct); (2) Yu Fu said (that) he was tired (indirect), whereas in Mandarin Chinese, this two forms of reported speech can be represented as: (1) 漁夫說，"我累了"; (2) 漁夫說他累了. Coulmas (1986) summarizes these differences in the following manner:

> In *direct speech* the reporter lends his voice to the original speaker and says (or writes) what he said, thus adopting his point of view, as it were. Direct speech, in a manner of speaking, is not the reporter's speech, but remains the reported speaker's speech whose role is played by the reporter. . .In *indirect speech*, on the other hand, the reporter comes to the fore. He relates a speech event as he would relate any other event: from his own point of view (2; italics added).

What linguists regard as contrasting deictic projections of an original utterance, literary scholars describe as distinct stylistic forms. For instance, direct reported speech presents a linear style that differentiates an utterance's author from its reporter. Inversely, indirect reported speech creates a pictoral style that merges the indirect utterance within the surrounding discourse (Vološinov 1973 (1929)).

In terms of function, scholars suggest that depending upon the context and objective, speakers prefer one form of reported speech over another. Several studies reveal this to be the case when speakers attempt to proffer evidentiatlity through reported speech (Baynham 1996; Chafe and Nichols 1986; DuBois 1986). In Nukulaelae discourse, Besnier (1993) observes that speakers turn to direct reported speech when needing to separate an "authorial voice" from the reported voice. This strategic choice reflects a broader concern for the "*presentation of reported speech as an authentic reflection of the original utterance*" (168;

original emphasis).[2] Brown and Levinson (1987) find a similar occurrence in their studies on politeness in the Tzeltal and Tamil languages where speakers use direct reported speech as a positive-politeness technique. For instance, in cases when a speaker is stressing common ground with a hearer, minimal adjustment is made when reporting the speech of another thus leaving uninterpreted expressions of reference and names "even where this may result in loss of clarity" (122).

However, the value and relationship between authenticity and direct reported speech has alternative connotations in other societies. For example, in the U.S. legal system of evidence law, speech reporting is considered to be "hearsay" given the argument that a witness' memory of what was heard is unreliable (Philips 1993). Moreover, because it is the reporter of the original utterance and not the original speaker who is under oath ("to tell the truth, the whole truth…"), the truthfulness of an utterance cannot be accurately assessed. Subsequently, in this context, reported speech carries less weight than visual accountings. These three examples illustrate that individual applications and social understandings of direct and indirect reported speech must be observed and contextualized within the specific settings and communities in which they are used.

In following chapters, my study examines the different influences direct versus indirect reported speech has on call-in participants' presentations and evaluations of Vice President Annette Lu's recent linguistic behavior. My analysis suggests that even when participants insert "snippets" (Clark and Gerrig 1990) of direct speech in their commentary, they create a more descriptive and persuasive interpretation of the original speaker's character and verbal behavior. In contrast, indirect reported speech or "summary quotes" (Buttny and Williams 2000) can weaken one's argument as the information provided in the summarized

[2] Besnier notes that speakers still have room for affective or prosodic variation in the deliverance of quoted utterances.

utterance becomes lost within and subsumed by the surrounding remarks. For instance, I later examine how a female panelist's use of summary quotes in her description and defense VP Lu's controversial keynote address leaves her listeners confused as to which portion of her remarks represent Lu's speech and which reflect the panelist's own assessment. I thus illustrate that in comparison to the other panelists who use direct reported speech to justify their criticism of VP Lu's inappropriate verbal behavior, the female panelist's arguments appear insubstantial, and subsequently, less convincing.

The polyphony of reported speech

When distinguishing direct from indirect reported speech, the broad delineation between "authorial" versus reporting voices simplifies and ignores the heteroglossic or multivocalic nature of utterances in general, and reported speech in particular (Bakhtin 1981, 1986). Speech reporting foregrounds the "layering of voices" or polyphony (Bakhtin 1981) within speech as well as the variety of reflexive (Lucy 1993a), metalingual (Jakobson 1960), and metapragmatic (Silverstein 1993) devices that speakers use when reporting the utterance and voice of another.

Yet, the exercise of identifying and separating the authorial voice from that of the reporter's during speech reporting represents a metacommunicative and metalinguistic exercise that "takes place all the time to help structure ongoing linguistic activity" (Lucy 1993b:18). For instance, Shuman (1993) acknowledges that the "question of whether the [quoted and reporting] voices are in solidarity or in conflict is crucial" to deciphering social relationships and identities in interactions (152). Aside from the layering that occurs within speech, language use is also intimately associated with and within the settings it occurs (cf. Duranti and Goodwin 1992). Call-in show participants are no different when it comes to performing identities and animating voices during program discussions. I explore how call-in participants' attempts to separate their voice from the characters they

portray reveal as much about local sociopolitical relations and discourses as it does about their own ideological stance and political leanings.

For instance, I later analyze how *2100* moderator Lee Tao uses reported speech to rapidly shift between his moderator voice and those of the hypothetical personages he animates. Through the combined use of reported speech, prosody, and code-switching, Lee Tao deftly illustrates the various social figures Taiwan's national identity crisis implicates as they negotiate their stance towards competing "Taiwanese" versus "Chinese" identities. However, in performing these disparate voices, I illustrate that Lee Tao not only reenacts Taiwan's sociopolitical power relations but also reveals his own language ideologies and identity constructions.[3]

Vološinov (1973 (1929)) captures the intricate relationship between speech reporting and context when he suggests that "between the reported speech and the reporting context, relations of high complexity and tension are in force" (153). The dialogic relationship between linguistic practice and speech events[4] (Hymes 1989, 1995) recalls Basso's (1979) analysis of Western Apache joking performances of the "Whiteman." Here, Basso finds that joking performances convey messages about two sets of relationships, including the *present* relationship between the speaker and the object of the joke as well as the *absent* relationship on which the present one is modeled. Similarly, my study regards speech reporting on call-in shows as a rich resource for indexing present and absent crisis discourses and sociopolitical relationships. On the one hand, speech reporting provides call-in participants the means to negotiate the intricacies of the controversial topics they deliberate, while on the other, the linguistic practice allows sociopolitical discourses and tensions based in the "real" world to "leak"

[3] I elaborate upon this example throughout the chapter, while providing a full analysis in Chapter Five.

[4] I explain the notion of "speech events" in Chapters Six and Seven when I examine reconciliation talk and saliva wars.

(Besnier 1993) into the participants' words within the confines of the call-in show studio setting.

Consequently, the voices and entities call-in participants portray through reported speech reveals much about the "social indexicality" (Koven 2001) of this device. As previously introduced, Lee Tao's performance of Taiwan's national identity crisis discourses succeeds in ascribing stereotyped speech to the hypothetical characters (e.g., a teacher, parent, and legislator) he animates. Although the fictional voices are not associated with specific individuals, the reported utterances iconically identify recognizable social personas in Taiwan society. The moderator's reported speech-laden monologue corroborates Koven's (2001) observation that:

> Quotations may indeed work as icons of the speech events they replay but they are not necessarily iconic of *actual* utterances. . .Quoted performances may not necessarily resemble the real words of *actual people* as much as they *index* or point to images of socially locatable, *linguistically stereotypical kinds of people* (517-518; original emphasis).

I revisit the theoretical assertion that reported speech does not actually represent original utterances later in the chapter and through analysis of selected call-in show excerpts in subsequent chapters.

Shifting voices and footings

An investigation into reported speech must also incorporate Goffman's (1981) notion of "footing," which refers to managing the production and reception of an utterance such as the frame of an event. Embedded or reported speech represents one linguistic device that speakers use to shift between different footings within the same stretch of talk. Embedding voices and shifting footings allows a speaker to ascribe and reassign roles, and thus power, to various voices within verbal interactions. Goffman (1974, 1981) distinguishes four roles or voices that speakers can embed within their own speech including author, principal, animator, and figure. Specifically, the *author* represents the owner of

the utterance; the *principal* identifies the party officially responsible for the words; the *animator* constitutes the entity who actually speaks the words (e.g., spokesperson); while the *figure* plays the protagonist of a narrative (e.g., character in a story) (Goffman 1974:144-147).

In the call-in show excerpts I later analyze, participants often shift the topic of conversation such that the conversation becomes the topic, with reported speech serving as the catalyst for the sudden change in footing. Shifts in footing through reported speech can nonetheless be ratified or rejected by other speakers. Speech reporting thus represents a highly negotiable and strategic tactic in call-in show deliberations. For instance, I later examine a verbal dispute between two guest panelists over the definition of "compatriot" (同胞), a term that was introduced into the program's deliberations by a video clip featuring ROC President Chen Shui-bian use of the word when describing Taiwan-China relations. As the term's definition becomes the main focus of the program, a guest panelist attempts to define "compatriot" by situating President Chen as the term's author, while positioning himself as merely the animator of Chen's initial utterance. In this context, the panelist attempts to employ "conventional brackets to warn us that what he is saying is…mere repeating of words said by someone else…[and] that he means to stand in relation of reduced responsibility for what he is saying" (Goffman 1974:512). However, when another speaker challenges the panelist to define "compatriot" in his own words, the panelist finds himself unable to do so, and by default, concedes the definitional dispute to his opponent.

Parodic stylization and code-switching

Speech reporting proves to be a highly compatible linguistic device that can easily be augmented with other verbal tools. For instance, combining reported speech with distinct shifts in prosody and code-switching allows the reporter to "draw upon, not only the context, but also the expression of the original speech"

(Buttny and Williams 2000:116). Goffman (1974) describes these linguistic manipulations as "invisible quotation marks" that isolate an utterance as belonging to someone other than the reporter. Similarly, Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) associate speakers' linguistic choices with "shifts of identity." To them, a speaker's linguistic behavior—including choice of lexis, grammar, pronunciation (e.g., prosody), and code—represents a set of "acts of identity" in which "people reveal both their personal identity and their search for social roles" (14). While the present study focuses less on presentations of individual identities per se, these scholars' observations inform my analyses on how call-in participants' speech reporting contextually performs locally-recognizable social entities and ideologies (Koven 2001), especially those associated with Taiwan's crisis discourses.

As previously noted, speech reporting accentuates the heteroglossic nature of language. Yet, the "layering of voices" in a given utterance can be further dramatized through the addition of prosodic features (Bakhtin 1981). Through the combination of reported speech and "parodic stylization" (ibid), reporters emphasize the separation between their own voice and the original speaker's in a hyper-performance of socially recognizable identities and linguistic stereotypes while retaining control of the discourse (Macaulay 1987). Associating "prosodic mimicking" with speech reporting further foregrounds the manner in which language can be used to reflect and recreate social relations of power (Álvarez-Cáccomo 1996). Günthner's (1999) research on "polyphonic strategies" suggests that combined with reported speech, this linguistic tactic blends the voices of the reporter and original speaker such that the same utterance carries two points of view from two different "worlds," including that of the "story world" and the reporting world. Besnier (1993) alternately describes this blending process as the reporter's voice "leaking" into both the quoted voice and utterance. Inserting prosodic features in speech reporting thus heightens an already marked production

of speech, demonstrating that various linguistic devices occur in tandem with, rather than in isolation from, one another.

However, Gumperz (1982) observes that "not all speakers are quoted in the language they normally use" (82). Reporting an utterance in its original language as "mimetic intention" (Alfonzetti 1998) to preserve the language of the original locutor is not *a priori*, although it does occur. Consequently, it is the difference between the reporting and surrounding languages, rather than the direction of the code-switch, that is significant (Sebba and Wooton 1998). This observation has inspired scholars to explore the pairing of code-switching with speech reporting during narratives in particular and social interactions in general (Gal 1979; Hill and Hill 1986). Auer (1995) claims that code-alternation provides a "contrast between the conversational context of the quote and the reported speech itself" (119). This code contrast can also highlight and play with the quoted speaker's identity associated with the reported language. For instance, unexpected "code displacement" by reporting the speech of another in a marked language—such as performing President G. W. Bush's voice in Arabic and Saddam Hussein's in English—allows the reporter to strategically dislocate, transform, or supplant socially-constituted identities and locally-recognized power alliances (Álvarez-Cáccomo 1996).

Of course, for code displacement to be successful, listeners must already possess and share sociopolitical knowledge that allows the juxtaposition to be readily apparent. Koven (2001) adds that implicit sociopolitical ideologies must already exist for listeners to recognize associations between language choice and the stereotyping of certain types of people (cf. Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998; Walters 1996, 1997; Zhang 2001). In this sense, "local ideologies that link register usage to socially locatable stereotypes of kinds of people,…[and] the register(s) in which a quotation is rendered indeed makes the quoted character come to life as a particular kind of person" (Koven 2001:550).

Again, in my analysis of Lee Tao's marked performance of several constructed voices, his use of parodic stylization as well as code-switching from Mandarin Chinese, the language of the surrounding commentary, to Taiwanese, when performing the voice of an emotionally charged parent, indexes ideologies associated with the two languages. Accompanied by noticeable changes in tone, pitch, and register, the moderator's combined code-switching and speech reporting enhances sociopolitical tensions laden within ethno-political relations of status and power between Mainlanders (*waishengren* 外省人) who are generally associated with Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese (*benshengren* 本省人) who are largely affiliated with Taiwanese (*Taijyu* 台語) or Hohlo.[5] Such code choices demonstrate the ability for reporters to perform not only stereotypical identities but also accentuate local ideologies, such as Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses.

WHERE IS THE "REPORTED" IN REPORTED SPEECH?

The previous section introduced "direct" reported speech as producing a "faithful" rendering of another speaker's words. However, in conversational use, scholars widely agree that it is misleading to interpret direct reported speech as "immutable" and to decipher it apart from its reporting context (Tannen 1989:109).[6] Furthermore, Leech (1978, 1980) asserts that quoted speech cannot easily be categorized as either "true" or "false"; rather, understandings of reported speech are better served by a "broader, gradable notion of representational accuracy or faithfulness" (1980:58). Simply put, the phrase "direct reported speech" basically represents a "misnomer" (Ebert 1986) that requires both a metalinguistic rearticulation and a metapragmatic reconceptualization.

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[5] "Hohlo" is an English transliteration of the Taiwanese word for the Taiwanese language.
[6] Ironically, this understanding can already be found in "real" world contexts, as shown by the "hearsay" ruling in U.S. courts (Philips 1993).

There are several perspectives from which to explore these observations and criticisms of the "reportedness" of direct reported speech. Bakhtin (1981) dismantles the impression of faithfully reported utterances in his observation that another speaker's words are frequently "transmitted with highly *varied degrees of accuracy and impartiality*" (337; emphasis added). Other scholars find Bakhtin's "varying" degrees to be too generous and contend that reported speech is actually "spontaneous speech" fashioned in the moment of talk (Kuo 2001:187). Similarly, Haberland's (1986) attempts to parse the notion that direct reported speech implies fidelity in form *and* content (Li 1986) to an original utterance reveals the problems with using the descriptor "direct" in association with "reported speech" or "quotation":

> the use of direct [reported] speech only implies a commitment to the content of the model speech act…[such that] [n]o commitment to its wording (its form) is implied. . .[thus] not every case of direct speech is a direct quotation (Haberland 1986:225).

Haberland's explanation complicates his argument by concurrently using "direct speech" and "direct quotation" in his attempt to separate the two terms and linguistic forms, thus leaving the distinction ambiguous. Tannen's (1989) coining of "constructed dialogue" in place of reported speech offers an alterative terminology that abandons the problematic phrase entirely:

> I am claiming that when a speaker represents an utterance as the words of another, what results is by no means describable as 'reported speech.' Rather it is *constructed dialogue*. And the construction of the dialogue represents an active, creative, transforming move which expresses the relationship not between the quoted party and the topic of talk but rather the quoting party and the audience to whom the quotation is delivered (109; emphasis added).

In this reading, Tannen places the emphasis on the relationship between the quoter or reporter and listener, rather than between the reporter and the reported utterance.

Other scholars also observe that in conversational practice speakers take great liberties in inventing and reconfiguring purportedly quoted speech (Baynham 1996; Irvine 1996). Haberland (1986) created the term "hypothetical reported speech" to capture the practice of reporting "something which some other speaker might have said, but which he or she actually did not say" (225). For instance, I later examine how a caller attributes hypothetical reported speech to Taiwan pop star A-mei as a means to present the singer in an unflattering manner. However, the caller's egotistical portrayal of A-mei through a self-promoting hypothetical utterance is at odds with the pop star's self-effacing demeanor as I illustrate through video clips of A-mei at a press conference featured earlier on the call-in show. By juxtaposing the caller's comments with the video clip, I investigate how call-in participants' linguistic practices interact and are informed by program resources such as sound bites, graphics, and of course, other participants' comments.

Aside from the alternative term of constructed dialogue (Tannen 1986, 1989) and its derivative "constructed utterances" (Kuipers 1990), other descriptors that capture the inherent variance in speech reporting include "partial quotation" (Fónagy 1986), "for-example quotation" (ibid), "selective depiction" (Clark and Gerrig 1990), "impossible quotes" (Mayes 1990), "generic" speech (Fairclough 1992), "typifying reported speech" (Parmentier 1993),[7] "hypothetical represented discourse" (Myers 1999a; Semino et. al. 1999), and "fictitious quotation" (Buttny and Williams 2000). For consistency, my study will generically refer to this form of speech reporting as "hypothetical reported speech" unless one of the aforementioned terms more accurately captures a specific example in the analyzed data.

[7] Parmentier (1993) describes "typifying reported speech" as "reported speech that has the surface linguistic form of direct quotation but which does not in face report discourse which ever occurred in the past" (280).

Inaccuracy and impartiality aside, hypothetical reported speech continues to be regarded as "bear[ing] enough family resemblance to be considered alongside reported speech" (Buttny and Williams 2000:113). Svartvik and Quirk (1980) acknowledge that hypothetical reported speech represents the rule rather than the exception in everyday linguistic practices. Moreover, they suggest that reporters often impute a wide variety of speech to a speaker (self or other) that may have little resemblance to not only the actual utterance but recognizable speech itself. Under this broad rubric, hypothetical reported speech can include fillers or substitute expressions (e.g., "such and such a time") (Clark and Gerrig 1990), as well as musings as to what "'could,' 'would,' or 'may' be said" (Buttny and Williams 2000:113). Even nonsense speech such as "blah, blah, blah" can act as "stand-ins" for information or content that the reporting speaker does not judge necessary for a more detailed recounting (Clark and Gerrig 1990:780). Consequently, what must be emphasized is that nonsense speech and fillers infuse a speaker's overall narrative or commentary with more description that their absence could not provide.

For these reasons, this study posits that hypothetical reported speech constitutes a powerful and creative linguistic tool within the "family" of reported speech. In fact, various excerpts I examine feature call-in participants inserting constructed dialogue in the form of musings of what "may be said" and nonsense speech or "stand-ins" for intelligible verbal content. In the first instance, I investigate how a guest panelist relies upon hypothetical utterances to reconcile the seemingly contradictory notion of embracing both "Taiwanese" and "Chinese" identities. In another excerpt, I explore how a moderator uses a combination of nonsense speech and constructed dialogue to perform heightened emotional reaction to the question of "what is your identity?" These and other examples illustrate that reported speech in the form of imagined utterances allows call-in participants greater leverage to articulate and negotiate disparate crisis

discourses in sociopolitically cognizant ways that their co-participants can easily recognize.

It is important to recognize that reported speech also includes non-verbal communication, most notably "inner speech" (Vološinov 1973 (1929)).[8] As Wierzbicka (1974) summarizes, the problem of reported speech is "inseparable from that of reported thoughts, reported feelings, reported perceptions, etc." (297). During an episode on the latest cross-straits incident, a guest panelist uses speech reporting to report the aggressive thoughts of the PRC authorities. In doing so, the panelist articulates an unstated yet tacitly understood sentiment among the participants, namely, that the PRC's heavy-handed tactics reflects the government's hegemonic attitude toward Taiwan.

Similarly, Clark and Gerrig (1990) note that traditional studies of speech reporting preface speech over non-verbal actions such as reported gestures, behaviors, unconventional sounds, and even "reported song" (Urban 1993). By overlooking reenactments of facial expressions, hand gestures, onomatopoeic noises, and nonsense speech, researchers of speech reporting prematurely discount a wide range of linguistic behavior and sociocultural knowledge. Having said this, the present study primarily focuses on call-in participants' use of verbal speech reporting, although some examples of reported thought and gestures are also examined.[9]

WHY STUDY REPORTED SPEECH? AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

This study's inquiry in the use of reported speech by call-in show participants follows a respected line of scholarly research in the fields of linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, literary studies, communication studies, and psychology. Such studies further understandings on the metapragmatic use of

[8] Fónagy (1986) describes "inner speech" as "monologues intérieurs" (258).

reported speech within everyday language use and face-to-face social interactions. Moreover, this body of research recognizes that speech reporting provides individuals the means to present, contest, and negotiate self and other identities, ideologies, and worldviews in subtle and sometimes unexpected ways.

In linguistic anthropology, scholars have largely focused on reported speech in terms of how speakers use the linguistic device to reflect and challenge a community's social values and cultural practices (Bauman 1986; Duranti 1993, 1994; Hill and Hill 1986; Hill and Irvine 1993; Michael 2001; Urban 1989). Citing two examples, Sherzer's (1983, 1990) research on the Kuna community in Panama discovers that reported speech serves as a conduit through which knowledge and information is conceptualized, received, learned, instructed, and conveyed among its members (Sherzer 1990:118). Furthermore, speech reporting provides testimony of one's achievements. In Briggs' (1992, 1993) accounts of Warao ritual wailing and narratives, he illustrates that women use reported speech to create a collective voice that counters their marginality vis-à-vis other expressive genres in Warao society. In other words, users of reported speech do not simply draw on past experiences and incidents, but also create them such that they assert a right to partake in social events. This process thus allows individuals to explore their social relationships either directly or through specific incidents such as death (Briggs 1992:345).

Both of these studies offer local understandings of speech reporting as practice and knowledge within a given community, an approach my study takes when I examine call-in participants' verbal interactions. In several excerpts, I illustrate how participants validate their acquisition of and access to privileged information by proffering evidence through reported speech. These claims to knowledge are often based on hypothetical renderings of reported utterances, a

[9] In order to focus on certain aspects of reported speech, namely its verbal properties, this study did not examine in detail the accompanying use of gestures and facial expressions. I address this

strategy one pro-China unification legislator capitalizes upon, given his "close" (*qin* 親) relationship with PRC officials, during deliberations on the ambiguous events surrounding the PRC ban of Taiwan pop-star A-mei.

Reported speech also offers marginalized call-in participants, such as callers, the opportunity to reclaim or contest crisis discourses that are often manipulated and monopolized by sociopolitical leaders and mass media personalities. For instance, one caller narrates a personal experience with a person of aboriginal descent by using reported speech to perform the aborigine individual's request to use Mandarin Chinese or "the national language" (*guoyu* 國語). This metalinguistic account and metapragamtic performance through reported speech effectively reexamines the call-in show's crisis topic, namely, that lingering language ideologies undermine present, everyday interactions between individuals from different backgrounds and linguistic environments.

Other linguistic anthropological studies have explored the role speech reporting plays in negotiating entitlement claims to narrated events. For instance, Shuman (1993) demonstrates that teenage girls use reported speech in fight stories to absolve themselves from being blamed for recounting such incidents. However, speech reporting allows them to actively reconfigure social relationships between the characters presented within the narrative. Shuman adds, however, that girls' attempts to use reported speech to conflate the strategies of maintaining one's social reputation on the one hand, and realigning interpersonal relationships through storytelling on the other, can occasionally cause them to trap themselves within their own "metacommunicative moves" (155).

Similarly, Marjorie Goodwin's (1990) study of "he-said-she-said" gossip disputes among African-American girls finds that speech reporting creates a "coherent domain of action" that includes identities, actions, and biographies of the participants involved as well as a past that justifies the present accusation

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omission in Chapter Eight in the section, "Limitations of the study."

(190). In the girls' social domain, reported speech acts as a powerful linguistic device in confronting accusations such as offering the defendant greater latitude to reframe the accuser's version of events, which Goodwin summarizes as follows:

> The ability to recontextualize disputed talk by embedding reported speech within other quoted speech provides participants with a powerful resource for negotiating the meaning and interpretation of the events in which they are engaged (208).

These two ethnographic studies on negotiating entitlement claims through speech reporting in verbal disputes inform the current investigation on call-in show saliva wars. Entitlement to specific knowledge as presented through reported speech frequently serves as a point of contention in guest panelist verbal sparring. However, overly relying upon quoted speech to defend one's perspective by presenting sources or bases (Pomerantz 1984), or to present materials to convince others that one's interpretation is accurate, can be risky and leave a speaker vulnerable to attack.

For instance, my examination of two saliva war passages in Chapter Seven suggest that the ability to ascribe reported speech and reappropriate the speech of another constitutes a highly negotiated process between disputants regardless if one is interpreting a controversial incident or defining politically-marked terms. In these examples, guest panelists find that their metacommunicative tactics fail as a result of a lack of corroborating evidence outside of reported speech. Recalling the "hearsay" argument in U.S. law that denies the presentation of reported speech as evidence (Philips 1993), my investigation of call-in show saliva wars suggests that speech reporting carries as much clout as the unfolding verbal interaction and the other disputants allow.

Among researchers of novels and storytelling, scholars find that direct speech reporting dramatizes narrated events by creating a more "vivid" (Labov 1972; Tannen 1989) portrayal and by injecting a "'theatrical', playful, imaginary

character" to the telling (Wierzbicka 1974: 272).[10] Inserting direct quotation in narratives restages a verbal utterance such that it "creates the illusion to witness the scene evoked by the narrator" (Fónagy 1986:255). In face-to-face storytelling, direct reported speech creates a feeling of "immediacy" between the narrator and audience, while encouraging greater involvement and "sense-making" on the part of the listener (Tannen 1986, 1989).

Günthner (1999) claims that using reported speech in conjunction with prosody and voice quality provides the reporter more resources with which to differentiate voices and utterances in the reporting world versus the "story world." Similarly, Hill and Zepeda (1993) argue that representations of a story world society through constructed dialogue makes the recounted events "sociocentrically" rather than egocentrically focused on the reporter's own experience (198). Literary scholars Semino et. al. (1999) also explore the possibilities of the story world through hypothetical discourse, discovering that it offers writers a viable strategy for contrasting various "possible worlds" with the "actual" world of the fictional text. This strategy creates "distribution" or diffuses responsibility for events recounted in the "interactional world" (Chafe 1980) such that it metaphorically creates the effect of multi-party participation in a speech event, even when only one person is speaking. Similarly, Wierzbicka (1974) finds that when reporters portray the meaning of an utterance together with its form through quoted speech, they avoid "the responsibility for a correct representation of the meaning as such" (279). Finally, direct reported speech serves as an effective and economical device to synthesize and communicate a wealth of information in both narratives and everyday talk (Holt 1996, 1999, 2000).

The aforementioned narrative and conversational inquiries into speech reporting bolster this study's exploration into how call-in participants inject a

[10] Michael (2001) appropriately notes that aside from lending "vividness" to the recounting of an event, reported speech is also frequently "yoked to social and interactive goals quite different from

sense of urgency into their remarks by selectively quoting another or, in the absence of an original utterance, creating hypothetical reported speech. By using real and imagined "reportings," I examine how participants involve their co-panelists and viewers in interpreting the revoiced utterances according to the participant's crisis-engendering rhetoric and the frame of the call-in program itself. For instance, speech reporting allows call-in participants the means to temporarily suspend the "real" world while presenting crisis-ridden "story worlds" that conveniently portray characters with unflattering, egotistical linguistic behaviors, which I illustrate in my analysis of how hypothetical reported speech is ascribed to pop star A-mei and Vice President Annette Lu. Furthermore, by shifting the footing of their commentary onto reported ground, participants can objectively and "distributively" present competing interpretations of an incident without jeopardizing their own social image and political reputations. Given the limited time participants have to speak during call-in show discussions, any linguistic device that allows them to quickly summarize their perspective and rebut another's counter-argument will find favor in this setting.

Scholars across disciplines often draw inspiration from each other's research on reported speech and incorporate their findings into their own. For instance, sociolinguist Greg Myers (1999a, 1999b) applies literary scholars Semino et. al.'s (1999) "possible worlds theory" in his examination of hypothetical represented discourse in focus group discussions. Myers finds that hypothetical speech reporting can act as a "thought experiment" (Myers 1999a) through which speakers present and weigh various perspectives of an issue. Moreover, the practice of addressing conflicting worldviews through "represented discourse" epitomizes a calculated maneuver to resolve complex issues through "saying rather than doing" (ibid). While hypothetical represented discourse can be used to dramatize tensions (Myers 1999b), the tactic also allows speakers to

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that of creating an engaging and affecting narrative" (50).

forward "counter-arguments" to mitigate contradictions within the discussion itself (Myers 1999a).

Studies on the role reported speech plays in group discussions have been conducted among communication studies scholars as well. Research on race relations among college students observes that students use "summary quotes" as a means to condense stereotypical traits and speech practices when portraying out-group members as an aggregate (Buttny 1997; Buttny and Williams 2000). Students also use reported speech to strategically "editorialize" or evaluate both the content of the original utterance as "serious or ironic" and the character of the speaker as "favorable or unfavorable" (Buttny and Williams 2000:119).

These findings on speech reporting practices in group discussions inform my study's examination of language use in multiparty call-in show deliberations. In particular, I focus on how and when panelists insert reported speech to characterize out-group members (e.g., Chinese residents), editorialize an opponent and his utterance, explore conflicting readings of Taiwan's national identity(-ies) through a constructed dialogue "thought experiment," and ostensibly resolve Taiwan's ethno-political tensions through a "saying rather than doing" approach.

Interest in speech reporting has also led to collaboration between scholars in psychology and linguistics. For instance, Clark and Gerrig (1990) elaborate upon Grice's (1957, 1968) maxims of intention by arguing that reported speech substitutes for or demonstrates other actions. Using reported speech as a form of demonstration enables listeners to experience "what it is like to perceive the things depicted" (Clark and Gerrig 1990:765). Building upon Goffman's (1974) view that human actions fall into two broad categories—serious versus nonserious or "play" versus "real" (47)—Clark and Gerrig likewise assert that reported

speech constitute nonserious representations and enact "parts of serious activities" (ibid).[11]

My study draws upon the perspective that speech reporting represents play rather than real actions when I examine guest panelists perform saliva wars or verbal sparring. In this case, I regard call-in show saliva wars as mock warfare or "transformations" (Goffman 1974) of serious actions. In the heat of call-in verbal disputes, participants use reported speech as linguistic ammunition in their nonserious performances of real sociopolitical tensions, such as the potential for cross-straits war between Taiwan and China.

Lastly, while research on speech reporting in languages other than English proves quite extensive,[12] the use of reported speech in Mandarin Chinese remains a sparsely researched area. Lin's (1999) dissertation on reported speech in Mandarin conversational discourse represents one of the few detailed studies on this linguistic practice (cf. Kuo 2001). Using discourse and metapragmatic approaches, Lin analyzed 15 conversations and five radio interviews and classified speakers' speech reporting behavior as either isolated, monologic, or dialogic. Lin claimed that indirect speech represented the preferred, unmarked form of speech reporting in her data sample. However, the functions of reported speech differed depending upon its "textual" versus "interactional" levels. That is, at the textual level, speakers used direct and indirect reported speech as a form of evidence or as an entitlement claim. In social interactions, Lin found that when speakers sought greater audience involvement and wanted to express the original speaker's speech affects, only direct reported speech would be used.

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[11] This understanding distinguishes reported speech from descriptions, as Clark and Gerrig regard descriptions as "serious actions."

[12] A cross-section of research on reported speech in languages other than English includes Italian (Alfonzetti 1998), Nukalaelae (Besnier 1993), Warao (Briggs 1992, 1993), Samoan (Duranti 1993, 1994), Hungarian and German (Gal 1979), Spanish (Hill and Hill 1986), French and Portugeuse (Koven 2001), Nanti (Michael 2001), and Kuna (Sherzer 1983, 1990).

In a different Mandarin-based reported speech study, Kuo (2001) examined the pragmatic and sociolinguistic applications of speech reporting in public discourse, namely, political debates. Like Lin's investigation of speech reporting in conversations, Kuo also found that the three mayoral candidates in her study demonstrated a preference for indirect reported speech in political discourse. Nonetheless, Kuo concluded by cautioning that the three mayoral candidates' distinct communicative styles influenced the degree and frequency with which speakers inserted direct reported speech in their comments. I provide a more detailed comparison of Kuo's study to the current project in the following section.

POPULARIZING POLITICS: CRAFTING CRISIS DISCOURSES THROUGH REPORTED SPEECH

Research on political oratory confirms that reported speech serves as a strategic linguistic device in this speech genre. In her analysis of Reverend Jesse Jackson's public speaking patterns at the 1988 Democratic National Convention, Tannen (1989) observes that Jackson uses quoted speech to "anticipate and animate others' point of view" in order to promote his political message and appeal to his audience in a more engaging manner (178). In a different sociopolitical context, Parmentier (1993) finds that high-ranking chiefs in Belau, Micronesia, also use reported speech to resolve political tensions by establishing the norms for speaking. In this case, the insertion of quoted proverbial expressions creates an "overall authoritative, traditional aura," which abets the chief in averting a looming political crisis (269). Parmentier concludes that reported speech carries "pseudo-performative force" (cf. Silverstein 1981), which speakers can design or reconfigure to redress sociopolitical conflict. Interestingly, the pseudo-performative force speakers evoke through reported speech in Parmentier's observations contradicts Myers' (1999a) finding that the use of hypothetical reported speech in "thought experiments" as a form of "saying rather

than doing" is associated with powerlessness (585). My study illustrates, however, that speech reporting can both empower and disempower speakers given its negotiable properties and process in verbal interactions.

These two studies inform my examination of how call-in participants use reported speech to animate their arguments in order to appeal to fellow participants and viewers. Moreover, like Parmentier's Belauan chief who resorts to quoting proverbial expressions to confer authority to his words, my analysis also suggests that call-in participants insert reported utterances, both real and imaginary, from authoritative figures or entities to bolster their arguments. For instance, guest panelists use hypothetical reported speech as a strategic linguistic device to claim knowledge and to establish the validity of their interpretation of a conflictual sociopolitical event or issue.

As previously introduced, Kuo's (2001) examination of political candidates' use of quoted speech in the 1998 Taipei mayoral debates best approximates my present investigation of call-in participants' speech reporting practices.[13] Her findings reveal that the mayoral contenders would often "harness 'another's words'" to add legitimacy to their own speech through the "juxtaposition of iconically represented speech" (ibid:200). In terms of application, Kuo claims that the candidates strategically inserted direct reported speech for positive, self-promotional as well as negative, oppositional purposes. Candidates also turned to direct reported speech when desiring to provide evidence of their leadership capabilities and to enhance their credibility among voters. Specifically, the three candidates used self-quotation or other-quotation to "construct and project desirable versions of their identities enacted in a succession of performances" (ibid:190). Direct reported speech thus allowed the candidates

[13] I was present in Taiwan during the mayoral election and was able to observe the three televised debates. At the time, the Taipei mayoral election was widely touted by Taiwan scholars, political parties, and media as a precursor to the 2000 presidential election which this study briefly analyzes via selected call-in show excerpts.

to draw attention to their achievements through the utterance of another, while appearing modest by exhibiting positive politeness in the process (Brown and Levinson 1987). Inversely, this linguistic tactic also allowed candidates to distance themselves from denigrating comments directed toward their opponents, while increasing the reliability of their claims.

Hence, Kuo's study and my own share similar features including speaker representation of Taiwan's major political parties, speaking time constraints, and mass-mediated forums. One significant departure, however, is that the majority of guest panelists on Taiwan's call-in shows are not political candidates,[14] even though most guests are politicians, scholars, and political analysts who favor or are aligned with a particular political party or candidate. In addition, this study includes callers who do not hold high profile positions. The present project offers an opportunity to compare the manner in which a range of call-in participants use reported speech in a shared public space.

Consequently, my study intends to augment the relative paucity of research on speech reporting in Mandarin. In particular, I consider call-in participants' speech reporting practices as one among many linguistic devices they draw upon in their deliberations which, moreover, animates and augments the program's overall crisis frame. In his observations speech reporting in a classroom setting, Baynham (1996) notes that a "direct quoting strategy can also be seen as a means of decreasing distance, not only between the human participants in discourse, but also between human subjects and the topic at hand" (78). This observation informs my study's premise that speech reporting likewise

[14] Although rare, political candidates have appeared on call-in shows. For instance, New Party vice presidential candidate Elmer Fung (馮滬祥) appeared on all the major call-in shows during the 2000 presidential election. Otherwise, candidates may be invited for a "special" appearance either via satellite or for a one-on-one interview, which independent presidential candidate Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良) and DPP vice presidential candidate Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) elected to do.

diminishes the conceptual distance between call-in participants and the crisis discourses they evoke and perpetuate.

Speech reporting as call-in show cultural capital

On political TV call-in shows, reported speech carries significant "pseudo-performative force" (Silverstein 1995) given the dramatic and mass-mediated venue in which it is used. In other words, reported speech has symbolic value, not only as a readily assessable and transmittable symbolic capital, but also as an "ideology" (i.e., norms of communication) (Silverstein 1992:694) or ideological activity (Bakhtin 1981:337). In the former case, call-in participants wield reported speech as a sign of authority and knowledge, while in the latter, call-in programs feature mass-mediated reported speech in the form of edited video clips and sound bites in their promotion of a crisis-oriented worldview. This study thus explores the process of how call-in participants exchange and negotiate the discursive value of reported speech as they buy and sell the authenticity of their sociopolitical knowledge within the call-in show's competitive infotainment marketplace in particular and Taiwan's sociopolitical landscape in general.

In addition, I explore how call-in show participants use reported speech in ways unique to their "on-air" roles. For instance, moderators prove particularly adept at reappropriating another speaker's utterances, shaping them with alternative meanings and interpretations as they direct and facilitate call-in show deliberations. It is through this reframing and embedding tactic that moderators selectively fashion guest panelist and caller comments into urgent-sounding rhetoric in order to maintain the program's overall crisis frame.

In comparison, guest panelists are invited as purveyors of valuable information relevant to the featured topic. Glynn (2000) claims that given their exalted status, panelists are able to "rise above contingency and politics" (196). However, this idealized reading of talk/call-in show panelists conveniently ignores their political agendas and biased rhetorical practices. For instance, call-in

panelists seek to persuade viewers by prefacing their remarks with self-described "rational" and "objective" reasoning. Panelists maintain these "rational" claims by masking their ideological leanings through "objective" reported speech, thus absolving themselves as the source of utterance. Similarly, panelists couch unpalatable readings of controversial issues in quoted speech, which then strategically places the hapless quoted speaker as the scapegoat for personal criticism and public scrutiny.

Perceived as representing authentic voices of everyday experiences, call-in show callers are lauded as the voices of "firsthand experience and emotional authority" (Glynn 2000:197). In such cases, the introduction of reported speech in personal narratives is generally regarded as enhancing the caller's unquestioned authenticity. However, my study shows that callers have also learned the skill of ascribing hypothetical reported speech to prominent social figures as a means to criticize administrative agendas and disrupt powerful discourses.

These call-in participant linguistic profiles suggest that speech reporting constitutes a linguistic device that is as accessible to everyday citizens as it is to sociopolitical leaders. Given that call-in programs frequently feature topics that address assumed behaviors, anticipated events, theorized scenarios, and possible outcomes, reported speech represents a linguistic equalizer that allows all participants to venture constructed discourses of "what *could* or *would happen*" (Buttny and Williams 2000:127, original italics). Despite the technology to provide video clips or sound bites of the original utterance, call-in participants take liberties when revoicing, and even creating, utterances as they attempt to forward particular readings of the call-in show crisis of the day. Yet to the careful call-in show viewer, speech reporting also exposes the participants' biased evaluations and ideologies. Reported speech thus represents both a rich linguistic resource and source of information for its user and recipient respectively.

Examining call-in shows ways of reporting

In the next three chapters, I present selected call-in show verbal interactions for analysis in order to explore the following claims:

First, using reported speech as a form of evidentiality constitutes a negotiable process between the reporter of the original or hypothetical utterance on the one hand, and the listener(s) to whom it is presented on the other. For instance, participants often insert reported speech from imputed authoritative figures and entities to bolster their arguments or to serve as claims to knowledge. The persuasiveness of reported speech as an argumentative tool can thus be undermined by another speaker.

Second, participants combine reported speech with other linguistic devices (e.g., prosody and code-switching) as a means to heighten their verbal performance and/or to further differentiate between their own and the animated characters' voices.

Third, participants use hypothetical reported speech as a means to present and reconcile conflicting worldviews and interpretations by couching their comments within a "storyworld" which they juxtapose with the "real" world. Call-in participants also use constructed dialogue to engage in verbalized "thought experiments," which allows them to forward alternative scenarios or worldviews that might otherwise remain unarticulated or are often marginalized.

Fourth, participants use reported speech to editorialize another speaker's utterance as well as forward their own sociopolitical worldview.

And fifth, speech reporting—particularly the use of direct and hypothetical reported speech—serves as a strategic and flexible linguistic device for animating and augmenting sociopolitical crisis discourses. In so doing, participants simultaneously verbally perform conflicts generated within the *present* setting of the call-in show studio, as well as symbolically index tensions between sociopolitical entities outside of and *absent* from the call-in show studio.

Chapter Five: Animating Crisis Discourses through Reported Speech

> The more intensive, differentiated and highly developed the social life of a speaking collective, the greater is the importance attaching, among other possible subjects of talk, to another's word, another's utterance, since another's word will be the subject of passionate communication, an object of interpretation, discussion, evaluation, rebuttal, support, further development and so on.
>
> Bakhtin (1981:337)

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the ways call-in participants use reported speech to animate and recreate various crisis discourses surrounding call-in show featured sociopolitical issues and events. In particular, I explore how participants use direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech to forward their interpretation of the call-in show topic to varying degrees of success. I also examine participants' use of reported speech in combination with code-switching and prosodic stylization, including the manner in which these linguistic devices enhance the performative nature of the call-in show's crisis frame.

The quote by Bakhtin in this chapter's epigraph captures the main premise of this study and chapter, namely, the recognition that the words of another represent a rich site for speakers to interpret, deliberate, contest, and support the worldview of another. In the discursive space of call-in shows where talk represents both tool for expression and a site of debate, speech reporting constitutes an even more persuasive and powerful linguistic device. Subsequently, this chapter introduces the ways in which reported speech facilitates and compliments the rapid give-and-take of call-in show verbal interactions.

CALL-IN SHOW HYPOTHESIZING

Given that call-in shows frequently invite guest panelists and viewers to deliberate assumed behaviors, anticipated events, theorized scenarios, and possible outcomes, it is not surprising that participants resort to using hypothetical reported speech (Haberland 1986) or constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989) in their arguments and commentary. Even when the programs provide video clips and sound bites of the original utterance, participants often impute words to other speakers that more likely resemble "impossible" or "fictitious" speech (cf. Buttny and Williams 2000; Mayes 1990). Quoting "someone else's words" need not be based on an actual utterance to be effective as a source of evidence. By using hypothetical reported speech, call-in participants can calculatedly recreate and anticipate other speaker's linguistic behavior and thoughts in a manner that lends credibility to the participant's main argument. The following excerpts highlight the prevalence of "coulds," "woulds," and "shoulds" (Buttny and Williams 2000) in call-in participants' speech reporting practices as they expose and heighten the dangers and opportunities within call-in show crisis topics.

Cross-straits pop political crisis

For three nights, TVBS's *2100: All People Open Talk* invited guest panelists and callers to share their views of the PRC government's decision to ban Taiwan pop star A-mei's CDs, Sprite commercials, and person from China.[1] Widespread interest on the topic allowed Taiwan's political TV call-in shows to dramatize and deconstruct the incident to high viewer ratings. In featuring the news event for three consecutive days (May 24 - May 26, 2000), the *2100* trilogy,

[1] The ban was also reported in local Chinese newspapers. For more information, see "五二〇唱國歌：張惠妹遭中共全面封殺" ("On 520 sings national anthem: Chang Hui-mei suffers Communist China's complete ban") dated May 24, 2000, and "阿妹汽水廣告， 大陸下禁令" ("A-mei's soft drink commercials, Mainland China issues orders for ban"), dated May 25, 2000, both published in the *China Times* (中國時報).

entitled "PRC bans A-mei" (中共封殺阿妹),[2] provides a case study of how call-in participants' linguistic practices contribute toward performing the crisis discourses that surround and inform sociopolitical events within Taiwan. Given the lack of information about the A-mei/PRC incident,[3] call-in participants thus used one of the few resources available to them under the circumstances: talk, including the use of hypothetical reported speech.

Media coverage of the A-mei ban converged on the rumor that PRC authorities objected to the pop star's performance of the Republic of China (ROC)[4] national anthem at President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) inauguration. Moreover, by singing the ROC national anthem, A-mei had demonstrated her support for Taiwan independence. Ironically, the PRC regime's interpretation revealed their ignorance of Taiwan's sociopolitical history, and specifically, divided domestic opinions toward the ROC national anthem. Pro-Taiwan independence advocates regard the national anthem as a vehicle of the mainland China-derived KMT party, and thus not representative of Taiwan and its people.[5] The latest cross-straits incident as manifested by the PRC's A-mei ban thus highlighted the rapid changes within Taiwan's sociopolitical environment. It also demonstrated the extent to which Taiwan's crisis discourses are a product of language and ideology, which I explain in greater detail below.

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[2] Interestingly, the Chinese characters for "ban" or fengsha (封殺) mean "to seal" (*feng* 封) and "to kill" (*sha* 殺) respectively. The term thus has broader connotations than its English translation "to ban" does.

[3] See "中共封殺阿妹, 各層面悄然展開" ("Communist China bans A-mei, each bureaucratic level quietly disperses") , *China Times*, May 25, 2000.

[4] I deliberately use "ROC" and not "Taiwan" as the national anthem is associated with the geopolitical entity officially recognized as the "Republic of China."

[5] The KMT represented the ruling party on Taiwan from 1949 to 2000. A more detailed introduction of Taiwan's political parties is provided in Chapter Three.

The ROC national anthem

As a symbolic utterance,[6] the ROC national anthem assumes a myriad of discourses that must be carefully deconstructed and contextualized. Excerpted from a speech by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (孫中山), the ROC's founding father and the first KMT party chairman (*zongli* 總理), the anthem's refrains recall Sun's "Three Principles of the People" (*sanminzhuyi* 三民主義) edict and pledges allegiance to the KMT party, rather than the ROC nation.[7] For these reasons, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is currently the ROC's ruling party,[8] denounces the ROC national anthem for being a discursive vehicle of the Mainland-derived regime. Subsequently, the DPP and its supporters do not recognize the ROC national anthem as representing the Taiwan people or nation.

The ROC anthem also figures prominently in daily lives of Taiwan's residents. For instance, students from elementary to high school begin and end their school day singing the anthem in chorus as a recorded, militaristic version blares forth over the school sound system. Before doing so, students uniformly march into the schoolyard or gymnasium grouped by classroom, line up in rows, and stand rigidly to attention facing the ROC flag. Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, the national anthem could also be heard in public settings such as movie theaters, complete with visual imagery before the feature presentation.[9] During my stay in Taiwan from 1998 to 2000, the anthem continued to be played before performances at national concert theaters[10] and sporting events.[11]

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[6] From a Bakhtian perspective, an utterance can be verbal or non-verbal. My reading of the ROC anthem in this analysis includes both aspects.

[7] Sun Yat-sen delivered the speech to the Whampoa Military Academy (黃埔軍校) in Guangzhou on June 16, 1924.

[8] ROC President Chen Shui-bian is a DPP party member.

[9] This cinemagraphic display would display the words of the national anthem at the bottom of the screen as images of soldiers performing military exercises, flying aircraft, rolling tanks, playing school children, and the ROC president reviewing troops paraded before movie-goers' eyes.

[10] I recall hearing the national anthem when attending concerts at the Sun Yat-sen memorial hall (國父紀念館) and Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall (中正紀念館). However, later versions during

A-mei's performative utterance

DPP President Chen's personal invitation to A-mei to perform the ROC national anthem at his inauguration represented a calculated move that both upheld the traditions of the official ceremony, while also infusing it with a new and alternative interpretation. By the time A-mei made her inaugural appearance, her Mando-pop[12] diva status already extended beyond Taiwan to the greater Asia Pacific region, including the PRC. Local and international media coverage of her multi-city PRC concert tour in early 2000 described A-mei as an ambassador of pop culture, if not cross-straits popular diplomacy.[13] That is, A-mei was credited for single-handedly bridging the sociocultural differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.[14] Selecting the world-renown A-mei to perform the ROC anthem at President Chen's inauguration thus seemed both politically and popularly appropriate at what promised to be a globally monitored event.

Aside from live coverage by Taiwan's local and cable TV networks, CNN International also broadcast the Republic of China's 11th presidential inauguration on May 20th, 2000, with foreign correspondent Mike Chinoy providing commentary from the presidential palace in downtown Taipei.[15] In

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Lee Teng-hui's presidency (1988-2000) de-emphasized the military tone and presented images of "modernity and properity," such as Pres. Lee visiting factories and children playing in the park.

[11] I deliberately note "played" and not "sung" as I don't remember hearing or seeing movie theater, concert, or sporting event attendees singing the ROC anthem, as is done in the U.S. in similar settings.

[12] The term "Mando-pop" refers to popular rock music with Mandarin lyrics. The term may have been derived from the term "Canto-pop," which refers to popular music with Cantonese lyrics. Canto-pop is primarily produced in Hong Kong, although there are Cantonese pop stars from Guangzhou Province (PRC) and Singapore.

[13] Lefkowitz (2001) notes, "Musical tastes are part of an elaborate hierarchy of symbolic capital" (180).

[14] In its January 8, 2001, edition, *Newsweek* (Asia edition) featured a cover story on A-mei including the repercussions of the PRC ban on her career. The cover headline read: "Pop & politics: last year she was banned by Beijing. Now Taiwan singer star A-mei is staging a comeback." The cover photo pictured A-mei wearing a grey, long-sleeved jersey as she reclined on a black leather sofa. On the shirt were several small buttons, including one that read—ad:hoc.

[15] For CNN's English listening viewers, an American-accented female voice read the prepared script of Chen's speech, which had also been translated into Japanese, Spanish, German, and French for the distinguished guests, international attendees, and press corps.

many ways, A-mei's appearance and performance epitomized the new administration's youthful, 21st century persona. Her fashionable attire in a lavender, strapless leather dress and pearl choker bespoke of an administration that intended to shed the vestiges of a mainland China-derived worldview in order to forge a locally-grown and forward-looking nation-state. Moreover, A-mei's dulcet, soprano voice, along with her camera-savvy hand and facial gestures transformed the controversial national anthem from a militaristic march into an operatic aria.

Figure 9: Video clip of pop star A-mei performing the ROC national anthem at President Chen Shui-bian's inauguration on May 20, 2000.

In fact, a guest panelist Prof. Hsieh Zhiwei (謝志偉), who appeared on the first night's coverage of the PRC ban, described A-mei's rendition of the ROC national anthem as "not like how we generally sing it," adding that her "rock and roll style" had transformed the national anthem into a "folk song."[16]

[16] Spoken on *2100* episode that aired on May 24, 2000. This comment recalls Jimi Hendrix's Woodstock rendition of the "Star Spangled Banner" in a U.S.-based context.

The PRC bans A-mei

Rumors of the PRC ban was first published in Taiwan's print media[17] and broadcast on news channels[18] on Wednesday, May 24, four days after the presidential inauguration. The PRC's alleged reasoning for the ban, namely, that A-mei's inaugural performance of the ROC anthem made her an advocate of Taiwan independence, confused the Chen administration, not to mention Taiwan's public, mass media, and A-mei herself.

Reactions by A-mei fans in China revealed that many of them interpreted her performance as a rejection of her Chinese identity. Some heatedly demanded that A-mei "apologize to all Chinese people," otherwise she would "end up just like the Taiwan splittists" (*Taipei Times*, May 24, 2000).[19] Another fan posted a message on the Sina.com website that both rebuked and mourned A-mei's turncoat behavior:[20]

> You have many fans in the mainland. You knew when you sang the Taiwan[21] national anthem, the splittists in Taiwan would applaud you, but Chinese fans were crying. (*Taipei Times*, May 24, 2000)

These ethnic and national identity constructions of A-mei revealed her fans' deliberate denial or unwitting ignorance of her personal background. A-mei

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[17] Articles in the English daily newspaper, *The Taipei Times*, included: "A-mei not 'the real thing' in China after inauguration" (May 24, 2000) and "Government denounces A-mei incident" (May 25, 2000). Similar articles in the Chinese daily, *The China Times* (中國時報), included: "五二〇唱國歌：張惠妹遭中共全面封殺" ("On 520 sings national anthem: Chang Hui-mei suffers Communist China's complete ban," May 24, 2000), "如何看待中共封殺啊妹?" ("How to read Communist China's ban of A-mei?," May 26, 2000), and an op-ed piece entitled, "封殺啊妹也封殺台灣青人" ("To ban A-mei is to ban Taiwan's youth," May 26, 2000).

[18] Twenty-four hour news channel TVBS began reporting the story on May 24, 2000. Its call-in program *2100: All People Open Talk* began its three-day deliberations that same evening. I analyze selected excerpts of this broadcast later in the chapter.

[19] The label "Taiwan splittists" refers to Taiwan independence advocates or *Taidu fenzi* (台獨份子). The quote was taken from an English language newspaper but was most likely translated from Mandarin Chinese, as is the subsequent quote I include later in the same paragraph.

[20] At the time of the incident. Sina.com was the largest Chinese language website.

[21] Again, note that the writer associated the national anthem with "Taiwan," indicating a lack of understanding regarding its controversial status in Taiwan as the "ROC" national anthem.

heralds from the Puyuma or Beinan (卑南) tribe, an aborigine group in Taiwan, and proudly identifies with her ethnic background (*Newsweek* 2001). During her concert appearances in China, however, the PRC government attempted to depict A-mei as an "ethnic minority," that is, not Han Chinese. In other words, the PRC government attempted to portray A-mei as a member one of the non-ethnic Chinese groups they have incorporated as part of China (ibid). Moreover, the PRC's portrayal of A-mei represented a symbolic gesture to demonstrate their rule over Taiwan.

Despite the political overtones of the ROC presidential inauguration, A-mei insisted that her participation in the event was "not that serious" and that she was "just a singer who has been invited to give a performance" (*United Daily News* (聯合報), May 17, 2000). A-mei expressed both surprise and optimism that the PRC ban was a "misunderstanding" (*wuhui* 誤會) and continued to emphasize her a-political stance:

> I feel that people in the Republic of China who were born and raised here, then, everyone is like, this—when I was little I had thought, I believed that everyone all, all-all sang the national anthem, were raised like this. So this time it was really very simple. I accepted this invitation in the role of a singer, and then I sang the national anthem. So, uh, it shouldn't be like this. It's a very simple situation to sing the national anthem and to make it into this—it's a little politicized. This is a misunderstanding. (*2100: All People Open Talk*, May 26, 2000)[22]

The pop star's "misunderstanding" comment later fueled the deliberations and emotions of *2100*'s call-in show participants as they wrestled with the ramifications of the PRC ban on cross-straits relations.[23]

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[22] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 2.

[23] I analyze the contents of this video clip in greater detail in Chapter Seven and the manner in which guest panelists refer to it in their deliberations.

"I can still do this": animating the PRC

Much of the intrigue surrounding the PRC's A-mei ban involved discerning the PRC authorities' rationale for its behavior. In the following excerpt, guest panelist Mr. Jin Wei-tsun (金惟純), publisher of *Business Weekly* magazine, portrays the PRC as a bully who willfully exerts its power over Taiwan, which now extends to banning a Taiwan pop star. In contrast, Jin finds the Taiwan government too concessionary and criticizes its leaders for constantly declaring what it won't do, but never what it will or intends to do in relation to the PRC.

To Taiwan's call-in show viewers, Jin's contrast between the PRC and Taiwan governments' behaviors is readily apparent. His reference to "what Taiwan won't do" refers to President Chen Shui-bian's inaugural speech in which he outlined his administration's "one if and five no's" cross-straits policy. That is, if the PRC has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, then Chen would follow the previous ruling party's (the KMT) lead and maintain the status quo.[24] This includes not declaring Taiwan independence, not changing the Republic of China's national title,[25] not altering the constitution, not holding a referendum on independence, and not abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification with mainland China (*Taipei Journal*, July 20, 2001).[26]

To linguistically foreground the PRC's aggressive politics versus Taiwan's passive one, Jin animates the PRC government's voice through hypothetical reported speech or constructed dialogue, while in contrast Jin represents Taiwan through indirect reported speech. Buttny and Williams (2000) explain that reported speech constitutes a valuable resource to understand how out-group members are discursively constructed. They add that whether the

[24] The pro-independence DPP party defeated the KMT in the 2000 presidential elections after the KMT been the ruling party on Taiwan since 1949.
[25] Such as changing the official title to the "Republic of Taiwan."
[26] The article was entitled, "Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian: A president's progress."

reported speech provides an accurate representation "is irrelevant since we are interested in the participants' discursive constructions" (123). Mr. Jin's combined use of hypothetical and indirect reported speech in his remarks vividly juxtaposes the PRC's and Taiwan's respective stances in not only the A-mei ban in particular, but also the cross-straits standoff in general. Thus, speech reporting allows Jin to vividly capture the unequal relations of power and status between the two sides.

The portion of his remarks that include the two uses of reported speech is presented below.

Transc. 5.1: "I still can do this"

1	Jin	。。我認為一個重要	.. I believe an important
2		需解讀的跡象	lesson that must be learned from this phenomenon
3		是說我們這邊一直	is that we (on) this side always
4		被迫說	feel compelled to say
5		我們不做什麼。	what we won't do.
6		我們要做什麼，	What we want to do,
7		我們不太講，	we don't say (what we will do),
8		一直講	(we) only say
9		不做什麼。	what (we) will not do.
10		那中共那邊	So Communist China that side's
11		的思路是：	thinking is:
12		"我要散佈一種訊息，	"I want to deliver a message,
13		告訴你說，	that tells you that,
14		我還可以做什麼。"	I can still do this."
15		可能包括對	Perhaps it includes targeting
16		工商企業界，	the business world,
17		可能包括對	perhaps it includes targeting
18		藝人，	artists (entertainers),
19		不過當然就是	but of course it will be

20	軍事演習之類，	along the lines of military exercises,[27]
21	它一直在強調說：	it (PRC) is constantly emphasizing that:
22	“我還可以做什麼。	“I can still do this.
23	很多事我都沒做。	There are a lot of things I haven’t done yet.
24	我一直在暗示你：	(But) I am continuously reminding you:
25	我還可以做什麼，	I can still do this,
26	做什麼。”	(and still) do that.”
27	我想這樣一個事實	I think this kind of reality
28	才是我們要 ––	is exactly what we must --
29	值得我們要注意的。。	is worthy of us paying attention to ..

Interestingly, Jin’s remarks portrays Taiwan as the victim in the latest cross-straits incident and captures Taiwan’s weak position through indirect rather than direct reported speech. This can be seen at the beginning of the passage when Jin describes “we on this side,” meaning Taiwan, as constantly feeling obligated to explain “what we won’t do,” meanwhile what “we want to do, we don’t say” (lines 3-7). Toolan (1988) explains that a narrator turns to indirect speech when he “purports to provide an accurate version of what the speaker said, but not by simply reproducing that speaker’s own words: instead, the narrator’s words and deictic orientation are retained” (120). Here, Jin opts to paraphrase President Chen’s litany of “nos” through a “summary quote” (Buttny and Williams 2000). By retaining his footing as the author of the summation, Jin clearly communicates his disappointment and criticism of the Chen administration’s approach. This tactic differs from the next example in which a caller uses direct speech to obliquely criticize both A-mei and President Chen, which I analyze shortly.

In contrast, Jin depicts Communist China as the perpetrator in cross-straits relations by articulating the communist regime’s aggressive stance through direct,

[27] “Military exercises” denotes the PRC’s military exercises in the Taiwan Straits. This tactic is periodically used by the PRC, as it did prior to the 1996 presidential election (see Chapter Three) and at least once a year in the past few years. Here, Mr. Jin suggests that the PRC engages in so-called military exercises as a means to threaten Taiwan’s sense of security and to remind the island-nation of the PRC’s reunification agenda.

albeit hypothetical, reported speech. Jin expresses the PRC's confidence in threatening Taiwan by voicing their heavy-handed tactics not once but twice in this brief stretch of talk. This can be seen in Jin's first introduction of hypothetical reported speech—"I want to deliver a message" (lines 12-14)—and again in lines 22-26 ("I can still do this. There are a lot of things I haven't done yet…").

Why does Jin attribute hypothetical direct speech to the Chinese Communist regime not once but twice? First, the repetition reinforces the urgency of the PRC's discursive and military threat, as well as foregrounds the perpetual crisis conditions under which Taiwan exists. Second, repeating the hypothetical utterance highlights the "immediacy and vividness" of cross-straits tensions (Kuo 2001; Tannen 1989). Third, the hypothetical reported speech serves as an involvement strategy that enhances the listener's (or viewer's) "emotional experience of insight" regarding the crisis scenario (Tannen 1989:13). Finally, given the ambiguous and alleged nature of the topic (the PRC ban of A-mei), Jin's use of constructed dialogue engages his fellow panelists and television audience in collective sense-making (Labov 1972; Tannen 1989) of the Communist regime's ban of A-mei and its repercussions for not only A-mei, but also Taiwan.

It is interesting to note that Jin opts to animate the geopolitical entity of China as a whole, rather than a specific person such as President Jiang Zeming (江澤民) or Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基). As previously mentioned, reported speech augments how a speaker demarcates in-group and out-group members. Here, Jin linguistically portrays his worldview of cross-straits relations between Taiwan and the PRC as an oppositional relationship between "us (on) this side" (*women zhebian* 我們這邊) and "Communist China (on) that side" (*zhonggong nabian* 中共那邊).

In sum, Jin's creative use of indirect and hypothetical reported speech successfully emphasizes Taiwan's role as the victim and "Communist China" as the aggressor in cross-straits relations. Moreover, by presenting Taiwan through

indirect speech, Jin subtly illustrates his frustration at the voiceless position that Taiwan assumes in its dealings with China. Inversely, in depicting the PRC through hypothetical reported speech, Jin verbalizes the PRC's discursive and somewhat effective saber-rattling practices. Finally, this example aptly illustrates the "dangers" (*wei* 危) and "opportunities" (*ji* 機) within the current crisis scenario: namely, that "we" (Taiwan) can either allow ourselves to be cowered by the PRC's ban of A-mei and continue to say "what we will not do" or "we" can grab the opportunity to say "what we want to do." Thus, through creative speech reporting Jin succinctly and effectively articulates his frustrations regarding the impasse between Taiwan and the PRC and, particularly, Taiwan's passive acceptance of the PRC leadership's threats to Taiwan's national security and citizenry.

"I sing very well…so let me sing (the national anthem)": A-mei's impossible quote

In the second passage, I examine how a caller uses hypothetical reported speech to express her disgruntlement at both A-mei and President Chen's administration. The caller strategically criticizes the pop star's untraditional rendition of the ROC national anthem by portraying the singer in an unflattering manner through a fictitious quote (Buttny and Williams 2000). By inserting the hypothetical utterance in the midst of her remarks, the caller conveniently disassociates herself from being responsible for the critical portrayal, thus allowing her "to convey information implicitly that might be more awkward to express explicitly" (Macaulay 1987:5).

Ms. Huang begins her call as most callers do, namely, by introducing herself. In this case, Ms. Huang identifies herself as a Singaporean.[28] This gesture

[28] Ms. Huang's self-introduction stands in contrast with that of Lee Tao, the moderator, as he introduces her as "Ms. Huang from Taoyuan." Taoyuan is a city in northern Taiwan, just southwest of Taipei, the capital.

immediately establishes her non-Taiwan identity. It also acts as a distancing move that dislocates her from Taiwan's ethno-political tensions between *waishengren* (Mainlanders) and *benshengren* (local Taiwanese). However, as her remarks demonstrate, her Singaporean status does not prevent her from making ideological interpretations of A-mei's performance and President Chen Shui-bian's non-performance of the ROC national anthem, respectively. The excerpt is presented in its entirety below.

Transc. 5.2: "I sing very well…so let me sing then"

1	Huang	呃，我是新加坡人。	Uh: I am a Singaporean.
2		Ok,我覺得叫 張惠妹	Okay, I feel: like, for Chang Huimei[29]
3		來唱國歌	to sing the national anthem,
4		很無聊，很無聊。	is very ridiculous, very ridiculous.
5		我相信從小到大的，	I believe that when growing up,
6		在任何場合	on any occasion
7		你們 要 唱 國歌，	when singing the national anthem,
8		沒有人說拿一個麥克風。	no one ever held a microphone.[30]
9		噢，"我歌唱得很好聽，	Uh, "I sing very well,
10		所以，啊，我來，	so, eh, let me,
11		我來唱就好。"	let me sing it then."
12		你們大家都不要唱嗎？	Don't all of you need to sing too?
13		我也觀察到	I have also noticed that
14		你們陳水扁	your Chen Shui-bian
15		沒有唱國歌。	wasn't singing the national anthem.

The caller's insertion of hypothetical reported speech in the middle of her remarks does not impede the flow of her surrounding remarks due to the "sequential contiguity" (Sacks et al. 1974) between her preceding commentary and the fictitious quote itself. Moreover, the hypothetical utterance forms the crux of Ms. Huang's argument as the sentences proceeding and following the quote are encapsulated in it. Namely, Ms. Huang uses the fictitious A-mei quote to

[29] A-mei's Mandarin Chinese name is Chang Huimei (張惠妹).

disapprovingly enact and critique the new DPP administration's approach toward the ROC presidency as epitomized by an unorthodox performance of the ROC national anthem.

Ms. Huang presents her critical stance by evaluating the DPP's decision to have A-mei sing the ROC national anthem as "very ridiculous, very ridiculous" (line 4). She bolsters her assessment by reminding her listeners that on previous occasions no one sang the national anthem with a microphone in hand (lines 6-8).[31] Here, Ms. Huang's evocation of memory ("when growing up," line 5), place ("on any occasion" line 6) and embodied practices ("no one held a microphone," line 8), succinctly captures the semiotic resonances the ROC anthem has for many Taiwan residents who grew up under the KMT regime.

Yet, Ms. Huang reserves her most vituperative criticism for A-mei. She does so by ascribing an "impossible quote" (Mayes 1990) to the pop singer that depicts A-mei bragging about her singing prowess and anointing herself as the representative performer of the ROC national anthem at Chen Shui-bian's inauguration (line 9-11). Press coverage before the inauguration reported that President Chen had personally invited A-mei to perform this honor. This further suggests that Ms. Huang's imputed quote is a strategically constructed utterance. Regardless of its veracity, the fictitious quote allows the caller to both depict A-mei and the Chen administration in an unfavorable light without directly implicating herself in this denigrating portrayal. Ms. Huang succeeds in distancing herself from the unflattering utterance by embedding the constructed quote within her ongoing comments, and thus making herself the animator rather than the author (Goffman 1974) of the critical remark.

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[30] For a more colloquial English translation, lines 7 and 8 would be reversed. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I elected to keep the English text consistent with the Chinese text.

[31] As mentioned earlier, the ROC national anthem is traditionally sung in chorus and while standing. A-mei's solo performance, abetted by a microphone, deviates from earlier performances of the national anthem as practiced and remembered by those who grew up in Taiwan.

By the end of the call, Ms. Huang reasserts herself as the author, which coincides with her overt criticism of the audience and President Chen for not singing the ROC national anthem at the inauguration. Through this rebuke, Ms. Huang recalls the choral fashion in which the ROC anthem has traditionally been sung and accusingly asks her call-in show interlocutors, "don't all of you need to sing too?" (line 12). Similarly, she also censures President Chen for not singing the ROC national anthem ("I noticed that your Chen Shui-bian wasn't singing the national anthem," lines 13-15). Her final use of the deictic "your" again distances herself from her Taiwan listeners, as her Singaporean identity allowed her to do earlier in the call.[32]

In sum, the caller's use of hypothetical reported speech to critically evaluate A-mei's "very ridiculous" rendition of the ROC national anthem serves as a conduit for expressing her disapproval of DPP President Chen Shui-bian, and particularly, his irreverence for the ROC national anthem. This passage also illustrates a different interpretation of the A-mei controversy: namely, Taiwan's current crisis derives not from the PRC, but from the Chen administration and its unorthodox leadership as Taiwan's new ruling party.

As these two examples illustrate, hypothetical reported speech offers call-in participants a powerful and subversive means to articulate their ideological readings of crisis scenarios. This proves particularly salient when the events surrounding a sociopolitical issue are obscured by misinformation or its lack thereof. While the prolonged attention *2100* paid the "PRC bans A-mei" incident was unprecedented, the call-in participants' hypothesizing through reported speech occurs in every call-in show episode and with every featured topic. Buttny and Williams (2000) find that "hypothetical speech provides a resource to give voice to counterfactual conditions—what 'could', or 'might,' or 'should' have

[32] It is also possible that the caller is only dissociating herself from President Chen's supporters, and not all Taiwan residents.

been said" (127). Constructed dialogue thus provides call-in participants the flexibility to select which facets of the crisis topic they wish to conveniently underscore or conceal.

LINEAR VERSUS PICTORAL ARGUMENTATION

In this section, I continue my analysis of the strategic interpretations call-in participants issue when using direct and indirect reported speech to depict the leading characters in a controversial scenario. The following verbal interactions present three guest panelists incorporating different speech reporting devices—direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech—within their comments as evidence for their arguments, but to varying effects. All three verbal interactions derive from an *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* episode entitled, "Should the Vice President be Recalled?" (副總統該被撤換嗎？). The call-in episode focused upon popular discourses that clamored for Vice President Annette Lu's removal from office following a recent string of verbal gaffes that her detractors alleged had undermined President Chen's administration, and by extension, Taiwan's national security.

As with most call-in show topics, the principle character (Goodwin 1982) or figure (Goffman 1974) in this episode does not participate in the call-in show.[33] In the present case, Vice President Annette Lu represents as the principal character, while her verbal gaffes serve as the supporting cast. However, call-in show participants are able to evoke VP Lu's presence, and thus, make their speech reportings the primary figure in their deliberations. In the following three excerpts, I illustrate how participants succeed or fail to present Annette Lu as the principle character in their remarks through reported speech, and moreover, how

[33] Exceptions occur can be found in the "Big Reconciliation Coffee" episode in which the legislators who participated in the coffee press conference were invited to appear that evening on *2100: All People Open Talk*.

their resourcefulness in using this linguistic device abets or detracts from their arguments.

The "black face/white face" (*heilian/bailian*) utterance

Airing on June 12, 2000, the topic of recalling VP Annette Lu came just three weeks into President Chen's new administration. Following the PRC's ban of A-mei and the pop political outcry it elicited, cross-straits tensions with the PRC remained at a heightened state of uncertainty. Furthermore, opposition parties and coalitions—including the KMT, New Party, and supporters of maverick presidential candidate James Soong[34]—of the DPP were also closely monitoring President Chen's performance. Consequently, opposition party leaders seized upon Vice President Lu's verbal blunders as political fodder for legislative censure and call-in show critique.

Political scholar Julian Kuo (Guo Zhengliang 郭正亮) initiated the idea to recall VP Annette Lu in an essay in the *The Journalist* (*Xin xinwen* 新新聞), a popular weekly magazine. In his article, Kuo declared that Lu's recent remarks not only contradicted the Chen administration's cross-straits policies, but also jeopardized ROC-PRC relations. Several opposition leaders subsequently pursued Kuo's suggestion and attempted to introduce a vice presidential recall bill in the Legislative Yuan. In response, the DPP and several scholars condemned the unprecedented legislation citing its unconstitutionality given Annette Lu's status as an elected official. The legislative motion thus threatened to initiate a constitutional crisis, a repercussion that would undermine the first democratic transfer of power since the Republic of China's inception 89 years earlier.[35]

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[34] The People First Party, which was created by Soong's followers in the summer of 2000, had yet to be officially founded at this time.

[35] The impending recall bill was also an attempt to distract, or even paralyze, the new administration from forwarding other legislation, such as eradicating "black gold" (*heijin* 黑金) or corrupt politics, repealing a nuclear power plant initiative, and privatizing government

Unlike the previous section in which innuendo and rumor surrounded the featured call-in show topic (the A-mei ban), *8 o'clock* included video clips of Vice President Lu's controversial "black face/white face" (*heilian/bailian* 黑臉/白臉) utterance within its program format.[36] Furthermore, in contrast to *2100* where the moderator delivers an opening monologue to introduce the evening's topic, *8 o'clock*'s moderator is only required to announce the topic's headline, while a 40-second video montage and voiceover summarizes the events and issues that inform the featured topic.[37] Interestingly, *8 o'clock* presented the Lu video clip after three guest speakers had already had an opportunity to share their perspectives on Lu's "black face/white face" remarks, which I analyze later. The video clip captured VP Lu giving a keynote address at a women's conference three days earlier on June 9th, 2000. The textual representation of the video clip is presented below:

> Look how remarkable our President Chen is. {Audience applause} He asked me to be his vice president. To play the black face (bad cop). {General laughter} And then he invited our Ms. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to be chair of the Mainland Affairs Council. (He) invited Ms. Zhong Qin (鐘琴) to be the spokesperson for the Executive Yuan. From now on, can the beautiful voices of Taiwan's women not project forth from the political stage at all times?[38]

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industries. The opposition parties' targeting of VP Lu was thus interpreted by many observers (and DPP supporters) as driven by partisan rather than national interests.

[36] Taiwan's 24-hour news channels also featured the black face/white face utterance on their newscasts throughout the day prior to the call-in show's broadcast later that night.

[37] For a more detailed description of the different call-in show broadcast formats, see Chapter Two.

[38] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 3.

Figure 10: Video clip of ROC Vice President Annettee Lu speaking at a national women's conference where she made her controversial "black face/white face" utterance. *8 o'clock* guest panelist Ms Peng Yen-wen watches the video clip on the call-in show.

The term "black face" is roughly equivalent to the notion of "bad cop" while its counterpart, "white face" (*bailian* 白臉), is similar to "good cop." Thus for VP Lu to depict herself as the *heilian* to President Chen's *bailian*, the analogy suggested that Lu served as Chen's political foil. Critics of Lu's unorthodox comparison converged on the implication that Vice President Lu publicly expressed what Pres. Chen himself could not. Therefore, his policy announcements and speeches were merely a cover for his real intentions, intensions that Lu could articulate.

Per *8 o'clock*'s standard guest panel format, that evening's broadcast featured five guests, including four male legislators representing each of the main political parties or coalitions.[39] Peng Yen-wen (彭弇雯), general manager

[39] The four legislators represented the KMT, New Party, DPP, and Soong's soon-to-be created People's First Party.

(*mishuzhang* 秘書長)[40] of a non-profit women's organization, the Awakening Foundation (*Funu Xinzhi Jijinhui* 婦女新志基金會), was the sole female guest. Within minutes of the program's opening discussion, the gender imbalance became apparent as Peng found herself fielding not only moderator Yu Fu's pointed questions, but those posed by the four male legislators as well. Among the five guest panelists, however, only Peng had attended the women's conference that morning and had personally heard Vice President Lu utter the now infamous "black face/white face" utterance.

"Her joking has caused this situation": editorializing VP Lu's verbal gaffes

In the following verbal interaction, I examine New Party Legislator Elmer Fung (Fung Hu-hsiang 馮滬祥) use of "snippets" of VP Lu's previous utterances as persuasive evidence for his claim that her linguistic behavior is irresponsible and unbefitting of an ROC vice president. The New Party legislator thematically links the three utterances and suggests that collectively, her remarks contribute to increased cross-straits tensions. Fung's use of reported speech thus serves to editorialize (Buttny and Williams 2000) both Lu's original remarks and her person, while presenting them as "weaknesses" in Taiwan's relations with the PRC. The passage with Leg. Fung's comments follows below:

Transc. 5.3: "These [remarks] will all…bring about cross-straits tensions"

1 YF[41] 最近 What about recent

[40] The title can also be translated as "secretary-general."

[41] YF represents the moderator, Yü Fu, while Fung denotes the New Party Legislator Elmer Fung.

2	Fung	［的弱感度呢？	[weaknesses (in cross straits relations)?
3		［那麼現在如果：--	[Then, if presently: —
4		啊：她的一個，	uh: her (VP Lu),
5		玩笑話啊，	joking (behavior) uh,
6		造成那個情況，	has caused this situation,
7		實際上不只這一次啦。	actually this isn't the first time.
8		(…)	(…)
9	YF	是。	Yes.
10	Fung	啊：到這個“黑臉”說，	Ah: from this "black face" remark,
11		從 “深宮怨婦”	from "a scorned woman in the palace"[42]
12		啊，到說	uh, to saying
13		“江澤民只敢	"Jiang Zemin only dares to
14		罵女人， ”	insult women," [43]
15		啊這些都會啊	uh these will all uh,
16		(xxx)	(xxx)
17		造成兩岸的緊張。	Result in cross-straits tensions.

Clark and Gerrig (1990) claim that reporters often need only reference a portion or "snippet" of a previously uttered remark for listeners to grasp its contextual meanings: "When speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, they tacitly assume that their addressees share the right background to interpret it the same way they do" (793). By reciting in quick fashion key segments of three utterances that Leg. Fung reattributes to Vice President Lu—namely, "black face," "a scorned woman in the palace," and "Jiang Zeming only dares to insult women"[44]—the New Party legislator successfully reminds his fellow panelists and television viewers the political uproar these comments provoked at the time of their utterance (line 10-14). In so doing, Leg. Fung further reifies the original utterances such that they move from being reported speech per se to becoming

[42] This Chinese saying roughly translates into English as "a scorned woman" or "a discarded woman." VP Lu initially made this remark in reference to her position within President Chen's administration (analogy to "palace"), insinuating that her role has been marginalized.
[43] Vice President Lu made this remark in response to the PRC president Jiang Zemin's direct criticisms of her.

iconic representations of VP Lu's perceived faux pas. Moreover, these utterances provide further evidence of how her verbal practices pose a threat to Taiwan's national security.

Although this is beyond the chapter's scope of analysis, VP Lu's original evocation of the proverb "a scorned woman in the palace" (*shengong yuanfu* 深宮怨婦) can be regarded as a distancing move, not in the sense of quoting another speaker, but by using a well-known proverb as an analogy to describe her current situation within President Chen's administration. This assessment supports Irvine's (1993) observation of how speakers use proverbs:

> Similar to the use of quotative speech and intermediaries is the use, in conversation, of proverbs…and other 'traditional' sayings, with fixed text or structured format, which can be assumed to have been handed down from ancestral times. Again, this is a type of quotation dissociating the speaker from authorship of a message (126).

Returning to Leg. Feng's revoicing of VP Lu's remarks, his selective reportings isolate recognizable portions that, not coincidentally, Taiwan's press and mass media have replayed in their news coverage. By embedding the vice president's words within his own editorial comments, Fung emphasizes "shared understandings of the way something would be said in order to imply what someone had said" (Shuman 1993:151). In case his listeners do not arrive at the same interpretation Fung does, he directly claims that VP Lu's linguistic behavior will result in cross-straits tensions (line 17). Through these brief yet descriptive snippets, Fung "effectively and economically" revoices the three utterances as well as negatively assesses the original speaker, Annette Lu (Holt 1996).

In Basso's (1979) study of "Whiteman" joking practices among the Western Apache, he describes a deerskin analogy speakers use to characterize their social relationships. In the Western Apache culture, new and untested

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[44] Vice President Lu made this remark in response to the PRC president Jiang Zemin's criticisms of her.

relationships are portrayed as being "stiff" like tough deerskin and thus easier to tear, while longstanding and mature relationships can be "stretched" and are more resilient like softened deerskin (ibid:70). In depicting ROC-PRC relations under the new DPP ruling party, Leg. Fung makes a similar comparison. In responding to the moderator's question of whether there are any "weaknesses" in current cross-straits relations, the New Party legislator immediately cites Vice President Lu's joking behavior as the culprit in increasing cross-straits tensions. Given Taiwan's precarious or stiff relationship with the PRC, and moreover, given that cross-straits relations have yet to "soften" to allow for such joking practices, Fung suggests that the vice president's verbal behavior not only mocks the seriousness of Taiwan-PRC relations, but also undermines it (cf. Hill and Irvine 1993).

Leg. Fung's "seeing for themselves" approach (Holt 1996; Wierzbicka 1974) strategically invites call-in participants and viewers to personally assess whether VP Lu's joking behavior endangers Taiwan's "stiff" relationship with the PRC, especially coming so early in President Chen's new administration and the PRC ban of A-mei.[45] In doing so, Fung allows listeners "to witness [the remark] for himself or herself, thus lending an air of objectivity" (Kuo 2001:42) to his own deductions. Fung's reappropriation of VP Lu's original utterances thus operates as "persuasive discourse" such that another person's speech no longer represents mere "information, directions, rules, [or] models," but moreover, determines "the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world" (Bakhtin 1981:342). In this case, Fung does not present the vice president's joking as bad humor, but frames it as a serious political threat to Taiwan's national security. Nonetheless, Fung's assessment must be contextualized in relation to his party's (the New Party) ideological leanings, which seeks eventual reunification

[45] Scholars in Taiwan commented that while the DPP party had much to learn in becoming the ruling party, the PRC regime was facing the same situation as their interactions with Taiwan over the past half century has been with their longstanding nemesis, the mainland-derived KMT party.

with China. Consequently, Leg. Fung's interpretation of VP Lu's joking reflects and forwards his party's worldview and cross-straits agenda.

While I have described Leg. Fung's speech reporting practices as examples of snippets of direct reported speech, I now reexamine my initial analysis. Returning to Tannen's (1989) interpretation of reported speech, she states: "[T]aking information uttered by someone in a given situation and repeating it in another situation is an active conversational move that fundamentally transforms the nature of the utterance" (105). She consequently asserts that what is generally recognized as "direct reported speech," actually represents "constructed dialogue." Through this lens, Leg. Fung's revoicing of the vice president's original remarks can be regarded as "constructed" rather than "reported" speech. In other words, Fung's recreations of Lu's utterances deliberately abetted his pro-PRC worldview, and inversely, were not intended to be "faithful" reproductions of Lu's original remarks (cf. Li 1986).

The following verbal interaction continues this line of inquiry by examining call-in participants' use hypothetical reported speech, and namely, utterances that purportedly have not and should not occur.

"In the next four years, she is the vice president": silencing and denying Annette Lu's "other" voices and identities

Most research on reported speech focuses on the reporting of another speaker's words that had already been uttered or is imputed to utter. However, what of the speech that a person reportedly does not or should not say? In the following call-in excerpt, KMT Legislator Apollo Chen (Chen Shei-saint 陳學聖)[46] employs the latter form of speech reporting to strategically silence Annette Lu by performing what she hypothetically should *not* say as ROC vice president. That is, Leg. Chen uses hypothetical reported speech to assert that

[46] The transliteration of Leg. Chen's Chinese name represents his own interpretation.

Annette Lu's "identity" (*shenfen* 身份) as the country's second highest elected official cannot be "separated" (*fenge* 分割) from her other social and personal roles as a "chairperson, scholar, or woman."

The KMT legislator's criticism of the vice president's past linguistic behavior and his censoring of her future utterances both polices and criticizes VP Lu's disregard for "social relations and social order" (Duranti 1993:25). By extension, Leg. Chen regards Lu's irresponsible verbal behavior as endangering these social relationships given that "acts of speaking" constitute "social deeds" (ibid). Like Leg. Fung in the previous passage, Leg. Chen also emphasizes Annette Lu's public role as ROC vice president and the responsibilities it carries, including upholding Taiwan's national security. Yet, Leg. Chen's preoccupation with the vice president's linguistic behavior is concerned less with the "truth-value" (Hill and Irvine 1993:6) of Lu's utterances, and more with the consequences of her remarks as one of Taiwan's most highly visible leaders.

The following verbal interaction begins with the moderator asking Leg. Chen to respond whether Annette Lu has overstepped her rights as vice president. Interestingly, the KMT legislator answers by describing the linguistic or verbal "authority" (*quan* 權) VP Lu has as a public official.

Transc. 5.4: "I feel that her joking is not appropriate…"

1	YF	我請教這個陳委員。	Let me ask Legislator Chen.
2		你覺得這個呂秀蓮	Do you feel that Annette Lu's
3		的談話有沒有　侵犯	remarks have infringed upon
4		到這個總：統：的職權。	the Pre:si:dent's authority?
5		已經談到這個	(We've) already mentioned that such
6		職權不容分割，	authority are not supposed to be separated,
7		你覺得要這麼嚴重嗎？	do you feel it's as serious as this?
8	Chen	我覺得：她的玩笑是：	I feel that: her joking is:
9		不當的玩笑。	an inappropriate(form of) joking.
10		［因為：	[Because:]

11	YF	［那--	[Then-]
12	Chen	在之前已經有：	before there were: already
13		很多的傳聞說她跟	a lot of rumors saying that she and
14		陳水扁兩個人，	Chen Shui-bian the two of them,
15		對於大陸政策，	regarding the mainland China policy,
16		是兩說策略。	had two different approaches.
17		一個扮白臉，	One plays the “white face,”
18		一個扮黑臉。	the other plays the “black face.”
19	YF	[Mm--	[Mm--]
20	Chen	［所以在這時候，	[So at]this moment,
21		此時此地，	at this moment,
22		她不應該開這樣的玩笑。	she shouldn’t joke around like this.
23	YF	［此時此地。	[At this moment.]
24	Chen	［她應該知道她現在	[She should know] that now
25		做副總統以後，	after becoming Vice President,
26		不僅要保持沉默，	not only must she remain silent,
27		還有很多 自由	what’s more a lot of her freedom
28		是已經失去了。	has been forfeited.
29		她也要知道她的身份，	She must also know that her identities,
30		也是不能分割的。	also cannot be separated.
31		他不能說	She cannot say
32		“我今天是代表某個	“Today I represent a certain
33		基金會，	foundation,
34		是董事長，	(I) am the chairperson of the board,
35		或是學者，	or (I) am a scholar,
36		或我是一位女性。”	or I am a woman.”
37		不要忘記，她永遠，	Don’t forget, she will always be,
38		在這四年當中，	in the next four years,
39		她是副總統。	she is the vice president.
40		所以很多的話	So a lot of (her) remarks
41		很敏感的。	are very sensitive.

As in the previous example, Leg. Chen sequentially establishes his argument before inserting hypothetical reported speech to bolster his contention that Annette Lu must forfeit her other identities and remain silent as long as she is ROC vice president. However, rather than presenting the fictitious utterance as

one that Vice President Lu could have said or should say, the KMT legislator submits the hypothetical utterance as a statement "she cannot say" (line 31).

In Michael's (2000) study of Nanti speech reporting practices, he defines a "cannot say" form of reported speech as a "negative attribution of speech" (68), which he describes as "reported situations that will never transpire" (61). This interpretation does not apply in the present situation as the utterance that Leg. Chen associates with Vice President Lu has already transpired, for she already embodies the identities the KMT legislator hypothetically denies her as "chairperson, scholar, and woman" (lines 34-36). A better interpretation of Chen's "cannot say" utterance can be found in Tannen's (1989) understanding of reported speech as constructed dialogue. Moreover, Chen's constructed utterance is determined by how he frames the imputed reported speech, and not with its actual past or future occurrence.

At first glance, Leg. Chen's insertion of constructed dialogue in his remarks seems to undermine his primary argument that Annette Lu cannot pursue social roles or identities that conflict with her duties as ROC vice president. Yet closer examination of his line of reasoning proves that the hypothetical utterance proves consistent with his remarks and highlights his main point. First, the KMT legislator reminds his fellow participants of VP Lu's inappropriate verbal behavior by describing her "black face/white face" joke as being untimely (lines 17-22). Moreover, the moderator's repetition of "at this moment" (line 23) reinforces Leg. Chen's assessment. Next, Leg. Chen emphasizes Annette Lu's responsibilities as ROC vice president and, in particular, the sacrifices she must make in performing this role, such as forfeiting her freedom and remaining silent (lines 24-28). Moreover, in the sentence prior to the hypothetical utterance, the KMT legislator claims that Lu's various identities "cannot be separated" (line 30) from each other, which suggests that they interfere with her ROC vice presidential role.

By the time Leg. Chen introduces his constructed utterance, he has established for his listeners an inherent conflict between Annette Lu's other social identities and her current position as ROC vice president. Incidentally, prior to becoming vice president, Annette Lu's public persona was based on the very roles Leg. Chen now holds against her, including her identities as a chairperson, scholar, and woman (lines 32-36). Moreover, Leg. Chen's hypothetical utterance succeeds in questioning VP Lu's other roles by relying on public knowledge that establishes the legitimacy of his imputed statement on "collective, rather than personal, authority" (Besnier 1986:167). As previously introduced in Chapter Three, Annette Lu is widely recognized as the founder of Taiwan's women's rights movement and continues to serve as an active member in many women's organizations. Furthermore, Lu possesses a law degree from Harvard University and has published a wide range of scholarly work in both English and Chinese.[47]

Ironically, Leg. Chen includes Lu's identity as a woman in his list of roles that she cannot pursue. However, it can be argued that Annette Lu's gendered (e.g., female) role largely defines her sociopolitical identities as a women's rights advocate and as being one of two women among a total of eight individuals who were incarcerated in the infamous Kaohsiung Incident that occurred on December 10, 1979.[48] Thus Annette Lu's significant contributions to Taiwan's social and political development, including her advocacy for Taiwan independence, were among the qualifying factors that led President Chen to select Lu as his vice presidential running mate.

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[47] Annette Lu (1986 (1974)) is best known for her book entitled, *New Feminism*, which at the time of its initial publication, incited the ire of several conservative women's organizations and their members including Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the first lady. It was reported that due to her unorthodox views, Lu was fired from her job at the Legal Department in the Executive Yuan (cf. Farris 1994).

[48] The Kaohsiung incident was initially organized as a rally to observe the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, once government forces attempted to suppress the rally with the use of tear gas, the event quickly transformed into a riot. Annette Lu was one of the opposition (*dangwai*) leaders at the time who was arrested for organizing the event.

Given this background, Leg. Chen's decision to restrict Lu's social identities and police her activities through a hypothetical utterance appears all the more significant. As Annette Lu already identifies with and has performed the roles of chairperson, scholar, and woman, the KMT legislator strategically refutes and denies her these accomplishments, as well as her influence on Taiwan's sociopolitical transformation from a society under martial law to its present democratic state, by silencing and erasing her through a constructed "cannot say" utterance. Leg. Chen further constrains Lu's public identities, and hence linguistic agency, by naming the only role she can assume in the "next four years," basically that of ROC vice president (lines 37-39).

Although the position of ROC vice president carries certain responsibilities and social prestige, it is also traditionally regarded in Taiwan as a "puppet" (*kuilei* 傀儡) that adheres to the movements and speech of the ROC president. That it, the symbolism between silencing Annette Lu and delimiting her identity to the ROC vice presidency evokes stereotypes found in popular discourses regarding the U.S. vice presidency, including the notion that the vice president serves as an invisible and mute spare to the ROC president. In fact, Lu's predecessors, all of whom were from the KMT, quietly fulfilled their duties as ROC vice president in this manner. Thus Leg. Chen's hypothetical utterance transmutes Annette Lu into a persona non-grata that is in alignment to his KMT-based political ideologies of "social relations and social order" (Duranti 1993).

Moreover, Leg. Chen's constructed dialogue also recalls traditional gendered practices, including the Confucian cultural perspective toward the division of labor in which "women are homemakers and men are breadwinners" (*nu nei nan wai* 女內男外).[49] This analogy reinforces the relatively voiceless and powerless official position Vice President Lu holds, which contrasts with the policy-making and promulgating powers of President Chen. Here, the KMT

legislator's constructed utterance reinforces the observation that "[w]ords often do not emanate from 'individuals' in the Western sense, but instead from the locus of a positional identity" (Hill and Irvine 1993:9). Following this line of thought, Leg. Chen's final claim that many of Lu's remarks are "sensitive" subtly underscores his argument she has no right to utter personal statements or opinions as long as she is ROC vice president (line 40-41) within Taiwan's sociopolitical order and its Confucian-based cultural relations of status, power, and agency.

"I was there in person, I heard": summarizing VP Lu's "black face" remark

In comparison to the previous two examples, the following excerpt illustrates an instance in which a guest panelist, Ms. Peng Yen-wen, relies on indirect reported speech or a summary quote to defend Annette Lu's "black face" utterance. In this example, I examine why Ms. Peng's speech reporting approach fails to contextualize Vice President Lu's controversial utterance, and subsequently, forward her argument that Lu introduced the utterance in relation to her speech on women's rights.

I observed the live broadcast of this call-in show episode in *8 o'clock*'s studio and recall becoming increasingly disturbed and confused by why the other panelists' comments so easily dismissed and overshadowed Ms. Peng's seemingly cogent arguments. Several days later, I interviewed Ms. Peng at her office and asked her to comment on the broadcast. She frankly admitted that she had "performed poorly" in the call-in program (Peng Yen-wen 2000). When I asked why she thought so, Peng vaguely responded that due to nervousness her answers were unstructured and her delivery was weak.

My initial studies of the taped broadcast shed scant light on how Peng's arguments appeared less convincing and her speaking style less aggressive than

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[49] A literal translation would be "women (work) indoors, men (work) outdoors."

those of her fellow participants.[50] However, once I began investigating the manner in which each of the panelists incorporated VP Lu's utterances in their comments—either through direct, hypothetical, or indirect reported speech—I noticed differences in the persuasive power the various reporting practices had on other participants' responses as well as on the ensuing direction and tone of the panelists' deliberations.

To elaborate, direct and indirect reported speech provide different forms of evidentiality. In quoting another speaker, the reporter appears to demonstrate concern for the integrity and authenticity of the quoted message (Vološinov 1978). From this perspective, listeners perceive direct reported speech to be "more authentic" and to maintain "greater fidelity" to the original source or utterance (Li 1986:41). As a linear style of presenting information, direct reported speech keeps the author of the quote and its reporter "maximally distinct from each other" (Besnier 1993:162). Inversely, indirect reported speech imparts a pictoral style that blends the quoted utterance within the surrounding discourse (cf. Besnier 1993; Vološinov 1978). Indirectly reported utterances subsequently seem less authentic when presented by a speaker as a piece of evidence. Kuo (2001) confirms this finding in her study of speech reporting practices in political debates. She observes that candidates insert direct quotation to highlight key elements and present evidence, but used indirect quotes to background unimportant information and clarify information or correct errors (ibid:182; cf. Mayes 1990).

The relative ineffectiveness of indirect reported speech as a means to present evidence corroborates with Ms. Peng's speech reporting practices and lack of persuasiveness during call-in show deliberations. The following two

[50] At first I concentrated on observing the manner in which male guest panelists took turns rebutting Peng's explanations, including her reasoning that the media was responsible for dramatizing VP Lu's "blackface" remarks and that the political arena was biased against women

passages illustrate instances where the introduction of direct reported speech could have strengthened Ms. Peng's arguments by more vividly portraying the linguistic behavior she describes. In the first passage, Peng contends that the media has distorted Vice President Lu's words, while in the second, she claims that President Chen Shui-bian's office delivered a press release that criticized the vice president without attempting to contextualize her "black face/white face" remark.[51]

Example 1: "the media…obviously twisted her words"

> Okay…in the past when Lu Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu) said anything [controversial], I was not present. I am not a reporter. I cannot [comment on that]--but this time I have personally observed that it is the media—the media basically twisted her words. Obviously in such a, such a large story what they selected was actually a little taunting, because Mainland China had labeled her [VP Lu] in this [negative] way, so it was a little taunting…

Example 2: "the Presidential office…issued a news release"

> …this time the Presidential office's reaction made me feel, that the [President and the Vice President's] internal (personal) interactions definitely revealed some problems. Because it basical- basically today it [the Presidential office] issued a press release and then, uh, informed Lu Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu). Also, it didn't try to understand Lu Hsiu-lian's entire speech within the context [of the women's conference]. I feel that, it (the press release) was a pretty disrespectful [thing] to do to the Vice President…

Although Ms. Peng suggests that the media and the Presidential Office have mistreated Annette Lu, she omits linguistic evidence for her claims. Specifically, Peng omits the next step of the evidentiary process, that is, "encoding" the sources she presents such as "reported speech and the animate human nouns to whom such speech is attributed" (Philips 1986:251).[52] For instance, Ms. Peng does not produce the names of newspapers and TV stations that misrepresented

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who were outspoken. However, analyzing turn-taking did not explain the argumentative imbalance, as the moderator provided Peng ample opportunities to rebut to criticisms of VP Lu.

[51] For the Chinese text of the following two examples, see Appendix B, Excerpts 4 and 5.

Lu's words. Likewise, Peng fails to provide evidence in the form of quoted speech (or text) to demonstrate exactly how the media manipulated Vice President Lu's keynote speech, which she again omits in the second passage when claiming that Chen's office criticized VP Lu.

Similar evidentiary omissions in the form of direct, or even hypothetical, reported speech occur in the following verbal interaction in which Ms. Peng attempts to answer moderator Yu Fu's question of whether Vice President Lu's "black face/white face" utterance endangers Taiwan's national security. As the lone panelist who personally heard Annette Lu's keynote address, Ms. Peng could have easily quoted portions of Lu's speech to demonstrate that the "black face/white face" remark merely represented one line of the keynote address, while the majority focused on women's rights advances in Taiwan and elsewhere. Unfortunately, Ms. Peng glosses the theme of Lu's speech in a summary quote that inadvertently becomes subsumed within Peng's own comments and thus conflating the two.

Transc.5.5: "She discussed a lot of things…"

1	YF	沒有到這個國家安全的	Has it not reached the point of where
2		這樣地步？	the national security (is involved)?
3		[地步--	[To the point where--
4		[我當然不覺得。我-	[Of course I don't feel this way. I—
5	Peng	這邊就要講就說這次談	wanted to say here that this time when
6		的黑臉的時候，	"black face" was mentioned (by Lu),
7		因為，這邊，和各人	because, this, and each of us
8		我想，都沒有參加過，	I think, did not attend
9		當時的全國婦女	a today's (this morning's) worldwide Women's
10		國事會，	National Conference,
11		以只我參加 ho^{n}.[53]	while I am the only one who did.

[52] Phillips' observations of presenting speech reporting as evidence was conducted in the context of U.S. court cases.

[53] "Ho^{n}" (a nasalized vowel) represents a discourse marker that speakers commonly use in Taiwan. It derives from Taiwanese and does not have a Chinese character representation that I am

12	我在場。我聽到，	I was personally there. I heard,
13	呂秀蓮四十分鐘的言講。	Annette Lu's 40-minute speech.
14	然後，她– 其實是	And then, she— actually it (the speech)
15	暢述從聯合國的	was to thoroughly detail (the prospect of)
16	婦女人權，	women's rights from that in the UN[54]
17	到台灣婦女的人權的遠景。	to women's rights in Taiwan.
18	其實，談的非常多。	Actually, (she) discussed a lot of things.
19	然後，談的譬如說，	And then, for instance (she) talked about,
20	女人不要依附	how women need not be
21	在男人之下，	subordinate to men,
22	這是我覺得最，	this is what I felt was the most,
23	最鼓舞的一句話。	most inspiring statement.

I should be noted that Leg. Fung spoke (see Example 5.3) prior to Ms. Peng's turn of talk. In comparison, Ms Peng's delivery comes across as even less persuasive and "authentic" following Leg. Fung's criticism of VP Lu's verbal blunders through direct reported speech. Also, by beginning her response to moderator Yu Fu's question on national security with the "blackface" utterance (line 6), Peng unwittingly reinforces the negative impression that Leg. Fung had previously established regarding the controversial remark and Vice President Lu without first providing an alternative interpretation. Interestingly, I found that Leg. Fung and Ms. Peng's different speech reporting practices foreshadowed an argumentative pattern that repeated itself throughout the program.

While Peng claims in this passage that Annette Lu spent the majority of her 40 minute keynote address "thoroughly detailing" (line 15) the development of women's rights through resolutions passed by the United Nations and those

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aware of. In some instances, its use is equivalent to "okay" or "right?" in American English such that it represents added emphasis or the present's attempt to solicit affirmation from an interlocutor. In this instance, the latter explanation could be applicable. However, I find that "ho" occurs in ways other than what I have described and thus requires further study.

[54] The abbreviation "UN" stands for the United Nations. Due to space reasons I opted to use its initials instead.

promulgated in Taiwan respectively, Peng subsumes these points by not quoting even snippets of Vice President Lu's speech to bolster her statement. Moreover, the introductory phrase "for instance (Lu) talked about" (line 19), prepares Peng's listeners for a direct quotation. By following this opening with a summary quote instead—"women need not be subordinate to men" (lines 20-21)—confuses listeners as to whether the statement represents Peng's opinion or a portion of the vice president's speech. Consequently, what Peng describes as the "most inspiring statement" (line 23) of the vice president's speech never materializes for her listeners in the form of a direct quotation that they can process, remember, and later reiterate. Peng thus fails to involve fellow call-in participants and viewers in her interpretation of VP Lu's speech by providing them with direct quotations that they can make sense of themselves (Tannen 1989).

This failure might not be so apparent and significant if Peng had directly reported VP Lu's remarks, no matter how brief, on women's rights in her recollection of the speech event. In retrospect, not taking advantage of her personal attendance at the conference—including Peng's privileged access to other segments of the speech that the other panelists did not have—as a means to replace the program's and other panelists' preoccupation with Lu's "black face/white face" utterance with something more substantial and memorable, now seems all the more negligent. Furthermore, in comparing Leg. Chen's use of a hypothetical non-utterance to silence Annette Lu's voice as a woman, Peng's disappointing efforts to portray VP Lu as a stalwart advocate, and even the embodiment, of women's rights in Taiwan also represents a lost opportunity.

In sum, by presenting their arguments through a quotive frame (Besnier 1993), Legislators Fung and Chen allowed "the power of another's words…[to] articulate a compelling discursive position" that absolved themselves of being responsible for their crisis interpretations (Buttny and Williams 2000:190). The two legislators' use of direct and hypothetical reported speech respectively,

succeeded in dramatizing and framing VP Lu's linguistic behavior as endangering Taiwan's national security and thus lent these crisis discourses greater "immediacy and vividness" (Kuo 2001; Tannen 1989). Inversely, Peng's summary quotes of Lu's speech appeared as subjective rather than objective readings of the vice president's language use. Unfortunately, this impression prevented Peng's co-participants and viewers from considering an alternative reading of VP Lu's controversial remarks that Fung and Chen performed and perpetuated. Moreover, Peng's less persuasive remarks impeded her ability to challenge dominant crisis discourses in Taiwan's sociopolitical environment regarding Lu's recent verbal behaviors and competency as ROC vice president.

EDITORIALIZING PRC SABRE-RATTLING: TAIWAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SHOWDOWN

In their study of group discussions on interracial conflict, Buttny and Williams (2000) find that students often use direct reported speech in their remarks to "editorialize" both the quoted utterance and the original speaker. This practice allows students to assess the quoted remark as "favorable or unfavorable," frame it as "serious or ironic," and by extension, obliquely evaluate the individual who uttered the original statement (119). Mitchell-Kernan (1972) documents a similar linguistic practice in African-American speech known as "marking" in which "the marker attempts to report not only what was said but the way it was said, in order to offer implicit comment on the speaker's background, personality, or intent" (176, in Clark and Gerrig 1990:81).

In the following passage, *2100* moderator Lee Tao uses reported speech in a similar fashion when he editorializes PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's threatening remarks to Taiwan voters days before Taiwan's second direct presidential elections. Early in the program, Lee Tao introduces a video clip of Zhu Rongji's remarks for panelists and viewers to hear and view Zhu's original words. Lee Tao revoices a segment of Zhu's utterance later in the program when

he discusses the election of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian. In this passage, Lee Tao also animates the imaged reactions of Taiwan's citizenry to both Chen's electoral victory and Prime Minister Zhu's threats. Despite call-in show producers' clams that moderators maintain a "neutral" (*zhongli* 中立) or unbiased role on the program,[55] Lee Tao manages to subtly express his personal opinions regarding the program's topic, participants, and other absent figures (e.g., political leaders) through the linguistic resources of direct and hypothetical reported speech.

"Events in the world are unpredictable": reappropriating PRC crisis talk

As Taiwan's presidential election gradually approached, the PRC leadership increased its verbal saber-rattling through thinly veiled threats that reminded Taiwan's voters to not risk endangering the precarious status quo in cross-straits relations.[56] Two days before the elections (March 16, 2000), *2100* featured various segments of PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's remarks in several short video clips spaced throughout the program. The textual representation of one video clip is presented below. It includes the segment of Zhu's speech that Lee Tao revoices in a marathon call-in show broadcast the night of the election two days later.

> The citizens of Taiwan now face a critical [and] historical moment. Where to go and who to follow?[57] Don't do anything emotional and rash. Otherwise in the future you'll cry over spilt milk.[58] We believe in the political wisdom of Taiwan's citizens. We believe that (our) Taiwan

[55] In Chapter Two, Lee Tao describes his role as moderator as portraying the neutral or impartial voice on the call-in program.

[56] This tactic had previously been used during the 1996 presidential election, albeit accompanied by live military exercises. Here, the "status quo" refers to reelecting the mainland China-derived KMT party and thus preventing the election of Taiwan independence-minded DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian.

[57] A more colloquial translation would be: "Where do you go from here? Who should you listen to (or obey)?"

[58] This can also be interpreted as meaning, "in pursuing or dreaming of a brighter future, you may just lose everything (and then some) that you already have."

> compatriots will make an intelligent historical decision! But there still are three [more] days. Events in the world are unpredictable. Taiwan compatriots! You must beware (stay alert)![59]

To Taiwan's citizens, Zhu's rhetorical questions of "where do you go from here? Who should you listen to" is obvious; that is, Zhu's remarks suggest Taiwan that its presidential election will have repercussions for both its domestic politics and cross-straits relations with the PRC. Similarly, Zhu's warning to Taiwan's electorate to not do anything "emotional and rash" represents a thinly disguised reminder not to use the election as a referendum for Taiwan independence by electing DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian to office.[60] In expressing his faith in the "political wisdom" of Taiwan's citizenry to "make an intelligent historical decision," Zhu confidently declares the PRC's belief that Taiwan's voters will maintain the status-quo in cross-straits relations (e.g., vote for the KMT candidate Lien Chan and keep the Mainland-derived party in power). The prime minister adds a temporal reminder that "there are still three days (to the election)" for Taiwan's voters to carefully contemplate their choices. Finally, Zhu's depiction of events in the world as being "unpredictable" (*nance* 難測) covertly reminds its "Taiwan compatriots" (*Taiwan tongbao* 台灣同胞)[61] that regardless of the electoral outcome, the PRC will use force if necessary to ensure that Taiwan and its people adhere to the "one China" principle.

On the night of the Taiwan presidential election on March 18th, 2000, *2100* aired a special a special four-hour live broadcast that covered the election

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[59] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 6.

[60] Under the "one China" principle, Taiwan is considered a province of China, in this case the PRC. Therefore, the PRC regards any election Taiwan holds, including Taiwan's 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, as local and not national elections.

[61] Zhu Rongji's use of "Taiwan compatriots" is calculatedly significant in that it assumes that Taiwan and its citizens are the PRC's breathen, and hence, one geopolitical entity. However, the notion of "compatriot" is politically marked, as I demonstrate in Chapter Seven when I examine a call-in saliva war between two guest panelists who debate its connotations.

returns.[62] During the marathon telecast, Lee Tao responded to Prime Minister Zhu's pre-election threats as the electoral results indicated that the DPP party and its candidate, Chen Shui-bian, would come away the victor over independent candidate James Soong, and more importantly, defeat the 51-year incumbent KMT party and its candidate Lien Chan. In his rebuttal to Prime Minister Zhu, Lee Tao referred to Zhu's "three days time" comment during a monologue, which I examine below, in which he also inserted two constructed utterances. The first hypothetical utterance conveyed the Taiwan populace's anxiety towards cross-straits relations following Chen Shui-bian's electoral victory, while the second reported utterance expressed the electorate's pride in defying the PRC leadership by electing a pro-Taiwan independence candidate.

Transc. 5.6: "Watch me stand up and confront you!"

1	LT	目前可能民眾	Presently what the citizenry
2		最關心的，	are perhaps most concerned about,
3		有很多人，	there are many people,
4		大概有六成以上	about 60 percent or more
5		民眾說，甚至於，	of the citizenry (who) say, what's more,
6		七八成以上 說，	seventy to eighty percent or more ask,
7		會不會 兩岸的問題	"Will the cross-straits problem
8		真的發生這個 危機，	develop into this crisis,"
9		像這個 四五天	like four five days (ago)[63]
10		這個朱鎔基 先生的	this Mr. Zhu Rongji's
11		這種威:脅:，說，	in a thr:eat:ing kind of way, said,
12		"過兩天再瞧！"	"We'll see in two day's time!"
13		那麼現在所有瞧，民眾，	But now we see, the citizenry,
14		台灣的民眾說 －	Taiwan's citizens saying—
15		我展開了，	"I'm standing right here,
16		我挺起腰桿來讓你瞧！	(just) watch me stand up and confront

[62] In the week before the election, *2100* had also lengthened its normally one-hour long program to two hours.

[63] Lee Tao's recollection that Zhu's original utterance was made "four, five" days ago illustrates the "constructedness" of direct reported speech, whereby reporters rarely recall, not to mention reiterate, the original speech word for word (Tannen 1989).

you!
17 怎麼樣! What about it!”

Clark and Gerrig (1990) argue that quoted speech are not accurate reproductions of an original utterance, bur rather represent verbal demonstrations or “selective depictions” of that utterance. Thus, although Lee Tao inaccurately revoices Zhu’s original utterance—he misreports Zhu’s threat as being “in two days time” (line 12) rather than “in three days time” (see paragraph excerpt of Zhu’s remarks)—the moderator nonetheless retains the utterance’s threatening affect through a demonstration of the utterance as a selective depiction. In other words, Lee Tao’s “reporting” relies less on accuracy or faithfulness than on the tacit assumption that call-in show participants share with him “the right background to interpret [the reported utterance] the same way” he does (ibid:793). To facilitate this reading, Lee Tao prefaces the reported utterance with the descriptor “this kind of threat” (line 11), thus making the crisis-laden connotations within Zhu’s remarks explicit.

A closer examination, however, reveals that Lee Tao’s two hypothetical utterances deliberately respond to Prime Minister Zhu’s remarks as featured in the program’s video clip two days prior. In the first hypothetical utterance (“Will the cross-straits problem develop into a crisis?” lines 7-8), the moderator articulates the Taiwan electorate’s anxieties of a cross-straits confrontation should Zhu’s warning that they “must stay alert!” (see previous paragraph quotation) escalate into a military retaliation if they elect the wrong presidential candidate.

However, in Lee Tao’s second hypothetical utterance, he reverses this tentative image of Taiwan’s populace. In responding to the PRC Prime Minister’s reminder to not do anything “emotional and rash”—such as electing pro-Taiwan independence DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian—Lee Tao portrays Taiwan’s citizens as exercising their sovereignty and exerting their democratic rights (“I’m standing right here,” line 15) by challenging the PRC Prime Minister through a

direct confrontation ("Just watch me stand up and confront you!" lines 16-17). Lee Tao's reenactment of Zhu Rongji's remarks through selective depiction both editorializes the PRC prime minister's original utterance and portrays his aggressive rhetoric as a "schoolyard bully," in this case a regional power with considerable military might. By performing the reported utterance with elongated and louder speech (lines 11-12), Lee Tao succeeds in dismissing both Prime Minister Zhu's ominous rhetoric and political influence.

In the second hypothetical utterance, Lee Tao also reveals his own attitude toward Zhu's verbal threats and Chen Shui-bian's presidential victory. As moderator, Lee Tao generally attempts to maintain an apolitical image out of deference to his guest panelists, which represent Taiwan's political spectrum regarding sensitive issues such as Taiwan independence and ethno-political relations, as well as to attract a broad audience and high ratings for the program. This includes refraining from expressing his personal opinions on sociopolitical issues in general and the featured program topic specifically. However, in the above monologue, Lee Tao subtly expresses his political leanings when animating the collective voice of "Taiwan's citizens" (line 14) given that he is a citizen as well (Livingstone and Lunt 1994; Wood 2001). Livingstone and Lunt (1994) note that talk show hosts usually play the romantic "hero" on behalf of the populace. However, Wood (2001) claims that regardless of the host's efforts to remain neutral, her positioning is apparent through the management of talk during program deliberations. Moreover, it is telling that Lee Tao describes the electorate as "Taiwan's citizens" and not "ROC citizens" given that constitutionally, the country is called the "Republic of China." Thus Lee Tao's word choice reveals his pro-Taiwan leanings.[64]

[64] I deliberately do not state that Lee Tao has "pro Taiwan-independence" leanings as there are people who identify with Taiwan, but who may not support Taiwan independence.

Consequently, the impartial persona that Lee Tao projects is as much a performance as his animation of Taiwan's citizenry through constructed dialogue.[65] Furthermore, Lee Tao's strategic insertion of reported speech in his monologue allows him to heighten the urgency surrounding the featured topic, without overtly appearing to do so. Speech reporting thus provides moderators a strategic device through which to subtly insert editorial assessments and "mark" or implicitly comment upon another speaker's "background, personality, or intent" (Mitchell-Kernan 1972) without jeopardizing their own neutrality and "moderate" stance.

"LAYERING OF VOICES": POLYPHONY AND CODE DISPLACEMENT

By accompanying reported speech with marked prosodic features and code-switching, a speaker foregrounds the heteroglossic nature of language as these linguistic devices strategically enhance shifts in footing within the same stretch of talk. For instance, in "bracketing" speech through marked language and prosodic choices, a speaker is better able to establish the reported utterance as deviating from her own speech. As Goffman (1974) notes:

> When a speaker employs conventional brackets to warn us that what he is saying is meant to be taken [...] as mere repeating of words said by someone else, then it is clear that he means to stand in a relation of reduced personal responsibility for what he is saying (512).

In particular, prosodic devices have the ability to enhance a reported utterance's deictic properties, such as demonstrating behaviors or marking particular identities or ideologies. Coulmas (1985) finds that the intonation of the original utterance changes into a "speech act indicating or defining device" once it is recreated in its reported form (48). Prosodic mimicking can accentuate the evaluative effect of a reported utterance such that personal voice, stance, and ideology interact to reveal the techniques in which language not only reflects, but

[65] By animating the public's voice, however, Lee Tao is also in the position to insert words into

also constructs situated power alliances (Álvarez-Cáccamo 1996). In this manner, the intonation used in direct reported speech communicates the reporter's own identity and worldview as well as evaluates the quoted utterance and the original speaker.

Moreover, prosodic techniques can enhance the "blending" between the animated voice and the reporter's assessment of the portrayed speaker (Günthner 1999). Speakers frequently supplement speech reporting with "polyphonic strategies" (cf. Günthner 1997) or "parodic stylization" (Bakhtin 1981:364) when recounting narratives as it allows the same utterance to "simultaneously belong to two persons (the quoted figure as well as the reporter), to be anchored in two 'worlds' (the storyworld and the reporting world), and to carry two points of view (the quoted figure's perspective and the ironic, mocking, evaluative perspective of the reporter)" (Günthner 1999:705).

When combining speech reporting with code-switching, the reported utterance is infused with ideologies associated with the languages the utterances are reported in, a practice known as "code displacement" (Álvarez-Cáccamo 1996). In a study on language spread and institutionalization in plurinational and multilingual Spain, Álvarez-Cáccamo explains that code choices are marked in language-mediated social relationships, particularly when used in conjunction with direct reported speech:

> …by assigning code choices to the characters depicted, [speakers] selectively draw from their own sociolinguistic knowledge in order to construct a *possible world* where characters behave discursively as they do, within the confines of negotiated authenticity. . .these procedures in themselves reflect, on the level of practice, the ideological constraints by which members of a given speech community at a given point in time associate language behaviors with socio-discursive relationships of camaraderie, distance, dominance, or resistance (34, original emphasis).

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their collective mouths.

Álvarez-Cáccamo summarizes this phenomenon as the "socio-indexical potential of language" (36), whereby reporters can linguistically negotiate the "authenticity" of other speakers' identities and power relations through their speech reporting practices.

Although Taiwan's call-in shows are primarily broadcast in Mandarin Chinese, participants often draw from a variety of languages in their deliberations, most frequently from Taiwanese and English, and upon occasion other Chinese dialects, Hakka, and Taiwan's aboriginal languages.[66] Given Taiwan's multilingual and multicultural environment, and the practice of code-switching in everyday interactions, this linguistic practice is not surprising. Yet, code choices by all call-in show participants—including moderators, guests panelists, and callers—remain ideologically marked in light of Taiwan's former language policies, most significantly, the KMT regime's promulgation of Mandarin Chinese as the "national language" or *guoyu* (國語). Taiwan's linguistic environment thus promoted an ideological environment that encouraged speakers to be proficient in Mandarin as these individuals were more likely to succeed educationally (e.g., pass college entrance exams) and socially (e.g., entered into powerful government positions).

However, *benshengren* or the "local Taiwanese" represent over 80 percent of the country's population, with a significant proportion of this group speaking Taiwanese to varying degrees of proficiency. Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwanese language use has risen in prominence and popularity, and

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[66] The 12 percent of *waishengren* or Mainlanders who emigrated from China between 1945 to 1949 do not necessarily speak Mandarin Chinese as their native language. Many *waishengren* would consider their regional language or dialect (e.g., Shanghainese, Cantonese) as their "mother tongue" or *muyu* (母語). However, these mainland China "Chinese dialects," save for Taiwanese or Hohlo which derives from Southern Min in Fukien province, are not incorporated in Taiwan's "mother tongue" language policy. Implemented in the mid 1990s, this policy offers language instruction to elementary school students in their chosen mother tongue, which includes Taiwanese, Hakka, and Taiwan's aborigine languages. In comparison, English-language courses have been mandatory in Taiwan's schools from elementary to high school for some time now.

moreover, inspiring changes in Taiwan's sociolinguistic landscape[67] such that not having Taiwanese language proficiency is now considered a handicap. The most significant example can be found in the political realm as candidates of all party affiliations increasingly use Taiwanese in their campaign speeches in their efforts to attract *benshengren* voters. With the election of the DPP as Taiwan's ruling party in 2000,[68] the study, use, and prevalence of the Taiwanese language in all spheres of Taiwan society continues to grow through government support and political representation.[69]

The ratio of Mandarin to Taiwanese code-switching among the different political TV call-in shows varies depending upon the moderator's Taiwanese language skills, the guest panelists, the target audience, and the featured topic.[70] For instance, of the two moderators I include in this study, *2100*'s Lee Tao is not a native speaker of Taiwanese while *8 o'clock*'s Yü Fu is. Lee Tao rarely uses Taiwanese, unless it is for set phrases (such as the program's title) or to distinguish his speech from its surrounding context. In comparison, Yü Fu occasionally poses questions to panelists in Taiwanese, but his opening and closing monologues are generally spoken in Mandarin. The one call-in show I found that makes a conscious effort to use Taiwanese is *Everyone Let's Deliberate* (*Dajia lai shenpan* 大家來審判) which is affiliated with Formosa TV, a DPP owned TV station. Although the female moderator uses Taiwanese during her introductory and concluding remarks, the majority of the deliberations are conducted in Mandarin.

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[67] For instance, universities such as Aletheia University in 1997 and National Cheng Kung University in 2000 have started graduate level programs and degrees in Taiwan literature and languages (*Taipei Journal*, November 1, 2002).

[68] The DPP conducts most of its party meetings and conferences in the Taiwanese language.

[69] It should be noted that since the *dangwai* movement in the early 1970s, Taiwanese language use was already promoted by opposition party members in their party meetings and through their "native" or *bentu* (本土) platform.

[70] See Chapter Two for more background on the two moderators, *2100*'s Lee Tao and *8 o'clock*'s Yü Fu.

In the following passage, Lee Tao's marked prosodic and language choices in combination with his use of reported speech creatively animates and evaluates Taiwan's national identity crisis discourses. Together, these linguistic devices succeed in problematizing recent sociopolitical incidents that have heightened the issue's political urgency.

"The feeling of being ungrounded is the greatest crisis": Taiwan's national identity crisis

The following segment aired on May 31, 2000, two weeks into President Chen Shui-bian's new administration. Entitled "Big reconciliation: what is our (national) identity?" (大和解：我們是什麼人？),[71] the episode was inspired by an event, a "Big reconciliation coffee" (*da hejie kafei* 大和解咖啡), organized by several high profile legislators from each of the four main political factions[72] in the Legislative Yuan (*lifayuan* 立法院) earlier that same day.[73] In *2100*'s opening video clip, the legislators were captured raising their porcelain china cups, toasting the cameras, and drinking coffee. This televisual moment noticeably featured the legislators acknowledging the absent audience (i.e., television viewers and constituents), rather than each other, for whom the event was primarily staged. Framed and covered as a political spectacle, Taiwan's news channels and some call-in shows headlined the "Big Reconciliation Coffee" as one of the top news topics of the day.

To contextualize the legislative event, *2100* opened the episode with a video clip of President Chen, shown seated in the Presidential Building's reception room, declaring that country's "identity disorder problem" (*rentong*

[71] Another interpretation of the program title might be "who are we?" However, as this leaves the underlying issue of national identity rather ambiguous, I opted to include national identity within my translation.
[72] This included the DPP, KMT, New Party, and members of the soon-to-be formed People's First Party (PFP), namely, supporters of independent presidential candidate James Soong.
[73] The Legislative Yuan represents Taiwan's national legislative body.

cuoluan de wenti 認同錯亂的問題) has caused "anxiety" (*youxin* 優心) in Taiwan society. The video segment ended with Chen dramatically stating that a "feeling of being unrooted (ungrounded) is the greatest crisis."[74]

Shortly after this video clip, and following introductory comments from each of the seven guest panelists, Lee Tao introduced another video segment which was comprised of three separate video clips. This video segment featured various sociopolitical leaders being interrogated on their national identity—that is, Do you consider yourself Chinese (*Zhongguoren* 中國人) or Taiwanese (*Taiwanren* 台灣人)?—and whether they supported Taiwan independence. The first video clip depicts a legislative interpellation session and a female KMT legislator interrogating Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC) chairperson, Ms. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).[75] The KMT legislator asks Chairperson Tsai to explain her claim that "as a scholar" she considers herself to be a "*Taiwanren*" (Taiwanese) and a "*Zhongguoren*" (Chinese), but as the MAC chairperson "it is not possible" (*jiu buxing* 就不行) to identify with both. A second video clip presents a male legislator in a different interpellation session demanding if an Chen administration official is against Taiwan independence. A long pause ensues before the legislator taunts, "You don't dare say" (*ni bu gan jiang* 你不敢講), to which the official admits that "it's very hard to say" (*zhe hen nan jiang* 這個很難講). The third clip in the series captures *2100* moderator Lee Tao from a previously aired broadcast fielding a question from a caller who baldly asks, "Can you tell me that you are a *Zhongguoren* (Chinese)?"[76] This final clip elicits laughter from the in-studio guest panelists in the current episode.

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[74] The original phrase President Chen used was: 沒有根的感覺就是一個最大的危機.

[75] An interpellation session involves legislators alternately inviting the various branches of the Executive Yuan, the ruling administration's cabinet, to the Legislative Yuan for questioning regarding any topic. These sessions are usually held once or twice a year.

[76] The caller's question in Mandarin Chinese was phrased as: "…可不可以告訴我你是中國人".

As these video clips demonstrate, and *2100* calculatedly dramatizes, declaring one's national identity and stance regarding Taiwan's sovereignty as an independent nation-state represents a controversial and even paralyzing issue for the country's sociopolitical leaders. In the following passage, Lee Tao animates the confusion this issue arouses in various sociopolitical figures through hypothetical reported speech. His remarks not only recall the three-part video segment, but are also inspired by them as he enhances the urgency of the topic through unique parodic stylization and code choices. Moreover, Lee Tao's monologue strategically weaves his moderator voice in and out of the four segments of constructed dialogue that enhance his remarks. The voices or figures (Goffman 1974) Lee Tao portrays include an irate parent, a caller, a legislator, and an administrative official. All of the reported voices are presented in Mandarin, save for one brief segment of Taiwanese which then lapses into nonsense speech.

Transc. 5.7: "What is your (national) identity?"

1	LT	是。那但是，	Right. Then but,
2		在目前來講，	currently speaking,
3		如果說，	that is if,
4		大家想基於知道,	anyone wants to know,
5		說我到底是個什麼樣的人	to ask what my (national) identity is
6		我可以說的出口。	I can say it aloud.
7		然後我的老　師：，	But then my teacher:,
8		也可能--放心的去教，	it is perhaps--to safely teach (this issue),
9		不要老師教完以後，	(And) to not have parents immediately
10		家長馬上跑過來，	run over after every class,
11		{rushed speech}	{rushed speech}
12		"*你講你(是人)*[77] ((nonsense speech))！"	"You say your (identity is)[78] ((nonsense speech))!"[79]
13		{laughter from guests)	{laughter from panelists}

[77] The italics in the Chinese text denotes that the words were spoken in Taiwanese.
[78] Spoken in Taiwanese. Speech in parentheses is unclear.
[79] Nonsense speech refers to an utterance that cannot be linked to any recognizable language.

14	罵的以後啊。	After being criticized (this way).
15	{general laughter}	{general laughter}
16	那這個老師會得神經病的。	This teacher would go nuts.
17	{laughter, male voice}	{laughter, male voice}
18	我都主持節目	Even when hosting a program
19	也會被問：	I am asked:
20	{falsetto, pointing at panelists}	{falsetto, pointing finger at panelists}
21	“你這個是那裡人？(.)	“Where do you come from?(.)
22	“你是什麼人？”	What is your (national) identity?”
23	{normal speaking voice}	{normal speaking voice}
24	啊，每個官員	Uh- when each official
25	到立法院，	goes to the Legislative Yuan,
26	{falsetto, pointing at panelists}	{falsetto, pointing at panelists}
27	“噢，你是什麼人？”	“Uh, what is your (national) identity?”
28	{general laughter}	{general laughter}
29	Uh-uh-uh，	Uh-uh-uh,
30	那個官員都要拿出	the official then has to take out
31	一個小抄本。	a notepad.
32	{looking down, muttering}	{looking down, muttering}
33	“我是什麼時候講什麼話。”	“What do I say?”

Fónagy (1986) notes that references to previous speech acts are “always clearly marked by different types of interrogative intonation patterns” (259). While Lee Tao’s parodic stylization creates a linguistic boundary between reported speech and personal commentary, his strategic use of prosody also editorializes these hypothetical utterances and the linguistic ideologies they index. Lee Tao’s rapid intonational shifts animate each performed voice in a “caricatured way” that both weakens the boundaries between the successively voiced subjects while also juxtaposing them against each other (Günthner 1999). In creating a narrative filled with “speech interference” (Vološinov 1978), Lee Tao’s use of constructed dialogue anchors his monologue in two “worlds,” including the “storyworld” (Günthner 1999) that he creates through his personal remarks and the reporting world on which his performance is based, namely, the video clips

presented earlier in the program. A closer examination reveals when and how he evokes these two "worlds."

Lee Tao performs the first reported utterance in the voice of an emotional parent who confronts a teacher after school with the words, "You say your identity is ((nonsense speech))!" (line 12). This constructed dialogue communicates several messages within its code-switched and nonsensical form. It is inferred that this verbal attack occurs after the teacher has taught a lesson to the parent's child on national identity, and moreover, that the parent is displeased with the way it has been taught. While Lee Tao leaves the teacher's identity ambiguous, as noted by the discordant speech following "your identity is" (line 12), he marks the parent's identity by performing the character's reported utterance in Taiwanese.

Álvarez-Cáccamo (1996) claims that code choices in reported speech reveal socio-indexical relationships of "distance, dominance, or resistance" that can "dislocate, transform or supplant identities and local power alliances" (34). Here, Lee Tao's constructed dialogue between the parent and teacher indexes Taiwan's ethno-political tensions between Mainlanders (*waishengren* 外省人) and Taiwanese (*benshengren* 本省人) as well as Taiwan's national identity discourses between being "Chinese" versus "Taiwanese." By performing the former character in Taiwanese and indirectly indexing the later in Mandarin, Lee Tao animates language ideologies (e.g., Mandarin versus the Taiwanese language) and sociopolitical power imbalances (Mainlanders versus Taiwanese) in Taiwan society. The moderator's linguistic choices ascribe the parent with a *Taiwanren* or Taiwanese identity and the teacher as being non-Taiwanese through his surrounding Mandarin-based commentary.[80] Although it is possible that the portrayed parent is a Taiwanese-speaking Mainlander, Hakka, or from one of the

[80] It should also be noted that Mandarin is the language of instruction in all public educational institutions, which for the most part is also the case in private institutions.

aborigine groups, the marked switch from Mandarin to Taiwanese in Lee Tao's monologue, and no where else in the passage, suggests otherwise.[81]

Furthermore, Lee Tao's portrayal of a Taiwanese-speaking parent reprimanding a teacher also highlights the ideological orientation in Taiwan public school curriculum. As previously mentioned under the KMT government, students were inculcated with a China-based worldview from the language of instruction to the teaching of geography that included maps of the "Republic of China" as incorporating present-day PRC. Recently, however, educational reforms since the late 1990s have introduced a *bentuhua* or "Taiwanized" interpretation of Taiwan society, history, and geography.[82]

Lee Tao's insertion of nonsense speech in the latter half of the second reported utterance also proves telling. Clark and Gerrig (1990) explain that:

> With *blah, blah, blah*, speakers can depict the source speaker's intonation entirely decoupled from its prepositional context. . .[such that] [t]hese are simply supportive aspects, stand-ins for information the current speaker cannot or doesn't feel the need to provide (780, original italics).

As a "stand-in" for content that is superfluous or redundant to the work that both Lee Tao's prosodic stylization and code choice (i.e., Taiwanese) provide, the nonsensical speech allows the listener to insert her own interpretations of the performed character, which may or may not expand upon the linguistic stereotypes that Lee Tao has already performed in a code-switch-marked hypothetical utterance.

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[81] Recall again that Lee Tao is not proficient in Taiwanese. Thus, he limits his use of Taiwanese on *2100* to several key phrases such as "thank you" (*do hsia li* or 多謝你 in Mandarin) and the title of the program "All People Open Talk" (*Quanmin Kaigan* 全民開講). The English transliterations are approximate interpretations of Romanized Taiwanese.

[82] In 1997, the first textbooks on Taiwan history, society, and culture were developed for and implemented in Taiwan's middle school curriculum.

Figure 11: *2100* moderator Lee Tao performing a character who asks an imaginary interlocutor, "What is your (national) identity?"

In his second and third character enactments, Lee Tao reformulates and elaborates upon the three-part video segment described earlier in which a program caller and two legislators demand their interlocutors to state their identities and perspectives towards Taiwan's sovereignty. Lee Tao animates these two characters in a high falsetto that is accompanied by hand gestures and bodily movement. That is, as he voices the hypothetical utterances in a high tone of voice, he rises from his seat, extends his right arm, and points his index finger at an imaginary interlocutor. His delivery is filled with repetition ("What is your national identity?" in lines 22 and 27) and repair, such as his frequent insertion of "uh" (lines 24, 27, 29). His marked speech succeeds in portraying the speakers as "emotional, unpredictable, and with generally negative character traits" (Besnier 1993:175). The salience of Lee Tao's prosodic stylization in this hypothetical utterance is also reflected in Fónagy's (1986) observation that the "most essential vehicle of the reporter's attitude in live speech is intonation," and moreover, that prosodic features are "the most conspicuous in artistic performances" (275). Consequently, my indexing his shifts of frame between personal commentary versus constructed dialogue through the alteration of unmarked and marked

unmarked prosody respectively, Lee Tao makes it clear to his audience where the linguistic boundaries are between his personal voice and that of the social personas he portrays.

In his final use of constructed dialogue, Lee Tao articulates the confusion an administration official experiences when facing inquiries regarding his national identity. At first glance, Lee Tao's muttered hypothetical utterance—"What do I say?" (line 33)[83]—accompanied by a lowering of the head as he glances at an imaginary notepad, appears incongruent with the previous vignettes in which he portrays figures who pointedly ask, "What is your national identity?" (lines 22 and 27). The inclusion of this final character proves significant as it rhetorically "responds" to the previous three hypothetical utterances. Interestingly, Lee Tao enacts the "feelings of unrootedness" and "anxiety" in his caricature of the administration official that President Chen had mentioned in the video clip featured earlier in the program.

In animating socially-recognizable personalities though creatively crafted constructed dialogue, Lee Tao depicts the confusion surrounding Taiwan's national identity as well as the competing political ideologies that struggle to define it. Hypothetical reported speech thus allowed Lee Tao to both articulate and critique these disparate discourses in a manner that both indexes and subtly evaluates their continued circulation. Lee Tao's monologue succeeds in demonstrating that regardless if one is instigating these discourses or the target of them, their impact is felt at all levels of Taiwan society.

Although Lee Tao is careful to distinguish the characters he portrays from his moderator's voice through calculated prosodic modulation and code-switching, his speech reporting nonetheless epitomizes a "concealed form of

[83] In another reading of this utterance, the official could be consulting his notes from previous interpellation sessions or similar question and answer forums in order to seek a consistent response to his interlocutor's identity query. Given that officials frequently have administrative

polyphony" (Bakhtin 1981) that blurs the line between what does and does not constitute reported speech. By the time Lee Tao introduces the fourth hypothetical voice in his monologue, the boundary between Lee Tao and his constructed characters has gradually become erased such that the "interrelations between inserted other's speech and the rest of the speech (one's own). . .penetrates through these boundaries and spreads to the other's speech, which [can be] transmitted in ironic, indignant, sympathetic, and reverential tones" (Bakhtin 1986:92-3). What this fuzzying of boundaries demonstrates is a personalization and personification of the call-in show topic "What is our identity?" by Lee Tao himself.

Besnier (1993) captures the permeability between the voices of author and animator or figure in his observation that the "rhetorical style of quotes allows the reporter's voice to 'leak' into the quote" (174-175). This understanding underscores the speech reporting practices I have analyzed in this chapter, namely, that the "leaking" between the reporter's own voice and those which he revoices reveals as much about the politics of the reporter as it does about the original speaker's. In the following two chapters, I continue to explore the degree to which call-in participants' ways of using reported speech reflect their sociopolitical leanings through two mini-speech events: reconciliation (*hejie* 和解) talk and saliva wars (*koushui zhan* 口水戰).

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aides who prepare notes for their use in anticipation of sensitive questions, this is a likely scenario. I thank Heng-rue Lin for bringing this to my attention.

Chapter Six: Reconciliation (*hejie*) Talk—Performing Social Harmony

> …you have to speak reason, you have to give—you have to let others have good fortune.
>
> Jin Xiuli, moderator

> The active pursuit of harmony ultimately aims toward a unity of differences, a synthesis of divergences, a confluence of contrasts. It is an attempt to engross all while offending none.
>
> Young (1994:45)

In this chapter, I continue my investigation into call-in show ways of using reported speech by examining excerpts of participants engaged in the performance of a specific speech event: "reconciliation" or *hejie* (和解) talk. Participants engage in reconciliation talk to build rapport with other interlocutors, including those present in and absent from the immediate call-in show context. Call-in show reconciliation talk frequently relies upon hypothetical reported speech (Haberland 1986) in order to editorialize (Buttny and Williams 2000) the original utterance and speaker as well as to animate voices that offer alternative readings of an event or issue. In addition, participants insert constructed dialogue (Tannen 1986, 1989) or selective depictions (Clark and Gerrig 1990) of an event or issue in order to mitigate a delicate topic by presenting it in a less contentious manner.

Specifically, I explore how call-in participants use hypothetical reported speech to conduct "thought experiments" regarding the featured crisis topic and offer "counter-arguments" to fellow participants' assertions (Myers 1999a). Through such speech reporting practices, participants find recourse to forward

"possible worlds" scenarios (Semino et. al. 1999) as well as resolve inherent tensions and contradictions latent within the topic or in other speakers' interpretations (Myers 1999a). I also examine how participants use hypothetical reported speech as "hoped for speech" (cf. Cohen 1996, in Buttny 1997) in their construction of utterances that might have or should have been said. Lastly, I compare how constructed dialogue contributes towards the dramatization of speaker narratives by creating a dynamic interaction between the animated character and the storyteller, in this case, the call-in participant (Tannen 1989). Narratives also entice or involve the audience to actively interpret the significance of the voiced character and reported verbal behavior, which I argue enhances the collective nature of reconciliation talk.

In terms of the call-in show's crisis frame, participants' reconciliation talk performances also contribute to the maintenance of this theme as this speech genre allows them to deliberately articulate and negotiate the featured topic's "dangers" and "opportunities." This chapter's analysis of *hejie* talk explores how hypothetical reported speech facilitates participants' abilities to entertain disparate readings of Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses without compromising their ideological perspective. In this sense, call-in participants draw upon "represented discourse" in order to address and reconcile sensitive, controversial issues through a "saying rather than doing" approach (Myers 1999a).

Moreover, I investigate how the successful use of hypothetical reported speech in reconciliation talk requires on the one hand for call-in show speakers to deftly embed such utterances within their comments and, on the other, for listeners to acknowledge its use as a fictional rather than direct quotation (Myers 1999a). The careful attention to interpersonal and sociolinguistic cues in speech reporting compliments the practice of harmony or *he* (和) in Chinese societies such as Taiwan. As a rapport-building practice, reconciliation talk subtly renegotiates relationships of power in ways that both overcome and reproduce

ideological beliefs and agendas. Consequently, hypothetical utterances allow participants to negotiate both "present" and "absent" relationships indexed within the speaker's commentary or narrative (Basso 1979). It is for these social, cultural, and political reasons that I consider participants' *hejie* performances as a significant form of linguistic behavior in call-in show verbal interactions.

"GIVING OTHERS HAPPINESS": MAINTAINING "HARMONY" AND "FACE"

Young (1994) explains that in Chinese cultures,[1] individuals attempt to present themselves as being non-aggressive and agreeable in order to create and maintain a harmonious social unit:

> The active pursuit of harmony ultimately aims toward a unity of differences, a synthesis of divergences, a confluence of contrasts. It is an attempt to engross all while offending none. It is a unity in diversity that is both dynamic and complex, one that works by mutual accommodation and adjustment. To achieve this ideal requires finding ways to creatively integrate differences while keeping intact the integrity of each participating element (45).

The maintenance of harmony or *he* (和)[2] denotes peace, unity, kindness, and amicableness (Gao 1996) and is linked with the concepts of tolerance and moderation (Moore 1967). In her study of the subtle linguistic devices speakers in Taiwan use to express dissention, Chang (2001) found that social harmony allows "the extensive web of interpersonal connections and hierarchical positioning [in Chinese societies] to be maintained with minimal discord, while at the same time

[1] The discourse of "Chinese culture" is problematic and symbolizes the "vicissitudes of the material and spiritual accomplishments of the Chinese people" (Tu 1991b:1). Despite its "dynamic landscape," most scholars acknowledge that societies predominantly populated by cultural and ethnic Chinese, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and mainland China, are based on and exhibit the "Chinese culture" (cf. Leung 1996; Tu 1991a; Wu 1991). I discuss this issue in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

[2] Chinese languages are known for having many homophones, which subsequently leads to word play in the search of extended connotations for a given word. Thus a homonym to "*he*" as in "harmony" (和) is the character 合, which means "integrity or wholeness." The term is used in the Chinese saying "合家平安," which means "an integrated and peaceful (harmonious) household or family." This notion incorporates the notion of "harmony" explained above.

concealing underlying aggressiveness and ulterior motives" (155).[3] In the pursuit of social harmony, individuals exercise etiquette (*li* 禮) or ritual and filial piety (*xiao* 孝) or respect to others and especially family members, behaviors which maintain the Confucian social theory of social relationships as being reciprocal yet hierarchical. From this social theory, the ethics of human relationships (*lunli* 倫理) proceeds from neither society nor the individual but rather from interpersonal relations (Liang 1949, in Yang 1994:70).

However, Chang (2001) argues that it is more fruitful to regard social harmony as an ongoing social dynamic rather than as an abstract guiding principle:

> Social harmony becomes an object toward which to orient, rather than a primary goal of interaction; it can be a ritual, a game, a performance, jointly realized…(ibid:161).

This understanding of social harmony can also be applied to the performative orientation of call-in show verbal interactions. Goffman (1959) likewise champions the underlying work performance achieves in reaffirming social values through this observation:

> To the degree that a performance highlights the common official values of the society in which it occurs, we may look upon it,…as a ceremony—as an expressive rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community. Furthermore, in so far as the expressive bias of performances comes to be accepted as reality, then that which is accepted at the moment as reality will have some of the characteristics of a celebration (35).

Goffman's celebratory analogy rings true in respect to the occasional performances of social harmony on Taiwan's political TV call-in shows. However rare these instances might be, producers seek opportunities to promote reconciliation scenarios when possible (Lee Liguo 2000; Xi Shenglin 2000), while its politically-savvy participants eagerly enact them.

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[3] In Chapter Seven, I explore how disaccord or dis-harmony is negotiated through "saliva wars" or

In the case of call-in show verbal interactions, the values of social harmony—including the concepts of unity, moderation, and respect—are preserved through reconciliation talk, and in particular, through the creative use of hypothetical reported speech. For instance, participants mitigate sensitive topics by engaging in "thought experiments" (Myers 1999a) where the speaker presents a variety of perspectives without being associated with a particular view. Selective depictions of so-called "direct" reported speech provide room for participants to evaluate other speakers' utterances while maintaining the semblance and negotiating the practice of social harmony.

In an excerpt taken from a *2100* broadcast entitled, "Big Reconciliation: what kind of people are we?" (*Da heji: women shi shenme ren?* 大和解：我們是什麼人?), I analyze a call-in panelist's use of hypothetical reported speech to rhetorically reconcile Taiwan's national identity crisis discourses. In this episode, *2100* invited seven legislators who had participated in a made-for-TV "big reconciliation coffee" (*da hejie kafei* 大和解咖啡) organized earlier that afternoon at the Legislative Yuan. Of interest to my analysis are the linguistic behaviors participants used to perform 60 minutes worth of televised sociopolitical harmony. The program's "reconciliation" ambiance was projected not only through the participants' deliberate speech and body language, but also with the quaint coffee cups placed before each panelist and moderator which reproduced and recalled the "reconciliation coffee" event. By providing a reconciliatory televisual moment, the program's participants created a celebratory atmosphere that complimented the panelists' political agenda and the call-in show's programming goals, namely, to perform Taiwan's disparate national identity discourses and temporarily resolve this sociopolitically constructed crisis.

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argumentative talk on call-in shows.

In my discussions with call-in show insiders, many interviewees described the notion of *hejie* (和解) or reconciliation as "supporting for the sake of supporting" (*wei zhichi er zhichi* 為支持而支持), which aptly captures how the value and practice of social harmony has become politicized in Taiwan's increasingly mass-mediated environment. From a different angle, call-in show moderator Ms. Jin Xiuli (靳秀麗) of ETTV's *Always Speak Your Mind* (*You Hua Laoshi Jiang* 有話老實講) offers a viewer's perspective of social harmony. Jin claims that viewers prefer call-in participants who "speak reason" (*jiang li* 講理) and "give others happiness" (*gei renjia fuqi* 給人家福氣) (Jin Xiuli 2000).

The *fuqi* (福氣) or "good fortune" that Jin speaks of can be interpreted as "giving others (positive) face" (*gei bieren mianzi* 給別人面子), that is, maintaining or improving another person's image or reputation. This notion must be contextualized in relation to the Chinese cultural values of "*lian*" (臉) and "*mianzi*" (面子), which both loosely translate as "face" in U.S. culture (Hu 1944).[4] Of the two, *mianzi* has the longer history, appearing in ancient Chinese literature since the early 4th century BC (ibid). However, other scholars have translated *mianzi* as "image" (Gao et. al. 1996:289) or "social face" (Yan 1996:167). For the purposes of this study, I will refer to *mianzi* as social face.

Social face thus involves the projection and claiming of public image (Ting-Toomey 1988) and can be gained or lost in the "jockeying for social prestige and social advantage" (Yang 1994a:140). To contextualize this notion within U.S. cultural practices, *mianzi* may be equated with "the kind of prestige that is emphasized [in the U.S.]: a reputation achieved through getting on in life,

[4] Interestingly, in Goffman's (1967) writings on "face-work," his notion of "face" as demonstrating the Chinese notion of *mianzi* or "social face" and not *lian* or "moral face" as in the following definition: "an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes—albeit an image others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself" (5).

through success and ostentation" (Hu 1944:45). *Mianzi* thus connotes positive notions of public image or social face and represents a combined sense of moral imperatives, social honor, and self-respect (Yang 1994a:141). Moreover, an individual can borrow, struggle for, add to, and pad *mianzi*, activities that contribute to increasing an individual's social face (Hu 1944:61).

In comparison, *lian* is a relatively modern notion with its earliest reference cited in the K'ang-hsi Dictionary dating from the Yuan Dynasty (1277-1367) (Hu 1944:45). *Lian* refers an individual with a "good moral reputation" (ibid), "basic moral characteristics" (Yan 1996:167), and the "public recognition of the ego's moral integrity" (Yang 1994a:140). Such an individual demonstrates decency "under all circumstances" (Hu 1994:45) as a result of his "deep internalization" of a society's fundamental code of ethics (Yang 1994a:140). Consequently, some scholars translate *lian* as "moral face" as opposed to *mianzi*'s "social face" (Yan 1996:167). In this study, I also use "moral face" when referring to *lian* in English.

However, individuals can also lose *mianzi* and *lian*.[5] To do so carries strong consequences, most notably the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of functioning property within one's community. For instance, Yang (1994a) goes so far as to claim that "the violation or loss of *lian* results in social ostracism and the collapse of the ego as a whole" (140, italics added). Moreover, once an individual has lost her moral or social face, it is extremely difficult to regain it. Thus the pressures to maintain *lian* serves as "both a social sanction for enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction" (Hu 1944:45), an observation that can be applied to the preservation of *mianzi* or social face as well.

Returning to moderator Jin Xiuli's comment that call-in show audiences prefer participants who "give others good fortune" over those who are "very annoying" (Jin Xiuli 2000), it can be extrapolated that reconciliation talk appeals

[5] The notion of "losing" or "augmenting" one's social and moral faces is analogous to maintaining a "face bank account" in one's social interactions. I thank Dr. Boretz for this descriptive phrase.

to viewers as it upholds and even contributes toward call-in participants' social faces or *mianzi*. Moreover, Jin's assessment suggests that viewers want participants to maintain the sociocultural value of harmony, even in the performative and competitive setting of political TV call-in shows. This finding contradicts the image of call-in shows as purely argumentative forums where saliva wars (*koushui zhan* 口水戰) or mudslinging prevail, a linguistic behavior I explore in the next chapter. As I illustrate in the following excerpts, reconciliation talk thus constitutes plays an integral role in call-in show verbal practices in particular and Taiwan politics in general. In short, reconciliation talk represents an important compliment to call-in show verbal sparring, especially in relation to Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses.

"SAYING RATHER THAN DOING": PRESENTING "POSSIBLE WORLDS" SCENARIOS

As one of the most extensive studies on the use of "hypothetical words and thoughts" in novels, autobiographies, and newspaper articles, Semino, et. al.'s (1999) taxonomy of hypothetical speech applies a "possible worlds"[6] construct based on Marie-Laure Ryan's (1991) cognitive model of fiction. Using a conversation analysis approach, Myers (1999a) revises and simplifies Semino et.al.'s possible worlds model in his examination of how speakers integrate hypothetical reported speech into verbal interactions and how listeners acknowledge its use. Myers thus suggests that for hypothetical reported speech to be successfully used, listeners must recognize when the speaker's linguistic frame shifts from represented discourse to hypothetical discourse.

What allows listeners to follow these shifts in frame is not logic per se, but being "aware of and open to hypothetical represented discourse whenever they are dealing with the clash of opinions" (ibid:579). Sherzer (1990) claims that

[6] Semino et. al.'s (1999) "possible worlds" model includes five "worlds," including knowledge worlds, intention worlds, obligation worlds, wish worlds, and fantasy universes.

competent listening and understanding involves "following the story line, recognizing the process of the embedding of direct quotation, and following this to a certain degree" (126). Achieving call-in show harmony through reconciliation talk thus requires not only linguistic competence in speakers who use constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989) and selective depictions (Clark and Gerrig 1990), but also in listeners who can differentiate embedded utterances from the surrounding discourse, as well as follow frame shifts and an evolving story line. In the following excerpts, I illustrate how hypothetical reported speech can be distinguished from the surrounding commentary through its function as a thought experiment, counter-argument, hoped-for-speech, or embedded narrative.

CONDUCTING RECONCILIATION TALK THROUGH THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

When used to conduct thought experiments and counter-arguments, hypothetical reported speech can help call-in participants to negotiate the intricacies of Taiwan's ideology-laden crisis topics that often degenerate into discursive quagmires in the form of saliva wars. By using hypothetical represented discourse in thought experiments, speakers can "enact tensions in their own thinking and…deal with opposition between possible views" (Myers 1999a:571). That is, verbal thought experiments facilitate the outlining or theorizing of difficult situations and its consequences for the sake of argument. Consequently, this linguistic practice is "not about describing a situation, but about making the situation real in order to get the right rhetorical effect" (ibid:584). "Rhetorical effect," in this case, refers to representing the conflict in the speaker's mind by dramatizing the confusion through conversation (cf. Billig 1987; Myers 1999a).[7]

In the first excerpt, I analyze a guest speaker's creative embedding of constructed dialogue throughout her commentary to facilitate and animate an

elaborate thought experiment on Taiwan's vying national identity ideologies. This linguistic strategy allows her the latitude to present and negotiate several identity constructions—namely, that the people of Taiwan identify themselves as "Chinese" (*Zhongguoren* 中國人) "Taiwanese" (*Taiwanren* 台灣人), or both—and in the process, expose the inherent tensions within the controversial issue. Inserting hypothetical utterances also provides the legislator greater flexibility to spontaneously rework her arguments with lowered risk of being directly held accountable for her words.

"If you were asked, 'Where were you born?'": experimenting with Taiwan's national identity(ies)

In the first excerpt, I analyze guest panelist PFP legislator Diane Lee's (Lee Ching-an 李慶安) interspersing of hypothetical reported speech within her commentary on *2100*'s featured topic: "Who are we?" (*Women shi shenme ren*? 我們是什麼人?*)* Legislator Lee's adept performance of a constructed dialogue between anonymous speakers—who she obliquely refers to as "someone/someone else" (*renjia* 人家) and "some people" (*you ren* 有人) in her remarks—allows her to introduce alternative interpretations of the ethno-political labels "Chinese" or *Zhongguoren* (中國人) and "Taiwanese" or *Taiwanren* (台灣人). It should also be noted that Leg. Lee's political party, the People's First Party, carefully promotes itself as embodying both "Chinese" and "Taiwanese" identities as reflected in its party membership.[8] Consequently, Leg. Lee's creative use of hypothetical reported speech allows her to strategically cater to the ethno-political groups (e.g., *waishengren* and *benshengren* respectively) with which the two identities are generally associated.

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[7] This interpretation of rhetoric differs from mainstream readings of the concept that emphasizes persuading listeners of a given position to further the speaker's goals (cf. Burke 1969).
[8] See Chapter Three for greater detail on the distinctions between Taiwan's various political parties and ideologies.

Leg. Lee's constructed dialogue also resembles what Fónagy (1986) describes as "for-example quotations," which lie on "the border-line between reality and fiction" (278). Here, the PFP legislator's reliance on for-example utterances strategically straddles the arbitrary boundary between "real" and "fictional" national identities in her attempt to include all, and alienate none, of her listeners. This playing with real and fictional voices is evident through the PFP legislator's rapid shifts between being the author and animator of her utterances (Goffman 1974). [9]

*Transc.6.1: "I am Chinese (*Zhongguoren*), I am also Taiwanese (*Taiwanren*)"*

1	DLee	我想如果說是談到說	I think that if this is about saying
2		你是那裡的人噢，	where are you from
3		那這個問題好像現在	then this problem has now
4		變的很 複雜	perhaps become very complex,
5		很敏感。	very sensitive.
6		但其實它也應該	But actually it should
7		是很簡單阿。	be very simple.
8		那：當然我會認為說：	So: of course I would think that:
9		我們是中國人。	we are *Zhongguoren*.[10]
10		那麼如果人家問我說	Then if someone asked me
11		國名 是 什麼，	"what is the name of (your) country?"
12		我們(國)家是中華民國： ，	Our country is the Republic of China:,
13		所以我們是簡稱	so we abbreviate that to
14		中國： ，中國人民：。	China:, *Zhongguo Renmin*:.[11]
15		那麼，如果問你是，	So, if you were asked,
16		生在那裡，	"where were you born,"
17		那我們是，	then we are,
18		我是生在台灣：阿。	I was born in Taiwan:.
19		所以我就說	So I then say
20		"我是中國人，	"I am a *Zhongguoren*,

[9] Ethno-political terms—such as *Zhongguoren*, *Zhongguo renmin*, *Taiwanren*, *Penghuren*, and *Jinmaren*—have been left in their Hanyu pinyin form in the transcript to preserve their presentation as well as their ideological associations. English glosses for the terms can be found in the Glossary. I will also footnote the English gloss in the transcript.

[10] Meaning "Chinese."

[11] Meaning "Chinese citizens."

21	我也是台灣人。”	I am also a *Taiwanren*.”[12]
22	那當然就是說	So of course that is to say
23	有人講說	there are some people who say
24	“不能說是中國人。”	“(You) can’t say *Zhongguoren*!”
25	其實沒有不	Actually there is no reason not
26	說中國人 的道理。	to say *Zhongguoren*.
27	我們的憲法，	Our constitution,
28	我們是中華民國：嗎，	we are the Republic of China:
29	我們 終不是中國人？	aren’t we all then *Zhongguoren*?
30	那--而且還有不要忘了，	So—moreover don’t forget,
31	我們不是只有台灣：	we not only have Taiwan:
32	我們有台澎金馬。	we have Penghu Kinmen Matsu.
33	所以我們有中國人也	So we have *Zhongguoren*
34	是澎湖人的，	who are also *Penghuren*,[13]
35	有中國人也	there are *Zhongguoren*
36	是金門人的。	who are also *Kinmenren*.[14]
37	不能說，	We cannot say,
38	“大家的全部是非得	“Everyone must be
39	叫台灣人。	called *Taiwanren*.
40	但是我是生在台灣	But I was born in Taiwan
41	我當然是台灣人阿。”	so of course I am a *Taiwanren*.”
42	所以我覺得這個 問題	So I feel that this issue
43	其實不要把它顯得	actually should not be considered
44	那麼，那麼嚴：肅。	so, so seriously.
45	那麼複雜。	So complicated.
46	那麼基於說	So according to
47	今天我們的 和：解	our big re:conciliation today
48	我到不認為說，	I don’t believe that,
49	一定 要在這類的	we must use this type of
50	名詞上說，	terminology [and] say,
51	“大家都要	“Everyone must
52	有個同意 的名詞	agree upon the same term
53	才叫 和 解。”	for it to be called a reconciliation.”

[12] Meaning “Taiwanese” or “people of Taiwan.” See Chapter Three for background on the difference between *Taiwanren* and *benshengren* (“people of this province,” indicating the province of Taiwan).

[13] Meaning “people of Penghu.”

[14] Meaning “people of Kinmen.”

Diane Lee's commentary begins with her observing that if the topic, "Who are we?" ("this," line 1), revolves around declaring "where are you from" (line 2), then Taiwan's national identity issue has become "very complex, very sensitive" (lines 4-5). The PFP legislator explains this perspective by claiming "Actually, it should be very simple" and adds that "of course I would think that we are *Zhongguoren* (Chinese)" (lines 6-9). By introducing her opinion first, Diane Lee's linguistic progression is consistent with Myers' (1999a) finding that speakers typically "will say what the result of the thought experiment is to be, before they lay down the conditions" (585). The present case, the PFP legislator summarizes her reading of Taiwan's national identity problem in two terse sentences.

However, after making this declaration, Leg. Diane Lee quickly frames her remarks as constructed dialogue in order to rhetorically demonstrate why Taiwan's national identity problem is "very simple" (*hen jiandan* 很簡單). Her introduction of constructed dialogue between a figurative "someone" (*renjia* 人家) and an alternating "we" (*women* 我們) and "I" (*wo* 我) animates the ideological issue while rending it in hypothetical terms. Lee elaborates her "very simple" reading by posing a hypothetical query, "If someone asked me, "what is the name of (your) country?" (lines 10-11). The PFP legislator then provides the second pair part (Sacks et. al. 1974) to the question by answering, "Our country is the Republic of China (*Zhonghua Minguo* 中華民國). So we abbreviate that to China (*Zhongguo* 中國), Chinese citizens (*Zhongguo renmin* 中國人民)" (lines 12-14).[15] Interestingly, Leg. Lee doubly emphasizes what type of "Chinese citizens" (*Zhongguo renmin*) she refers to by prefacing the identity term with the

[15] Although Diane Lee doesn't preface this hypothetical quote with a "saying" verb such as "I said," the rhetorical response is interpreted as a hypothetical utterance given the "if" statement preceding the statement.

descriptor "China" (*Zhongguo*), and moreover, by elongating the second character "*guo*" (國).[16]

Figure 12: *2100* guest panelist PFP Legislator Diane Lee addressing the topic: "Big reconciliation: what is our (national) identity?"

Leg. Diane Lee's theoretical line of inquiry continues through her imaginary interlocutor when the hypothetically voiced character poses a second question, "So if you were asked, 'Where were you born?'" (lines 15-16). The legislator begins to answer in the first person-plural "we are" (line 17), but quickly amends her response to the first person-singular, "I was born in Taiwan" (line 18). This marked shift from a collective "we" to the personal "I" reveals a self-correction or self-repair regarding how the PFP legislator wants to frame her remarks, namely, should her words be presented as a "possible worlds" scenario through a collective "we" or should it be based on her own identity(-ies) through a first person "I"? By choosing to use the first person, Leg. Diane Lee personalizes the rhetorical question and shares with her fellow panelists and program viewers that she was in fact born in Taiwan.

[16] This would be the equivalent of saying "I'm a U.S. American" (as opposed to a "Canadian American") or "I'm an American American" (as opposed to a "Chinese American"). I thank Heng-rue Lin for pointing this out to me.

The next hypothetical utterance, however, signals a shift back to the thought experiment frame. By presenting the following statement as constructed dialogue, Leg. Lee neatly reconciles her earlier claim to having a "Chinese" citizenship despite being born in "Taiwan"—"So then I say, "I am Chinese (*Zhongguoren*), I am also Taiwanese (*Taiwanren*)" (lines 19-21). The hypothetical utterance allows the PFP legislator to embrace both terms without alienating listeners who identify with either one or the other (or both) identity markers (Myers 1998, 1999a).

Realizing that her verbal thought experiment has reached a controversial juncture, Leg. Lee anticipates her imaginary interlocutor's response and inserts a hypothetical protest to her declaration of being both a *Zhongguoren* and a *Taiwanren* with the constructed objection, "(You) can't say *Zhongguoren* (Chinese)!" (line 24). Here, the represented utterance acts as a counter-argument to Diane Lee's earlier remarks, and moreover, voices sentiments that *Taiwanren*-identifying, and perhaps pro-Taiwan independence supporters, might express. This imaginary counterpoint is significant as it both exposes an "irreducible contradiction or tension" in Taiwan's national identity struggle as well as in Leg. Lee's ongoing thought experiment (Myers 1999a:580).

In the next few lines, the PFP legislator turns to presenting several "facts" as a means to prove why a person in Taiwan can identify herself as a "Chinese" (*Zhongguoren*) (lines 25-26). First, Leg. Leg evokes the Republic of China constitution (lines 27-28) to lend credence to her declaration that "aren't we all then *Zhongguoren* (Chinese)?" (line 29). This is next followed by a brief geography lesson to remind her listeners that the Republic of China includes not only Taiwan, but also the islands of Penghu (澎湖), Kinmen (金門), and Matsu (馬祖) (lines 31-32).[17] By listing the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which the

[17] The Penghu Islands (also known as the Pescadores) forms an archipelago in the Taiwan Straits off the southwestern coast of Taiwan. Located off the southern part of Fujian province, Kinmen is

ROC constitution lists as a part of Fukien province in China, Leg. Lee establishes the Republic of China as consisting of more than just the island of Taiwan, and hence, lending credence to her assertion that ROC nationals are not only *Taiwanren* or "Taiwanese."

After presenting this geographical evidence, Leg. Lee introduces a series of selective identity markers that broaden the *Zhongguoren* identity beyond its geopolitical and ideological connotations.[18] She deliberately links the identities of *Penghuren* (澎湖人) and *Kinmenren* (金門人) with *Zhongguoren* to state, "So we have *Zhongguoren* who are also 'people from Penghu' (*Penghuren*), there are *Zhongguoren* who are also 'people from Kinmen' (*Jinmenren*)" (lines 33-36). Although these identities are not "fictitious" (Clark and Gerrig 1990) in the sense that the people and places do exist, Leg. Lee's identity construction nonetheless creates a unified imagined community (Anderson 1991) through her deliberative discourse, and specifically, through her ongoing thought experiment.

After introducing these alternative identifiers, Leg. Lee reaches the crux of her contemplations which coincides with a shift back to hypothetical reported speech. The PFP legislator's use of a collective "we" attempts to establish a conciliatory frame when she asserts: "We cannot say, 'Everyone must be called *Taiwanren*" (lines 37-38). This declaration returns Leg. Lee to her earlier assertion that Taiwan's national identity should not be considered "so seriously" (*name yansu* 那麼嚴肅) and be regarded as "so complicated" (*name fuza* 那麼複雜) (line 43-45). Here, Diane Lee unveils how she imagines its

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the ROC territory that lies closest to China. The island of Matzu is located off the northern coast of Fujian province. In the early 1950s, both Kinmen and Matzu were heavily fought over between the CCP and KMT regimes. With U.S. military aid, the KMT succeeded in retaining the islands. To this day, the ROC maintains its heaviest military presence on Kinmen and Matzu.

[18] As mentioned in Chapter Three, the identifier "*Zhongguoren*" carries symbolic meanings linked to a historical and mythical "Middle Kingdom" (*Zhongguo* 中國) or "China," which includes obligations and loyalties of political affiliation as citizens of the Chinese state (Tu 1991b:25). I expand upon this concept in a saliva war between Mr. Ting and Leg. Fung in Chapter Seven.

reconciliation in a final hypothetical utterance: "I don't believe that, we must use the terminology [of *Zhongguoren* and *Taiwanren*] and say, 'Everyone must use the same term in order for it [the national identity issue] to be called a reconciliation'" (lines 48-53). Ironically, by voicing her conclusions through constructed dialogue Leg. Lee reemphasizes the issue's sensitivity, as demonstrated by her avoidance in authoring the remarks.

Myers (1999a) observes that oftentimes the use of "represented discourse" reflects the speaker's "powerlessness in the situation outlined in the thought experiment," thus leading the individual to resolve it through "saying rather than doing" (585). To voice the more sensitive portions of her commentary regarding Taiwan's national identity as the author and not the animator, which she elects to do here through hypothetical reported speech, could have jeopardized her social face in Taiwan's ethno-politically cognizant landscape. It can be assessed that the PFP legislator's objective in this passage focused upon "saying" rather than "doing" the reconciliation she proposed. That is, Diane Lee seemed less concerned about describing steps to resolving the crisis, and more interested in performing "reconciliation talk" that was believable to her co-participants and program viewers as well as enhanced to her credibility as a politician who represented all of Taiwan's people.

Myers (1999a) recognizes the strategic value and convenience of hypothetical reported speech when he notes:

> When [speakers] use represented discourse to position themselves, represented speech and represented thought are often interchangeable. . .The functions of represented discourse…emerge only if we see the interactions as rhetorical (ibid:587).

He adds that this linguistic device allows speakers to "experiment with [the] wording and rewording" of knotty issues (ibid:581). Consequently, Leg. Lee's repeated insertion of constructed dialogue in her commentary provided her the political opportunity through a safe discursive avenue (e.g., a thought experiment)

to contemplate and theorize Taiwan's national identity crisis. Overall, Diane Lee's creative merging of commentary and thought experiment, as well as her alternation between opinion and hypothetical reported speech, demonstrates how crisis discourses can be redressed through reconciliation talk on political TV call-in shows.

RECONCILING "PRESENT" AND "ABSENT" RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

Call-in show participants also use constructed dialogue as a counter-argument to the surrounding discussion in order to present alternative or opposing perspectives in relation to those already expressed. In the next example, a guest panelist uses hypothetical reported speech to selectively depict and tactfully assess another guest's remarks regarding the increased reliance on ethnic sentiments as a campaign tactic during Taiwan's recent national elections. By turning to hypothetical reported speech, the panelist has greater leverage to alleviate "irreducible contradiction or tension" underlying this sensitive issue (Myers 1999a:580). In particular, I explore how the panelist ascribes hypothetical utterances to a generic Taiwan populace to portray a unified and content citizenry. In doing so, the speaker attempts to demonstrate the complex laminations latent within *benshengren* and *waishengren* tensions.

Basso's (1979) seminal study of linguistic play among the Western Apache also informs the following analysis. In particular, I apply his interpretation that every joke indexes two sets of relationships, including a *present* relationship between the speaker and the object of the joke, as well as an *absent* relationship on which the present on is modeled (16). Although the next call-in show passage does not feature joke telling but rather reconciliation talk, this comparative relationship remains useful in comprehending the dual (or multiple) messages that hypothetical reported speech communicates. Specifically, I investigate how a call-in participant's animation of hypothetical utterances also

captures multiple relationships including those manifest and latent to the ongoing discourse. In the following excerpt, a guest panelist uses hypothetical reported speech to forward a counter-argument to a previous speaker's comments. Moreover, the panelists' hypothetical utterance indexes two interdependent relationships, namely, *benshengren/waishengren* relations—which represents the present relationship and the call-in show's main topic—as well as Taiwan- China cross-straits relations—which constitutes the absent relationship that has thus far remained unaddressed in the program's deliberations. I consequently explore how the panelist strategically inserts constructed speech to forward that Taiwan's *shengji qinjie* (省籍情結) or ethno-political crisis may one day be subsumed, and even be erased, by a greater threat from China as a result of cross-straits tensions.

"Why do we divide ourselves like this?": exposing contradictions in the "emotional problem" of *bensheng/waisheng* relations

The following three excerpts are all taken from a *2100* episode entitled: "*Bensheng*, *waisheng*, is there still a distinction?" The episode was broadcast on May 2, 2000, in the interregnum between the presidential election on March 18 and the presidential inauguration on May 20, 2000. The featured guests included former independent vice presidential candidate and current vice chairman of the newly formed People's First Party Chang Chau-hsiung (張昭雄),[19] DPP legislator Lee Ying-yuan (李應元), media producer Tang Xianglong (唐湘龍), and National Taiwan University history professor Li Yongzhi (李永治). The episode's topic focused on ethno-political relations (*shengji qingjie* 省籍情結), which

[19] Chang Chau-hsiung was independent presidential candidate James Soong's running mate in the 2000 presidential elections. At the time of the broadcast, he had recently been appointed the PFP vice chairman, which was comprised of Soong-Chang supporters.

moderator Lee Tao introduced as perhaps having "always existed in our society, but people very rarely speak of it."[20]

Given Taiwan's recent presidential election, ethno-political relations had attained greater prominence as various political parties decried the manner in which voting had supposedly occurred along ethno-political lines. Election results revealed that the DPP garnered the majority of the *benshengren* votes while the KMT and NP earned most of the *waishengren* votes. Independent candidate James Soong, however, attracted significant numbers of both *benshengren* and *waishengren* votes.

In the second excerpt, I examine guest panelist Tang Xiang-long uses hypothetical reported speech as a counter-argument to the other panelists' comments. As previously mentioned, ethno-political voting practices are closely tied to a political party's cross-straits policy, namely, whether the party advocates eventual reunification with China or Taiwan independence. Appearing near the end of the hour-long program, Tang's remarks offer an alternative view of the dangers and opportunities ethno-political tensions pose to Taiwan and its people. In particular, the media producer argues that Taiwan's preoccupation with *benshengren/waishengren* tensions will eventually undermine the country's national security, leaving it vulnerable to invasion by China. Tang demonstrates this point through two hypothetical utterances that depict Taiwan's citizenry as being satisfied with their lifestyle and finding the country's ethno-political divisions as being meaningless. I examine how Tang's hypothetical reported utterance refocuses the call-in show's present discussion regarding Taiwan's domestic political sphere by calling attention to an absent relationship, that is, cross-straits relations.

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[20] Lee Tao's remarks in Chinese were: "可能一直都存在我們這個社會裡面，
但是大家都很少去談."

Transc. 6.2: "There is no meaning to our discrimination"

1	Tang	那今天，在說	So today, when talking about
2		本省人跟外省人	*benshengren* and *waishengren*
3		這麼簡單的	such a simple
4		兩人對立，	confrontation between two people (groups),
5		非常不理性的區分。	a very unreasonable distinction.
6		是不是要非到等	Does it have to reach the point where
7		到那一天中共	one day after Communist China has
8		打過來之後，	fought its way over here,
9		大家發現說，	everyone will then realize and say,
10		"其實我們生活	"Actually our lifestyle
11		在這邊很好。	(on this side) is very good.
12		我們為什麼	Why do we
13		要這樣去區分呢？"	divide (ourselves) like this?"
14		這種感情的問題	Actually it is worthwhile for the
15		其實是很值得	populace to address
16		人民去對待。	this emotional problem.
17		但是它裡面有	But within this there is
18		這樣一個矛盾。	a kind of contradiction.
19		非要鬥，鬥，鬥，	One must fight, fight, fight,
20		到最後有一個外來	to where in the end a foreign
21		的統治者進來之後，	ruler enters (Taiwan) and afterwards,
22		大家才常常發現說，	everyone will come to realize and say,
23		"其實我們這樣區分	"Actually, there is no meaning in
24		是沒有意義的。"	distinguishing ourselves like this."

The excerpt begins with Mr. Tang declaring that the face-off between *benshengren* and *waishengren* is a "very unreasonable distinction" (*feichang bu lixing de qufen* 非常不理性的區分) (line 5). Tang then introduces an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) that Taiwan's concern with *shengji qinjie* relations leaves it vulnerable to invasion from "Communist China," such that one day the country will wake up and discover that the PRC has already succeeded in "fight[ing] its way over here" (line 8). With this statement, Tang succeeds in shifting the focus of the discussion from the present or current call-in show topic of *benshengren/waishengren* relations to the thus far unspoken and absent issue of cross-straits relations. Tang then dramatizes the opportunities and dangers ethno-

political and cross-straits tensions pose to Taiwan by voicing a surprised and enlightened citizenry's discovery that, "Actually, our lifestyle here (in Taiwan) is very good. Why do we divide ourselves like this?" (lines 10-13). Tang's use of hypothetical reported speech acts as a counter-argument to the other call-in participants' portrayals of *waishengren* as having "feelings of crisis" (*weijigan* 危機感)[21] and "feelings of loss" (*shiluogan* 失落感) earlier in the program.[22]

Tang's counter-argument also represents an attempt to alleviate the surmounting contradictions and tensions undermining *waishengren/benshengren* relations by depicting a populace that is not in "crisis," but rather finds their lifestyle "very good" (line 11). Tang refers to *shengji qinjie* relations as an "emotional problem" (line 16), and moreover, that "a kind of contradiction" exists within the issue (lines 17-18). He then predicts that Taiwan's concern with ethno-political inequalities will only cease when a "foreign ruler" (*wailai de tongzhizhe* 外來的統治者) (line 20-21) invades and conquers Taiwan, an oblique yet recognizable reference to the PRC.

The media producer further dramatizes the urgency of the situation by inserting another hypothetical utterance, which he again presents as the voice of Taiwan's citizenry. Here, Tang portrays the public as suddenly realizing that, "Actually, there is no meaning to dividing ourselves like this" (line 23-24). The resemblance between the two hypothetical reported utterances in Tang's brief remarks emphasizes the inherent contradictions in the possible-worlds scenario he presents in which the PRC successfully invades Taiwan (Semino et. al. 1999). That is, while Taiwan's political parties engage in an ethno-political power struggle, they concurrently weaken the country's ability to defend itself from "Communist China." In short, Tang's use of constructed dialogue warns that

[21] I discuss this notion in greater detail in the next excerpt.
[22] These phrases were used by both guest panelist and DPP Legislator Lee Ying-yuan as well as moderator Lee Tao in this episode.

should ethno-political tensions consume Taiwan's domestic sphere, the country's current sociopolitical problems will pale in comparison to what their lifestyles will be like under PRC rule.

I consider this passage as a performance of reconciliation talk insofar as Tang's remarks seek to regain a semblance of harmony in Taiwan society by reminding his colleagues and viewers that Taiwan by and large enjoys a harmonious sociopolitical environment with a populace that is unified under a democratic government. By turning to constructed dialogue, Tang articulates the dangers and opportunities latent within *benshengren/waishengren* tensions. To him, a potent danger lies in becoming too engrossed with domestic power struggles and leaving the country vulnerable to invasion by China. Tang thus suggests that the citizenry should take the opportunity to address their "emotional problems" (*ganqing de wenti* 感情的問題) as well as appreciate their comparatively harmonious environment in Taiwan for what it already offers. Thus Tang's remarks suggests that he considers Taiwan's ethno-political crisis as reconcilable, particularly in comparison to cross-straits tensions.

RECONCILIATION TALK AS "HOPED FOR SPEECH"

The third excerpt investigates how a guest speaker uses reported speech to reappropriate or "replay" a previous panelist's remarks in a manner that selectively depicts and editorializes the original utterance. A "replaying" serves to link the reporter's interpretation of the original utterance and the utterance itself such that it:

> …appears to establish a personal perspective and temporal starting point of an anecdote, such that *any* quoted statement which follows can somewhat serve as the concluding part of a temporally developed two-part story, in this way providing a replaying of sorts (Goffman 1974:506; original italics).

By revoicing another speaker's utterance, call-in participants recreate its content and even reorient its discursive target. The following excerpt demonstrates how participants can selectively depict another speaker's remarks, including switching the subject and object of an utterance and thus producing an opposite reading of the deliberated crisis scenario.

The passage also illustrates how hypothetical reported speech can serve as an "apocryphal quotation" (cf. Payne, n.d., in Buttny 1997) or "hoped for speech" (cf. Cohen 1996, in Buttny 1997). In this manner, hypothetical utterances enact what "could or should have been said" or even thought (Buttny 1997:486). Call-in show speakers often use and attribute constructed dialogue to self and other speakers in order to demonstrate alternative linguistic behavior from that already expressed. In this case, a panelist models hypothetical thought that he attributes to others, in this case other politicians, in order to illustrate how a conciliatory attitude can contribute to reducing Taiwan's ethno-political tensions.

"Is there some way to get these ethnic groups to vote for me?": expressing "hoped for speech"

The excerpt begins with PFP vice chairman Chang Chau-hsiung producing three instances of hypothetical reported speech, which he uses to critique Taiwan's political parties and their preoccupation with Taiwanese vs. Mainlander voting patterns. Chang's remarks represent a response to DPP legislator Lee Ying-yuan's earlier comment that independent presidential candidate James Soong, Chang's former running mate, had attracted 80 to 90 percent of the *waishengren* vote in the recent presidential election. The crux of Leg. Lee Ying-yuan's remarks are as follows:

> Right now the problem is, the feeling of crisis among *waishengren*, is so strong that approximately 80 to 90 percent (of their votes) were concentrated on James Soong.[23]

[23] See Appendix B, Excerpt 7 for Chinese transcription.

As a former vice presidential candidate, Chang responds to Leg. Lee Ying-yuan's allegations by first revoicing and rephrasing the DPP legislator's original remarks. Chang then offers an alternative reading of the situation, which he presents through two hypothetical utterances. Chang's use of direct reported speech serves to editorialize the original utterance, while the insertion of hypothetical reported speech as a form of "hoped for speech" (Buttny 1997) places the onus of diminishing ethno-political biases on Taiwan's politicians, and particularly, on President-elect Chen Shui-bian.

Transc. 6.3: "...is there some way to get these ethnic groups to vote for me?"

1	Chang	所以剛才提到呢，	So just now it was raised that,
2		這個事情就是說，	this incident that is to say,
3		我們民進黨朋友	our Democratic Progressive Party friend
4		說，"外省籍十percent,	said, "Ten percent of *waishenji*,[24]
5		只有十percent 投我？"	only ten percent vote for me?"
6		我覺得反而我們應該	Rather, I feel that we should
7		要去想想，是不是	think about this, shouldn't
8		應該在這個時候要	(we) at this time need to
9		去想說，	think and say,
10		"我能夠，有沒有什麼	"Can I, is there some
11		辦法，讓這些族群	way, that I can get these ethnic groups
12		能夠來投我。"	to vote for me?"
13		(…)	(…)
14		所以這個事情就	So this situation should be
15		是我們怎麼來努力。	how hard do we work for it.
16		那很重要的是，	So what is important is,
17		政治人物是很重要。	politicians are very important.
18		尤其這次陳水扁	Especially Mr. Chen Shui-bian
19		先生他當選了以後，	after becoming elected,
20		我想想他不要（…),	I believe that he should not (…),
21		不要一直掛念這說，	shouldn't be concerned about this and say,
22		"啊，這一群人只十	"Ah, this group of people only
23		percent 投我，所以	ten percent voted for me, so
24		我就不理。"	I will then ignore them."

[24] Meaning, "people from outside the province" or "Mainlanders."

25 那這個就很糟糕。 This would be very unwise.

Chang's calculated juxtaposition of direct and hypothetical reported speech in this brief stretch of talk accomplishes two tasks: first, to mitigate his criticism of Leg. Lee Ying-yuan's preceding remarks, and second, to address the issue of ethno-political tensions. When Chang reassesses the DPP legislator's comment that presidential candidate James Soong garnered the majority of *waishengren* (Mainlander) votes, he does so in a circumspect and amiable manner by referring to Legislator Lee Ying-yuan as "our Democratic Progressive Party friend" (line 3). This friendly overture serves to introduce Chang's following remarks, including his revoicing and editorializing of the DPP legislator's earlier comments.

Interestingly, when Chang "replays" the DPP legislator's observation of Taiwan's voting patterns, he selectively emphasizes the Democratic Progressive Party (rather than James Soong as depicted in Leg. Lee's original utterance) as being the recipient of *waishengren* (Mainlander) votes. That is, while Leg. Lee cited presidential candidate James Soong (Chang's former running mate) as receiving 80 to 90 percent of the Mainlander vote in the last election, Chang revises the voting behavior from the opposing perspective in the following reported utterance: "Why is it that ten percent of *waishengji* (Mainlanders), only ten percent vote for me (the DPP)?" (lines 4-6). In other words, Chang succeeds in "reclassifying" the message of Leg. Lee's original remarks (Shuman 1993:145). Specifically, Chang reclassifies the beneficiary of *waishengren* votes from James Soong to the DPP. In addition, he redirects the issue of Taiwan's voting practices away from *waishengren* voters and their "feelings of crisis" (*weijigan* 危機感) and towards the DPP and their complaint of only garnering ten percent the *waishengren* vote. In this sense, Chang's use of reported speech resembles "selective depiction" more than "direct quotation" (Clark and Gerrig 1990).

Chang next uses hypothetical reported speech to illustrate through a thought experiment the suggestion that Taiwan's politicians, including those on the call-in program, should reconsider the voting patterns that Leg. Lee has raised (lines 6-7). Here, the PFP vice chairman performs the voice of a self-reflecting politician who ponders what he can do to redress ethno-political voting biases, "Can I, is there some way that I can get these ethnic groups to vote for me?" (lines 10-12). When evaluating a speaker's remarks, assessments can arrive "prepositioned," "postpositioned," or embedded within the reported utterance (Buttny 1997:501). In this passage, Chang embeds his critique of Leg. Lee's earlier remarks within his commentary.

Chang's insertion of a hypothetical quotation in the midst of his commentary acts as a demonstration, in the sense that "quotations are demonstrations that [themselves] are component parts of language use" (Clark and Gerrig 1990:769). In this instance, Chang demonstrates what Taiwan's politicians (including himself) can do to overcome ethno-political relations. The PFP vice chairman's use of a hypothetical utterance articluates "hoped for speech" that "shows what could or should have been said" by DPP Leg. Lee Ying-yuan in his earlier comment on *waishengren* voting practices (Buttny 1997:486). Later, Chang reiterates his hopeful attitude when he suggests that reconciling Taiwan's ethno-political differences depends upon the efforts politicians dedicate toward this goal (line 15) as they are central to improving this issue (line 17).

The vice chairman attributes his next and final use of hypothetical reported speech to President-elect Chen Shui-bian, whom Chang regards as critical to ameliorating *waishengren* and *benshengren* relations (lines 18-19). Myers (1999a) finds that most "instances of hypothetical represented discourse are not marked as imaginary, but as possible or conditional" (576). Moreover, reported speech and reported thought are often interchangeable, as demonstrated

in Chang's performance of a hypothetical utterance, or rather a hypothetical thought, which he describes as "very unwise" (line 25) should President-elect Chen utter or think it.

In this hypothetical utterance, Chang advises the DPP president to not dwell upon, and moreover, retaliate for the fact that only ten percent of *waishengren* voted for him (lines 22-24). Here, Chang uses hypothetical reported speech to model what President-elect Chen should not do once taking office, namely, ignore this segment of the population (line 24). Moreover, the PFP vice chairman presents alternative approaches to a situation "in which there are always potentially opposing views" (Myers 1999a:580). Chang's hypothetical utterance thus reminds President-elect Chen that there are many ways to address *waishengren/benshengren* relations aside from categorizing voting practices and reifying ethno-political differences, which Taiwan's political leaders have repeatedly done in the past.

As an example of reconciliation talk, Chang's adept juxtaposition of direct and hypothetical reported speech in his comments performs and advocates an apolitical approach to ethno-political tensions. Namely, he directs his speech reporting performances at his former political opponent, President-elect Chen Shui-bian, and his fellow panelist, DPP Leg. Lee Ying-yuan. Moreover, aside from advising Chen and Lee to take a reconciliatory approach, Chang himself does so in his own speech. This is demonstrated in Chang's tactful editorialization of Leg. Lee's earlier remarks through selective depiction, which reevaluates the utterance in a manner that preserves the DPP legislator's social face or *mianzi*. In other words, rather than overtly criticizing Leg. Lee, the PFP vice chairman "gives him (positive) face" (*gei ta mianzi* 給他面子). Moreover, Chang's advice for President-elect Chen regarding what should not do if he wanted to redress ethno-political voting biases has the potential of elevating both Chen and the

DPP's *mianzi* should Chang's suggestions succeed in improving, or at least not worsen, *benshengren/waishengren* relations.

Sternberg (1982) observes that "tearing a piece of discourse from its original habitat and recontextualizing it within a new network of relations cannot but interfere with its effect" (108). Consequently, by revoicing and rephrasing Leg. Lee's initial comments, Chang recontextualizes its original "effect" of blaming *waishengren* voters for exhibiting "feelings of crisis" and transforms it into "hoped for speech" that forwards a "shouldn't we say" approach to challenge politicians to rethink their methods of appealing to voters (Buttny 1997). Furthermore, in forwarding a reconciliatory approach, Chang foregrounds the opportunities and dangers that await not only President-elect Chen Shui-bian, but all of Taiwan's sociopolitical leaders as well should *shengji qingjie* biases remain unaddressed. As in an earlier excerpt in which PFP Leg. Diane Lee relied upon constructed dialogue to create a "possible worlds" scenario to reconcile Taiwan's national identity problem, PFP vice chairman Chang's use of hypothetical utterances models linguistic behavior in a world where *benshengren/waishengren* distinctions should not matter.

REVISITING LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES THROUGH NARRATIVES

The final excerpt in this chapter appears in the same episode as the previous two examples and features a caller who recounts a personal experience through a brief 20-second narrative. Tannen's (1986) research on constructed dialogue in conversational and literary narratives finds that "the creation of drama from personal experience and hearsay is made possible by and simultaneously creates interpersonal involvement among speaker or writer and audience" (312). In the next passage, I examine how a single line of dialogue effectively recaptures and vividly dramatizes a confrontation involving language choice. Although the narrative depicts the confrontation as occuring between the caller and his recalled interlocutor, the recounting also indexes Taiwan's language ideologies regarding

the "national language" or *guoyu* (國語), more commonly known as Mandarin Chinese, and the Taiwanese language, also known as *Taiyu* (台語) or Hohlo. Moreover, the caller's insertion of a "snippet" of constructed dialogue represents the moral of his story as it "expresses the relationship not between the quoted party and the topic of talk but rather the quoted party and the audience to whom the quotation is delivered" (Tannen 1989:109).

In Sherzer's (1990) examination of Kuna public oratory, he claims that recited words are understood by the audience as belonging not to the orator, "but rather as quotes of other, previous times and places, of other speakers and voices…or of future times, places, and voices" (124). In the present case, the caller's association of the reported utterance to another speaker likewise represents and epitomizes numerous other verbal interactions between *guoyu* and *Taiyu* speakers in Taiwan. The importance and value of the caller's anecdote thus resides in its references to other speakers, times, and contexts where Taiwan's language ideologies have played out in both public (e.g., call-in shows) and private (e.g., everyday language use) spaces. Conseequently, I regard the caller's narrative as performing reconciliation talk insofar as Taiwan's language ideologies are discursively overcome and temporarily resolved through the creative use of constructed dialogue.

"Speak the 'national language' (*guoyu*), okay?": a narrative of past and future times, places, and voices

The caller, a Mr. Wu from Tainan, a city in southwestern Taiwan, begins his call by announcing he has a story to share. Wu situates his narrative during his military service, which is mandatory for all males in Taiwan.[25] In the story, Wu describes himself addressing a "mountain aborigine (or indigenous person)"

[25] Recently, Taiwan's conscription law was amended to allow certain individuals for approved reasons (e.g., medical clearance, conscientious objector) to fulfill their military service

(*shandi yuanzhumin* 山地原住民) in *Taiyu* or Taiwanese. Wu then portrays his interlocutor as demanding, "speak *guoyu* (the national language) okay?" As the only line in the narrative that Wu presents through constructed dialogue, the reported utterance becomes the focal point of his story. This interpretation is corroborated at the end of Wu's narrative when he forwards that speaking *guoyu* should be considered a "communication tool" (*goutong gongju* 溝通工具).

As in previous excerpts, I have deliberately left certain Mandarin terms in their pinyin form (e.g., *Taiyu*, *guoyu*, *waishengren*, and *Shanghaihua*) to preserve their sociolinguistic and contextual significance in the narrative. The entire caller segment is presented below.

*Transc. 6.4: "I feel that speaking the "national language" (*guoyu*) is a kind of communication tool"*

1	Wu	阿唯？ 你好。	Eh, hello? How are you.
2		我想講一個故事啊。	I would like to tell a story.
3		我在軍中當兵的時候	When I was serving in the military
4		我有用台語跟那個-一個	I used *Taiyu* to speak with that- a
5		山地原住民講話啊。	mountain aborigine.
6		他很不客氣就跟我講說	He then very impolitely said to me
7		"你講國語好不好啊？"	"(You) use *guoyu* okay?"
8		那現在-在台灣裡面ho^{n},[26]	So now—inside Taiwan uh,
9		我覺得講國語是一種,	I feel that speaking *guoyu* is a kind
10		溝通工具。	of communication tool.
11		你:，不要每次到	You:, it isn't necessary that each time
12		這邊都一定要用	(you) come to this place (you) must
13		台語講話。	speak *Taiyu*.
14		然後外省人也要,	And so *waishengren* also must,
15		外省人他學的國語，	the *guoyu* that *waishengren* learn,

requirement by participating in humanitarian projects. However, choosing this option required two years of service as opposed to the requisite 18 months.

[26] I have interpreted the Taiwanese discourse marker "ho" as "uh" in this instance, but it could also be represented by "um" or any comparable space holder as might be used in English. It should be noted that the use of "ho^{n}" is particular to Taiwan speakers of Mandarin Chinese, and especially those who also speak Taiwanese. I thank Heng-rue Lin for assisting me in this translation.

16 我們是也要學他們 Do we also have to learn their
17 的上海（話）？ *Shanghai*(*hua*)?

To understand the caller's comments requires background knowledge of Taiwan's language policies and linguistic diversity. The marked linguistic moniker "*guoyu*" or "national language" captures the ideological relationship between language and nation-building that the former KMT ruling party imposed on the local Taiwan populace. In the early 1950s, the KMT introduced a national language policy that mandated only Mandarin would be used as a language of instruction.[27] By 1964, the KMT implemented another law that banned the use of Taiwanese, as well as the other local languages in Taiwan (e.g., Hakka and the aborigine languages), in schools and official settings (Wachman 1994).

Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, speakers have increasingly use Taiwanese in various daily interactions such that it is now socially fashionable and politically beneficial to do so.[28] Moreover, with President Chen Shui-bian's election in March 2000 and the rise of the local Democratic Progressive Party as Taiwan's ruling party, Taiwanese will grow in prestige and use in a wider array of sociopolitical contexts.[29] Taiwanese has also become necessary in the business world as commercial transactions and negotiations are increasingly conducted in the language, a practice that occurred even before the lifting of martial law in 1987. More significantly, the Taiwanese language is emblematic of a coalescing Taiwanese nationalism that promotes an independent Taiwan nation-state distinct

[27] Prior to the KMT regime's arrival in 1945, Taiwan had been a Japanese colony from 1885-1945 during which time Japanese was mandated in schools and official settings throughout Taiwan. For fear of lingering Japanese sentiments and patriotism, the use of Japanese was forbidden by the KMT government. Thus the Mandarin-only language policy not only replaced Japanese as the language of instruction, but also ensured that Mandarin, and not Taiwanese or any of the other local languages, would become Taiwan's new official language.

[28] The general use of Taiwanese in the business world occurred before the lifting of martial law and prior to its popularity in the political arena. This is primarily due to the fact that over 80 percent of the population are of *benshengren* decent. Consequently, a majority of benshengren speak Taiwanese in their daily lives, including when conducting business transactions.

[29] As with former President Lee Teng-hui, the previous ROC president, current President Chen Shui-bian is a fluent Taiwanese speaker.

from the PRC and a China-based worldview. Given that Mandarin Chinese is based on the Beijing dialect in northern China, the strategic choice by pro-independence advocates to use Taiwanese rather than Mandarin is readily apparent.[30] Despite these recent changes to Taiwan's sociolinguistic environment, Mandarin remains the country's lingua franca and dominant language in the mass media, schools, government, and business.

For these reasons, Mr. Wu's narrative recollection of himself using *Taiyu* to a person of aboriginal decent indexes many of the ideological associations listed above. The caller's initial choice to not speak *guoyu* to an individual whose native language or "mother-tongue" (*muyu* 母語) most likely is not Taiwanese, as each aboriginal group has their own indigenous language, is notable for its ideological significance, and moreover, its own form of linguistic oppression. Mr. Wu highlights this moment by animating his interlocutor's response through reported speech, "(You) speak *guoyu* okay?" (line 7), which the caller describes as being spoken in a "very impolite" (*hen bu keqi* 很不客氣) manner.

Wu's insertion of constructed dialogue forms the crux of the narrative for several reasons. Tannen (1986) claims that speech is rarely represented in oral storytelling exactly as initially spoken by the original speaker. Thus Mr. Wu's recollection and reporting of the aboriginal speaker's words constitutes a reconstruction of the original utterance in a way that meets the objectives of the present narrative. For instance, the caller's deliberate depiction of the aboriginal speaker's linguistic behavior as "very impolite" carries sociocultural connotations. Within Chinese-based societies, *keqi* (客氣) meaning "to be polite" or "politeness," represents a highly valued practice in all interpersonal interactions (Gao et. al. 1996). A host demonstrates *keqi* by performing acts that

[30] Some speakers in Taiwan refer to Mandarin as "the Beijing language" (*beijinghua* 北京話) rather than *guoyu* in order to linguistically and politically mark the language or dialect as from China and thus foreign to or "outside of" (*wailai* 外來) Taiwan.

makes the guest feel at home or treats her as "one of us" (*ziji de ren* 自己的人), while the guest returns *keqi* by trying not to impose on the host. The ritual of *keqi* between host-guest interactions thus generally follows a pattern of "offer-decline-offer-decline-offer-accept" (ibid).

Wu's portrayal of the aboriginal speaker's request to "speak *guoyu*" as being impolite is consistent with the conspicuous absence of the word "please" or *qing* (請) in the reported utterance. The caller establishes the aboriginal speaker as bluntly demanding that Wu use a "foreign" or "outside" (*wailai* 外來) language, namely, *guoyu*. This selective reenactment recalls the KMT's hegemonic imposition of *guoyu* on the local population in Taiwan. However, the primary characters in this interaction are incongruent with ideological associations of *guoyu* with Mainlander or *waishengren* speakers. For instance, the caller portrays one minority group speaker (the mountain aborigine) as requesting another (Mr. Wu who is a Taiwanese speaker) to use a "foreign" language.

In the latter of half of his remarks, the narrative shifts into commentary as Wu explains the moral of his story. That is, the caller advocates that speakers in Taiwan should regard *guoyu* as a facilitator instead of as a barrier to linguistic interactions. This interpretation can be gleaned from the caller's statement that, "So now—inside Taiwan…I feel that speaking *guoyu* (the national language) is like a communication tool" (lines 8-10). Mr. Wu's analogy of *guoyu* as "communication tool" (*goutong gongju* 溝通工具) represents one I have heard other speakers express in Taiwan. In my interviews with various individuals—including politicians, scholars, students, as well as call-in show producers and viewers—similar if not the same linguistic comparison was voiced on several occasions.[31]

[31] The topic of Taiwan's languages and ideologies would arise during personal interviews as I would ask why most call-in shows were broadcast in Mandarin Chinese. I also asked call-in

Commonly translated into English as "to connect," the notion of "*goutong*" proves complicated as it involves more than connecting with another individual or interlocutor. Some scholars suggest that *goutong* "articulates the nature, purpose, and characteristics of communication" as well (Gao et. al. 1996:281). From this reading, *goutong* involves the act of understanding others and being understood in return. Consequently, *goutong* also proves complementary to the notion of harmony or *he* (和). Mr. Wu's deliberate description of *guoyu* as a "communication tool" thus alters the language's ideological associations and offers *guoyu* as a vehicle for greater interpersonal understanding, including the reconciliation of Taiwan's ethno-political and linguistic differences.

Mr. Wu's final rhetorical question seeks to demonstrate that *guoyu* not only constitutes a foreign language to those who already resided on Taiwan before the KMT's arrival, but for many Mainlanders as well. This interpretation is conveyed in Wu's observation that *waishengren* (Mainlanders) also had to learn *guoyu* (national language) (line 15), which was not the mother tongue of many *waishengren*, when they arrived in Taiwan ("to this place," line 12). Consequently, Wu suggests that imposing *Taiyu* on non-Taiwanese speakers would be equivalent to requiring those speakers referenced in his use of "we," namely *Taiyu* speakers such as himself, to learn "their" *Shanghaihua* (Shanghainese) (lines 16-17),[32] with "their" referring to *waishengren*. Wu's concluding comments thus uses *guoyu* to unify all speakers in Taiwan, though in a way that differs from the KMT's original intention. That is, Wu finds common ground by presenting *guoyu* as a "foreign" language to everyone in Taiwan. From

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participants when they would choose to speak in Mandarin, Taiwanese, or another language (e.g., English and occasionally Hakka) on the programs.

[32] Shanghainese is a Chinese dialect and derives from Shanghai, a city in China. It's use here also carries derogatory ideological implications as it is associated with Mainlanders, and hence, China-based worldviews.

this perspective, Wu succeeds in portraying *benshengren*, *waishengren*, and even his aborigine interlocutor as linguistic equals.

In sum, this excerpt hinged upon the caller's effective use of constructed dialogue to forward the argument that Taiwan's ethno-political and language differences can and should be reconciled. Mr. Wu's narrative construction and use of reported speech required listeners to participate in "sense-making" by interpreting the narrative for applicability in their own lives and interpersonal interactions (Tannen 1986:324). In addition, constructed dialogue allowed Mr. Wu, a Taiwanese speaker, to advocate the use of *guoyu* through a generalizable personal experience—that is, negotiating language choice in social interactions—that most Taiwan residents are already familiar with or will eventually encounter.

Mr. Wu's use of reported speech also acts as a counter-argument to previous callers who exhibited ethno-political bias in their remarks. For instance, preceding Mr. Wu's turn, a female caller, a Ms. Hsu from Taoyuan (a city in northwestern Taiwan), suggested that "first generation Mainlander grandfathers" (*waisheng lai de diyi dai lao beibei* 外省來的第一代老伯伯)[33] should not be allowed to speak in the media due to their "problems with sorrow" (*beiqing de wenti* 悲情的問題), an oblique reference to their yearning for China.[34]

Most significantly, the caller's use of constructed dialogue affirms the observation that "[q]uoting is also a most effective way to demonstrate that knowledge has indeed been acquired" by the speaker (Sherzer 1990:125). In this case, the knowledge gained and imparted by Mr. Wu includes the recognition that past linguistic ideologies surrounding *guoyu* have no role in a contemporary, democratic and multilingual Taiwan society. By inserting this moral lesson through reported speech, the caller allows his listeners to interpret and apply his

[33] The caller's use of "*beibei*" in Mandarin for "grandfather" is an example of Taiwanese Mandarin as the word originates from the Taiwanese term for the same person "a-peh" (阿伯). I thank Dr. Boretz for bringing this to my attention.

account to their past, present and future interactions. In sum, Mr. Wu's constructed dialogue as commentary neatly reconciles Taiwan's language ideologies through a personal narrative.

CONCLUSION

Reported speech, as both direct and hypothetical utterances, contributed significantly to call-in participants' reconciliation talk performances in this chapter's four examples. Reconciliation talk as embellished by reported speech offered participants the means to theoretically contemplate and hypothetically animate the dangers and opportunities latent in the crisis topics they deliberated. By pursuing reconciliation talk through "saying rather than doing," participants found a discursive space where contradictions were negotiated and knowledge was shared through constructed dialogue.

Despite the self-congratulatory performance of harmony through staged call-in show productions, as epitomized by the episode entitled "Big Reconciliation Coffee," this chapter's examination of reconciliation talk demonstrated that hypothetical reported speech offers participants the means to consider and introduce alternative, "possible worlds" scenarios by voicing what could and should be said, and not merely what was said. Reconciliation talk and its premise of upholding harmony thus contrasts markedly from call-in show verbal sparring, otherwise known as saliva wars, a speech genre I examine in the following chapter.

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[34] To read the entire caller passage see Appendix B, Excerpt 8.

Chapter Seven: "Saliva Wars" (*koushui zhan*)—Call-in Show Verbal Sparring

> I think no person would willingly allow himself to be perceived with a saliva war (*koushui zhan*) image.
>
> Lee Liguo, guest panelist

> [The guests] are arguing. They are not performing for you to watch, they are really, really arguing.
>
> Yü Fu, *8 o'clock* moderator

George Orwell (1946) once wrote that "political speech…[is] largely the defense of the indefensible" (87). Orwell's observation applies equally well to this chapter's exploration of call-in show verbal sparring in the form of "saliva wars" (*koushui zhan* 口水戰). Call-in show saliva wars frequently occur when participants present competing arguments for sensitive sociopolitical issues and controversial events that do not readily offer straightforward answers or interpretations. When engaged in argumentative talk, participants often evoke the words of another to challenge the evidentiality (Besnier 1993; Hill and Irvine 1993) and sources (Pomerantz 1984) of the quoted utterance. However, speakers also use reported speech, generally direct and hypothetical reported speech, as claims of entitlement (Shuman 1993) to insider knowledge of confidential information and obscure events. Call-in show verbal sparring, however, also demonstrates that "knowledge" constitutes a social phenomenon that is constructed and recreated through social interaction (Du Bois 1986).

Given the rapid pace of call-in participants' saliva war confrontations, reported speech serves as an economical and efficient device for the disputants. As Holt (1996) observes, "not only does [reported speech] avoid the need for

glossing or summarizing what was said, it also conveys diverse kinds of information at once and can perform tasks in the current conversation as well as portraying a previous one" (241). Saliva war participants thus frequently use reported speech in their arguments in place of cohesive, in-depth responses to moderator questions and panelist accusations. As an added benefit, speech reporting absolves the participant from taking responsibility for the quoted utterance and its associated connotations (Sherzer 1983).

Goodwin's (1990) account of "he-said-she-said" dispute practices among African American children inspires my examination of call-in participant saliva wars, which I similarly dub as "I-said-you-said" verbal duels. I also compare call-in show saliva wars to "character contests" (Goffman 1967:239-258) given the manner participants alternately establish and question each others' values and allegiances to present and absent participants (Basso 1979). Participants' mock verbal warfare is representative of what Goffman (1974) regards as "transformations" of serious actions (41). Similarly, Clark and Gerrig (1990) regard speech reporting practices as the epitome of "nonserious" actions as reported utterances merely demonstrate what an individual said or did. Given these perspectives, I examine how call-in participants' saliva wars perform nonserious doings of "real" or serious wars (e.g., ROC-PRC cross-straits tensions) with an arsenal of linguistic weapons that includes reported speech. Call-in show saliva wars thus perpetuate Taiwan's crisis discourses by foregrounding and enacting sociopolitical tensions in the form of "incipient violence,"[1] which has the potential to exacerbate and evolve into broader confrontations in society.

In the previous chapter, I introduced the role of harmony in Chinese-based societies such as Taiwan's and demonstrated how call-in participants' performances of reconciliation talk contribute to its maintenance. However, rather

[1] I thank Dr. Avron Boretz for linking call-in participants' saliva war practices with this descriptor. Any expansion on the notion is my own, however.

than regarding participants' saliva wars as merely fomenting dis-harmony, a more accurate assessment of the role verbal sparring plays on call-in shows can be found in the following observation.

> Arguments may not shut down conversation, it may make for "the best conversations". . .And it may well be that various characterizations of who the participants are, is specifically relevant to the usability of argument as a technique for generating happy conversations (Sacks 1992:707).

The notion that arguments generate "happy conversations" serves as the overarching premise in my examination of call-in participant saliva wars. In the following excerpts, I demonstrate that saliva wars play an integral role in not only political TV call-in shows, but also in perpetuating Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses.[2] In short, participants' verbal disputes provide a valuable discursive space and opportunity for the presentation, contestation, and negotiation of Taiwan's contending sociopolitical ideologies.

"EXPERIENCE NEAR" UNDERSTANDINGS OF SALIVA WARS

Hymes (1995 (1962)) acknowledges that "[o]ne good ethnographic technique for getting at speech events[3]. . .is through words which name them" (110). Both critics and fans of political call-in shows describe its confrontational verbal format as as *koushui zhan*, which I translate as "saliva wars." I decided to translate "*koushui*" as "saliva" rather than "spitting," even though both English glosses can be used for the Mandarin Chinese term, in order to avoid competitive and negative connotations associated with "spitting." However, I regard saliva

[2] Due to the greater time allotment (approximately 6:1) to guest panelist deliberations over caller commentary, the excerpts in this chapter only focus on panelist saliva wars.

[3] I regard saliva wars as a speech event according to Hymes (1972b) understanding as a bounded social activity that participants mostly, but not exclusively, engage in through linguistic performance.

wars as having both positive and negative associations in Taiwan's call-in show and political arenas.[4]

A comparable term to saliva wars in U.S. culture would be "mudslinging" given its associations with politics, and specifically, the verbal blustering that characterizes political language (cf. Hart 2001; Jamieson 1992). However, call-in show saliva wars also recall Goodwin's (1990) observations of "argumentative talk" among African-American children in which "talk is used to build [a] local social world" (142). Like Goodwin, my examination of call-in show saliva wars attends to both the linguistic process itself as well as the linguistic competencies participants exhibit "to build the dispute as a coherent, culturally, appropriate object in the first place" (ibid:142).

Moreover, my investigation of *koushui zhan* continues the dissertation's objective to explore ways of talking that are unique to Taiwan's political TV call-in shows.[5] To situate call-in show saliva wars, I begin by turning to Taiwan's political arena. When Taiwan began experimenting with democracy in the late 1980s, lawmakers frequently engaged in verbal and even physical brawling on the legislative floor. These parliamentary confrontations provided ample "desired televisual moments" (Wood 2001:87) for Taiwan's news stations, who eagerly captured and rebroadcast them on the nightly news.

Present-day call-in show saliva wars represent subdued versions of these early "deliberative" practices that could be found in city councils across the country and even in Taiwan's highest parliamentary body, the Legislative Yuan (*lifayuan* 立法院). To some extent, the accusation-and-denial format of call-in show verbal sparring transfers the Legislative Yuan's question-and-answer

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[4] See footnote 37 in Chapter One for a more detailed discussion of suggestions for comparable English translations of "*koushui zhan*."

[5] I should add that the term "*koushui zhan*" is also used by Mandarin speakers in China. However, how this linguistic practice is similar to or differs from Taiwan requires further examination. I thank Dr. Qing Zhang for brining this to my attention.

interpellation sessions onto a more public and performative stage. This chapter's examination of call-in show *koushui zhan* considers and situates this linguistic practice within Taiwan's democratic process where expressions of dissent through attention-getting verbal behaviors continue to mature. As a result, the use of reported speech, rather than a speaker's podium, as an attack strategy represents one manifestation of Taiwan's sociopolitical democratization.[6]

The ethnographic practice of "informant labeling" (Irvine 1993) offers another means to acquire a local understanding of sociolinguistic processes. Irvine's research on insult practices through *xaxaar* performances in a Wolof village used this approach to mitigate as much as possible ethnographer-imported readings and generalized understandings of this linguistic phenomenon. She consequently recognized that invoking informant labeling "is essential if we are not simply to import our own notions of defamatory content and find them everywhere" (ibid:111).

In my interviews with call-in show participants, I frequently heard *koushui zhan* depicted as "attacking for the sake of attacking" (*wei gongji er gongji* 為攻擊而攻擊) or "opposing for the sake of opposing" (*wei fandui er fandui* 為反對而反對). Call-in participants' use of *koushui zhan* in their verbal interactions proves consistent with these understandings. For instance, a guest panelist Professor Liu Yijun (劉義鈞) uses "*koushui zhan*" to describe the unrelenting "pondering" or "deliberating" (*zhuomou* 琢磨) by his fellow panelists regarding President Chen Shui-bian's recently appointed cabinet members. The panelists' primary point of contention focuses on the cabinet appointees's

[6] My analogy albeit intended to be humorous nonetheless draws from actual incidents. In the past, legislators have been known to overturn podiums while an opposition member was speaking as a form of protest. Just recently, in December 2001, PFP legislator Diane Lee was attacked by an independent legislator (Lo Fu-chu 羅福助) in the Legislative Yuan and sustained a neck injury. Legislator Lo was later censured by the Legislative Yuan for misconduct as well as made a public apology to Leg. Diane Lee.

nationalities, and namely, whether they are "foreign" (*wailai* 外來), with the implication being that the cabinet appointees are not Taiwan citizens.[7] Professor Liu's reaction to this discursive wrangling is as follows:

> Like right now, our Taiwan has a problem. This time we have Mr. Chen Shui-bian announcing the people in his cabinet. . .In the past, these people all had U.S. citizenship. . .Today, do these people, have this kind of US imperialism. . .that is to say, do we consider them as being foreign. Because, if we thoroughly think about this…if you go investigate their children. They are most likely all American citizens. ((louder speech)) Does this count as being foreign? ((faster speech)) I believe that, if we…deliberate this too much we will feel that, this is really (just) a **saliva war**. It's not worthy of you deliberating (it).[8]

Professor Liu argues that to belabor whether Chen's cabinet members are "foreign" bogs the discussion into a verbal quagmire. Consequently, he equates his call-in show colleagues' persistent exchanges as a "saliva war," that is, "arguing for the sake of arguing." Liu emphasizes the uselessness of the debate by concluding that topic is "not worthy of deliberation."

Comparisons between the overt performance of verbal sparring and its concerted avoidance through consensus-building (e.g., reconciliation talk) also offer insightful readings into the role saliva wars play in call-in show verbal interactions. The following explanation by KMT news division head Lee Liguo (李立國), a frequent call-in show guest panelist, captures the approach-avoidance attitude participants have toward *koushui zhan* practices (Lee Liguo 2000):

> I believe that the guests who appear on call-in shows, or the moderator himself, they don't necessarily hope that they only become a **saliva war** broadcaster. Because the people who appear on call-in shows, whether he[9] is a formal party representative, a scholar, or a public servant, I think that they all need to, during the course of a call-in show, create an image for

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[7] Excerpt from TVBS *2100: All people open talk* episode that aired on April 25, 2000, entitled "President Lee: removing foreign political sovereignty. Is this reconciliation? Provocation? or ethnic relations?" (李總統：終結外來政權/ 融合？挑撥？族群)

[8] Author's emphasis in bold. For Chinese text see Appendix B, Excerpt 9.

[9] The Mandarin term "*ta*" (他) is translated as "he" and "him" through out the quote.

> society. So, therefore I think no person would willingly allow himself to be perceived with a **saliva war** image.[10]

Lee's image-conscious comments highlight the ambivalent relationship call-in show participants have with entering into saliva wars on the programs. His suggestion that participants need to create an "image for society" alludes to providing a good example to viewers.

As mentioned in the previous chapter on reconciliation talk, the concept and value of *mianzi* involves individuals presenting and claiming a positive social image for themselves through public comportment (Ting-Toomey 1988). Consquently, participating in saliva wars can potentially damage a panelist's moral face (*lian* 臉) and/or social face (*mianzi* 面子) as viewers may regard such verbal behavior as socially unacceptable, and moreover, flaunting the value of harmony (*he* 和) in social interactions. In other words, they jeopardize presenting themselves as "*buyao lian*" (不要臉), meaning "not wanting or needing (moral) face," or "*buyao mianzi*" (不要面子) or "not wanting or needing (social) face." These two expressions directly condemn an individual's lack of personal integrity and moral character, as well as a lack of consideration for preserving one's (positive) social face, respectively (Gao 1996:94).

Saliva wars thus involve a complex dance between maintaining and flouting these two Chinese sociocultural maxims. On the one hand, call-in show participants avoid engaging in *koushui zhan* as it diminishes the speaker's prestige or social face, which guest panelist Lee Liguo neatly summarizes this sentiment when he states, "no person would willingly allow himself to be perceived with a saliva war image." On the other hand, saliva wars also encourage verbal aggressiveness on the part of guest panelists, which some viewers enjoy. Consequently, some moderators may attempt to deliberately provoke a heated

[10] Author's emphasis in bold face type. Interview was conducted in Mandarin. Translation into English by author.

response from a panelist in order to instigate a similar reaction from another participant.

Although I do not directly equate call-in show *koushui zhan* with Katriel's (1986) study of *dugri* speech or "straight talk" in Israeli Sabra culture, there are some similarities that reveal the cultural significance of the two linguistic behaviors. Hebrew speakers use *dugri* speech to express sincerity, assertiveness, naturalness, and solidarity. In this sense, the linguistic practice involves "a conscious suspension of face-concerns so as to allow the free expression of the speaker's thoughts, opinions, or preferences that might post a threat to the addressee" (ibid:111).[11] Similar to a Hebrew speaker's use of *dugri* speech, call-in show *koushui zhan* suspend the Chinese cultural values of *lian* (臉) or moral face and *mianzi* (面子) or social face

Given the symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1991) in Taiwan society of preserving and upholding one's moral and social faces in interpersonal encounters, and especially in public forums, why do call-in shows encourage saliva wars, and more significantly, why do speakers continue to participate? Katriel's (1996) finding that Arab speakers, in contrast to Hebrew speakers, use *dugri* speech to convey information truthfully without undue artifice or embellishments may partially explain the importance of *koushui zhan* on call-in shows in particular and in Taiwan society in general. This reading can be verified by Yü Fu, moderator of *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*, who characterized verbal disputes as confirming the call-in show's argumentative authenticity (Yü Fu 2000):

> Some people ask me," (…) on the program you fight so fiercely. Are you still arguing during the commercial breaks?" I say, "[The guests] are

[11] In contrast, Arab speakers use *dugri* speech to demonstrate honesty and to convey information truthfully without concealments and embellishments. I elaborate upon this later in the chapter.

arguing. They are not performing for you to watch, they are really, really agitated."[12]

Are saliva wars then a means for Taiwan's public figures to escape from the social constraints that *lian* and *mianzi* generally impose, and consequently, to openly voice what they really think? In other words, are call-in show *koushui zhan* exempt from maintaining moral standards and personal restraint (*lian*) as well as excused from the need to project and claim a positive social face (*mianzi*)?

A better cultural explanation for the acceptance of saliva wars in public forums such as call-in shows, however, might be found in the narrow definition social harmony (*hemu* 和睦) carries in Chinese cultures. That is, social harmony mainly applies to and is bounded by the family structure (Chang 2001).[13] For this reason, it is more acceptable to express aggression toward out-group members, and particularly, one's opponents. However, the tendency to clearly distinguish between insiders and outsiders undermines the Confucian ideal of social harmony and differs from the reality of everyday life. Ironically, or perhaps unsurprisingly, the constraints of a deference-oriented, hierarchical society require individuals to "cultivate skillful forms of verbal play to compete and negotiate with, criticize, and even ridicule others" (ibid:159). The discourse of social harmony can thus intensify the need for alternative modes of (dis-)harmonious expression. For these reasons and others, political TV call-in shows offer Taiwan's sociopolitical elite and public the opportunity to engage in speech play that criticizes and ridicules their leaders and peers in a way that is not only publicly sanctioned, but also encouraged.

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[12] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 10.

[13] The concept of "family" within Chinese society does not only refer to kinship ties, but also close friends and colleagues who are considered as family, as evidenced with the widespread use of family address titles (e.g., "aunt," "uncle," "brother," or "sister") to individuals with whom one has a close relationship. The terms are also used to create an "intimate" impression that the addressee is considered part of the "family," namely, as a means to bridge social distance.

My subsequent analysis of call-in participants' use of reported speech while engaged in saliva wars explores how this linguistic device both absolves speakers of being responsible for their reported utterances, while also providing them the means to evaluate other speakers' words as well as negotiate self and other social and moral faces.

SEEKING EVIDENCE AND PRESENTING SOURCES IN VERBAL DISPUTES

In the first saliva war, I examine how participants use reported speech as a form of "evidentiality" (Besnier 1993), and in particular, as "the kinds of evidence a person has for making factual claims" (Anderson 1986:273, in Besnier 1993:164). Evidence as evoked through reported speech is often presented as one's "sources or bases" (Pomerantz 1984), whereby the direct or hypothetical quotation validates the individual's "entitlement claim" to the ownership of talk as well as experience (Shuman 1993:135). Expanding upon my analyses in previous chapters, I also explore how call-in show participants as verbal disputants present reported speech as evidence, while at the same time clearly establish that they bear no responsibility for the quoted utterance and its connotations (Hill and Irvine 1993).

Yet, presenting reported speech as evidence does not constitute a failsafe linguistic strategy as other panelists and even the moderator can challenge and even discount its validity. For instance, a panelist can question the character of the reporter and thus undermine the credibility of both the utterance and reporter. Moreover, speakers can judge certain forms of reported speech as being more believable than others. In extending my comparison of direct and indirect reported speech as argumentative tools, my analysis of call-in participants' saliva wars confirms the finding that in comparison to direct reported speech, summary quotes prove to be less effective and efficient as a form of persuasion.

Call-in participants' speech reporting practices during saliva wars likewise foregrounds Du Bois' (1986) observation that "knowledge" constitutes a social

phenomenon, and subsequently, derives from and is developed through social interaction. This finding proves particularly salient when verbal confrontations revolve around the issue of who is entitled to speak, and furthermore, for whom. Similar to Philips' (1993) study on how U.S. courts determine "what happened" by relying upon highly codified and specific evidentiary standards, my examination of call-in show saliva wars also explores "*how* evidence is presented, *what* evidence can be presented (content), *who* can present evidence, and how evidence can be *interpreted*" (249; original italics) in order to investigate how participants present and contest crisis interpretations of controversial sociopolitical issues and events.

The following three saliva wars feature participants using reported speech to forward and defend their entitlement claims, and inversely, criticize and even ridicule their interlocutors' counter-evidence. In the first example, I demonstrate how speech reporting can be both advantageous and detrimental to reporters in a saliva war-cum-character contest (Goffman 1967) as they engage in an "I-said-you-said" verbal dispute to alternately protect their own and disparage their opponents' moral face. In the second passage, I contrast the impact "snippets" of direct reported speech and summary quotes have as forms of evidence. In the third and final saliva war, I explore the demonstrative function of reported speech in terms of allowing call-in participants to engage in nonserious doings of serious actions.

SALIVA WARS AS CHARACTER CONTESTS AND MORAL GAMES

Goodwin's (1982, 1990) research on how children facilitate the transmission of gossip and rumor through "he-said-she-said" reporting practices informs my analysis of the following saliva war between two legislators who contest rumors surrounding the PRC authorities' reported ban of A-mei's products and future concert appearances in China. Given the absence of verifiable information regarding the A-mei ban, the two saliva war disputants resorted to

presenting evidence through the voice of another in order invoke a "coherent domain of action…that includes identities, actions, and biographies for the participants within it, as well as a relevant past that justifies the current accusation" (190). In my analysis, I focus on the credibility of the participants' allusions to past reputations, behaviors, and associations indexed in the saliva war, and particularly, the manner in which these verbally constructed histories both inform and weaken the disputants' claims and counter-arguments.

At the participant level, call-in show saliva wars can be regarded as interpersonal contests that generally involve only two speakers who present competing interpretations of an event or issue. Yet, aside from contesting the issue in question, these verbal disputes also question the disputants' characters and social relationships, including those present in and absent from the call-in show context. Goodwin (1990) claims that argumentative practices provide speakers the opportunity "to display character and realign the social organization of the moment through opposition" (142). This understanding is similar to Goffman's (1967) notion of character contests, which are "incidentally concerned with establishing evidence of strong character" (240). Character contests, moreover, only occur at the expense of other participants' characters and not one's own. However, the "field" or resource that individuals use to demonstrate and challenge another's character often draws from that person's "character expression" (ibid). In terms of call-in show saliva wars, I consider reported speech as one "field" on which participants express and establish evidence of "strong character." In other words, it is through reported speech that disputants monitor, evaluate, and criticize the morality of another speaker and his utterances.

Aside from being character contests, saliva wars also represent "a special kind of moral game" (ibid:240). Like the style of play a chess player uses, the linguistic strategies a speaker employs (e.g., reported speech) reveals much about his and other participants' "style of conduct" in the social interaction (ibid:237).

My examination of the following verbal duel demonstrates how reported speech can both abet and hinder a speaker's relationship claims and subsequent interactions. Specifically, I illustrate how speech reporting can unwittingly draw attention to "some of the gray areas" in the accuracy and authority of the presented reported utterance (Shuman 1993:136).

"This is a misunderstanding": sifting evidence from rumor in an "I-said-you-said" dispute

Taken from the third of three episodes *2100* devoted to the PRC's ban of Taiwan pop singer A-mei,[14] the saliva war features DPP legislator Yen Jinfu (顏錦福) and New Party legislator Elmer Fung (馮滬祥) as the primary disputants. The verbal dispute is inspired by a comment Leg. Fung had made prior to the actual saliva war excerpt I later analyze, in which he argues that the rumored A-mei ban stems from a "misunderstanding" (*wujie* 誤解). However, Leg. Yen refutes this assessment, which then initiates the eventual verbal sparring over what has and has not been misunderstood. Interestingly, in an impromptu press conference earlier that same day, A-mei had also described the ban as a "misunderstanding," *2100* shows an edited segment of her remarks,[15] but after the saliva war between Fung and Yen. The text of edited A-mei news conference can be found in Chapter Five.[16]

The press conference captures a casually attired A-mei with a black baseball cap over her ponytail coiffed hair as she speaks to a waiting press corps at the Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) airport.[17] The call-in show sound bite version

[14] I provide background information on this incident in Chapter Five.

[15] I was present in the video editing room when this video segment was made by a *2100* production member. The "video clip" is actually comprised for three discontinuous segments of A-mei's press interview that were spliced together to form a coherent whole for the purposes of the program. The editing process itself represents a form of "reported speech" which I discuss in Chapter Two.

[16] For the Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 2.

[17] A-mei was just returning from an overseas trip.

focuses on A-mei's explanation that the invitation to sing the ROC national anthem at President Chen's inauguration ceremony was "really very simple" (*hen danchun* 很單純). She explains that she performed the ROC national anthem in the role of a singer, thus indirectly refuting allegations that she participated in the event as a political activist. The crux of her comments come at the end of the video segment when A-mei describes the furor surrounding the PRC ban as "a little politicized" (*you yidian zhengzhihua* 有一點政治) and concludes with her attributing the entire incident to a "misunderstanding" (*wuhui* 誤會).

In moderator Lee Tao's program introduction, he situates A-mei's "misunderstanding" interpretation as an optimistic assessment of the rumored ban. However, he counterbalances this positive evaluation with the sobering suggestion that the rumors could be the "actual situation." I provide this portion of Lee Tao's comments below: [18]

> …is it possible that Mainland China will provide a so-called goodwill response to allow Taiwan's citizens to understand that this is-is an actual situation, or else that it is a misunderstanding. But until now what is it?[19]

Aside from presenting an inherent tension between rumor and fact, Lee Tao's introductory statements also establish A-mei's "misunderstanding" remarks as the focus of that nigiht's deliberations, which the program later reemphasizes by playing clips of her interview. However, it is possible the four guest panelists had already heard A-mei's "misunderstanding" utterance before appearing on the program that evening on Taiwan's 24-hour news channels throughout the day.[20]

Selected as the first speaker in that night's episode to address the PRC's intentions to ban A-mei, Leg. Fung replies that according to his understanding and

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[18] The following passages of moderator Lee Tao and guest panelist Legislator Fung Hu-Hsiang are presented in quoted form in order to provide the content, but not a detailed analysis, of their remarks.

[19] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 11.

[20] It is also possible that the guests had prepared notes prior to appearing on the show after the producers had informed them of the evening's topic by late afternoon.

investigations into the matter a misunderstanding has occurred. The NP legislator adds that Taiwan's citizenry has also been misled by the local media coverage of the rumored ban. Fung next uses a hypothetical "negated quotation" (Fónagy 1986:279)—that is, he voices what the PRC authorities have *not* said, not what they have said—to animate the voice of a PRC government department in order to lend greater credence to his misunderstanding interpretation. The relevant segment of Fung's aforementioned remarks is as follows:[21]

> Ah, according to my understanding and investigations these past two days, ah, it is obvious that there is a misunderstanding here. So then there is also a misunderstanding on the Mainland. Ah, A-mei—So what we have here—Taiwan's readers and viewers ah, from the media coverage, also have partly misunderstood. Because a counterpart department on the Mainland, they actually haven't said, ah, "Because A-mei sang the Republic of China national anthem, therefore, we will ban her songs, we will ban her commercials." Rather it is their overall impression that has misconstrued A-mei as supporting Taiwan independence, as supporting Chen Shui-bian, as praising him. So then, we of course must clarify this misunderstanding in order to get to the truth.[22]

In the saliva war passage between legislators Fung and Yen that follows, Fung's representation of the PRC through hypothetical reported speech becomes a point of contention when DPP legislator Yen Ching-fu recalls and questions the utterance. Specifically, Leg. Yen challenges Fung's declaration that Taiwan's readers and viewers are partly to blame for the so-called "misunderstanding." The resulting saliva war evolves into an accusation and denial sequence between the two legislators and is filled with direct and indirect references to Leg. Fung's remarks as presented above.

My analysis concentrates on how Leg. Yen discounts the NP legislator's entitlement claims of insider PRC knowledge by recalling a "snippet" (Clark and Gerrig 1990) of Fung's original utterance. I approach my analysis of this saliva

[21] I underline the negated preface to the hypothetical quotation for easier identification.
[22] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 12.

war as a character contest that involves the two legislators in a vituperative "I-said-you-said" exchange as each disputant alternately defends their own and challenges the other's allegiance to Taiwan. The saliva war ends when moderator Lee Tao interrupts to announce a commercial break. The dyadic verbal confrontation spans 23 turns of talk (12 turns for Yen, and 11 turns for Feng). I present most of the exchange below.

Transc.7.1: "Now you have misunderstood"

1	Yen	不過 我不讚同	However I don't agree with this
2		這個馮滬祥 先生他--	Mr. Fung Hu-hsiang his—
3		一直的解釋說，	persistent explanation that,
4		這個是誤解。	this is a misunderstanding.
5		(…)	(…)[23]
6		我覺得這坐在	I feel that sitting here
7		旁邊的是不是國-	at my side is this a Kuo-[24]
8		中共的哈，代言人哈。	Communist China ah, spokesperson ah.
	Feng	{speaking quickly}	{speaking quickly}
9		這個：扣帽子	This is: an act of labeling. (You are labeling me.)
10	Yen	[不是，不是-]	[No, no-] [25]
	Feng	{spoken quickly}	{spoken quickly}
11		[就不**夠**理性。]	[This is unreasonable.]
12	Yen	[不是，我不]	[no, I'm not]
13		口帽子。	labeling (you).
	Feng	{speaking quickly and loudly}	{speaking quickly and loudly}
14		[我講得是事實的啊。]	[I've been telling the truth.]
15	Yen	[因為你解釋，]	[Because your explanation ,]
16		如果今天是一個事實，	if this is true today,
17		沒錯，	correct,
18		應該這幾天	(then) these past few days
19		中共當局	Communist China's authorities

[23] Skipped text.

[24] It appears that the partial word "Kuo" represents the first character for "Kuomintang" or the Nationalist Party. See text for a more detailed analysis.

[25] Indicates overlapping speech with the following two lines of Yen's utterance (lines 6-7).

20		要馬上跟	should have immediately
21		我們這裡回應嘛 …	responded to us on this...
	Fung	{speaking quickly}	{speaking quickly}
22		［它已經否認了］	[It has already denied (it)]
23	Yen	［它沒有，eh，它沒有。。］	[It didn't, eh, it didn't..]
24	Fung	［。。國臺辦	[..the Taiwan Affairs Office and the
25		海協會	Association for Relations Across
26		都否認了。］	the Taiwan Straits both denied it.]
27	Yen	［它如果否認了時候，]	[But if and when it had denied it,]
28		那應該說	then they should have said
29		你剛才講的，	what you just said,
30		阿妹那項在可口可樂	"A-mei's Coca-Cola
31		的宣傳，	advertisement"—
32		那它也，	so it also,
33		真的把它禁止了嘛。	really did ban it.
34	Fung	［你--	[You--]
35	Yen	［對，］	[Right,]
36	Fung	所以唱片沒有禁止 阿］	so no records[26] were banned
37	Yen	對，那麼就是說	right, then that is to say it
38		有一陣禁止，	was banned for a period of time,
39		那麼如果說	then if let's say
40		它每一樣都沒有禁止，	that it didn't ban every item,
41		那麼我們今天在這裡	then today if it is
42		是我們是誤解嘛。	we who have misunderstood.
43		那這個不能是誤解。	So this cannot be a misunderstanding.
44		那事實上已經做了嘛。	So in actuality it has already been done.
45		［那麼做了後，後來- ］	[So after doing it, afterwards—]
	Fung	{speaking quickly }	{speaking quickly}
46		［(xx) 做了，我們要	[(xx)[27] was doing, we need to
47		看他們的政策。］	look at their policy.]
48		是不是它的	Did the order (command) come
49		［命令.］	[from them (it).]
50	Yen	［所以］	[Therefore]
51		你不必要,	you don't need to,
52		你應該--要是這個非常	you should--if this is deliberated very
53		公正理性 的來講，	fairly and reasonably,

[26] Refers to compact discs.

[27] Unintelligible speech.

54		而你不能自己說，啊,	then you yourself cannot say, ah,
55		在那邊 講了那麼多，	having already said so much over there,
56		［因為，**全台-]**	[because, all of Tai-]
	Fung	{speaking quickly}	{speaking quickly}
57		［我沒有替他們講話。］	[I do not speak for them.]
58		我也講說這是 錯的。	I have also said that this is wrong.
	Yen	{louder speech}	{louder speech}
59		［你，你現在， 你現在,	[You, now you, now you,
60		你現在=］	now you=[28]]
	Fung	{speaking quickly, louder}	{speaking quickly with louder speech}
61		［請你用理性。］	[Please (you) use reason.]
62		［不要扣帽子。］	[Don't label (me).]
63	Yen	［=說他們誤解啊。］	[=say that they have misunderstood..]
64		我們，阿，那你–	We, ah, then you—
65		我們整個台灣人就是	are all of us *Taiwanren*
66		通通那麼沒有智慧嗎？	without any intelligence whatsoever?
67		通通把人家	Have (we) completely[29]
68		誤解了嗎？	misunderstood them?
69		那我們也是經過–	So we have also gone through—
70		各方面，阿，得來真正	all kinds of, ah, received true
71		的消息嘛，那麼，	and accurate information, so,
72		我們台灣人	Us *Taiwanren*
73		現在的憤慨，	(our) current anger ,
74		我們的憤怒，是不是	our current indignation, is it also
75		也是 我們沒有理性，	because we are not being reasonable,
76		我們一直在誤解，	that we have continuously misunderstood,
77		你不能用這樣的話來說。	you can't say these kinds of things.
78		(xxxx)	(xxxx)[30]
79		我們通通誤解掉了。	(that) we have completely misunderstood.
	Fung	{speaking rapidly}	{speaking rapidly}
80		我想您扣帽子	I think that your act of labeling,[31]
82		［就是誤解。］	[is a misunderstanding.]
83	Yen	［沒有，**沒有，]**	[No, no,]

[28] The "=" refers to continuous, unbroken (unpaused) speech.
[29] The Chinese term "*renjia*" (人家) can also be translated as "others" but in this context "them" provided a more colloquial reading in English.
[30] Unintelligible speech.
[31] Fung uses the plural or formal (polite) form of "you" (您) here.

84		**我們沒有**扣帽子。	we haven't been labeling (you).
85		因為你-因為你講,	Because you-because you have spoken,
86		［解釋的太清楚了。］	[explained (everything) so clearly.]
	LT	{speaking loudly}	{speaking loudly}
87		［我們稍後再進行。	[We will continue in a moment.
88		謝謝。］	Thank you.]

The saliva war begins with Leg. Yen directly stating that he doesn't agree with Leg. Fung's assessment that the PRC ban of A-mei is a misunderstanding (lines 1-4). In revoicing Fung's "misunderstanding" utterance (see previous quoted passage), the DPP legislator revoices and editorializes a snippet of Fung's statement. Holt (1999) claims that reported speech is "bivalent" and "can be used to fulfill a range of tasks in the current conversation" (ibid:527). In this example, Fung's "misunderstanding" utterance carries not just bivalent, but multivalent meanings. Aside from indexing A-mei's earlier "misunderstanding" utterance, the two legislators' separate reportings of the pop star's original utterance throughout the verbal dispute function as the following: (1) an entitlement claim by the NP legislator that he has insider knowledge regarding the A-mei ban; (2) counter-evidence as used by Leg. Yen to demonstrate that Fung has suspiciously close relations with PRC authorities; and (3) a trope for Yen's and Fung's "I-said-you-said" dispute that revolves around who has misunderstood, and inversely, has been misunderstood by, whom.

Following Leg. Yen's voiced disagreement to Fung's analysis of the A-mei/PRC situation, Yen proceeds to disparage Fung by rhetorically asking whether he is seated next to a spokesperson for the Communist Chinese government (lines 6-8).[32] Leg. Yen's open questioning of Leg. Fung's loyalty to Taiwan causes the New Party legislator to immediately protest Yen's "act of

[32] It should be noted that DPP legislator Yen began to refer to the New Party Legislator as a "Kuomintang" (Nationalist Party) spokesperson (line 7), but quickly amended his speech to "Communist China." Leg. Fung was originally a KMT party member, but left the party along with several other KMT defectors to found the New Party in 1994.

labeling" (*kou maozi* 扣帽子) (line 9). Leg. Fung then declares that Yen's accusation is "unreasonable" (line 11) and emphasizes that he has been telling the truth (line 14). In response to these counterarguments, Leg. Yen denies that he is labeling the New Party legislator (lines 10, 12-13).

Figure 13: DPP Legislator Yen Jinfu and New Party Legislator Elmer Fung (Fung Hu-hsiang) engage in an "I-said-you-said" saliva war while addressing whether the PRC's ban of Taiwan pop star A-mei is a "misunderstanding."

Although I have translated Leg. Fung's counter-accusation as, "This is labeling" or "You are labeling me" (line 9),[33] a direct translation of this phrase would be "to put a hat on (someone)" (*kou maozi* 扣帽子). Interestingly, this descriptive turn of phrase captures the tenor of the two disputants' "misunderstanding" saliva war. As I later illustrate, the more stringently Leg. Yen attempts to discredit Leg. Fung's labeling of the PRC ban of A-mei as a "misunderstanding," the more adamant Fung becomes in his repeated accusations that Yen is labeling him in return. Thus, the "act of labeling" or "putting on of

[33] A more colloquial translation might be, "You're labeling me." However, as the Chinese phrase Leg. Fung uses does not have an overt subject (e.g. 'you') and object (e.g. 'me'), I decided to represent the phrase in the passive voice.

hats" is and reciprocated by both parties and represents the crux of the "I-said-you-said" saliva war.

In returning to the topic of the disagreement, the A-mei ban, it is important to recall that the ban was based primarily on hearsay given that Taiwan's mass media and government had little information on which to base the rumored act. Philips (1993) describes "hearsay" as "anything said by another that the witness heard said" (254). Hence, with the PRC authorities offering neither verification nor denial of the rumored ban,[34] Leg. Yen challenges Leg. Fung to provide concrete evidence for his interpretation that the alleged ban is a "misunderstanding." Goodwin (1982) notes that in rumors, "the principal character in the story is a party who is not present" (804). Given that the principal figure in this narrative is the PRC authorities, it is interesting to note that Leg. Yen strategically establishes Leg. Fung as a "proxy" voice for Communist China (lines 6-8).

Once Yen has named the New Party legislator as the PRC's spokesperson, the onus now lies with Fung to present the requisite evidence to confirm or refute the alleged ban. Thus the NP legislator attempts to do so by declaring that the PRC has already denied the ban (line 22). When Yen refuses to accept Fung's claim (line 23), Fung quickly lists two PRC agencies—the Taiwan Affairs Office (國臺辦) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) (海協會)[35]—as the principle sources for his informed assertion (lines 24-26).

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[34] Some would argue that the PRC government and media are one and the same.

[35] Given the lack of formal and official interactions between the ROC and PRC, what limited contact the two entities do have occur through "non official" agencies or organizations. ARATS represents the PRC government agency that interacts with the ROC's non-profit organization, the Taiwan Straits Foundation (TSF). Wang Daohan (汪道涵） is the chair of ARATS while Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫）is the chair of TSF. The last time the two men met was in China in the fall of 1994. The ROC government has extended several invitations to Wang to visit Taiwan, but each proposal has been postponed for one reason or another.

However, in so doing, Leg. Fung confirms Yen's earlier accusation that the New Party legislator represents the PRC's spokesperson.

Yet, Leg. Fung's tactic also allows him to defend his "misunderstanding" interpretation as well as to convince Leg. Yen (and other listeners) that his information regarding the A-mei ban is accurate and legitimate (Pomerantz 1984). As the sources Fung name are recognizable and authoritative PRC government divisions, Yen does not question Fung's claim. Rather, Yen undermines Fung's credibility through a different tactic by strategically recalling a "snippet" (Clark and Gerrig 1990) or "sketchy reenactment" (Haberland 1986) of Fung's earlier hypothetical utterance, which I introduced before the saliva war excerpt. Yen thus recalls the hypothetical utterance ("'A-mei's Coca-Cola advertisement", lines 30-31) to argue that if Fung's "misunderstanding" interpretation is correct then the PRC authorities "should have said what you just said" (lines 27-29).

By strategically reappropriating Fung's hypothetical voicing of the PRC, Yen exposes the "gray areas" (Shuman 1993:136) in the NP legislator's portrayal of and authority to speak for the PRC. In fact, Leg. Yen elaborates upon his early suspicion that Fung is a spokesperson for Communist China (lines 6-8) by evaluating Leg. Fung as an unreliable source whose version of the events surrounding the alleged A-mei ban is questionable. Combined with Fung's earlier introduction of a hypothetical negated quotation—recall that he depicted what the PRC did *not* say, not what they did say—the New Party legislator's entitlement claim appears even more dubious such that it now reads as a "guess or inference" (Pomerantz 1984:624).

Leg. Fung attempts to regain this loss of social face or *mianzi* (面子) to his personal character and political credibility by providing the DPP legislator with supplementary evidence that a "misunderstanding" has indeed occurred, namely, that A-mei's records (i.e., compact discs) have not been banned in China (line 30). Although Yen concedes that perhaps not all of A-mei's records were banned,

he continues to undermine Fung's credibility by presenting an even more reliable source, namely, the people of Taiwan (line 42). Leg. Yen emphasizes the citizenry's credibility, and thus accurate interpretation of the ban, by stating it is impossible that "we (the people of Taiwan)…have misunderstood" (line 42) and therefore the ban "could not have been a misunderstanding" (line 44). Here, the DPP legislator's direct comparison of Fung and the people of Taiwan overtly evaluates each source as either "good or bad," an evaluation that subsequently "bears on whether the version in question is believed or not" (Pomerantz 1984:624). In short, by alluding that Fung's negated quotation is at best "hearsay" (Philips 1993), and hypothetical at best, Yen strategically establishes Fung to be a "bad" source and "we" the Taiwan citizenry as a "good" source and thus believable.

In the second half of the passage, the saliva war intensifies considerably when Fung takes personal affront to Yen's oblique disparagement of another aspect of his character, in this case, his "moral face" or *lian* (臉). Specifically, the DPP legislator criticizes Fung by declaring that the A-mei ban needs to be "deliberated very fairly and reasonably" (lines 53). Leg. Yen's statement disparages Fung's moral face by blatantly suggesting that the NP legislator has no political mores given his loyalty to the PRC. The DPP legislator supports his accusation of Fung's suspect intimacy or "closeness" (*qin* 親) with the PRC by drawing attention to Fung's linguistic behavior, in this case, his conversations with PRC authorities "over there" (*nebian* 那邊) (line 55).

At this point, it is necessary to recall that Taiwan's political continuum (from right to left) ranges from China reunification to Taiwan independence ideologies. In this environment, New Party is regarded as the political party that advocates reunification the most, and therefore, is considered to be "close to Mainland China" (*qin dalu* 親大陸). Furthermore, pro-Taiwan independence

advocates, such as the DPP, frequently warn Taiwan's populace that the New Party will "sell out Taiwan" (*chumai Taiwan* 出賣台灣) to the PRC in pursuit of unifying the two "Chinas." In contrast, the Democratic Progressive Party occupies the opposite end of this ideological spectrum with its party constitution listing Taiwan independence as one of its platforms.[36]

Thus Leg. Yen introduces the NP legislator's "relevant past," including Fung's frequent trips to the PRC and his pro-unification political stance, provides further verification of his disparagement of Leg. Fung's political agenda given the current cross-straits "crisis" and dispute (Goodwin 1990:190). Fung, however, contests Yen's defamation of both his personal character and political image by declaring, "I am not speaking for them [the PRC authorities]. I have also said this [the A-mei ban] is wrong" (lines 57-58). The NP legislator's sudden admission that the PRC's recent actions are wrong seeks to both regain his moral face (*lian*) and improve his social face (*mianzi*) by realigning his assessment of the A-mei ban with the majority of Taiwan's citizenry, and more importantly, to demonstrate that he allies himself with Taiwan. In her study of children's verbal disputes, Goodwin (1990) explains that when charged with an offense, defendants often "attempt to restore the expressive order by reframing the event being challenged" (207). Here, Leg. Fung attempts to do so by reframing Leg. Yen's interpretations of his political behavior and personal values.

The saliva war's sudden change in direction from debating the PRC's A-mei ban to Legislator Fung's political bias towards the PRC represents a "metacommunicative shift in discourse" that indexes a move "from the topic of conversation to conversation as a topic" (Shuman 1993:155). By shifting the verbal dispute's focus, Yen effectively undermines both Fung's credibility as a

[36] As previously stated in Chapter Three, since becoming the ruling party, the DPP under President Chen Shui-bian has moderated its pro-independence stance in order to maintain stability in cross-straits relations as well as in Taiwan's domestic sphere. Consequently, the Taiwan

politician concerned with Taiwan's welfare and casts aspersions on his entitlement claims to insider PRC knowledge of the A-mei ban. In her observations of fight stories among female high school students, Shuman notes that one's proximity to an event relies more on "entitlement rather than accuracy" (ibid). Although Yen doesn't challenge the accuracy of Fung's alleged information, he does question the NP legislator's acquisition of it. In this case, the NP legislator's knowledge claims as presented through a hypothetical and negated quotation (e.g., "they did *not* say") serves as a liability rather than an asset in this saliva war.

Leg. Fung's defensive "I have also said" rebuttal (line 57) initiates a modified version of a "he-said-she-said" verbal dispute (Goodwin 1982, 1990), or what this study considers to be an "I-said-you-said" saliva war. In response, Leg. Yen provides the second pair part (Sacks et al. 1974), that is, the "you said" component, to this dispute sequence by referring back (lines 59-60) to what the New Party legislator said earlier in the discussion. In turn, Fung reciprocates with another accusation by protesting, "(You) please use reason" (line 61).

However, Yen responds to Fung's call for "reason" (*lixing* 理性) as an offense to the moral face (*lian* 聯) of "all of us *Taiwanren*" (line 65).[37] Furthermore, in interpreting Fung's call for "reason" as a criticism of "us *Taiwanren*'s" lack of "intelligence" (line 66), Legislator Yen privileges the emotional "anger" and "indignation" (lines 73-74) that "us *Taiwanren*" feel toward the PRC as a result of the A-mei ban, and subsequently, establishes it as being more authentic than any "reasoning" Fung could offer.

Solidarity Union (TSU), which was established after the 2000 presidential election, now represents the most vocal advocate for Taiwan independence.

[37] It is noteworthy that Yen uses "*Taiwanren*" (台灣人) rather than the more exclusionary *benshengren* (本省人) here, which suggests that Yen is making an attempt to include both *benshengren* and *waishengren* through a collective "all of us" identifier.

The saliva war returns to the earlier "I-said-you-said" format when Fung states that Yen's act of labeling is itself a misunderstanding (lines 80-82). However, Leg. Yen manages to have the "last word" before the commercial break, by again denying that he or anyone else (e.g., "we") is labeling the New Party legislator (line 84). Moreover, Yen summarizes his argument through another reference to Fung's remarks by claiming that Fung has explained his position so well that he has established his own complicity with the PRC authorities irrespective of Yen's accusations (lines 85-86).

Recalling Rymes' (1996) observation that naming constitutes a social practice that has "multiple generations of meanings," this saliva war over who is labeling whom, and specifically, who is misunderstanding of has been misunderstood by whom, illustrates the degree to which an act of labeling or the "putting on of hats" is actively resisted and contested by the accused and the alleged accusers. The multiple generations of labeling that arises in this saliva war includes *present* parties, namely, legislators Yen and Fung, as well as *absent* entities such as the PRC and A-mei. Subsequently, while this verbal dispute confirms the observation that labeling represents a "socially significant and contested practice" (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1995), however, this analysis finds that acts of labeling are "endowed" (ibid) with as much, if not more, meaning in rumored situations and with alleged perpetrators as they are in "real" events and with "real" persons.

In summary, this saliva war between legislators Yen and Fung corroborates Shuman's (1993) observation that "he-said-she-said" routines do not necessarily lead to diplomacy, but rather are incorporated into a fight sequence (155-56). In the present "I-said-you-said" saliva war, the two disputants abandoned "rational" language and "reasonable" methods in favor of denigrating each other's characters (e.g., moral face (*lian* 臉) and social face (*mianzi* 面子)) and refuting each other's entitlement claims and evidentiality. These labeling and

counter-labeling practices thus contributed to heightening rather than redressing the crisis topic, namely, the A-mei ban. Moreover, given that the ban was based largely on rumor and gossip where evidence and entitlement claims were highly negotiable, the legislators' calculated use of hypothetical negated quotations and "snippets" of direct reported speech respectively, illustrates the interactive and collaborative construction of social knowledge.

My examination of this saliva war sequence demonstrates that reported speech can both reveal and conceal information. In other words, speech reporting is vulnerable to "leakage" such that interlocutors can "'see through" the framing of a reported incident (Hill and Irvine 1993:13). In this exchange, Leg. Yen is able to "thin out" Leg. Fung's hypothetical negated quotation and "distribute" his alternative interpretation to successfully refute Fung's evidentiality claims and interpretations (ibid:13). In sum, this d dispute highlights that "firsthand experience" and knowledge is not an observable "fact" but rather a negotiated, socialized phenomenon (Shuman 1993:150).

A SALIVA WAR BETWEEN "SNIPPET" AND SUMMARY QUOTES

In the second saliva war excerpt, I analyze a dispute between three guest speakers in an *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* episode entitled, "Should Vice President Lu be recalled?" As introduced in Chapter Five, the program topic addresses Vice President Annette Lu's linguistic behavior, and in particular, her use of the terms "black face" (bad cop) and "white face" (good cop) in reference to herself and President Chen Shui-bian, respectively.

The following verbal dispute illustrates that in the rapid dialogue of saliva wars, the use of brief reported speech allow disputants to efficiently recall an individual, event, or context. The saliva war also demonstrates how even "snippets" of reported speech can enhance solidarity between call-in participants and viewers. In this case, a participant's careful selection of key portions of an utterance assumes and emphasizes a shared perspective with listeners (Clark and

Gerrig 1990:793) as well as engages them in collaborative "sense-making" of the original utterance (Tannen 1989). Inversely, the following verbal dispute also demonstrates how the use of indirect reported speech or "summary quotes" (Buttny and Williams 2000) dilutes a message's content, and moreover, the speaker's credibility. As a result, use of summary quotes leaves the speaker vulnerable to disbelief and ridicule, and thus, undermining the proffered evidence.

This saliva war likewise investigates the notion of harmony in Chinese-based cultures, and specifically, the manner in which speakers resort to creative forms of speech play when criticizing and even ridiculing others (Chang 2001). In the excerpt, KMT legislator Chen Shei-saint (陳學聖) and PFP legislator Chou Hsi-wei (周錫瑋) use snippets of reported speech to not only criticize the topic's principle figure, VP Lu, but also ridicule both the vice president and another panelist, Ms. Peng Yen-wen (彭弇雯), presented earlier in Chapter Five. Through repetition and speech reporting, the two legislators succeed in discrediting Ms Peng's suggestion that VP Lu is a victim of mass media and political machinations. However, the legislators' argumentative success also derives in part from Ms. Peng's vaguely framed claims, which she presents through indirect reported speech.[38]

"What do you mean, smearing?": revoicing and ridiculing summary evidence

The following saliva war begins with KMT legislator Chen Shei-saint questioning who Vice President Lu's *heilian/bailian* analogy references and evaluates her choice of words as being inappropriate given her elected position. In comparison, Ms. Peng has difficulty convincing her fellow participants that

[38] See Chapter Five for a more detailed analysis of Ms. Peng's frequent use of indirect rather than direct reported speech in her arguments. For examples, see Appendix B, Excerpts 4 and 5.

Taiwan's mass media has maligned or *mohei* (抹黑),[39] meaning to "smear black," Lu's image. Following this declaration, both legislators Chen and Chou laughingly echo Peng's "*mohei*" utterance. In turn, moderator Yu Fu asks Peng to clarify her statement. Peng, however, fails to provide concrete evidence to support her claim, which causes the legislators to ridicule Peng's unsubstantiated suggestion. Once again, Peng is stymied from convincing her interlocutors of her argument, which I attribute to her reliance on summary quotes rather than direct reported speech as a form of evidentiality.

Transc. 7.2: "I'm not smearing her"

1	Chen	我-我要請教	I—I want to ask
2		彭秘書長	general manager Peng
3		一件事情。	one thing.
4		那-那，黑臉	So-so, black face
5		這個三個字 (.)	these three words.[40] (.)
6		是什麼意思，	What does it mean,
7		你會告訴我們？	can you tell us?
8		如果這是一個玩笑，	If this is a joke,
9		那想傳出去，	that will be disseminated,
10		這是什麼樣？	what kind of thing is this?
11		[那誰扮白臉？	[So who plays the white face?
12	Peng	[我覺得這裡特別	[(I feel that) here there are
13		有很多(詮釋)。	a lot of (interpretations).
14	Chen	對。那你可不可以	Right. So can you
15		告訴我們。	tell us (what they are).
16	Peng	[對。譬如說--	[Right. For example--
17	Chen	[她-她--指是誰	[She-she- who does she refer
18		在扮--	to that's playing--
19	Peng	[譬如說女人，	[for example women,
20	Chen	[白臉？	[the white face?
21	Peng	她-這些--	she- these things—
22		我們大家都在—	we are all—

[39] Ms. Peng's choice of words is ironic, given that the panelists are currently deliberating whether VP Lu has smeared President Chen with a "white face" label.
[40] Leg. Chen misspoke here. See analysis below.

23		我們大家都在抹黑她，	we're all smearing her,
24		我們都在強迫她—	we're all forcing her—
25	Chou	[抹黑她 {laughingly}	[Smearing her. {laughingly}
26	Peng	[扮這些—	[to play these—
27	Chou	[抹黑她 {laughingly}	[Smearing her. {laughingly}
28	Chen	我不是抹黑她。	I'm not smearing her.
29		{laughter}	{laughter}
30	Peng	{loudly} 所有的人—	{loudly} All people—
31		我覺得，不管是	I feel, whether it
32		[媒體=	[is the media =
33	YF	[這麼說，抹黑呢？	[What do you mean, smearing?
34	Peng	=或者是男性	= or whether it is male
35		政治人物=	politicians=
36	YF	是。	Right.
37	Peng	=基本上，都，是一種，	= basically, all, are kind of,
38		有一點(xxxx)，	have a little (xxxx),[41]
39		嘲諷的態度	sarcastic type of attitude
40	Chou	我沒有。	I don't.
41	Peng	對待	towards
42		[他的，	[her,
43	Chou	[我-我-完全不能同意	[I-I- completely disagree
44		(這樣子。)	(with this) .
45	Peng	她的發言。	her words.
46	Chen	{laughs}	{laughs}

The KMT legislator begins his comments by immediately recontextualizing VP Lu's black face/white face utterance a manner that alters its situated use (e.g., within the context of the women's conference) and "immediate interactional goal" (Tannen 1989:105). In his study of language and persuasion, Sornig (1989) states that "it is not the verifiable truth of a message which is relevant and likely to impress an audience…[but rather] it is the *way* things are said (or done), irrespective of the amount of genuine information carried by an utterance" (95; original italics). Hence, by questioning whether Lu's

[41] The insertion of (xxx) represents unintelligible speech.

helian/bailian utterance as a joke (lines 8-10), Leg. Chen succeeds in negatively framing both the utterance and speaker.

Figure 14: Ms. Peng Yen-wen and KMT Legislator Chen Shei-saint engage in a saliva war regading VP Annette Lu's controversial "black face/white face" utterance. The text on the screen below their images show the results of a phone-in poll asking, "Scholars recommend recalling the vice president, do you?" Most callers agree with the recall vote.

In decontextualizing VP Lu's remarks through selective depiction, the KMT legislator does not produce a passive act of "reporting" per se, but rather "an active one of creating an entirely new and different speech act, using the 'reported' one as source material" (Clark and Gerrig 1990:108). In this case, the KMT legislator recreates Lu's "black face/white face" utterance as a joke and demands to know who plays the "white face" in her analogy (lines 8-11). Leg. Chen's inaccurate reference to "black face" or *heilian* (黑臉) as "these three words" (lines 4-7), rather than two, provides further evidence of how his revoicing of this "snippet" of Lu's original utterance represents a recreation.[42]

[42] The three words Leg. Chen refers to could be "*ban heilian*" (扮黑臉), which means "to play the black face" or "to play the bad cop."

In attempting to respond to Leg. Chen's question, Ms. Peng finds her words overlapping with those of the KMT legislator, and specifically, his double repetition of the question "who plays the white face?" (lines 11, 17, 20). Although she initially attempts to present her interpretation from a female perspective (line 19), Peng abruptly changes tactics mid-sentence to declare that "we're all smearing her, we're all forcing her" (lines 22-24). Before she has time to expand upon her interpretation, Peng's comment is interrupted by PFP Legislator Chou Hsi-wei's incredulous laughter and repetitions of Peng's "smearing her" remark (lines 25, 27), which is closely followed by Leg. Chen's equally skeptical laughter and outright denial that he isn't besmirching VP Lu (line 28).

Tannen (1989) reports that the use of repetition reveals a speaker's attitude towards an utterance and the ongoing discourse. In this instance, Leg. Chou and Leg. Chen's repetition of Peng's "parts of prior talk" appear "not as mindless mimics," but rather as creations of new and even reverse meanings (ibid:96). Leg. Chou's mocking echoes of "smearing her," which he voices not once but twice, reframes the utterance such that it departs from Peng's original use and serious presentation. In this sense, Leg. Chou's facetitous revoicings represent ironic distortions or "twisted quotations" (Fónagy 1986: 281-2). The PFP legislator's parody of Peng's "smearing her" remark also condenses and exaggerates the utterance's surface form, as well as completely alters and even reverses its contextual meaning. In effect, Chou's reported speech "parodying" ridicules rather than merits Peng's statement (ibid). Similarly, Leg. Chen's denial of smearing ("I'm not smearing her," line 28) further undercuts Peng's *mohei* uttearance and its accusatory clout.

Moreover, Legislators Chen and Chou's repetitious revoicing of "smearing" three times in rapid succession reshapes Peng's remark to "set up a paradigm" for a new application (Tannen 1989:48). In fact, by the time moderator Yu Fu seeks clarification from Peng for her pronouncement (line 33), his query

inadvertently validates the two legislators' alternative *mohei* paradigm as a dubious and ungrounded declaration as well as introduces another one in the form of a query. Although the three speakers individually and separately reiterate Peng's *mohei* utterance, their revoicings collectively rob Peng of her argument and even her original use of the word.

Following these unfavorable reactions, Ms. Peng attempts to clarify her remarks (lines 30-32) by claiming that the media (line 32) and male politicians (lines 34-5) have a "sarcastic type of attitude" (lines 34-35) toward Vice President Lu. Her vague depiction, however, undermines her credibility. Here, the absence of direct reported speech to evidentiate her argument through demonstrations (Clark and Gerrig 1990), vividness (Tannen 1989), or sources and bases (Pomerantz 1984) weakens Peng's argument. Moreover, Peng leaves herself vulnerable to criticism by not displacing responsibility for her assessment through a direct quotation (Shuman 1993). As a result, her co-participants exhibit disbelief, express denial, seek clarification, and display mockery to her assertion. Pomerantz (1984) observes that providing sources for one's claims represents an attempt to defend one's perspective as well as to convince others that one's view is correct. Thus for Peng to omit such information, she unwittingly presents her *mohei* declaration as unsubstantiated, and moreover, herself as having no credibility.

I also consider Peng's reliance on summary quotes as an argumentative style as being representative of "powerless" language use. This reading contrasts with Buttny's (1997) observation that the use of direct reported speech to contest, challenge, or criticize problematic events reflects the speaker's "sense of powerlessness" for being unable to affect change or improve her immediate environmental conditions (e.g., race relations) (502). However, my evaluation of Peng's speech reporting practices supports Álvarez-Cáccamo's (1996) finding that users of direct quotations achieve "conversational power" through "the

dialectic relationship between reporter and audience in the negotiation of the definition of the reported speech" (56). In this saliva war, Legislators Chen and Chou wield more conversational power than Peng by successfully revoicing and reframing her *mohei* utterance through twisted quotations. My analysis also draws from Lakoff's (1982) understanding that power derives from the speaker who can "motivate the discourse in a certain direction, [as well as] begin or terminate it explicitly" (32). In short, this verbal dispute demonstrates that even "snippets" of direct reported speech have greater influence in maneuvering the course of call-in show saliva wars—including their initiation, direction, and termination—than indirect reported speech.

Lastly, this saliva war passage illustrates how call-in participants use reported speech to openly criticize and ridicule other speakers while still upholding the social more of maintaining interactional harmony (Chang 2001). I interpret the call-in participants' momentary display of disharmony as consistent with distinctions between in-group versus out-group behavior. To elaborate, Ms. Peng's accusation that male legislators and the media had denigrated VP Lu created a division between herself and her co-participants along two lines. Most obviously, the remark distinguished and distanced Ms. Peng from her co-participants in terms of gender. Second, as a representative from a non-profit organization, Peng was also marked as the sole non-politician/legislator on the panel. Thus by launching the "*mohei*" accusation, Peng established a "me/you" dichotomy between herself and her male co-participants.

Moreover, by violating the social and moral faces of her colleagues first, Peng's targets retaliated in kind by mocking her accusations and causing her to lose social face on the program. Interestingly, her male co-panelsits used Peng's own words in the form of twisted quotations to reverse her finger pointing back onto herself. Finally, by not couching her remarks within the guise of direct

reported speech, Peng alone was accountable for her remarks and thus left herself vulnerable to rebuke from the other participants.

SALIVA WARS AS NONSERIOUS DOINGS OF SERIOUS ACTIONS

In the third and final example, I demonstrate how call-in show saliva wars constitute "play" or "nonserious doings" in the sense that the verbal dueling is regarded as "not literally or really or actually occurring" (Goffman 1967:47). Linking nonserious actions to reported speech, Clark and Gerrig (1990) propose that speech reporting constitutes a demonstration of what a person did in saying something.[43] Moreover, reported speech can "denote events, states, processes, or objects, and allow for both generic and specific referents" (Clark and Gerrig 1990:770). From these perspectives, I regard participants' saliva wars speech reporting practices as being nonserious given that both the linguistic device and the speech event they participate in playfully demonstrate "real" or serious confrontations, such as general sociopolitical tensions or a potential cross-straits war.

However, does my assessment of saliva wars as nonserious doings counter moderator Yü Fu's comment that call-in show panelists are "really, really arguing"? To reconcile the "realness" of saliva wars from its play characteristics, I again draw from Basso's (1979) understanding of Western Apache tongue-in-cheek portrayals of the "Whiteman" as "diminutive dramas" that are not necessarily a product of the speaker's imagination, but rather patterned on "slices of unjoking activity" (41). Basso's analysis informs my analysis of call-in show saliva wars as exhibiting concurrent laminations of play and "unjoking" activities. Be it a joke or mock (saliva) warfare:

> [A]ny actual performance may be said to consist in the construction and presentation of a *secondary text* that is intended to be understood as a

[43] The scholars' interpretation draws from Grice's (1957, 1968) inquiry into what methods individuals use to perform communicative acts.

> facsimile or transcripted copy of the *primary text* on which it is patterned. This, of course, is not made explicit by the [speaker] because the success of his performance—how well it "comes off"—depends upon his ability to persuade the [other interlocutor] to play along, that is, to pretend with him that the facsimile he has constructed is not a facsimile... (Basso 1979:41; italics added)

I thus illustrate that although call-in show saliva wars are often regarded as superficial, linguistic reenactments of ideological tensions culled from the geopolitical stage, participants' verbal disputes nonetheless have real consequences just as PRC military exercises and presidential elections do. Furthermore, the "pretending" that call-in participants perform through hypothetical reported speech constitutes more than a "mock-up" of reality. Rather, saliva wars represent an equally informative mass-mediated and discursive representation of Taiwan's sociopolitical landscape. Specifically, I examine in the following passage a saliva war over the notions of "compatriot," "nation," and "sovereignty" that simultaneously performs a secondary text (the call-in show saliva war) and two intertwined primary texts (cross-straits tensions as well as different political party ideologies).

In addition to reported speech, code-switching figures prominently in the following passage. Blom and Gumperz (1972) suggest that the social meanings communicated by language shifts represent reflexive statements about the organization of face-to-face encounters, as well as the structure and content of interpersonal relationships. In other words, code-switching serves as a form of indirect social commentary. In this saliva war, I analyze a guest panelist's insertion of English loan words as a calculated move that negotiates the sensitive topic within the call-in show context and its associated ramifications for cross-straits relations.

"He basically has confused 'compatriot,' 'nation,' and sovereignty'": (non)serious playing with words

The following saliva war comes from the second of three successive *2100* episodes that deliberated the PRC ban of pop star A-mei. Broadcast on May 25, 2000, the episode was entitled, "The (ROC) President expresses regret: Does Communist China regard compatriots as the enemy? (*Zongtong yihan: Zhonggong jiang tongbao dang diren?* 總統遺憾: 中共將同胞當敵人？). The main participants in the verbal confrontation include DPP Legislator Lin Cho-shui (林濁水) and Taiwan Gallup chairman and political analyst Mr. Tim T. Y. Ting (Ting Tingyu 丁庭宇) with moderator Lee Tao occasionally facilitating the dispute.

As with the previous two saliva war examples, an edited video clip inspires the verbal dispute, which appears at the beginning of the program and before the examined exchange between Leg. Lin and Mr. Ting. The video segment features recently inaugurated President Chen Shui-bian commenting that the PRC's ban of A-mei as equivalent to treating Taiwan as the enemy. The text of the video clip is provided below:

> As a citizen of the Republic of China, on the homeland of the Republic of China, to sing the Republic of China's own national anthem, and to still suffer, suppression, I would never have thought, this could be aimed at, a compatriot, or a brother, or a sister, to have … is this the right way to show your hospitality? This is strictly treating us like the enemy, I feel saddened [by this]…[44]

In an oblique reference to the PRC ban of A-mei, the video segment captures President Chen proclaiming his surprise that the PRC government would suppress (*daya* 打壓) its "compatriots" (*tongbao* 同胞), "brothers" (*xongdi* 兄弟), and "sisters" (*jiemei* 姊妹) across the straits for singing the ROC national anthem.

[44] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 13.

President Chen then culminates his remarks by claiming that the PRC is treating ROC citizens like the "enemy" (*diren* 敵人).

In the remainder of the program, the moderator and guest panelists frequently revisit this video clip, and specifically, revoice President Chen's remarks as they deliberate the significance and appropriateness of his use of "compatriots" in portraying of the relationship between the people of Taiwan and China. The following saliva war focuses on the connotations of "compatriot" and the associated notions of "country" and "sovereignty." Immediately prior to the verbal dispute I examine, Mr. Ting comments on the notion of being "Chinese" and "one China," which I represent below:

> …Today [if] Chen Shui-bian, is not bestowing prosperity and growth on the Republic of China and instead he identifies himself as Chinese (*Zhonggonren*). [Then] like what Legislator You just said, if the People's First Party, New Party, Democratic Progressive Party, Kuomintang, all supported Taiwan, you only have to identify [yourself] as "We are Chinese, we are one China."…[45]

Here, Mr. Ting recalls several of President Chen's recent verbal and symbolic gestures, including congratulating or "bestowing prosperity" on the ROC nation and publicly identifying himself as a "Chinese" (*Zhongguoren* 中國人).[46] Ting then argues that if all of Taiwan's political parties wanted to demonstrate their support for Taiwan, they would do so by stating "We are Chinese, we are one China." By making this statement, Ting establishes himself as advocating a "China" worldview, a verbal gesture that is significant for the following saliva war with DPP Leg. Lin.

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[45] For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 14.

[46] Recall that President Chen Shui-bian is from the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates Taiwan independence. Although Chen mitigated his Taiwan independence rhetoric during the presidential campaign, his campaign commercials, speeches, and products clearly situated Chen's allegiance and identity with "Taiwan, this piece of land" (*Taiwan zhe kuai tudi* 台灣這塊土地*)*.

In the saliva war between Legislator Lin and Mr. Ting, I focus upon the verbal strategies the disputants' use to present their interpretations of "compatriot" (*tongbao* 同胞),[47] "country" (*guojia* 國家), and "regime" (*zhengquan* 政權). Initially, Mr. Ting provides their English translations (e.g., "race," "ethnicity," and "statehood") to establish, differentiate, and even mitigate their ideological meanings. Ting later inserts "snippets" of President Chen's "compatriot" utterance to bolster his interpretations. However, Leg. Lin finds Ting's speech reporting tactics unsatisfactory and demands that the political analyst speak in his own words. After several attempts to articulate the problematic notions without drawing from President Chen's remarks, Ting resignedly concludes that he is unable to do so.

Although Lin and Ting's saliva war primarily revolves around divergent interpretations of the aforementioned terms, the dispute's primary text stems from their different stances toward Taiwan's national identity. As a DPP legislator, Lin Cho-shui advocates an independent and sovereign Taiwan. Inversely, political analyst Mr. Ting leans towards the KMT and a pro-unification stance, as demonstrated in the above excerpt.[48] Consequently, Leg. Lin faults Mr. Ting for confusing the concepts of "compatriot," "nation," and "regime," and specifically, for promoting the view that as "compatriots" Taiwan and China are therefore the same country.

The entire saliva war spans 22 turns of talk, with four turns coming from the moderator Lee Tao and the remaining 18 turns being evenly divided between the main protagonists, Leg. Lin and Mr. Ting. As in previous excerpts, certain Mandarin Chinese terms are left in their Hanyu Pinyin form in the English text in

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[47] In Mandarin Chinese, singular and plural nouns are not linguistically differentiated. In the English text of Mr. Ting's remarks I translated "*tongbao*" as the plural "compatriots" for a more colloquial reading. However, "*tongbao*" also represents the singular "compatriot."

[48] In the past, the Taiwan Gallup chairman has conducted public opinion polls for the KMT during national and regional elections.

order to preserve its original meaning as much as possible. Glosses for the terms can be found in the footnotes or the glossary at the end of the dissertation.

Transc. 7.3: "I don't know how to say it"

1	Lin	我認為丁庭宇先生	I believe that Mr. Ting Tingyu
2		他基本上	that he basically has confused
3		同胞，國家跟	compatriot, nation, and
4		政權三種	regime these three
5		認同混為一談。	identities into one.
6		我認為這個制式	I believe that once this concept
7		一亂，越搞	is confused, it becomes more
8		越混亂。	and more confusing.
9		那麼如果是這樣子的話，	So if it is like this,
10		我們是不是真的對，	do we really have toward,
11		阿，新加坡的	uh, Singapore's
12		華人沒有同胞的感覺呢？	*Huaren*[49] no compatriot affections?
13		至少-以我的經驗	At least—in my experience
14		是有的。	(we) do.
15		(…)	(…)
16		所以我認為，	Therefore I believe,
17		中國人，	if *Zhongguoren*,
18		或者華人	or else *Huaren*
19		要現代化，	want to modernize,
20		拜託拜託，	please please,
21		把政權的認同，	let regime identity,
22		國家的認同，	national identity,
23		跟同胞的認同，	and compatriot identity,
24		文化的認同做一個釐清。	cultural identity be clarified and distinguished.
25		那麼水乳	So that water and milk
26		自然可以交融	can naturally blend together.[50]
27		[xx]--	[xx]--
28	LT	[這是] 林濁水委員強調	[This is] Leg. Lin Cho-shui's

[49] The identifier "*Huaren*" (華人) generally refers to the "Chinese" people but more specifically Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in greater China. The term is more commonly used in Singapore than in Taiwan or China. See explanation in the textual analysis of this excerpt.
[50] Meaning, in perfect harmony. The analogy is similar to the English analogy of water and oil mixing (or not mixing) well together.

			emphasis.
29		但是有一個定義的。.	But there is a definition.
30	Ting	［同胞是有］	[Compatriot--]
31	LT	是。	Right.
32	Ting	同胞，同胞當然	Compatriot, compatriot of course
33		同一個國家，	(is) the same country,
34		我覺得你弄混了，	I feel that you have it mixed up,
35		一個是race，	one is race,[51]
36		就是一個種族，	which is a race,
37		一個ethnicity,	one is ethnicity,
38		就是文化的認同，	that is cultural identity,
39		一個statehood，	one is statehood,
40		是國籍。	that is nationality.
41		同胞當然	Compatriot of course
42		同一國，	(refers to) the same country,
43		同胞如果	if compatriot does
44		不同國，	not (refer to) the same country,
45		這個同胞就	then this compatriot
46		沒有意義了。	has no meaning.
47	LT	您林濁水講說同胞	Then Lin Cho-shui is saying compatriot
48		是可以的，	is okay,
49		但是是這兩個不同的國家。	But it is two different countries.
50	Lin	那如果, 如果是這樣，	Then if, if this is the case,
51		那麻煩大啦。	then the trouble (problem)[52] is (even) greater.
52	Ting	但是這是你認為的。	But this is what you believe.
53		陳水扁認為，	Chen Shui-bian believes,
54		陳水扁說是不是說	didn't Chen Shui-bian say,
55		“同胞也好，”	"Whether as a compatriot,"
56		不是我說的	it wasn't me who said (it)
57		是他說的。	it was he who said it.
58		哎，我問問看法律	Hey, let me ask law
59		專家尤教授，	expert Professor You,
60		同胞是不是	are compatriots
61		同一個國家？	from the same country?
62	Lin	我先跟你講，	Let me first say to you,

[51] Terms in Arial font were spoken in English.

[52] Meaning that the confusion is even greater.

63		［如果你這個觀念，］	[f this concept of yours,]
64	LT	［對不起..］	[Excuse me..]
65	Lin	你馬上要處理	You need to immediately resolve
66		這個問題，	this problem,
67		那你是不是要讓	so do you want to let
68		西藏獨立？	Tibet to become independent?
69		你可以說西藏（人）	Can you say that a Tibetan
70		是同胞嗎？	is a compatriot then?
71		他跟你是	Are you and he[53]
72		同一國阿？	from the same country?
73		那你是不是要讓，讓	So do you want to let, let
74		內蒙古獨立	Inner Mongolia to become
75		出去？你是不是要	Independent? Do you want
76		讓新疆維吾	to let the people from the
77		爾族的人	Xinjiang Uighur ethnic group
78		獨立出去？	become independent?
79		你是不是要把	Do you want to let the
80		西南的那個，那個	Southwest's that, that
81		［那夷族獨立	[that Yi ethnic group become
82		出去？］	independent?]
83	Ting	［我覺得，我覺得］	[I feel, I feel that]
84		同胞當然是	compatriots are of course from
85		同一國，	the same country,
86		這個是陳水扁講的	this is what Chen Shui-bian said
87		不是我講的啊。	it wasn't me who said it.
88		同--陳水扁說，	Com--Chen Shui-bian said,
89		"同胞也好，"	"Whether as a compatriot,"
90		同胞當然	compatriots are of course from
91		同一國啦。	the same country.
92	Lin	我們現在在講你的，	We are now talking about your (explanation).
93		我們是評論你的，	We are now discussing your (remarks).
94	Ting	我認為同胞	I believe compatriots are
95		當然	of course
96		同一國.	from the same country..
97	Lin	你認為--好.	You believe –okay.

[53] The third person singular "he" or "*ta*" (他) is sometimes used to refer to a group or the third person plural "they" (*tamen* 他們).

98		那你就是主張	Then you are advocating
99		西藏獨立啦.	Tibetan independence.
100	Ting	我怎麼會主張	How could I be advocating
101		西藏獨立呢？	Tibetan independence?
102	Lin	他跟你有	He and you have
103		血緣關係啊？	consanguinity (blood ties)?
104	Ting	同胞不一定要有	Compatriots don't necessarily
105		血緣關係.	have consanguinity.
106		他同胞是[同一個]--	His compatriot is [the same]--
107	Lin	[同胞是]	[Compatriot is]
108		同一個胞胎，	the same fetus,
109		[同一個國家.]	[The same country.]
110	Ting	[不對，不對-]	[That's not right, that's not right--]
111	Lin	[同一個子宮，	[The same womb,
112		叫著同胞，拜託..]	means compatriot. Please..]
113	Ting	我真的-	I really---
114		不對。	That's wrong.

The passage begins with Leg. Lin challenging Mr. Ting's use of the terms "compatriot" (*tongbao* 同胞), "nation" (*guojia* 國家), and "regime" (*zhengquan* 政權) by claiming that Ting has mistakenly confused the words as being one and the same (lines 1-5). The DPP legislator expands upon this assessment by asking whether Ting's conflation of the three terms infers that "we" (*women* 我們), meaning Taiwan, have no "compatriot affections" (*tongbao de ganjue* 同胞的感覺) toward *Huaren* (華人), people of Chinese descent, in Singapore (lines 9-12).

Here, Leg. Lin's use of the identifier "*Huaren"* is significant for several reasons. First, the term *Huaren* generally refers to culturally ethnic Chinese. Moreover, the descriptor avoids connotations to geopolitical affiliations, including citizenship or country of residence, and thus encompasses *Huaren* from the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere (Ong 1999; Wu 1991). As Tu (1991b) explains, the identifier and notion of *Huaren* is not geopolitically centered. Consequently:

> …the deliberate use of *Huaren* (people of Chinese origin) rather than *Zhongguoren* (citizens of the Chinese state) to designate people of a variety of nationalities who are ethnically and culturally Chinese. . . indicates a common ancestry and a shared cultural background, whereas *Zhongguoren* necessarily evokes obligations and loyalties of political affiliation and the myth of the Central Country.[54] (ibid:25; original italics)

Leg. Lin's comments thus indexes the ethnic and cultural meanings Tu details above. This is evidenced in Lin's self-repair (lines 17-18), in which he replaces his initial use of "*Zhongguoren*" (line 17) to "*Huaren*" (line 18). In so doing, Leg. Lin uses "*Huaren*" to argue for a united and modernized Chinese community (line 19) based on "a common ancestry and a shared cultural background," as Tu described earlier. In sum, Lin's conscientious use of the word "*Huaren*" evokes a pan-Chinese community.[55]

However, should Leg. Lin have continued to use the term "*Zhonggruoren*," he would have inadvertently forwarded a "one China" worldview that is antithetical to his party's (the DPP) Taiwan independence platform. Wu (1991) explains that the term "*Zhongguoren*" "carries the connotation of modern patriotism or nationalism…a connectedness with the fate of China as a nation" (149). By amending his word choice from "*Zhongguoren*" to "*Huaren*," Leg. Lin preserves and indirectly emphasizes an independent and distinct Taiwan identity. At the same time, he opens the discursive space for the realization of a pan-*Huaren* community that "we" Taiwan are a member of and whose compatriots include *Huaren* in Singapore and around the world.

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[54] Tu's use of "the Central Country" represents one translation of the Mandarin Chinese characters "*Zhongguo*," which is more commonly known as "China." Another translation of "*Zhongguo*" is "the Middle Kingdom." Both "Central Country" and "Middle Kingdom" refer to a Chinese worldview and philosophy that establishes "*Zhongguo*" as "an imagined universally recognized cultural center" (Tu 1991a:vi).

[55] For example, "overseas Chinese" are commonly referred to as "*Huaqiao*" (華僑), which again is based on a "*Hua*" worldview. More recently, *Huaqiao* have come to "define themselves as members of the Chinese 'diaspora,' meaning those who have settled in scattered communities of Chinese far from their ancestral homeland" (Tu 1991b:13).

Another reason Leg. Lin's use of *Huaren* is marked in this context derives from its infrequent use in Taiwan. In comparison, the terms *Huaren* and *Huayu* (話語) or the Hua language (meaning Mandarin), are more commonly used in Singapore, as well as by overseas Chinese who wish to associate themselves with this transnational community. How each Han Chinese individual describes herself, and even the language she uses, represents an "act of identity" (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985) and reflects her sociopolitical ideologies.

For instance, the Mandarin Chinese language is referred to as "*Huayu*" (華語) in Singapore, again reflecting the Han Chinese community's and its members' "*Hua*" or pan-Chinese worldview. In contrast, Taiwan residents have been inculcated under the former KMT regime since the late 1940s to refer to Mandarin as "*guoyu*" (國語), which literally means the "national language." However, speakers in Taiwan who resist this sociolinguistic worldview subversively use "*Beijinghua*" (北京話), meaning the "Beijing language," instead as a means to reestablish the language's China-based origin and to renounce its nationalistic resonances. In China and Hong Kong, however, the same language is called "*putonghua*" (普通話) or "the common language," thus reflecting the Chinese Communist Party's ideology of equality. Returning to Leg. Lin's deliberate introduction of "*Huaren*" in the saliva war, the aforementioned distinctions between *Huaren* versus *Zhongguoren* identities demonstrates a concerted effort on the DPP legislator's part to index and affirm non-political "compatriot" relations with fellow *Huaren* outside of Taiwan.

To reiterate his earlier criticism of Mr. Ting's remarks, Leg. Lin concludes his turn of talk by dramatically pleading ("please, please" line 20) that the terms "regime identity" (*zhengquan de rentong* 政權的認同), "compatriot identity" (*tongbao de rentong* 同胞的認同), "national identity" (*guojia de rentong* 國家的認同), and "cultural identity" (*wenhua de rentong* 文化的認同) be

distinctively clarified (lines 21-24). He then argues that in doing so, this will allow these identities to exist in perfect harmony, which he poetically expresses as "water and milk naturally blend[ing] together" (lines 25-26). This metaphorical image suggests that Leg. Lin regards these concepts as being distinct from, yet complementary to each other. That is, the legislator's "water and milk" analogy seeks to capture Taiwan and Singapore's different geopolitical statuses on the one hand, while emphasizing their sociocultural similarities as modernized *Huaren* societies on the other.

Following Leg. Lin's remarks, *2100* moderator Lee Tao clarifies that this is what the legislator wishes to emphasize regarding the sociopolitically sensitive terms (lines 28). However, Lee Tao then suggests that the term "compatriot" (*tongbao* 同胞) does have a definition (line 29). Before Lee Tao can elaborate upon this comment,[56] Mr. Ting interjects to clarify his interpretation of "compatriot" by stating "of course" compatriot refers to "the same country" (lines 32-33). Ting following his assertion by claiming that it is Leg. Lin who has the concept "mixed up" (line 34).

Interestingly, Ting defines the three terms with the aid of English loan words. Ting's marked code-switch from Mandarin to English reflects the unique topic of this verbal exchange, namely, a metalinguistic saliva war over ideologically-laden terminology. The significance of code-switching or "language alterations" in socially-sensitive situations is noted by Basso (1979) when he states:

> If it is useful to understand that language alterations convey messages about what is 'present' in social situations, it is equally important to recognize that they may convey messages about what is 'absent' from them as well (11).

[56] The moderator's remarks can also be interpreted as a calculated move to invite another speaker to offer an alternative definition to would differ from Leg. Lin's understanding.

Here, Ting's introduction of the English terms "race" (line 35), "ethnicity" (line 37), and "statehood" (line 39) represents a concerted attempt to establish definitions for the words while diminishing their ideological associations in Mandarin Chinese. The loan words also offer him an alternative route to negotiate a "real" war and sociopolitical tensions between absent parties. This includes the cross-straits war between Taiwan and the PRC as well as ideological differences between Taiwan's political parties and factions, most notably between the ruling DPP party and the former KMT party and its splinter parties, the New Party and People's First Party.

It is important to note that Mr. Ting's linguistic competency in English is greater than Leg. Lin's, partly due Ting's graduate studies in and degree from the U.S. In comparison, the DPP legislator did not pursue academic studies in an English-speaking environment.[57] On a related note, many former and present high-ranking KMT leaders earned graduate degrees in the United States, including former President Lee Teng-hui, former Taiwan governor and current PFP chairman James Soong,[58] KMT chairman Lien Chan, and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou.[59] In comparison, many senior DPP leaders have not studied abroad, most notably current DPP chairman and ROC president Chen Shui-bian, who earned his law degree in at National Taiwan University (*Taiwan Daxue* 台灣大學), the country's most prestigious university. One prominent exception is

[57] All students in Taiwan are required to study at least six years of English from 7th to 12th grade. Moreover, Taiwan's college entrance exam includes an English proficiency section, which all prospective college students must take.

[58] James Soong left the KMT party in December 1999 in order to run as an independent presidential candidate in the 2000 elections after being denied the KMT nomination. Then KMT vice chairman Lien Chan was nominated as the KMT candidate instead.

[59] President Lee earned a Ph.D. in agricultural economics from Cornell University, PFP chairman Soong earned a Ph. D. in philosophy from Georgetown University, KMT chairman Lien Chan is a Ph.D. graduate of the Univ. of Chicago in political science, while Taipei Mayor Ma earned a Ph.D. in law from Harvard University (*Who's Who in the ROC*, 2000). Shortly after Lee Teng-hui became ROC president in 1988, *Time* magazine noted that the ROC had one of the highest percentages of U.S.-educated presidential cabinets in the world. It should be noted that at the time, the ROC's central government was comprised of predominantly, if not only, KMT members.

ROC vice president Annette Lu, who earned her law degree from Harvard Law School. Consequently, Ting's introduction of English could be interpreted as a move to establish his U.S.-derived education and stronger English competence and thus indirectly highlight Leg. Lin's lack thereof. However, the fact that most of *2100*'s viewers are not as educated as its guest panelists,[60] it is possible that they were unable to understand, not to mention appreciate, Ting's sociolinguistic strategy.

In this sense, Ting's use of English may have complicated rather than facilitated the metalinguistic disagreement over the aforementioned terms. Moreover, the Ting-Lin saliva war is further complicated by the fact that even the Chinese representations for the words "race," "ethnicity," and "statehood" are "foreign" to the Chinese language, having been introduced to the Chinese language through contact with Western societies. As Wu (1991) explains:

> In order to create a modern identity to cope with conditions created by China's confrontation with the Western world, the Chinese were obliged to deal with foreign concepts, including that of nation, state, sovereignty, citizenship, and race; more recently, with cultural and ethnic identity (148).

While the English term "race" can be glossed in Mandarin Chinese as "*zhongzu*" (種族), Ting's use of the English words "ethnicity" and "statehood" as linguistic equivalents for the Mandarin terms "*wenhua*" (文化) and "*guoji*" (國籍) respectively are inaccurate, and moreover, problematic. For instance, in the above excerpt, I interpreted Mr. Ting's use of "*wenhua de rentong*" (文化的認同) as "cultural identity" (line 38). However, he associated the English term "ethnicity" with the Chinese notion of "*wenhua de rentong*."

Similarly, Ting's association of the English word "statehood" with "*guoji*" (國籍) represents one English gloss for this Chinese notion. Earlier, I glossed

[60] From personal discussions with *2100*'s staff, I learned that most of its viewers' have a high

Leg. Lin's use of "*guo*" (國) for "*guojia*" (國家) and "*guojia rentong*" (國家認同) as "nation" and "national identity." However, the same term (*guo* 國) has also been associated with "kingdom" as in "the Middle Kingdom" (*Zhongguo* 中國), more commonly known as "China."[61] Consequently, merely providing English glosses "race," "ethnicity," and "statehood" for the Chinese terms "*zhongzu*" (種族), "*wenhua*" (文化) and "*guoji*" (國籍) respectively, doesn't adequately explicate their definitional differences, especially for a Chinese[62] speaking audience. Nor do does Ting's English loan word explanations refute Leg. Lin's claim that he has confused the terms. Thus the English-Chinese translation issues discussed here reflect sociolinguistic difficulties in conveying concepts and worldviews within one language and culture to another (cf. Whorf 1956).[63]

However, Ting culminates his definitional explanation by reiterating that "of course compatriot refers to the same country," and if it does not, then "this compatriot has no meaning" (lines 41-46). While Ting's repetitive utterance emphasizes his opening statement in this turn of talk, it can also be interpreted as an effort to "produce language in a more efficient, and less energy-draining way" (Tannen 1989:48), by reusing a previous remark. This strategy also facilitates speakers' verbal attacks when engaged in a saliva war.

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school level of education.

[61] Wu (1991) explains that the notion of the "Middle Kingdom" reflects a traditional view among "Chinese" peoples that represents an important aspect of "being Chinese." Moreover, he states that this "anthropocentric view is based on a deep-rooted sense of belonging to a unified civilization that can boast several thousand years of uninterrupted history" (149).

[62] I deliberately use "Chinese" to refer to all Chinese languages, including Mandarin, Taiwanese (Hohlo), Shainghainese, Fukienese, etc.

[63] Whorf makes the link between language and thought (or worldview) when he states that human beings "are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group" (134).

Figure 14: In pointing away from his body, political analyst Mr. Tim Ting demonstrates through a hand gesture that it was President Chen Shui-bian who used the word "compatriot." Meanwhile, Leg. Lin Cho-shui demands that Ting provide his own understanding of the term.

Figure 15: Here, Mr. Ting indicates that he did not utter the word "compatriot," which he emphasizes by pointing to himself, while DPP Legislator Lin continues to insist on hearing Ting's interpretation of the term.

Following Ting's metalinguistic rationalization, Lee Tao attempts to direct the discussion back to Leg. Lin's "compatriot" analogy between Singapore and

Taiwan (lines 47-49). Before he can direct the discussion back to this point, Leg. Lin interjects to declare that Mr. Ting's explanation is unsatisfactory as it makes the "trouble" or "confusion" surrounding the terms even greater (lines 50-51). Ting promptly responds that this is the DPP legislator's opinion (line 52). However, Ting emphasizes that President Chen Shui-bian had used the term "compatriot" in his remarks, and therefore, it was President Chen ("he," line 67), and not Ting ("me," line 56). Mr. Ting accompanies the deictic referents "me" and "he" with hand gestures that alternatively point to a bodily present "me" (his chest) and an absent "he" (pointing away from his body and to his right) (See Figures 15 and 16).

Interestingly, this gestural distinction between the pronouns "me" and "he" is not arbitrary. In other words, in pointing to his right (the viewers' left), Ting is using a concrete object as his referent. Having observed the live broadcast in the studio, I understood Ting's gesture for "he" as pointing to the closed-circuit TV monitor, which was located to the right of the guest panelist table, on which program video clips are played for the in-studio participants. Recall that prior to Lin and Ting's saliva war, the program had played a video clip of Pres. Chen making his "compatriot" remark as a means to situating the featured topic. Thus, for Ting, the TV monitor embodied President Chen Shui-bian or "he," thus providing a convenient and temporary object toward which he could orient his deictic "me" versus "he" distinctions and gestures. In fact, later in the saliva war, Ting again uses the same pair of gestures, albeit this time with his right index finger, to identify and index Pres. Chen as the original speaker of the "compatriot" utterance that he (Ting) is merely revoicing.

Returning to Ting's use of reported speech, he proffers evidence for President Chen's "compatriot" utterance by repeating a snippet of the president's remarks from the video clip (line 55). At first glance, this may not appear as substantial evidence for Ting's claim that "'compatriot' refers to the same

country." However, using Clark and Gerrig's (1990) argument that "quotations are demonstrations of component parts of language use" (769), the embedding of Pres. Chen's utterance within Ting's remarks represents a communicative act (Grice 1968) or speech act (Searle 1969) that associates his use of "compatriot" with Pres. Chen. In this case, Ting reappropriates Pres. Chen's remark that the PRC is suppressing its "compatriots" in Taiwan. Regardless if President Chen's "compatriot" remark is actually a declaration of a shared Taiwan-PRC national identity, Mr. Ting effectively creates this impression when he links Pres. Chen's utterance which his earlier remarks regarding the terms "ethnicity," "race," and "statehood." As Tannen (1989) notes, "when speech uttered in one context is repeated in another, it is fundamentally changed even if 'reported' accurately" (110).

Despite Mr. Ting's economical and efficient use of reported speech in his rebuttal (Holt 1996), speech reporting proves only as persuasive and effective as the listener's ability and willingness to recognize the reporter's intentions (Grice 1968). In the present scenario, Leg. Lin rejects the political analyst's reported source not once, but twice. First, Lin discounts Ting's explanation as being inadequate and chastises Ting to "immediately solve this problem" (line 65-66). As for what this "problem" (*wenti* 問題) entails, Leg. Lin provides a lengthy explanation, punctuated with a rising tone of voice, in which demands if Ting considers Tibetans to be compatriots, and moreover, if he advocates that Tibetans, Inner Mongolians, Uighurs, and the Yi ethnic group declare independence (lines 67-82).

Leg. Lin's line of questioning is ideologically-marked as each of these ethnic groups has struggled over the past 50 years to gain independence from the PRC. In naming this minority groups, Lin indirectly evokes similarities to

Taiwan's controversial nation-state status vis-à-vis the PRC.[64] Leg's listing of these particular groups and geographic entities is significant for another reason as well. Under the Republic of China constitution, these lands are regarded as territories of the ROC, just as "Taiwan" is recognized as a "province" and not a nation. Moreover, Lin's inclusion of Inner Mongolia represents a deliberate jab at Ting and his China-based worldview. For while this "province" has been an independent country since the mid-20th century, the ROC continues to consider Inner Mongolia as a part of its geographical jurisdiction as captured on national (and world) maps produced by the government. This worldview is telling displayed on the inside front cover of the *2000 Republic of China Yearbook*, an official publication of the Government Information Office (GIO), in which a map of the Republic of China includes "Mongolia."[65]

However, the DPP legislator's comparison of Tibet and Taiwan's identities as "compatriots" is as convincing to the political analyst as Ting's "same country" interpretation is persuasive to Leg. Lin. In other words, Leg. Lin's rhetorical commentary does not disrupt Ting's line of thinking. In fact, Ting reiterates his previous responses, including his use of President Chen Shui-bian's "compatriot" utterance to argue that "compatriot" refers to "one country" (lines 83-91). Ting's use of repetition both emphasizes his main point as well as serves as an "evaluative" function of Leg. Lin's remarks through Pres. Chen's original "compatriot" utterance (Labov 1972:354-96). Moreover, reiteration of previous statements also strategically produces "ample talk" even when there might not be

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[64] A significant difference between the listed territories and ethnic groups, however, is that they are *de facto* and *de jure* provinces or territories of the PRC, while Taiwan *de facto* constitutes an independent country. This distinction becomes complicated, however, when considering that the majority of the world's governments (including the U.S.) do not officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation-state. This area of inquiry goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. For further reading, please see Chapter 3 in Joei's (1997) *In Search of Justice: the Taiwan story*; Chapter 9 in Maguire's (1998) *The rise of modern Taiwan*; and Wachman's (2000) "Taiwan: parent, province, or blackballed state?" in *Taiwan in Perspective*.

[65] Interestingly, a smaller map of the same region appearing in the lower left hand corner depicting the "area under Chinese Communists' control" includes neither "Mongolia" nor Taiwan.

much to say (Tannen 1989:48). As previously mentioned, Ting accompanies his distinction between what President Chen said (lines 86, 88) and what Ting himself did not say ("it wasn't me," line 87) with hand gestures that alternatively point away and at himself.

The crux of Ting and Lin's saliva war arrives when the DPP legislator directly and dismissively rejects Ting's reference to Pres. Chen's utterance a second time (lines 92-93). In this case, Leg. Lin denies Ting's "entitlement claim" as an authorized messenger and authoritative interpreter of Pres. Chen's original remarks (Shuman 1993). The DPP legislator's linguistically disarming move partly relies upon Leg. Lin and Pres. Chen's in-group relationship as members of the DPP party. That is, Leg. Lin regards himself as a more reputable evaluator of Chen's "compatriot" utterance in comparison to the KMT/PFP-leaning Mr Ting. Leg. Lin thus rejects Ting's reading and revoicing of the president's words as an outsider's understanding, and therefore, discountable.

Thus, Leg. Lin's refutation of Ting's use of reported speech initiates a series of quick verbal exchanges that leads to the saliva war's eventual and rapid conclusion. For instance, when Leg. Lin exhorts Ting to proffer an interpretation of "compatriot" in his own words, which Ting does by claiming "of I believe compatriots are course from the same country" (lines 94-96), the DPP legislator turns Ting's admission into a declaration of Tibetan independence (lines 98-99). When Ting retorts, "How could I be advocating Tibetan independence?" (lines 100-101), Leg. Lin quickly asks whether Ting shares "blood ties" with Tibetans (lines 102-103). At this point, Ting is stymied from producing any acceptable counterarguments to the DPP legislator's increasingly metaphorical arguments.

Despite Ting's denial that compatriots have blood ties (lines 104-105), Leg. Lin expands upon his consanguinity line of reasoning by engaging in a bit of speech play. That is, the legislator's explanation takes the form of a children's word game as he takes the second character in the Chinese word for "compatriot"

(*tongbao* 同胞) (line 107), the ideogram "*bao*" (胞), to create a different word that begins with the same character, in this case, "*baotai*" (胞胎) (line 108).[66] Lin's word play results in a word—"*baotai*"—that does not exist in the conventional (e.g., dictionary) sense. However, his implications in coining the word are clear, to emphasize his argument that compatriots, which he shortens into "*bao*" (胞) and which also means "deriving from the same set of parents," share the same fetus, that is "*tai*" (胎), and thus have consanguinity ties.[67]

Although Ting directly refutes Leg. Lin's interpretation of "compatriot" necessarily denoting "blood ties" by stating "That's not right" (line 110) and "That's wrong" (line 114), Ting does not elaborate upon *why* the DPP legislator's claims are incorrect. It is worthy to contemplate why Ting did not clarify his interpretation of "compatriot" as referring to residents from the same country, either in his own words or in the form of another reported utterance. One explanation might be found in Haberland's (1986) assessment on speech reporting:

> …it is wiser to commit oneself to something true than something false. In the same way, it is wiser to commit oneself to somebody else having said something which that person actually *has* said than to somebody else… (223; original italics).

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[66] I recall seeing this word game as a child in a children's newspaper in Taiwan, 國語日報 (*Guoyu Ribao*) and in the form of written exercises when I took Chinese language courses (the newspaper also had a language institute). The word game challenges the language learner or linguaphile to link random words in novel ways through a process of word or character association. For instance, in taking the second character "*wen*" (文) of the word *lunwen* (論文), meaning "dissertation," one would then form another word that began with the same character such as "*wenzhang"* (文章), meaning "a written article." Similarly, the second character of "*wenzhang*," *zhang* (章) , would then serve as the first character of another word, such as "*zhangji*" (章魚), meaning "octopus," and so on.

[67] Leg. Lin's speech play also demonstrates the strategic creativeness that participants display not only in saliva wars but during call-in show deliberations as well. I often heard call-in participants (and speakers in Taiwan more generally) engage in this kind of word play due in part to the highly homophonic nature of the language.

In the present case, Ting's linguistic behavior suggests he found it "wiser" to attach himself (and by extension his argument) to what someone else (i.e., President Chen) actually said than to "something else," such as his own words. In weighing the risks of presenting his own definition to reproducing another speaker's utterance, Ting sought safety in something "true" (e.g., Pres. Chen's comments), in order to reduce the risk of providing a personal interpretation that could be judged by Leg. Lin as being "false."

Unfortunately for Ting, by forgoing the opportunity to elaborate upon his understanding of "compatriot" as being "from the same country" (lines 94-96), Leg. Lin recontextualized Ting's remarks to coincide with his own political agenda. That is, Leg. Ling reframed Ting's utterance as an admission for Tibetan independence, which obliquely suggests that Ting is also advocating Taiwan independence per the above discussion. Having introduced this notion, Leg. Lin complicates the metalinguistic debate by introducing a novel understanding of "compatriot" as being linked to "blood ties." Finally, the saliva war ends with Lin's "consanguinity" argument and last refuting rebuttal from Ting.

In sum, Ting and Lin's saliva war over the terms "compatriot," "nation," and "race" exposes the fallacy that words assume static definitions. Rather, this metalinguistic saliva war highlights the negotiability of the use and meaning of words. Sornig (1989) notes:

> One should not forget that the idea of stability in meaning in words and phrases is really fictitious and results from wishful thinking on the semanticist's part. In reality, meaning, i.e., semantic content, is continuously modified: decreased or increased in range and intensity, replenished or deflated in order to meet the requirements of a given situation (98).

Yet, aside from the connotations and ideologies these terms reference, it is their associations with and applications to Taiwan-China relations that fuels Leg. Lin and Mr. Ting's saliva war. Reported speech thus provides the panelists an oblique

avenue through which to forward and contest "sovereign" versus "province" sociopolitical ideologies regarding Taiwan's nation-state status.

In contrast to the previous saliva war example in which even the use of a "snippet" of reported speech proved effective in denigrating an absent principle figure and weakening a fellow participant's argument, this saliva war reveals that presenting direct reported speech as a form of evidence can also be undermined if an interlocutor discredits the reporter's interpretation of the original utterance and representation of the original speaker. Here, Leg. Lin refuses Ting's interpretation of Pres. Chen's "compatriot" remarks by drawing upon his in-group association with Pres. Chen as DPP party members.

Overall, this passage illustrates that even nonserious saliva wars demonstrate serious actions. In this case, the disputants enacted conflicting political ideologies and worldviews regarding Taiwan's national identity and sovereignty. This secondary text or "diminutive drama" of Leg. Lin's and Mr. Ting's metalinguistic saliva war performs an "unjoking activity" of a primary text whereby terms such as "compatriot," "nation," "regime," and "statehood" represent not only words, but also metadiscursive, political agendas. In this passage, the figurative distance between a call-in show saliva war and an ongoing cross-straits civil war is only as far apart as that between "play" and reality. That is, the significance of this saliva war and others like it resides in the moments when "the secondary text [becomes] a primary one, and that the whole affair is not a mock-up of some precedent reality, but that reality itself" (Basso 1979:41).

CONCLUSION

In my exploration of call-in show *koushui zhan*, I have illustrated that participants' argumentative talk reflect social practices of displaying disaccord (or dis-harmony) through the creative use of verbal play to "compete and negotiate with, criticize, and even ridicule others" (Chang 2001:159). The primary form of speech play explored here focused on speech reporting including direct,

hypothetical, and indirect reported speech. The quoting of another not only strategically provides sources or evidence to support a reporter's entitlement claims to lambaste a call-in show colleague, but also offers protection by disassociating the reporter from the original utterance. However, the insertion of quoted speech does not guarantee that a reporter's interpretation of an event or issue will be accepted by other interlocutors. Despite its versatility and concise summary of complex arguments, speech reporting can nevertheless leave an individual open to attack, ridicule, and disbelief.

Furthermore, the verbal artistry of saliva wars resides not so much within its "spectacle of confrontation" (Livingstone and Lunt 1994) or "confrontation as a spectacle" (Hutchby 2001) appeal, but rather in its requirement that participants proffer evidence for their stances as they engage in argument-building. In other words, the "alignment-saturated" orientation of call-in show "crisis" topics depends upon the presentation, negotiation, and contestation of entitlement claims and evidentiality. Participants' speech reporting practices represent one linguistic tactic that lends credibility to the call-in show's claim of featuring "competing versions of reality" (Hutchby 1996:8) via saliva wars.

Moreover, this chapter's investigation of saliva wars through participants' speech reporting practices contributes to the dissertations' overarching objective: to describe ways of talking that are unique to Taiwan's political TV call-in shows. For instance, call-in show saliva wars allow participants to wrangle with and viewers to process knotty and sensitive issues in a real yet playful manner. My investigation recalls Irvine's (1993) insights on her study of verbal abuse in a Wolof village:

> Acts of abuse and defamation of character provide a special opportunity for the study of responsibility and evidence in talk. Anthropologists and sociologists have long noted that a society's principles of conduct may often be most clearly revealed in the breach—through violations and disruptions of normative forms of conduct and social relations, and through negotiated claims about those violations (105).

Likwise, the linguistic resources call-in participants draw upon when engaged in saliva wars confirm Pomerantz's (1984) finding that "requesting, giving, considering and evaluating evidence are practices which are within the repertoire of social actions that are performed by competent people within a culture" (607).

Moments of conflict constitute crucial components of political TV call-in shows, so much so I argue, that they delineate, if not define, this mass-mediated programming genre. It is through the guise of saliva wars that Taiwan's underlying tensions and empirical crises are exposed, thus offering everyday citizens and sociopolitical leaders a forum to deliberate their dangers (*wei* 危) and opportunities (*ji* 機). From this perspective, call-in show saliva wars constitute an acceptable means for Taiwan's competing ideologies—including national identity and cross-straits relations—to be voiced and displayed while allowing for the recreation and reevaluation of constantly shifting sociopolitical agendas and discourses. Aside from being morality games and character contests on the call-in show sound stage, saliva wars also represent Taiwan's ethno-political conflicts and national identity struggles on the political stage writ small.

In the case of call-in show saliva wars, Sacks' (1992) observation that arguments generate "happy conversations" can be modified to include the generation of "happy politics" insofar as sociopolitical figures capitalize upon this speech event to articulate and negotiate their disparate perspectives. Recalling the recent past in which public discussions of political events and issues were banned in Taiwan, and moreover, individuals who defamed political leaders ran the risk of incarceration, the prevalent use of reported speech on call-in show saliva wars constitutes a significant sociolinguistic development and sociopolitical milestone in the country's democratization process.

Chapter Eight: From Civil War to Saliva Wars—Taiwan's "Not-so-quiet" Revolution

This dissertation began with the observation that Taiwan's call-in shows, and by extension its mass media, promote crisis discourses that are at once empirically based on sociohistorical events in Taiwan and rhetorically (re)created through strategic language practices such as reported speech by its participants. I have also suggested that with the arrival of call-in shows on cable TV in the early 1990s, Taiwan's sociopolitical leaders have found a favorable televisual environment in which to feature and promote crisis events and issues. Volosinov's (1973 (1929)) observation that "relations of high complexity and tension" (153) reside within reported speech captures the manner in which call-in participants used this linguistic device to animate the dangers and opportunities within the crisis topics they deliberated, while doing so in ways that problematized the viability as well as perpetuated the circulation of such discourses.

My interdisciplinary approach to investigating the dialectical relationship between the TV call-in show's crisis frame and its participants' linguistic behavior on the one hand, and Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis ambiance on the other, generates a study in which its various components "interpenetrate" one another (Hawkes 1996:5). In seeking to demonstrate that language use represents a valuable conduit for examining political and mass media processes, my study also offers the opposite, namely, that political agendas and mass media products indeed influence linguistic practices. In the following sections, I summarize the study's findings as well as suggest directions for future research.

OVERVIEW OF STUDY: CLAIMS AND FINDINGS

In my examination of call-in participants' use of reported speech as a form of evidentiality, I discovered speech reporting involves not only the competent "giving" of the reported utterance on the behalf of the reporter, but also an open-minded "getting" on the part of the listener. While previous scholars have established that reported speech represents a convincing form of evidence for claims of knowledge, my analysis of call-in show saliva wars suggests that speech reporting also constitutes a highly negotiated process between reporter and receiver.

Despite the possibility of having one's reported speech-based evidentiality refuted by another speaker, certain types of speech reporting nevertheless prove to be more persuasive than others. In several excerpts, I illustrated that the participants' use of direct and even hypothetical reported speech increased the credibility and validity of a call-in participant's comments. In contrast, attempts to bolster an argument with the aide of indirect reported speech failed to achieve the same, and in some cases, even detracted from the participant's assertions.

Moreover, I discovered that the manner in which verbal interactions are framed can influence the persuasiveness of a participant's speech reporting practices. For instance, participants (e.g., moderators, panelists, callers) who used reported speech in ways that contributed and even magnified the program's crisis frame were more successful in persuading other participants to maintain the overall crisis ambiance. Inversely, those participants who attempted to refute the program's crisis orientation faced greater difficulties in having other participants ratify their opposing interpretations, despite attempts to present evidence towards the contrary.

In analyzing excerpts where participants combined other linguistic tools—such as parodic stylization and code-switching—with reported speech, I found that these devices allowed the participant to further distinguish her own voice

from those she animated. Participants' use of such polyphonic strategies not only enacted hyper-performances of locially identifiable public figures and their respective linguistic behaviors, but also critically editorialized the original utterance's meaning as well as judgmentally marked the original speaker's character. I found that by combining other linguistic properties with reported speech, call-in participants diversified the number of linguistic devices they had at their disposal to transform and supplant socially constituted identities and locally recognizable power relations.

This study has also revealed that call-in participants use reported speech to surreptitiously leak their own impressions towards an issue or figure into their commentary while maintaining their "neutral" stance. That is, speech reporting subtly disguises the reporter's assessment of the original remark through the voice of an "Other" or, in Goffmanian terms, the reporter assumes the stance of animator and not author of the reported utterance. As a "cloak and dagger" linguistic device, the call-in participant places herself in the powerful position of impugning another speaker's words, personality, and intent with reduced impunity to her own person. Yet, evoking the words of another may not be as neutral as it first appears, particularly when another speaker refuses to accept reported speech as an argumentative strategy. Speech reporting thus constitutes a double-edged sword as it can indiscriminately help or hinder the reporter's argumentative objectives.

Speech reporting also provided participants a linguistic device for alternatively maintaining and flouting the Chinese values of moral face (*lian* 臉), social face (*mianzi* 面子), and social harmony (*hemu* 和睦). Call-in participants actively negotiated these sociocultural values when they performed reconciliation talk and engaged in saliva wars. Although I have suggested that the call-in show's performative space provided participants a relatively safe and socially acceptable forum in which to temporarily shed the sociocultural constraints of attending to

lian, *mianzi*, and *hemu*, I nonetheless found that call-in participants mitigated the impact of their verbal affronts by directing their acts of social dis-harmony toward their interlocutor's linguistic behavior, and particularly, speech reporting practices. Even when a call-in participant targeted another speaker's character for criticism, reported speech served as a foil for personal denigration. In so doing, call-in participants used reported speech as a buffer between the directed criticism and the breach of social harmony caused by the verbal affront.

Drawing from Basso's (1979) observation that joking performances convey messages about two sets of relationships—a present one between the current interlocutors and an absent one based on the present situation—my study found that call-in participants' speech reporting behaviors also indexed both present and absent crisis scenarios within their verbal interactions. The present crisis scenario call-in participants referenced through their linguistic practices paralleled the call-in show itself, namely, the program's crisis frame and featured topic. At the same time, participants used reported speech to articulate and reproduce absent crisis scenarios, including crisis discourses circulating in Taiwan society such as the country's precarious national security and conditional sovereignty, the citizenry's ambivalent identity formation processes, and struggles over gendered relations of status and power.

This study likewise discovered that call-in participants used reported speech to conduct thought experiments and craft storyworlds as a means to forward alternative and oftentimes unfavorable scenarios that challenged dominant sociopolitical discourses that might otherwise remain unarticulated. Hypothetical reported speech proved particularly useful in this case, as participants used this linguistic device to rhetorically entertain and resolve disparate perspectives towards the program topic, and by extension, contest prevailing crisis discourses. Yet, in articulating popularized and even

marginalized understandings of Taiwan's various crisis discourses, participants nevertheless continued to contribute to the circulation of such discourses.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

At the outset of the dissertation, I identified this study as one that draws upon methodologies and theoretical frameworks from the ethnography of speaking, conversation analysis, language as social action, and communication studies in its intension to further linguistic, sociocultural, and mass media research on Taiwan. Following my analysis of call-in show participants' speech reporting practices however, I find that this study also has relevance to mass media studies, popular culture, and political science.

My discourse-centered analysis of TV call-in show verbal interactions relied upon an ethnographic approach to understand how participants used language to articulate complex and oftentimes contradictory interpretations of sociopolitical crisis issues and events in Taiwan. How speech reporting constitutes one feature of call-in show ways of talking directed my investigation on the ways this linguistic device contributed to the program's crisis frame and participants' crisis readings of the deliberated topics. Participants' speech reporting practices dually highlight present relationships within the call-in show setting, namely, those between in-studio participants, as well as relationships absent from the studio context.

The creative ways in which call-in participants used reported speech to index and negotiate Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses within a marked performative space coincide with Duranti's (1994) assessment that it is through speakers' linguistic practices that crises become an occasion for reassessing social order. Much like his Samoan setting where political acumen is strongly affiliated with verbal skills, Taiwan's political TV call-in shows offer participants a space to create a "path of words" where solutions to conflicts over definitions and linguistic framings can be crafted through ways of speaking (176). In the present

case, call-in participants laid a path of words with the utterances of other speakers, a linguistic strategy I recognize as "ways of reporting."

In promoting a conversation analysis approach to examine talk-in-interaction, I found that by donning "mundane colored glasses" (Schegloff 1988/89:217) in my investigation of the political TV call-in show, I was less susceptible to having my "moral/political/dramatic sensibilities mobilized by the data" (ibid:218). Moreover, my turn-by-turn examination of participants' verbal interactions revealed how the "generic domain" of reported speech reveals much about the sociopolitical issues and events they index (ibid). Indeed, videotaped data of the call-in shows further verified this finding. Through the combined use of participant observation and videotaped data, I was able to critically address what Koven (2001) remarked as a shortcoming in reported speech research, namely, the inability to compare the original utterance to its future reporting and thus evaluate the extent of their "reportedness."

In addition, my research contributes to understandings of speech reporting in naturally-occurring speech in Mandarin Chinese. While previous studies on reported speech of Mandarin speakers either quantitatively compared the number of instances of direct versus indirect reported speech or evaluated their use within a formal versus informal language use paradigm, my study expands the applications of reported speech beyond these dichotomies. Call-in participants used reported speech to present sources and evidence; conduct thought experiments; negotiate the sociocultural values of face, image, and harmony; juxtapose the "real" world with the storyworld; and most significantly, to animate and reconfigure dominant sociopolitical crisis scenarios within Taiwan society.

As for the field of communication studies, my study illustrates the benefits of using ethnographic methods for examining quasi-mediated interactions. While communication studies scholars of radio and TV talk/call-in shows have used discourse analysis to draw associations between language on the one hand, and

political participation and democratic values on the other, such an approach reifies language as product and sociopolitical participation as process. My study offers an alternative approach in which linguistic practices and sociopolitical discourses dialectically inform and recreate one another such that "language is a part of communicative conduct and social action" (Hymes 1972a:316).

By extension, this study also contributes to mass media studies by considering how "tabloid" journalism can challenge dominant discourses by foregrounding marginalized voices and identities (Gamson 1998). Although some scholars have decried the rise of infotainment, I have shown that the merging of performative linguistic and mass-mediated practices with information content has a significant place in modernizing and democratizing societies such as Taiwan. Infotainment can open up discussions of controversial issues and events, which in some ways reflects the gradual democratization of a previously silenced populace and censored mass media. Although sound bite-oriented verbal sparring and 20-second caller segments have their political drawbacks, such as giving short shrift to complex topics, nonetheless the call-in show's many advantages include incorporating public participation in political discussions and featuring opposing viewpoints rather than subtly obfuscating dissension in the name of general consensus.

In addition, this investigation furthers the development of a "(linguistic) anthropology of mass media" (Spitulnik 1993). That is, my examination of Taiwan's political TV call-in shows integrates "the study of mass media into [anthropology's] analyses of the 'total social fact' of modern life" (ibid:293), in this case, one predicated on "crisis" discourses. This study also situates mass media as a site and impetus for "fundamental and irreversible social and cultural change" in a modernizing and democratizing society (ibid:306), including one where sociopolitical leaders' utterances are vulnerable to interpretation and

reappropriation by not only call-in participants, but also a diverse and transnational viewing audience.

In regards to the developing field of Taiwan studies, my linguistic anthropological investigation into the role political TV call-in shows play in Taiwan's sociopolitical environment offers an interdisciplinary understanding of the country's mass media liberalization and democratization processes. This "multilateral" approach expands upon previous research that has primarily focused on one or two of these areas—namely, Taiwan's linguistic, mass media, and democratic development—but rarely all three simultaneously. My study also draws attention to alternative sociopolitical spheres in Taiwan where marginalized voices and actors have increasing opportunities to participate in previously restricted venues such as broadcasting and mass media. Similarly, my ethnographic investigation of a popularized mass-mediated forum broadens traditional anthropological research in Taiwan from the study of "native" languages and cultures (e.g., those of Taiwan's various Aboriginal groups) to contemporary sociopolitical venues.

This project also contributes to popular culture studies where new mass-mediated spaces like talk shows and the Internet garner greater scholarly attention as they dismantle and blur the arbitrary distinction between public and private spaces, voices, and identities. Although my examination of call-in participants' speech reporting practices represents a localized investigation of how everyday linguistic practices are strategically applied in sociopolitical discussions on Taiwan's political TV call-in shows, my findings have relevance for other modern and modernizing societies as well. In particular, my research forwards an understanding of popular culture as involving "both ideological constraint and expressive process" (Traube 1996:133). Moreover, this study situates call-in show participants as "actively engag[ing] in mass-produced cultural forms [and] producing meanings informed by their lived experience" (ibid:135).

My investigation into call-in show ways of reporting also offers the field of political science a non-conventional approach toward examining the emergence of democratic processes and practices through language use. My study demonstrates that popularized avenues such as political TV call-in shows deserve as much scholarly attention as conventional political forums in Taiwan such as the Legislative Yuan or the campaign trail, particularly in terms of analyzing public participation and sociopolitical discourses. My investigation into call-in show saliva wars as a postmodern linguistic expression of formerly physical confrontations illustrates what an ethnopragmatics approach can offer in understanding the transformation of political processes in the face of technological and sociological changes.

LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

As previously mentioned in the introductory chapter, the present study does not provide ethnographic data on the reception of political TV call-in shows by viewers in Taiwan and elsewhere.[1] Investigating how Taiwan viewers receive and interact with call-in shows would have enriched this study by providing a perspective of how mass-mediated products are incorporated into the everyday lives of its consumers (cf. Caldarola 1994; Eiselein 1972, 1975; Lull 1990; Mankekar 1999; Radway 1984). This viewpoint would have also offered insights into how "media consumption is embedded in the culture of media production" (Spitulnik 1993:299; cf. de Certeau 1984; Lave et al. 1992). Future research on this topic should seek to incorporate this angle.

Another area that requires further analysis involves the interaction between call-in show technology and participant linguistic behaviors. Such an investigation would include examining how call-in show production mangers frame the narration of a topic through visual, audio, and satellite technologies.

This involves exploring how "technologically mediated environments" such as call-in shows require and challenge participants to negotiate "complex participation frames including different semiotic modes" (Keating 2000:100).

Examples of areas that can be explored in greater detail include the ways participants interact with call-in show video clips, how call-in operators select and potentially screen callers, the influence phone-in polling has on participant discussions, and well as the different linguistic practices participants use with physically absent, yet virtually present interlocutors who are incorporated through satellite transmission. For call-in program viewers, the addition of topical aids such as headlines, cartoons, maps, and information-bearing "news mixed supplements" before commercial breaks, also comprise the technologically enhanced experience of watching these programs that the in-studio participants may not see, and therefore, cannot interact with.

Given this study's focus on verbal demonstrations of reported speech, further research is required to examine the role nonverbal forms of expression play in participants' speech reporting practices, including gestures as well as body movement and alignment. This study attempted to incorporate in its analysis of reported speech body movement and gestures, especially when they played a significant role in speech reporting performances (e.g., *2100* moderator Lee Tao's arm and finger gestures when indexing an imaginary interlocutor; Mr. Tim Ting's hand gestures when differentiating himself as animator and Pres. Chen Shui-bian as author of a reported remark). Examining how call-in participants enhance their verbal utterances with nonverbal behavior not only enriches one's understanding of reported speech, but also abets studies on gesture and nonverbal speech practices in general (cf. Haviland 1993; Kendon 1981, 1997; McNeill 1992; Schegloff 1984). In short, future research on speech reporting should regard

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[1] Several of the cable TV stations (e.g., TVBS, ETTV) broadcast their call-in shows to the U.S., Singapore, and Australia.

gestures as "culture-specific emblems that function as complete, quotable utterances in their own right, independent of or substitutable for speech" (Haviland 1999:89).

Subsequently, call-in show research should also explore the variety of codes or languages participants use on the programs. Given Taiwan's multilingual environment, and especially with the growing prestige and use of Taiwanese in informal and formal settings, examining when and how call-in participants insert, borrow, or switch between different codes would provide valuable insights into the shifting relationship between as well as changing attitudes towards the "national language" (*guoyu* 國語) or Mandarin Chinese and traditionally marginalized languages (e.g. Taiwanese, Hakka, and the various Aborigine languages) in Taiwan. Furthermore, with Taiwan's recent language reforms that require students to begin learning English in middle school, and combined with the popularity of private English language lessons for preschool children, further study into the presence and use of English in mass-mediated forums such as call-in shows is also warranted.

Furthermore, given that Taiwan's call-in shows are primarily broadcast in Mandarin, it is worthwhile to note the role mass media plays in influencing sociolinguistic changes towards language use and linguistic ideologies. The study briefly addressed some of these issues in two call-in show excerpts, including moderator Lee Tao's code switching from Mandarin to Taiwanese and guest panelist Mr. Ting's English word borrowing. Both of these linguistic choices instantly created a multilingual setting, which contrasted with the predominantly Mandarin-based program discussion. Moreover, it is telling that call-in participants inserted codes that were readily available in Taiwan's multilingual environment as a means to strategically index locally-marked sociopolitical identities and to forward an ideological stance, respectively.

Prior to the U.S. war with Iraq, several European leaders published an op-ed article in the *Wall Street Journal* in which they declared their support for the U.S., a gesture *New York Times* contributor William Safire called "op-ed diplomacy."[2] Expanding upon this mass-mediated diplomatic approach, I consider call-in shows and their sociopolitical deliberations as engaging in a form of "call-in show diplomacy," a significant, yet overlooked function of this programming genre that deserves greater study. The call-in show's diplomatic role can be discerned from efforts to incorporate overseas Chinese, many of whom are voters in Taiwan, in discussions on Taiwan's sociopolitical processes through on-site broadcasts in the U.S, a event that occurred during Taiwan's 2000 presidential campaign season. Aside from enlarging the call-in program's viewing audience, these broadcasts strengthen ties between Taiwan and overseas Chinese (*huaqiao* 華僑) residents who often serve as unofficial diplomats for the ROC government in the communities in which they live.[3] These communities also represent a marginal yet important space in cross-straits tensions as both the governments of Taiwan and China regard overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and intellectuals as a rich source of economic and symbolic capital.

Along these lines, call-in show diplomacy has the potential to play an influential role in cross-straits diplomacy. The possibilities already exist through Taiwan-China guest panel verbal interactions, as demonstrated in episodes in which *2100: All People Open Talk* invited scholars from China to participate through satellite transmission. Although this study did not analyze these interactions, I particularly encourage communication studies and public diplomacy scholars, and others, to examine call-in shows as a potential conduit

[2] In "And now: op-ed diplomacy," *New York Times*, Monday, February 3, 2003.
[3] The scandal involving Taiwan national Jimmy Chung and his solicitation of financial support among the overseas Chinese community for former President Clinton represents a case in point.

for informal "track three"[4] cross-straits diplomacy. Given that Taiwan's call-in shows are already broadcast to overseas Chinese communities in the U.S. and Singapore for instance, it is only a matter of time before residents and government officials in Hong Kong, Macau, and China have access to these programs as well, if not already.

While my study focused upon the relationship between political TV call-in shows and Taiwan's sociopolitical transformation, there are other mass-mediated oppositional public spheres that also wield increasing influence in moderating public discussions of current affairs in Taiwan. One promising space is the Internet, which call-in programs such as *2100: All People Open Talk* and *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* already maintain websites for viewers to post messages or email comments. As an interactive medium, it is worthwhile to consider the role reported speech (in the form of written quotations) plays in recreating and proliferating crisis interpretations of sociopolitical events and ideologies, and moreover, how these linguistic practices accentuate or differ from those promoted on call-in show broadcasts.

In my analysis of call-in participants' reactions to the PRC's banning of pop star A-mei, I briefly included Internet postings from A-mei fans in the PRC to illustrate the extent of her alleged political transgression. What I did not mention, however, was the humorous yet potentially threatening cross-straits Internet "hacker war." Paralleling the PRC/A-mei crisis, this hacker war reportedly began when PRC Internet users infiltrated ROC government websites and posted pro-China propaganda. In retaliation, Taiwan Internet users redecorated PRC government webpages with images of Hello Kitty revolving to the strains of the

[4] The phrase "track three" plays with the notion that current informal cross-straits diplomacy is referred to as "track two" diplomacy, including the Koo-Wang meetings in 1992, meetings between low-level officials, and sociocultural exchanges. "Track one" diplomacy represents direct or formal dialogue between Taiwan and China, which has never existed between the two geopolitical entities since the KMT moved its regime to Taiwan in 1949.

ROC national anthem.[5] This Internet manifestation of cross-straits tensions illustrates that public participation in the reproduction and consumption of sociopolitical crisis discourses increasingly assumes a myriad of forums as it unfolds in newfound places.

This seemingly "nonserious" cross-straits confrontation on the Internet recalls a related need for further research on the role of speech play in call-in show deliberations. My dissertation cursorily examined this linguistic behavior through call-in participants' verbal sparring performances and during moderator Lee Tao's prosodically marked and hypothetically reported speech-laden monologue on Taiwan's national identity crisis discourses. However, call-in participants also use puns, jokes, and anecdotes to spice their remarks with mocking insinuation and facetious implications.[6] As a "deeply serious and significant" feature of verbal interactions, speech play offers both participants and scholars of call-in shows a valuable and versatile resource for expressing and analyzing "implicit and explicit metacommentary" (Sherzer 2002:1) regarding controversial sociopolitical issues and events.

A final area that requires further study involves addressing call-in participants' wide repertoire of argumentative styles during program deliberations. My analysis on the use of reported speech as evidentiality, a measurement of authority, and a persuasive device merely introduces one argumentative resource. Although my examination of call-in show saliva wars provides a detailed analysis of argumentative talk, further research should be conducted on how call-in participants' confrontations are structured by turn-taking, initiated and closed, as well as co-opted by the moderator or other participants (Lunsford et. al. 2001). In short, how call-in participants succeed or

[5] What these two markedly different hacking styles reveals about the popular and political cultures in Taiwan and the PRC I leave for other scholars to explore.

fail in performing confrontation talk constitutes a key component of the call-in show's crisis frame, including the recreation and perpetuation of crisis discourses in public discourse.

THE TAIWANIZATION OF TALKSHOWS

Scholars have admiringly described Taiwan's relatively stable economic (from an agricultural to an industrial and technologically based one between the 1960s to 1980s) and political transformations (from an authoritarian system to a democratic society between the 1970s to 1990s) as a "quiet revolution" (cf. Gold 1984 and Rigger 1999). In contrast, I regard the rise of alternative mass media programming—beginning with underground radio in the late 1960s to cable TV call-in shows in the mid 1990s—as Taiwan's "not-so-quiet revolution." In coining this part-facetious, part-descriptive moniker, I deliberately draw attention to the gradual emergence of alternative avenues for public, and highly vocal, political participation in Taiwan.

Yet the "Taiwanization" of talk shows into "knock and respond" (*kouying* 叩應) shows in this democratizing society and emerging mass media environment continues to reflect the country's unique sociohistorical development and geopolitical circumstances. As Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) observe, media issues have a tendency to become highly politicized in Taiwan, and subsequently, develop into political objects and sites of contestation. The scholars also regard Taiwan as a "media-friendly" society, considering that its mass media institutions have been at the center of the country's sociopolitical evolution (ibid:5). This study's examination of call-in show crisis topics and participants' strategic language practices lends further credence to this reading, especially by encouraging public discussion of controversial events and sensitive issues.

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[6] For an analysis of a guest panelist's effective use of punning when discussing cross-straits tensions during the PRC/A-mei crisis, see Chu (forthcoming) in "Taiwan's mass-mediated 'crisis discourse': pop politics in an era of political TV call-in shows."

In her characterization of Israeli prime-time talk shows, Liebes (1999) describes this discursive forum as epitomizing the replacement of "reporting by argument…a sense of unity by conflict, and the sense of the anchor's control by an image of playful chaos" (123). While my study's examination of call-in show saliva wars finds credence for this programming genre's "playful chaos," it is Liebes' observation that talk shows engender "unity by conflict" that most resonates with my investigation into call-in show crisis discourses. Through call-in participants' speech reporting practices, I found that call-in show discussions were linked by disparate yet equally urgent readings of the various sociopolitical events or issues.

The importance of political TV call-in show's in Taiwan's collective consciousness is also substantiated in Tolson's (2001b) assessment that talk shows deserve attention if only for provoking considerable public debate about their presence and role in societies where popular programming wields growing influence. My analysis of call-in deliberations of Taiwan's ambivalent national identity(-ies) and cross-straits impasse with China demonstrated that participants use this mass-mediated space to verbalize and negotiate such issues, which in turn circulate in public discourse and impact sociopolitical process. For instance, the organization of call-in teams by political parties during the 2000 presidential election as a means to sway voter perceptions demonstrates the influential role call-in shows play in Taiwan's sociopolitical landscape. Similarly, call-in shows can fan public disapproval and moderate the admonishment of public officials, as in the case of Vice President Annette Lu's controversial remarks. These two examples illustrate the extent to which local call-in show producers and participants have "Taiwanized" this originally-Western programming product.

Given these developments some scholars have expressed disappointment in cable TV's failure in providing impartial news coverage, a service for which Taiwan's non-cable TV stations have long been criticized. Political scientist and

Taiwan studies scholar James Robinson (1996) dismisses cable TV news programs, including political talk shows, as simply promoting "greater competition in biased reporting" (in Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2001:76). Although Robinson's call for "more objective commentary" (ibid) by Taiwan's news media is valid in terms of the *reporting* of news, however, the call-in show's role as infotainment provider and product precludes it from this expectation. Rather, my study illustrates the worthiness of examining call-in participants' subjective remarks for what they reveal about Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses, and moreover, for how they recreate and reconfigure such discourses through verbal interactions.

In my interviews with participants, viewers, and scholars of call-in shows, several individuals commented on the populist tendencies in Taiwan politics and recent mass media developments. For instance, in a personal interview, Chengchi University (政治大學) communications scholar Bonnie Peng (彭芸) expressed her reservations toward the political TV call-in show as a mass-mediated representative of Taiwan's nouveau public sphere, especially when the sociopolitical elite are paid to deliberate facetious topics—such as whether former ROC president Lee Teng-hui could produce a self-deprecating "farewell" video like former U.S. President Bill Clinton did—over "serious" issues (e.g., political corruption, rising crime, economic slowdown) (Bonnie Peng 2000). While call-in show fans may be amused by and its detractors scornful of such infotainment fare headlining as "news," it is nevertheless worthwhile to note the popularization of news coverage in Taiwan even if it leans towards "new news" (Kalb 1998). Given Taiwan's recent mass media liberalization, each call-in show episode strengthens the country's sociopolitical democratization including what can, rather than what cannot, be discussed. Moreover, call-in show topics are selected for their appeal to viewers rather than government censors, which again demonstrates the gradual popularization of politics in Taiwan.

MEDIA-TING TAIWAN'S POP POLITICS THROUGH EVERYDAY DISCOURSE

Bosco (1994) describes Taiwan's post-martial law environment as constituting a "struggle between orthodoxy of the center and heterodoxy of the periphery [that] has given way to the unorthodox cosmopolitism of Taiwanese popular culture" (394). In this study, call-in show participants' use of reported speech as a means of animating and contesting sociopolitical crisis discourses represents an example of how the center and periphery in Taiwan are increasingly blurred through postmodern, "unorthodox" political discourse. My analysis suggests that public political discourse in Taiwan has become popularized through new mass media venues as call-in participants increasingly draw from everyday linguistic resources (e.g., reported speech) and personal experiences in their deliberations.

Applying everyday ways of speaking alone, however, does not mark call-in show deliberations as a form of "popular politics" or pop politics. For instance, Chinese societies, including Taiwan, have long appreciated the use of well-established proverbs to describe current events as a sign of a speaker's linguistic dexterity and political astuteness. Rather, what popularizes call-in show discussions is in the manner call-in participants adroitly reappropriate the real or imagined words of sociopolitical figures, including leaders (e.g., ROC President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu) and pop stars (e.g., A-mei), as their own for strategic application and reinterpretation. It is this equal opportunity revoicing of another speaker's words that characterizes the popularization of political discussion in call-in program verbal interactions. Thus, speech reporting represents a sociolinguistic "equalizer" in that all speakers, regardless of political background and linguistic competence, have the potential to use this linguistic device to editorialize an utterance and by extension a speaker's character.

The mediazation and popularization of political practices in Taiwan is also marked by the shift from physical sparring to verbal sparring as the confrontation

mode of choice among most politicians.[7] The emergence of saliva wars as both a colloquialism and TV call-in show mainstay reveals that sociopolitical leaders are modifying their behavior in ways that the public (e.g., the viewers and electorate) deem as acceptable political conduct.[8] Although call-in show saliva wars represent the newest form of political performance on the one hand, they have the benefit of rechanneling political tensions into acceptable verbal expression in ways that both articulate and renegotiate such conflicts on the other.

The form of pop politics that political TV call-in show epitomize, however, differs from what Taiwan's mass media has self-reflectively and metadiscursively dubbed "media politics" (*meiti zhengzhi* 媒體政治),[9] a term that describes the growing number of media celebrities in the political realm.[10] In contrast, the political TV call-in show's raucous deliberative format, crisis frame, and sound bite-oriented summaries of program topics as well as participants' tongue-in-cheek verbal performances constitute a popularization of sociopolitical issues and discourses. My study's examination of this programming genre's reliance on video clip summaries of current events and participants' insertion of reported speech as argumentative evidence (e.g., Mr. Ting's revoicing of President Chen's "compatriot" utterance provides as a strong example) foregrounds how these practices contribute to the "sound biting" of political

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[7] I cautiously qualify this assessment with the word "most" to allow for the periodic occurrence of physical assaults between politicians in Taiwan. See Chapter Seven for reference to one such recent episode.

[8] This is not to say that the public does not appreciate and welcome political performance; however, voters have penalized politicians who have "performed" too much or unfavorably by electing them out of office.

[9] In the December 2002 Taipei City Council elections, voters elected five "celebrity politicians" to office including a TV news show host, a sports news anchor, an impersonator of former ROC president Lee Teng-hui, and an actor. Taiwan's political pundits reportedly predicted that these electoral victories suggested an increasing role for media politics in future elections (*Taipei Times Online*, December 8th, 2002).

[10] This latest generation of media personalities-cum-politicians contrasts with the rise of "black-gold" (*heijin* 黑金) politics in the 1980s and 1990s in which gangsters-cum-politicians was

discussion, not to mention sociopolitical discourses, in Taiwan. It is this sound biting tendency and discursive process as disseminated through new mass media conduits that characterizes Taiwan's emerging pop political environment and unorthodox politicking.

The popularization of politics in Taiwan in the form of call-in show crisis-oriented deliberations recalls Bourdieu's (1991) notion of "political fetishism," whereby "delegates" or representatives of a group appear as self-sufficient spokespersons who "engage in verbal battles" (Thompson 1991:27). Yet, the appearance of autonomy these spokespersons have (e.g., politicians representing a political party), conceal from themselves and others the sociopolitical discourses on which their influence and the power of their words depends (ibid). Consequently, call-in shows represent a popularized and mass-mediated version of Bourdieu's "political field," while its participants constitute the agents who reproduce Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses through their linguistic practices, especially when engaging in saliva wars. Ironically, the more often participants appear on call-in shows to problematize prevailing crisis discourses, the more they endow them with a life and value of their own.

Yet, this study suggests that locating the production and fetishization of Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses within popularized forms and venues of political discussion does not diminish their significance, but rather, enhances it. Schegloff (1988/89) recognizes that complex sociopolitical processes often arise from everyday linguistic practices such that even the most "momentous issues in the civic polity are played with the same practices of conduct as inform the most humble scene" (237). Consequently, this study argues that to disregard the "common practices of mundane sociality" occurs at the "peril of

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decried as infiltrating the political scene. Although black-gold politics is largely associated with the KMT, it continues to exert its presence under President Chen's DPP administration.

misunderstanding what is, at least officially, of much greater seriousness" (ibid).[11] To regard the use of reported speech as a means to animate and negotiate crisis discourses as a mundane act both underestimates the influence this linguistic practice lends its users as well as overlooks the complexity of its latent messages.

Lastly, call-in show crisis frames and participants' performative interpretations also draws comparisons to the "CNN-effect," that is, the extent to which television pictures of crises drive the foreign policy agenda of Western governments such as the United States (cf. Negrine 1996). Along these lines, call-in show crisis-of-the-day topics and participants' urgent rhetoric generate a "call-in show effect" which influences both governmental behavior and public perceptions of Taiwan's sociopolitical issues and events. Needless to say, the repercussions of a "call-in show effect" go beyond the breadth of the current study. I consider this programming "side effect" as worthy of further study and encourage other researchers to pursue it.

CALL-IN SHOW DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Liebes (1999) claims that events or topics that stir public emotions can be both opportune and risky as "the public demand for reassurance and the popular demand for the allocation of blame leads in a melodramatic, populist direction" (122-23).[12] My study embraced this dualism as it examined call-in participants' articulation and negotiation of the dangers and opportunities laden within the program topics they deliberated. For instance, while Lee Tao enacted the confusion wrought by Taiwan's national identity crisis in his polyphonic and multivocal monologue, this was contrasted by PFP Legislator Diane Lee's

[11] From a slightly different perspective, Thompson regards the vehicle of national entertainment in U.S. popular culture has the "uncanny ability to dissolve just about anything and incorporate it, transformed and repackaged, into the body politic" (*New York Times*, August 8, 2002, A17).

[12] Blum-Kulka et. al.'s (2002) study of argumentation on Israeli talk shows also acknowledges the "pop" nature of political discourse on talk shows as demonstrated through language use, in this case, the Jewish tradition of *xavruta* or the practice of paired-study of Talmudic texts in an aggressive and quarrelsome tenor.

performative "thought experiment" that reassuringly reconciled her own and Taiwan's Chinese and Taiwanese identities.

Another danger/opportunity dichotomy this study faced included its narrowly focused investigation into the political TV call-in show's crisis frame by means of its participants' speech reporting practices. This ambitious endeavor had the potential to trivialize its subject, not to mention a topic-cum-phenomenon that has assumed "mania" (*rechao* 熱潮) proportions in Taiwan's popular and political imaginary. My study could have been undermined by the topic's "political or otherwise dramatic character," and correspondingly, the expectation that its inquiry "live up" to this image (Schegloff 1988/89:216-217). Rather than be overwhelmed by the monumental scale of its subject, however, my study capitalized upon the opportunity that examining seemingly "mundane considerations" (ibid) (e.g., reported speech) offered to investigating the political and emotive dimensions of call-in show verbal interactions.

While the call-in show crisis frame's *wei* (危)/*ji* (機) or danger/opportunity dualism drove my investigation of participants' speech reporting practices, another dialectical feature ran throughout the study. This feature included the present and absent relationships participants' verbal interactions indexed and recreated. On the one hand, the dangers of deliberating controversial topics with political opponents and colleagues within the call-in show setting had the potential to carry over to other sociopolitical figures and relationships outside of the studio context. On the other hand, participants eagerly capitalized upon the call-in show's contrived setting as they temporarily shed identities and suspended relationships they were required to maintain outside the program. The call-in show thus offered a welcome opportunity for participants to play with a variety of characters and voices in the name and interest of the call-in show's performative frame. However, it should be noted that the danger/opportunity relationship remained tenuous as a participant could not

anticipate when a "play" or non-serious character or voice might be interpreted as a "serious" one by another participant or call-in show viewer.

Overall, the inherent contradictions latent within call-in show participants' articulations and explanations for Taiwan's crisis discourses were readily apparent in the creative linguistic practices speakers used to juggle the dangers and opportunities sociopolitical events and issues alternatively provoked and inspired in the public imaginary. This finding collaborates with Edelman's (1977) observation that "our modes of referring to problems and policies creates for each of us a succession of crises, of respites, of separate grounds for anxiety and for hope. . .This, too, is a formula for coping with them ineffectively, and that is bound to reinforce anxiety in its turn" (41). My study thus regards call-in show ways of reporting as merely one expression of the tensions and ambivalences the people of Taiwan experience in their daily interactions, be it on mass-mediated programs, during legislative interpellation sessions, or in face-to-face interactions.

SITUATING CALL-IN SHOW "WAYS OF REPORTING"

As this study's final note, I would like to recall Carbaugh's (1988) opening remarks in his ethnographic examination of *Donahue*. He stated that his aim was not to claim that talk show participants speak a particular way, but to forward a "way of listening" to cultural discourses and a culture speaking to itself in one American venue. My examination of political TV call-in show verbal interactions in Taiwan has similarly explored both the "getting and giving of information" in this setting (Bauman and Sherzer 1989:xv). In short, while this study ostensibly explored ways of speaking, or more specifically, ways of reporting on call-in programs, it also investigated ways of contextualizing call-in show deliberations of crisis discourses within Taiwan's evolving sociopolitical environment. Thus, this investigation of Taiwan's call-in shows primarily represents a study on call-in show "ways of speaking/reporting," and second, of

linguistic practices that are discursively relevant and intriguing regardless of their spectacle or non-spectacle characteristics (cf. Edelman 1988; Schegloff 1988/89).

When I introduced the dissertation's focus on call-in show participants' speech reporting practices, I linked Volosinov's (1973 (1929)) notion of dialogism as "speech within speech, utterance within utterance and at the same time speech about speech, utterance about utterance" (115) with the Chinese saying "within speech there is speech" (*hua zhong you hua* 話中有話). As these two concepts suggest and as my analysis demonstrates, utterances and the words that comprise them are constantly being reproduced and reinterpreted by the speakers who use them and the listeners to whom they are spoken. My study's finding that call-in participants strategically use reported speech for persuasive influence and argumentative substantiation when deliberating sensitive sociopolitical issues contends that speech reporting does not represent an arbitrary linguistic practice for articulating and resolving Taiwan's crisis discourses. In other words, it is an "illusion" to believe that "language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection" (Whorf 1956:134).

Yet do call-in participants' linguistic performances of crisis discourses constitute what Althusser (1994) identifies as "misrecognition," that is, mistaking a false and partial view of reality for reality itself? Has Taiwan replaced formerly and overly KMT-controlled mass media "ideological State apparatuses" with publicly participated and "open" deliberations that nonetheless recycle and promulgate the same dominant discourses? In other words, are program participants and viewers so "seduced" (Hart 1994) by the call-in show's sound-bite packaging that its partial perspective, in both senses of the word, has been accepted as Taiwan's "reality"?

In response, I regard call-in participants' performances of Taiwan's sociopolitical crisis discourses as exhibiting a "socially constituted linguistics"

that is based on linguistic and cultural relativity (Hymes 1972a). Through this lens, speakers produce "reality" through their verbal constructions and discursive interventions, which are in turn critiqued as well.[13] Chng (2002) claims speakers "constitute and reconstitute" their sociopolitical and cultural realities through language use while "vying constantly for the right to control and to define a particular worldview that is consistent with one's own ideology" (6). In the context of political TV call-in shows, speech reporting served as a valuable linguistic tool for maintaining and deconstructing Taiwan's competing worldviews regarding the nation and its people's identities and relations of power and status.

In grounding my study in a linguistic relativity perspective, I emphasize the dynamic and negotiated process, or the "getting and the giving," of speech reporting between speaker and listener (Bauman and Sherzer 1989). Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) remind us:

> [E]very use of language is a fresh application, a metaphorical extension, of existing systems. . .expressing not truths about the external universe but views of the universe modeled by a particular speaker or hearer—and they…are the only repositories of language, the only creators of systems, the only, and idiosyncratic, links between language and the 'real' world (196).

It is precisely through call-in participants' idiosyncratic speech reporting practices that utterances are rejuvenated, and subsequently, have the opportunity to assume a "fresh" meaning and interpretation. That is, until words are used, we do not know the "precise values they will bear in the new context or the precise part of the sentence they will form" (ibid:196). My examination of call-in show ways of reporting interactions substantiates this finding as the same utterance assumed

[13] This perspective draws from the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis which acknowledges a language-world relationship between the nature of language and how speakers of particular languages view their world. Sapir (1966 (1929)) explains language as "a guide to 'social reality' [as] it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes" (68).

disparate interpretations from reporting to reporting during call-in participant deliberations.

Hence, call-in show ways of reporting serve as symbolic cues that momentarily capture Taiwan's crisis discourses as reconstituted processes which vividly perform the call-in show's "debate without conclusion" premise. The call-in show's non-concluding conclusions and "stay tuned" signoffs not only capture the program's main premise, but also reflect Taiwan's sociopolitical environment. That is, just as speech reporting draws both speaker and reporter into an unanticipated relationship, so does the call-in show's crisis frame and Taiwan's crisis discourses weave intricate webs of significance for its participants and the community in which it unfolds.

For these reasons, to seek a conclusion of any form prematurely and unnecessarily restricts a discursive process that thrives on ambiguity and uncertainty. Consequently, I find the call-in show's crisis ambiance and participants' linguistic reflexivity a fitting tribute to Taiwan's real and imagined perpetual crises. As a parting example of the delicate balance between sociopolitical "reality" and call-in show verbal art, I conclude my study with moderator Lee Tao's parting words at the end of a *2100* episode on cross-straits tensions, one that aptly captures the futility and superficiality of providing a "conclusion" per se:

> My time has also run over. As for the five in-studio guests, we also don't have time for everyone to give their closing remarks. However…whether the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits understand each other, [it's] just like what Mr. Jin Wei-tsun [a guest panelist] just said, there is this mutual understanding. So this kind of situation continues on [and] perhaps we all need to carefully observe it. All People Open Talk.[14] Thank you very much for watching. Tomorrow, 9 o'clock [to] 10 o'clock [we] meet again. Thank you.[15]

[14] Text in Arial font spoken in Taiwanese.
[15] See Appendix B, Excerpt 15.

Appendices

APPENDIX A. TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Notation	Example	Explanation
.	word.	Stop at end of phrase
:	word:	Elongated pronunciation; each additional (:) refers to the length of the pronunciation
,	word, word	Pause between two words or phrases
--	word--word	Abrupt stop between two words or phrases
underline	word	Spoken with added emphasis
Arial font	word	Spoken in a language other than Mandarin; usually code-switching from Mandarin to English or Mandarin to Taiwanese.
( )	(word)	In Chinese text, refers to unclearly spoken words and the author's interpretation of the words.
		In English text, refers to unclearly spoken words as well as words that were not uttered in Chinese but clarifies the English translation.
(( ))	((word))	Comments within an utterance
{ }	{word}	Additional sounds, descriptions, and clarification
(xxx)		Unclear utterance; each "x" represents a syllable that was unclearly spoken
[ ]	[word word]	Refers to overlapping speech between two or more speakers
[ ]	[word word]	
=	=word=	Continuous speech or spoken without pause
(…)		Omitted text
(.)		Very brief pause

APPENDIX B. CHINESE TEXT OF CALL-IN SHOW EXCERPTS.

Chapter Three Excerpt

Excerpt 1. Lee Tao (*2100 *moderator)
Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 2, 2000
Topic: *Bensheng/waisheng*: must they still be differentiated? (本省，外省還要分嗎?)

大家好。歡迎收看2100全民開講。今天要為各位探討一個::. . 問題！ 可能一直都存在我們這個社會裡面，但是大家都很少去，談:。因為這個問題比較，敏::感!

Chapter Five Excerpts

Excerpt 2. A-mei video clip
Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 26, 2000
Topic: Has Communist China banned A-mei? Is this forcing Taiwan to declare independence? (中共封殺阿妹？逼臺獨立?)

我覺得從小生長在中華民國在這兒的人，那，大家都一起, 這個--
小時候我想，我相信大家都，都--都是唱過國歌的，這樣子長大的，
所以這次是真的很單純。我是以一個歌手的身份去這個受邀，然後唱國歌。
所以，eh，不應該是這樣子吧。很單純的一件事情唱國歌被弄成是這個--
有一點政治化。這是一個誤會。

Excerpt 3. Vice President Annette Lu video clip
Program: *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*
Date: June 12, 2000
Topic: Should the Vice President be recalled? (副總統該被撤換嗎?)

看我們總統多英明。{applause} 他找我當，副總統。 扮黑臉。{general laughter} 然後呢，他請，我們蔡英文女士當陸委會的主委。請鍾琴女士當任行政院的發言人。從今而後，台灣女性美妙的聲音，不是隨時要從政治舞台發出去嗎？

Excerpt 4. Ms. Peng Yen-wen (panelist)

Program: *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*
Date: June 12, 2000
Topic: Should the Vice President be recalled? (副總統該被撤換嗎?)

好…其他呂秀蓮以前講什麼話，我不在現場，我不是記者，我不能--但是我這次親身觀察，媒體--媒體明明就是扭曲發言。明明在這麼，這麼大的文章中它挑其中的其實是有點自嘲諷的，因為大陸這樣貼她標籤，所以它有點嘲諷，…

Excerpt 5. Ms. Peng Yen-wen (panelist)

Program: *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*
Date: June 12, 2000

Topic: Should the Vice President be recalled? (副總統該被撤換嗎**?**)

…我覺得，這件事總統府的反應讓我覺得內部溝通，的確出現了一些問題，因為，它基，基本上它今天發表一個新聞稿，然後才，eh告知呂秀蓮，它沒有去了解呂秀蓮這篇演講的全文，我覺得這是一個蠻不尊重副總統的一個…

Excerpt 6. PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji video clip

Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: March 16, 2000
Topic: Final decision 24 (hrs.): who is letting the electorate vote in fear? (決戰24: 誰讓選民在恐懼中投票?)

台灣人民，面臨著，緊急的歷史時刻。何去何從。切莫意識衝動。以免後悔莫及。我們相信台灣人民的政治智慧。我們相信台灣同胞，會作出明智的歷史決策！但是還有三天。世事，難測。台灣同胞！你們要警惕啊！

Chapter Six Excerpts

Excerpt 7. DPP Legislator Lee Ying-yuan (panelist)
Program : *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 2, 2000
Topic: *Bensheng/waisheng*: must they still be differentiated? (本省，外省還要分嗎?)

現在的問題說，外省人的那個危機感，強到幾乎八成到九成集中在宋楚瑜身上。

Excerpt 8. Ms. Hsu (caller)
Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 2, 2000
Topic: *Bensheng/waisheng*: must they still be differentiated? (本省，外省還要分嗎?)

Hello? Hi. Uh-uh I want to say: that: China—I feel that from—from those first generation Mainlander grandfathers and, grandfathers they (okay), I feel that they should not in, the media, say too much about their, thinking because I feel that they have a problem with their sorrows (okay). So, they will, lead public opinion towards the past where there were many (xx). It's as if (they are) building a China within Taiwan that kind of—{line cut off}

喂? 你好。 啊-啊我想要說:那個:中國-- 我覺得從--
從那個外省來的第一代老伯伯和，老伯伯他們hoⁿ，我覺得他們不應該在，媒體裡面，講太多他們的，想法因為我覺得它們有悲情的問題hoⁿ。那，他們會，讓我們輿論到以前滿多的一個(xx)。好像等於在台灣蓋一個中國的那個—{line cut off}

Chapter Seven Excerpts

Excerpt 9. Professor Liu Yi-jun (panelist).
Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: April 25, 2000.
Topic: President Lee: removing foreign political sovereignty. Is this reconciliation? Provocation? (or) Ethnic relations? (李總統：終結外來政權/融合？挑撥？族群)

像現在就說，我們台灣有一個問題啊。這次就有陳水扁先生發佈的就說這個內閣名單裡面. . .這些以前都是美國籍的...今天就說，這些人是不是，有這種美國帝國主義的就說這個-. . . .還是就說，我們要把他當作就說他是外來的。因為，如果今天要仔細想的話，我們曉得…你去查他的子女。大概還是清一色的美國籍。{louder}這算不算就說是外來的。{faster speech}我相信就是說，我們如果在這個方面，太多琢磨它會覺得說，這真的就是口水戰。你不值得就說討論。

Excerpt 10. Yu Fu (*8 o'clock *moderator)
Personal interview.

有的人跟我說，“啊，你這種，那個…節目上面吵著那麼樣子。你中間廣告時候會不會吵？” 我說，“他們在吵啊。 他們不是演戲給你看，他們是真的，真的在生氣啊。”

Excerpt 11. Lee Tao (*2100 *moderator)
Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 26, 2000
Topic: Has Communist China banned A-mei? Is this forcing Taiwan to declare independence? (中共封殺阿妹？逼臺獨立？)

…是不是來自大陸會有一種回應所謂善意的回應讓台灣的民眾能夠了解是-是一個確實的狀況， 或者是一個誤解。 但到目前為止又是如 何？

Excerpt 12. Legislator Fung Hu-xiang (panelist)
Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 26, 2000
Topic: Has Communist China banned A-mei? Is this forcing Taiwan to declare independence? (中共封殺阿妹? 逼臺獨立?)

啊，根據我這兩天的查證以後了解，啊，這中間很明顯是有誤會。那麼大陸上也誤解了。阿，阿妹，那麼我們的這個，台灣的讀者啊，從媒體上也有部份的的誤解。因為在大陸的相關的部門，他們並沒有講說是，啊，“阿妹因為唱中華民國的國歌，所以要禁掉她的歌，要禁掉她的廣告。”而是他們籠統印象誤以為阿妹是支持臺獨，是支持陳水扁，捧他的場。
那麼，我們這點當然是要去除誤解才能夠了解真相。

Excerpt 13. President Chen Shui-bian video clip

Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 25, 2000
Topic: The (ROC) President expresses regret: Does Communist China regard compatriots as the enemy? (總統遺憾：中共將同胞當敵人?)

作為中華民國的國民，在中華民國的土地上，唱中華民國自己的國歌，還要受到，打壓，我真的沒辦法想像，這難道是對，同胞也好，對兄弟，姊妹也好，應有的。。待客之道嗎？這簡直是把我們當作敵人，我覺得非常的遺憾。。。

Excerpt 14. Mr. Ting Ting-yu (panelist)

Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 25, 2000
Topic: Is cross-straits populism heating up? Is conflict unavoidable? Who will resolve it? Bian or Jiang? (兩岸民粹加溫？對決難免？扁，江誰解?)

。。。今天陳水扁，不是在恭祝中華民國國運昌隆而把自己定位成中國人的時候。假如，尤委員講的，親民黨的，新黨，民進黨，國民黨，都支持台灣的話，你只要定位成 “我們是中國人，我們是一個中國” 。。。

Chapter Eight Excerpt

Excerpt 15. Lee Tao (moderator)

Program: *2100: All People Open Talk*
Date: May 24, 2000
Topic: Is the PRC banning A-mei? (中共封殺阿妹?)

我的時間也已經超過了，現場的5位來賓我們也沒有時間讓大家來做結論。不夠。。。兩岸之間的問題是不是大家相互的了解就像剛剛金惟純先生所講的。。。這樣的情況持續下去我們可能也都要非常謹慎的來觀察。（臺：全民開講）非常謝謝收看。明天，九點十點 再會。謝謝。

APPENDIX C. RUNDOWN SHEET FOR *8 O'CLOCK LOUD AND SOFT VOICES*

八點大小聲

RUNDOWN

來賓：國民黨立委 許舒博、民進黨立委 許添財、親民黨立委 陳振盛
台北縣政府機要秘書 吳秉叡、中經院研究員 邱毅

2000年6月30日第713集

		長度	道具
片頭			
壹	**主題：全民加稅？8 月唐飛該下台？** 行政院長唐飛今天表示明年有可能實施國民年金，然而推動國民年金之後，老人福利津貼將可能停辦，另外，由於政府經費不足，唐飛也表示爲了籌措財源將不排除加稅的可能，唐飛此話一出是否表示扁政府又要跳票了？何以新政府上路還不到半年，阿扁總統的的政策就頻頻跳票？支票跳票人民又該怪誰？	**15'** 開場 VCR	
	~~大補帖 1＋C.M.1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		
貳	**主題：全民加稅？8 月唐飛該下台？** 關於行政院長唐飛昨天表示若開辦國民年金，將不排除加稅的可能，財政部長許嘉棟則擔心如果此時加稅的話，可能對傳統產業造成傷害，在目前台灣財政仍相當困難的情況下，究竟福利措施是不是一定要做？如果要做的話幅度是不是要調整？國人在享受福利的同時，是否要有「天下沒有白吃的午餐」的心理準備？	**9'** 開放 3 通 CALL IN	
	~~大補帖 2＋C.M.2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		
參	**主題：全民加稅？8 月唐飛該下台？** 由於行政院不排除以加稅開辦國民年金，國民黨發言人胡志強今天批評新政府竟成全民加稅政府，新政府爲避免「萬萬稅」的情況發生，是否應該儘早進行政黨協商，以共同解決問題？而成立新政府之初，堅持拒絕政黨協商的的阿扁總統又該如何找台階下？	**9'** 開放 3 通 CALL IN	
	~~大補帖 3＋C.M.3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		
肆	**主題：全民加稅？8 月唐飛該下台？** 內政部長張博雅以「尊重立法院」爲由，承諾撤回老人津貼案，引發多位民進黨立委的不滿，民進黨立委蘇煥智公開痛批行政院長唐飛沒魄力、沒擔當，而唐飛昨天公開表示「如果我不行，就辭官」，究竟扁唐替制是否出了問題？唐內閣是否是外界所質疑的「弱勢內閣」？	**9'**	
	~~大補帖 4＋C.M.4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		
伍	**主題：全民加稅？8 月唐飛該下台？** 由於新政府的老人年金及幼兒教育券頻頻跳票、民進黨立委何嘉榮表示，「行政院該堅持自己的版本，不能因爲國民黨人多就害怕」，然而面對在立院暫多數席次的國民黨，弱勢的民進黨該如何才能支持新政府政策的實施？政黨在惡性競爭之下，新政府該如何才能再度喚回人民的信心？	**6'**	

Glossary[1]

Transliteration[2]	Chinese	English translation and other transliterations	Explanation and supplementary information
bailian	白臉	"white face"; good cop	Refers to someone playing the "good cop" to someone else's "bad cop." The counterpart to "*bailian*" is "*heilian*" or "black face."
baipishu	白皮書	white paper	A political announcement that typically includes a party's or group's policies toward an issue (e.g., "cross-straits white paper")
baise kongbu	白色恐怖	"White Terror"	Refers to a period (1950s-1970s) in Taiwan in which the KMT leadership ordered the incarceration and elimination of intellectuals and leaders among the local population who threatened their regime.
Beijinghua	北京話	Beijing dialect or language	A dialect spoken in the area surrounding Beijing, China. The term has also been adopted by more radical Taiwan independence separatists in protest to the notion of Mandarin or "*guoyu*" as being the ROC's "national language." This linguistic gesture serves to "localize" and excluse those speakers who use it as non-

[1] Not all Chinese terms and phrases presented in the dissertation are listed in the glossary. Only those that require greater explanation or reappear several times throughout the dissertation have been included.

[2] The transliterations listed in this column represent those that are most commonly used throughout the dissertation. Thus, they could be in Hanyu Pinyin or Wades-Giles. However, alternative transliterations or spelling forms are provided in the third column under "English translation and other transliterations."

			Taiwanese.
bendi	本地	“from this place”; native or local	Also used in Taiwan to refer to those who identify with Taiwan.
benshengren	本省人	“Taiwanese”	“people of this province”; Han Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan prior to 1945.
bentu	本土	“from this earth”; native	Often used in Taiwan politics to refer to Taiwanese consciousness (bentu yishi 本土意識) or “Taiwanization” (bentuhua 本土化).
buyao lian	不要臉	“not wanting or needing face”	A saying that refers to a person who is displaying shameful behavior.
buyao mianzi	不要面子	“not wanting or needing face (image)”	Refers to a person who is displaying behavior that undermines her social reputation.
chuanzong jiedai	傳宗接代	“continuing the family line”	Traditional Chinese concept that values men over women as males carry on the family name and hence lineage.
chumai Taiwan	出賣台灣	“to sell out Taiwan’	An accusation used in Taiwan against politicians and political parties that advocate reunification with the PRC.
Da hejie kafe	大和解咖啡	“Big reconciliation coffee”	A cross-party event organized by legislators in the Legislative Yuan.
dalu	大陸	a.k.a. “mainland China”	Refers to present-day People’s Republic of China.
dangwai	黨外	“outside the party”	Opposition movement to the KMT party prior to the lifting of martial law in 1987.
er-er-ba	二二八	“2-28”	Refers to the February 28 Incident in 1947 in which tens of thousands of Taiwanese were incarcerated and killed by the KMT government following riots that were instigated by police who harassed a Taiwanese

			woman who was illegally selling cigarettes.
Fuermosha	夫爾摩沙	a.k.a. Formosa	Transliteration of the Portuguese name for the island of Taiwan. See also “Meilidao.”
Funu Xinzhi Jijinhui	婦女新知基金會	Awakening Foundation	A women’s rights organization in Taiwan. Founded by Vice President Annette Lu.
gei bieren mianzi	給(別人)面子	“To give (others) face (image)”	A Chinese concept of maintaining the positive face of another as a matter of respect and courtesy.
gei renjia fuqi	給人家福氣	“To give others happiness”	A phrase moderator Jin Xiu-li used to describe the type of verbal interaction viewers prefer to watch.
goutong gongju	溝通工具	“communication tool”	A term a caller used to describe using language as a communicative resource.
guoyu	國語	“national language”	Term used in Taiwan for Mandarin Chinese, the official or “national” language of Taiwan. (See also *beijinghua*)
Hakka	客家人	kejiaren	A Han Chinese ethnic group in Taiwan, originally from China.
he(mu)	和(睦)	(social) harmony	A Chinese sociocultural concept that denotes peace, unity, kindness, and amicableness.
hejie (hexie)	和解	reconciliation	Term used in reference to a linguistic practice this study dubs as “reconciliation” talk.
heijin	黑金	“black-gold”; corruption	The descriptor “black-gold” refers to corrupt political practices (e.g., “black-gold” politics) and is largely associated with the KMT party. However, political corruption remains a widespread problem in Taiwan in general.
heilian	黑臉	“black face”; bad	Refers to someone playing the

		cop	"bad cop" to another person's "good cop." Its counterpart is "*bailian*" or "white face."
Hohlo	河洛話	heluohua	Transliteration of "Taiwanese language" from Taiwanese.
Hua	華	a.k.a. Cathay	An identifier that primarily refers to Han Chinese in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Huaqiao	華僑	overseas Chinese	Ethnic Han Chinese who reside outside of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
Huaren	華人	"Chinese" (people)	An identifier that generally encompasses Han Chinese in "greater China."
ji	機	opportunity; time; a pivotal turning point	Here, refers to the second ideogram or character in the Chinese term for "crisis" (*weiji*).
jiang li	講理	to speak with reason or reasonably	A phrase moderator Jin Xiuli used to describe what kinds of programs viewers prefer to watch.
Jiang Zemin zhi gan ma nüren	江澤民 只敢罵 女人	"Jiang Zemin only dares to insult women"	Statement that ROC Vice President Annette Lu (Lu Hsiulian) made after PRC President Jiang criticized her in the PRC press.
Jinmenren	金門人	"person from Kinmen"	Referring to residents of the island of Kinmen (Quemoy), which is part of the ROC.
keqi	客氣	polite, politeness	A cultural value in Chinese societies.
Kinmen	金門	a.k.a. Quemoy; Jinmen	Island off the eastern coast of mainland China. Considered part of Fujian province by both the ROC and PRC. Currently, part of the ROC.
kou maozi	扣帽子	to label someone; lit. "to put on a hat"	A phrase used to describe the act of labeling someone. Used in a saliva war between legislators

			Yen and Fung (see Chapter 7).
koushui zhan	口水戰	"saliva wars"	Refers to verbal sparring. Usually used in reference to verbal confrontations in the Legislative Yuan or on call-in shows.
kouying	叩應	"knock and respond"	Transliteration of "call-in."
kouying jiemu	叩應節目	call-in show	Taiwan's version of talk shows.
kouying rechao	叩應熱潮	call-in mania	Descriptor for the popularity of call-in shows in Taiwan.
Kuomintang (KMT)	國民黨	a.k.a. Nationalist Party; Guomindang	A political party on Taiwan. Former ROC ruling party on mainland China (1911-1949) and Taiwan (1945-2000).
li	禮	etiquette, propriety	Chinese sociocultural concept that refers to deference and politeness to others.
lian	臉	"face" or "moral face"	Refers to demonstrating respect for an individual with a "good moral reputation" and who demonstrates decency "under all circumstances"
Lü Dao	綠島	a.k.a. Green Island; lit. "green island"	An island off the southeastern coast of Taiwan which was used to incarcerate political prisoners during martial law.
Matsu	馬祖	a.k.a. Matzu; Mazu	A group of islands off the southwestern coast of mainland China. Considered part of Fujian Province by the ROC and PRC. Currently, part of the ROC.
meiti zhengzhi	媒體政治	media politics	Refers to the growing numbers of former media personalities being elected to public office.
Meilidao	美麗島	lit. "beautiful island"; Mandarin translation of "Formosa"	Name of a magazine published by opposition (*dangwai*) activists in the 1970s. The name was inspired by the Portuguese descriptor for Taiwan, "ihla

			Formosa.”
mianzi	面子	“image”; “social face”	Chinese sociocultural notion that involves the projection and claiming of one’s social image or face. Refers to the prestige or reputation a person earns in public.
Minjindang	民進黨	a.k.a. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Current ruling party in Taiwan. Advocates Taiwan independence.
mohei	抹黑	“to smear black”; mudslinging	Refers to besmirching or denigrating someone, such as a political opponent.
muyu	母語	“mother tongue”; native language	Taiwan’s mother-tongue language policy requires the instruction of Taiwanese, Hakka, and Aborigine languages to elementary school students.
nan wai nu nei	男外女內	“men are the breadwinners (work outdoors) women are housewives (work indoors)”	Traditional Chinese concept that divides public and private spaces along gendered lines.
nan zun nu bei	男尊女卑	“man is respected [and] women are debased”	Traditional Chinese concept that expresses the sociocultural view that men are superior to women.
pianmian zhencao	片面貞操	“one-sided chastity”	Traditional Chinese view that women are obligated to be chaste in their sexual activity but men are not.
Penghu	澎湖	a.k.a. Pescadores Islands	Archepelego off of the southeast coast of Taiwan. Considered part of the ROC.
qin	親	to be friendly or intimate with someone	As a verb, the term can be used with an object, such as “being close to mainland China” (親大陸).
qin dalu	親大陸	“mainland China-friendly”; close to or initimate	Phrase used to refer to political parties in Taiwan who are favorable to China and lean

		with mainland China	towards China reunification.
Qing (Dynasty)	清	a.k.a. Ching	The name of the last ruling dynasty in China.
Qinmindang	親民黨	a.k.a. People's First Party (PFP)	Established in 2000 under the chairmanship of James Soong. A KMT splinter party.
rechao	熱潮	mania; craze; rush	Used in reference to "call-in mania." Translated a "rush" as in "Gold Rush" (淘金熱).
san cong si de	三從四德	"three obediences and four virtues"	This concept only applies to women in feudal Chinese society. The three obediences refer to obeying the father before marriage, the husband after marriage, and the son after the husband's demise. The four virtues include morality, proper speech, modest manner, and diligent work.
sanminzhuyi	三民主義	"Three Principles of the People"	This ideology was crafted by the ROC founder, Dr. Sun Yatsen and refers to the principles of nationalism (*minzuzhuyi* 民族主義), democracy (*minquanzhuyi* 民權主義), and social well-being (*minshengzhuyi* 民生主義).
shandi yuanzhumin	山地原住民	"mountain aborigine"	The Aboriginal groups in Taiwan are broadly distinguished between those who live on the coastal areas of Taiwan, in the mountains, and on neighboring islands.
Shanghaihua	上海話	Shanghainese (language)	A dialect or language spoken in Shanghai, China.
shengji qingjie	省籍情結	ethno-political relations; lit. "province identity sentiments"	A term used to refer to tensions between Taiwan's ethnic groups, namely, between "Mainlanders" or *waishengren* and "Taiwanese" or *benshengren*.

shengong yuanfu	深宮怨婦	"scorned woman in the palace"	A Chinese phrase that refers to a woman that has been neglected. An analogy to the neglect of wives or concubines within the imperial palace.
shiluogan	失落感	"feelings of loss"	In Taiwan, used in connection to *waishengren* who experience feelings of loss toward China.
shuangchong daode biaozhun	雙重道德標準	"double moral standard"	This phrase expresses gendered imbalances in traditional Chinese sociocultural expectations.
Taidu	台獨	Taiwan independence	Abbreviation of "Taiwan independence." See "Taiwan duli."
Taiwan	台灣		Main island of the Republic of China (ROC). Term also used to refer to the entire ROC geopolitical entity.
Taiwan duli	台灣獨立	Taiwan independence	Non-abbreviated rendition.
Taiwan tongbao	台灣同胞	Taiwan compatriots	Phrase used by PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in reference to Taiwan's voters prior to the ROC's 2000 presidential election. Inversely, a phrase pro-China unificationists in Taiwan commonly use to demonstrate solidarity with the citizenry in China is "mainland China compatriots" (e.g., 大陸同胞).
Taiwan Tuanjie Lianmengdang	台灣團結聯盟黨	a.k.a. Taiwan Solidarity Union Party (TSU)	Political party established in 2001 under the leadership of former ROC president Lee Teng-hui. Advocates Taiwan independence.
Taiyu	台語	Taiwanese (language)	Also refered to a Hohlo or *Taiwanhua* (台灣話).
wailai	外來	"foreign"; lit, "coming from outside"	In Taiwan, used in reference to foreigners, and in some contexts, to Mainlanders (*waishengren*).

waishengren	外省人	“Mainlanders”	Ethno-political term used in Taiwan to refer to Han Chinese who immigrated to the island after 1945.
wei	危	“danger”	First ideogram or character in the Chinese term for “crisis.”
weiji	危機	“crisis”	The characters that comprise the term “crisis” include “danger” (*wei*) and “opportunity” (*ji*).
weijigan	危機感	“feelings of crisis”	A phrase used in Taiwan in reference to *waishengren* who are afraid of losing political power and social status as a result of the KMT’s defeat in the 2000 presidential elections.
wei fandui er fandui	為反對而反對	“to oppose (someone or something) for the sake of opposing”	To oppose someone or something to demonstrate that one can.
wei gongji er gongji	為攻擊而攻擊	“to attack (someone or something) for the sake of attacking”	To attack others to demonstrate that one can.
wei zhichi er zhichi	為支持而支持	“to support (someone or something) for the sake of supporting”	To act as though one supports someone or something.
wenhua zuqun	文化族群	cultural group(s)	A means to distinguish between various Han Chinese on Taiwan by “culture” rather than “ethnicity.”
wuhui/wujie	誤會/誤解	to misunderstand; a misunderstanding	Used in featured excerpts in reference to the PRC’s “misunderstanding” of Amei’s performance of the ROC national anthem at Presidential Chen Shuibian’s inauguration
xiao	孝	filial piety	Chinese sociocultural concept

			that refers to respect to one's elders (e.g. children to their parents). Based on the Confucian worldview in which social relationships are hierarchical.
xiaozhong	小眾	"small masses"	Refers to a niche audience or market. In constrast, the neologism "big masses" (*dazhong* 大眾) has emerged that plays with this notion.
xingbie jaose chabie	性別角色差別	sex-role differences	Refers to sociocultural demarcations of sex roles in traditional Chinese society.
Xin Taiwanren	新台灣人	"New Taiwanese"	Term coined to encompass all of Taiwan's residents regardless of their ethno-political background.
Xin xinwen	新新聞	*The Journalist*; lit. "new news"	A weekly news magazine in Taiwan.
Xindang	新黨	a.k.a. New Party	KMT splinter party. Established in 1994. Advocates pro-China reunification.
yige zhongguo	一個中國	"one China"	A political concept that both Taiwan and China represent "China." Currently under negotiation by the ROC and PRC governments.
yige zhongguo de yuanze	一個中國的原則	"one China principle"	Refers to the agreement that the representatives of the ROC and PRC governments reached regarding the existence of "one China."
yige zhongguo zhengce	一個中國政策	"one China policy"	The political approach that PRC authorities and pro-China unification advocates in the ROC advocate in the pursuit of eventual PRC-ROC reunification.
yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu	一個中國各自表述	"one China, each with his own interpretation"	"One China" agreement that arose from the 1992 cross-straits meeting.

yiguo lianglun	一國兩論	“one China, two theories”	Former ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s cross-straits policy announced in July 1999. (See “yiguo liangzhi”.)
yiguo liangzhi	一國兩制	“one China, two systems”	A political approach or policy former PRC chairman Deng Xiaoping coined to describe, and placate concerns toward, Hong Kong and Macau’s reunification with the PRC in 1997 and 1999 respectively. The PRC leadership has also attempted to present their pursuit of Taiwan-China reunification as following this dual governmental system.
yuanzhumin	原住民	Lit. “original peoples”; “Aborigine”	Refers to members of Taiwan’s Aborigine groups of which there are eleven. Believed to be the original inhabitants of Taiwan.
Zhongguo	中國	a.k.a. “China”	Literally translates as the “Central Country” or “Middle Kingdom.” Today, it is generally used to refer to the People’s Republic of China.
Zhongguo Gongchandang	中國共**產**黨	Communist Chinese Party (CCP)	Ruling party in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Zhongguoren	中國人	a “person from China”; “Chinese”	Refers to people in both Taiwan and China who identify with a Chinese worldview.
Zhongguo renmin	中國人民	Chinese citizens	Refers to PRC citizens.
Zhonghua Minguo	中華民國	a.k.a. Republic of China (ROC);	Founded on mainland China in 1911 by Sun Yat-sen, “father of the ROC.” The ROC’s seat of government is currently located in Taipei, Taiwan. Other terms used to refer to this geopolitical entity include Taiwan, Chinese Taipei, Democratic China, and “the territories of Taiwan-Penghu-Kimoy-and-Matzu.”

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo	中華人民共和國	a.k.a. People's Republic of China (PRC)	Other terms also used to refer to this geopolitical entity include China, mainland China, or Communist China. Government leadership seeks to reunify Taiwan with "China."
zhongjian	總監	"Senior Vice President"	A title referring to a position within a company or organization.
zhongli	中立	neutral; neutrality	Used to refer to call-in show moderators who do not demonstrate overt bias towards a particular political party or ideology.
zhong nan qing nu	重男輕女	"valuing men over women"	Traditional Chinese concept that privileges men over women in all realms of society.
ziji de ren	自己(的)人	"one of us"; referring to an in-group member	A phrase used to indicate that a guest should feel at home or among family.
zongli	總理	party chairman; premier	Used in the ROC (Taiwan) to refer to the KMT "party chairman." In the PRC, the term refers to "premier"; in contrast, the Communist Chinese Party's "party chairman" is referred to as "*zhuxi*" (主席).

List of Individuals[1]

Name	Chinese	Title and Affiliation
A-mei	阿妹	Pop singer from Taiwan; member of the Puyuma (Beinan) tribe, one of eleven indigenous groups in the ROC
Chang Huimei	張惠妹	A-mei's Chinese name
Chang Chau-hsiung	張昭雄	2000 vice presidential candidate; Vice Chairman of the People's First Party
Chen Shui-bian	陳水扁	ROC president (elected May 2000). DPP chairman (since mid-2002(. Former Taipei mayor (1994-1998).
Chen Shei-saint Chen, Apollo	陳學聖	KMT Legislator, Legislative Yuan
Chiang Kai-shek Jiang Jieshi	蔣介石	Generalissimo of ROC military and Chairman of the KMT party. Former ROC president (1948-1975). Led KMT retreat from China to Taiwan.
Chou Hsi-wei	周錫瑋	People's First Party legislator, Legislative Yuan
Chou Jinsheng Chou, Jonathan	周晉生	Producer, *Always Speak Your Mind*
Fung Hu-hsiang Fung, Elmer	馮滬祥	New Party legislator, Legislative Yuan
Guo Zhengliang Kuo, Julian J.	郭正亮	Professor of political science at Soochow (東吳) University; political analyst
Ho Sun-sea	何善溪	Editor-in-chief of CTN's news division and moderator of *Face-to-Face Debate*

[1] According to the conventions of Hanyu Pinyin, Chinese names that have been transliterated according to this Romanization system do not include a hyphen in their name. However, names that have an alternative Romanization spelling (e.g., Wades-Giles) include a hyphen (usually to distinguish between the corresponding second and third characters in the second part of the name). Although Taiwan does not use the Hanyu Pinyin system, I have elected to transliterate my Taiwan informants' and other public figures' Chinese names according to this Romanization system when an alternative spelling has not been found. I have also included a corresponding English name for those individuals who use and are commonly referenced by this name in English language newspapers.

Hsieh Chi-ta	謝啟大	New Party legislator, Legislative Yuan
Hsiung Jie Hsiung, James C.	熊杰	Professor and dean of communication studies at Shih Hsin University
Hsu Hsin-liang	許信良	Independent presidential candidate in the 2000 presidential elections; former DPP chairman
Jiang Zemin	江澤民	PRC president
Jin Wei-tsun	金惟純	Publisher, *Business Weekly* magazine; political analyst
Jin Xiuli	靳秀麗	Moderator, *Always Speak Your Mind*
Koo Chen-fu	辜振甫	Taiwan Straits Foundation chairman; the ROC's unofficial representative for cross-straits dialogue with the PRC
Lee Liguo	李立國	KMT news division head
Lee Ching-an Lee, Diane	李慶安	People's First Party legislator, Legislative Yuan
Lee Tao	李濤	Moderator, *2100: All People Open Talk*
Lee Teng-hui	李登輝	Former ROC president and KMT chairman (1988-2000)
Lee Ying-yuan	李應元	DPP legislator, Legislative Yuan
Lee Yongzhi	李永治	Professor of history at National Taiwan University
Lien Chan	連戰	KMT chairman; former ROC Vice President (1996-2000); KMT presidential candidate in 2000
Lin Cho-shui	林濁水	DPP legislator, Legislative Yuan
Liu Yijun	劉義鈞	Researcher, Institute of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica
Lo Fu-chu	羅福助	Independent legislator, Legislative Yuan
Lu Hsiu-lian, Lu, Annette	呂秀蓮	ROC Vice President; member of the DPP
Ma Ying-jeou	馬英九	Taipei mayor; member of the KMT

Mao Zedong, Mao Tse-tong	毛澤東	Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Supreme Leader of the PRC from 1949 and until his death in 1976
Peng Yun Peng, Bonne	彭芸	Professor of journalism at National Chengchi University
Peng Yen-wen	彭弇雯	Secretary-general (general manager) of a non-profit organization, Awakening Foundation (婦女新知基金會)
Shi Ming-teh	施民德	Former DPP chairperson and legislator, Legislative Yuan.
Song Chuyü, Soong, James C.Y.	宋楚瑜	People's First Party chairman; independent presidential candidate in 2000
Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongshan	孫中山	Founder of the Republic of China and first chairman of the KMT
Tang Fei	唐飛	ROC Prime Minister under President Chen (May to October 2000)
Tang Xianglong	唐湘龍	Media producer
Ting Tingyu Ting, Tim T.Y.	丁庭宇	Taiwan Gallup, chief consultant; Globalview Interactive Research, Inc., Chairman; political analyst
Tsai Ing-wen	蔡英文	Chairperson of the ROC Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC)
Wang Daohan	汪道涵	Chairman, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits; the PRC's unofficial representative for cross-straits dialogue with the ROC
Yen Ching-fu	顏錦福	DPP legislator, Legislator Yuan
Yu Tzu-hsiang Yu, Jack Tzu-hsiang	游梓翔	Professor of communication studies at Shih Hsin University
Yü Fu	漁夫	Moderator, *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices*
Zhong Qin	鐘琴	Spokesperson for the Executive Yuan
Zhu Rongji	朱鎔基	PRC prime minister

Personal Interviews

Bu Dazhong (卜大中)
January 25, 2000. Moderator of *Face-to-Face Debate* (CTN). Taipei, Taiwan.

Chou, Jonathan (周晉生); Chou Jinsheng
April 7, 2000. Producer of *Always Speak Your Mind* (ETTV). Taipei, Taiwan.

Ho Sun-sea (何善溪)
February 22, 2000. Editor-in-chief of CTN News and moderator of *Face-to-Face Debate* (CTN). Taipei, Taiwan.

Hsiung, James C. (熊杰); Xiong Jie
April 6, 2000. Professor of communication studies at Shi Hsing University. Taipei, Taiwan.

Jin Xiuli (靳秀麗)
April 11, 2000. Moderator of *Always Speak Your Mind* (ETTV). Taipei, Taiwan.

Lee Tao (李濤)
March 28, 2000. Vice President of TVBS and moderator of *2100: All People Open Talk*. Taipei, Taiwan.

Lee Liguo (李立國)
February 15, 2000. KMT news division head (新聞黨部書記長). Taipei, Taiwan.

Peng Yen-wen (彭弇雯)
July 19, 2000. General manager (秘書長) of Awakening Foundation (婦女新知基金會), a women's non-profit organization. Taipei, Taiwan.

Peng, Bonnie (彭芸); Peng Yun
July 2000. Professor of journalism at National Chengchi University. Taipei, Taiwan.

Xi Shenglin (奚聖林)
February 1, 2000. Producer of *Face-to-Face Debate* (CTN). Taipei, Taiwan.

Yu, Jack Tzu-hsiang (游梓翔); Yu Tzu-hsiang

February 24, 2000. Professor of communication studies at Shi Hsing University. Taipei, Taiwan.

Yü Fu (漁夫)

April 5, 2000. Moderator of *8 o'clock Loud and Soft Voices* (SETN). Taipei, Taiwan.

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